"""Durable delivery-obligation ledger for gateway final responses. A final agent response that was generated but not yet confirmed-delivered to the messaging platform is the one artifact the gateway can lose without a trace: the turn already burned its tokens, the text exists only in a Python local, and a crash / planned restart between finalize and platform ACK drops it silently (#58818, #41696, #63695). This module records a small durable row per outbound final response in the shared ``state.db`` (same file and conventions as ``tools.async_delegation`` — WAL, owner pid + process-start-time liveness, bounded retention). The gateway writes three checkpoints around the send: record_obligation() state='pending' before any send attempt mark_attempting() state='attempting' immediately before the await mark_delivered() / state='delivered' only on SendResult.success mark_failed() state='failed' on a definitive rejection On startup, ``sweep_recoverable()`` claims rows whose owning process is dead and hands them to the gateway for redelivery. Crash semantics are explicit about ambiguity (the contract review of the earlier delivery-outbox attempt, #61790, closed it for silently resending ambiguous sends): - ``pending`` — the send never started: redeliver plainly, no dup risk. - ``attempting`` — crashed mid-await: the platform MAY already have the message. Redelivered WITH a visible recovered-reply marker so the contract is honest at-least-once, never a silent duplicate. - ``failed`` — definitively rejected once; the restart is a natural retry boundary. Also carries the marker. - ``delivered`` — nothing to do; retention prunes. Poison rows cannot spin: attempts are capped, stale rows expire, and both transition to ``abandoned`` (kept briefly for inspection, then pruned). Everything here is best-effort by design: ledger failures must never block or delay an actual send. Callers wrap every call in try/except. """ from __future__ import annotations import hashlib import json import logging import os import sqlite3 import threading import time from contextlib import contextmanager from typing import Any, Dict, Iterator, List, Optional from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) _DB_LOCK = threading.Lock() # Redelivery policy knobs (module constants; deliberately not config — the # ledger itself is gated by ``gateway.delivery_ledger`` and these bounds # only matter in the rare recovery path). MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3 STALE_AFTER_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60 _RETENTION_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 _MAX_ROWS = 500 # Visible prefix for redeliveries that might duplicate an already-received # message (crash mid-send / post-rejection retry). Honest at-least-once. RECOVERED_MARKER = ( "♻️ Recovered reply — the gateway restarted during delivery, " "so this may be a duplicate:\n\n" ) def _db_path(): return get_hermes_home() / "state.db" def _connect() -> sqlite3.Connection: path = _db_path() path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10) try: _initialize_schema(conn) except Exception: # A PRAGMA/DDL failure after a successful connect() must not leak the # just-opened connection back to the caller. conn.close() raise return conn def _initialize_schema(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None: from hermes_state import apply_wal_with_fallback apply_wal_with_fallback(conn, db_label="state.db (delivery_ledger)") conn.execute( """CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS delivery_obligations ( obligation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, session_key TEXT NOT NULL, platform TEXT NOT NULL, chat_id TEXT NOT NULL, thread_id TEXT, content TEXT NOT NULL, state TEXT NOT NULL, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, created_at REAL NOT NULL, updated_at REAL NOT NULL, owner_pid INTEGER, owner_started_at INTEGER, last_error TEXT )""" ) @contextmanager def _transaction() -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]: """Open a connection, commit/rollback on exit, and ALWAYS close it. ``sqlite3.Connection.__enter__``/``__exit__`` only commit or roll back the transaction; they do not close the connection. Using ``with _connect()`` alone therefore leaks a connection — and its WAL/SHM file descriptors — on every call, deferring the close to the garbage collector. On a long-running gateway that exhausts ``RLIMIT_NOFILE`` (the cron-ledger sibling of this bug was #69567 / PR #69594). ``record_obligation`` runs on every outbound final response, so this ledger is the highest-frequency leaker. """ conn = _connect() try: with conn: yield conn finally: conn.close() def _owner_stamp() -> tuple[int, Optional[int]]: pid = os.getpid() try: from gateway.status import get_process_start_time return pid, get_process_start_time(pid) except Exception: return pid, None def _owner_alive(pid: Any, started_at: Any) -> bool: """True when the recorded owning process still exists (pid + start time).""" if not pid: return False try: pid = int(pid) except (TypeError, ValueError): return False try: from gateway.status import get_process_start_time current_start = get_process_start_time(pid) except Exception: current_start = None if current_start is None: # No such process (or unreadable) — treat unreadable-but-extant # processes as alive only if the pid exists. try: os.kill(pid, 0) # windows-footgun: ok — EPERM counts as alive below except ProcessLookupError: return False except PermissionError: return True except OSError: return False return True if started_at is None: return True try: return int(current_start) == int(started_at) except (TypeError, ValueError): return True def compute_obligation_id(session_key: str, message_ref: str, content: str) -> str: """Stable id: same turn + same content re-records idempotently, while distinct threads/topics on the same chat can never collide (the session_key carries platform, chat and thread; ``message_ref`` is the triggering inbound message id, distinguishing turns in one session).""" payload = f"{session_key}|{message_ref}|{content}" return hashlib.sha256(payload.encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()[:24] def record_obligation( *, obligation_id: str, session_key: str, platform: str, chat_id: str, thread_id: Optional[str], content: str, ) -> None: """Record a final response as owed to the platform (state='pending').""" now = time.time() pid, started = _owner_stamp() with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn: conn.execute( """INSERT OR REPLACE INTO delivery_obligations (obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, state, attempts, created_at, updated_at, owner_pid, owner_started_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', 0, ?, ?, ?, ?)""", (obligation_id, session_key, platform, str(chat_id), str(thread_id) if thread_id else None, content, now, now, pid, started), ) _prune() def mark_attempting(obligation_id: str) -> None: _update_state(obligation_id, "attempting") def mark_delivered(obligation_id: str) -> None: _update_state(obligation_id, "delivered") def mark_failed(obligation_id: str, error: str = "") -> None: _update_state(obligation_id, "failed", error=error) def _update_state(obligation_id: str, state: str, error: str = "") -> None: with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn: conn.execute( """UPDATE delivery_obligations SET state=?, updated_at=?, last_error=? WHERE obligation_id=?""", (state, time.time(), error[:500] if error else None, obligation_id), ) def sweep_recoverable( now: Optional[float] = None, *, deliverable_platforms: Optional[set] = None, ) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]: """Claim undelivered rows owned by dead processes; return them for redelivery. Claiming atomically re-stamps the owner to THIS process and increments ``attempts``, so a second gateway racing the same sweep cannot double-claim (the UPDATE is guarded on the previous owner stamp). Rows over the attempts cap or older than the stale cutoff transition to 'abandoned' instead of being returned. ``deliverable_platforms`` (platform value strings) restricts claiming to platforms the caller can actually send on this boot. ``attempts`` is the redelivery budget, so it must only be spent on a real send: a platform that failed to connect would otherwise burn one attempt per boot and hit the cap having never been sent once. Rows for absent platforms are left untouched for a later boot; the stale cutoff still bounds them. """ now = now if now is not None else time.time() pid, started = _owner_stamp() claimed: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [] with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn: rows = conn.execute( """SELECT obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, state, attempts, created_at, owner_pid, owner_started_at FROM delivery_obligations WHERE state IN ('pending', 'attempting', 'failed')""" ).fetchall() for (oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, state, attempts, created_at, owner_pid, owner_started_at) in rows: if _owner_alive(owner_pid, owner_started_at): continue # a live gateway still owns this row if attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS or (now - created_at) > STALE_AFTER_SECONDS: conn.execute( """UPDATE delivery_obligations SET state='abandoned', updated_at=? WHERE obligation_id=?""", (now, oid), ) continue if ( deliverable_platforms is not None and platform not in deliverable_platforms ): # No adapter for this platform this boot — the caller cannot # send, so claiming would spend an attempt on a no-op. continue cursor = conn.execute( """UPDATE delivery_obligations SET owner_pid=?, owner_started_at=?, attempts=attempts+1, updated_at=? WHERE obligation_id=? AND (owner_pid IS ? OR owner_pid=?)""", (pid, started, now, oid, owner_pid, owner_pid), ) if cursor.rowcount: claimed.append({ "obligation_id": oid, "session_key": session_key, "platform": platform, "chat_id": chat_id, "thread_id": thread_id, "content": content, # pending = send never started, redeliver plainly; # attempting/failed = ambiguous or rejected, carry marker. "needs_marker": state != "pending", "attempts": attempts + 1, }) return claimed def _prune(now: Optional[float] = None) -> None: now = now if now is not None else time.time() cutoff = now - _RETENTION_SECONDS try: with _transaction() as conn: conn.execute( """DELETE FROM delivery_obligations WHERE state IN ('delivered', 'abandoned') AND updated_at < ?""", (cutoff,), ) total = conn.execute( "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM delivery_obligations" ).fetchone()[0] excess = max(0, total - _MAX_ROWS) if excess: conn.execute( """DELETE FROM delivery_obligations WHERE obligation_id IN ( SELECT obligation_id FROM delivery_obligations ORDER BY CASE state WHEN 'delivered' THEN 0 WHEN 'abandoned' THEN 1 ELSE 2 END, updated_at ASC LIMIT ?)""", (excess,), ) except Exception: logger.debug("delivery ledger prune failed", exc_info=True) def ledger_enabled(config: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> bool: """Read the ``gateway.delivery_ledger`` config gate (default on).""" try: if config is None: from hermes_cli.config import load_config config = load_config() gw = config.get("gateway") or {} value = gw.get("delivery_ledger", True) if isinstance(value, str): return value.strip().lower() not in {"false", "0", "no", "off"} return bool(value) except Exception: return True def debug_rows(limit: int = 20) -> str: """Human-readable dump for ad-hoc inspection (sqlite3-free path).""" with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn: rows = conn.execute( """SELECT obligation_id, session_key, state, attempts, created_at, updated_at, last_error FROM delivery_obligations ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT ?""", (limit,), ).fetchall() return json.dumps( [ { "id": r[0], "session": r[1], "state": r[2], "attempts": r[3], "created_at": r[4], "updated_at": r[5], "last_error": r[6], } for r in rows ], indent=2, )