"""Tests for config-driven platform access policies at the gateway layer. Background (#34515): WeCom, Weixin, Yuanbao, QQBot, and WhatsApp expose a documented config-driven access surface (``dm_policy`` / ``group_policy`` / ``allow_from`` / ``group_allow_from`` in ``PlatformConfig.extra``) and enforce it at intake — a message is dropped inside the adapter and never reaches the gateway unless it already passed that policy. The gateway's env-based allowlist check (``_is_user_authorized``) runs *after* the adapter. Adapters that own their access policy declare ``enforces_own_access_policy`` (a ``BasePlatformAdapter`` property, default ``False``) so the gateway can honor a config-only ``dm_policy: allowlist`` / ``allow_from`` (which the adapter already enforced) instead of double-denying it when no ``PLATFORM_ALLOWED_USERS`` env var is set. Crucially, the flag is NOT a blanket "already authorized" pass. These adapters default ``dm_policy`` / ``group_policy`` to ``"open"``, which forwards *every* sender, so the gateway trusts the adapter only when its effective policy for the chat type is an actual ``"allowlist"`` restriction. Trusting ``"open"`` here admitted the whole external network with no operator-configured allowlist — the fail-open SECURITY.md §2.6 forbids for network-exposed adapters ("an allowlist is required for every enabled network-exposed adapter ... code paths that fail open when no allowlist is configured are code bugs"). Open access requires an explicit ``{PLATFORM}_ALLOW_ALL_USERS`` / ``GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS`` opt-in. """ from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock import pytest from gateway.config import GatewayConfig, Platform, PlatformConfig from gateway.session import SessionSource # Platforms whose adapters own their access policy at intake. _OWN_POLICY_PLATFORMS = [ Platform.WECOM, Platform.WEIXIN, Platform.YUANBAO, Platform.QQBOT, Platform.WHATSAPP, ] def _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) -> None: for key in ( "WECOM_ALLOWED_USERS", "WEIXIN_ALLOWED_USERS", "YUANBAO_ALLOWED_USERS", "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS", "QQ_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS", "WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", "GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS", "GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "WECOM_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "WEIXIN_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "YUANBAO_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "QQ_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", "WHATSAPP_ALLOW_ALL_USERS", ): monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False) def _make_runner(platform: Platform, config: GatewayConfig, *, enforces: bool): """Build a bare GatewayRunner with one adapter for *platform*. ``enforces`` controls whether the adapter declares ``enforces_own_access_policy`` — i.e. whether it owns its access gate. """ from gateway.run import GatewayRunner runner = object.__new__(GatewayRunner) runner.config = config adapter = SimpleNamespace(send=AsyncMock(), enforces_own_access_policy=enforces) runner.adapters = {platform: adapter} runner.pairing_store = MagicMock() runner.pairing_store.is_approved.return_value = False runner.pairing_store._is_rate_limited.return_value = False return runner, adapter def _source(platform: Platform, *, chat_type: str = "dm") -> SessionSource: return SessionSource( platform=platform, user_id="some-user", chat_id="some-chat", user_name="tester", chat_type=chat_type, ) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Layer 1: the base-class contract and per-adapter overrides # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def test_base_adapter_defaults_to_not_owning_access_policy(): """Adapters that don't override the property delegate to the gateway.""" from gateway.platforms.base import BasePlatformAdapter # The default lives on the base property descriptor. assert BasePlatformAdapter.enforces_own_access_policy.fget(object()) is False @pytest.mark.parametrize( "module_path, class_name", [ ("plugins.platforms.wecom.adapter", "WeComAdapter"), ("gateway.platforms.weixin", "WeixinAdapter"), ("gateway.platforms.yuanbao", "YuanbaoAdapter"), ("gateway.platforms.qqbot.adapter", "QQAdapter"), ("plugins.platforms.whatsapp.adapter", "WhatsAppAdapter"), ], ) def test_own_policy_adapters_declare_the_flag(module_path, class_name): """The config-policy adapters override the flag to True.""" import importlib module = importlib.import_module(module_path) adapter_cls = getattr(module, class_name) # Property is overridden on the subclass and returns True regardless of # instance state (it reflects a static capability, not runtime config). value = adapter_cls.enforces_own_access_policy.fget(object.__new__(adapter_cls)) assert value is True # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Layer 2: gateway trusts the adapter-enforced flag # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @pytest.mark.parametrize("platform", _OWN_POLICY_PLATFORMS) def test_own_policy_allowlist_authorized_without_env_allowlist(monkeypatch, platform): """A config-only ``dm_policy: allowlist`` is trusted without an env allowlist. The adapter only forwards an allowlisted sender under ``allowlist`` policy, so a message reaching the gateway *was* authorized for this specific sender. The gateway must honor that instead of double-denying (the #34515 case). """ _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) config = GatewayConfig( platforms={platform: PlatformConfig(enabled=True, extra={"dm_policy": "allowlist"})} ) runner, _adapter = _make_runner(platform, config, enforces=True) assert runner._is_user_authorized(_source(platform)) is True @pytest.mark.parametrize( "module_path, class_name, dm_helper", [ ("plugins.platforms.whatsapp.adapter", "WhatsAppAdapter", "_is_dm_allowed"), ("plugins.platforms.wecom.adapter", "WeComAdapter", "_is_dm_allowed"), ("gateway.platforms.weixin", "WeixinAdapter", "_is_dm_allowed"), ("gateway.platforms.qqbot.adapter", "QQAdapter", "_is_dm_allowed"), ], ) def test_pairing_dm_policy_strict_intake_auth_denies_unknown( monkeypatch, module_path, class_name, dm_helper, ): """Default ``dm_policy: pairing`` must not admit senders via strict auth.""" _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) import importlib from gateway.config import PlatformConfig module = importlib.import_module(module_path) adapter_cls = getattr(module, class_name) adapter = adapter_cls(PlatformConfig(enabled=True, extra={"dm_policy": "pairing"})) assert getattr(adapter, dm_helper)("unknown-user") is False @pytest.mark.parametrize("blank_sender", ["", " ", None]) def test_yuanbao_pairing_dm_intake_denies_blank_principal(monkeypatch, blank_sender): """Yuanbao pairing intake must not forward senderless C2C callbacks.""" _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) from gateway.platforms.yuanbao import AccessPolicy policy = AccessPolicy( dm_policy="pairing", dm_allow_from=[], group_policy="pairing", group_allow_from=[], ) assert policy.is_dm_intake_allowed(blank_sender) is False assert policy.is_dm_intake_allowed("user-1") is True def test_wecom_open_group_with_per_group_sender_allowlist_is_authorized(monkeypatch): """WeCom ``groups..allow_from`` is an adapter-enforced restriction. The top-level group policy is still ``open`` for the chat ID, but the adapter has already checked the sender allowlist before dispatching to the gateway. That is not the fail-open case and must not be double-denied. """ _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) config = GatewayConfig( platforms={ Platform.WECOM: PlatformConfig( enabled=True, extra={ "group_policy": "open", "groups": {"some-chat": {"allow_from": ["some-user"]}}, }, ) } ) runner, _adapter = _make_runner(Platform.WECOM, config, enforces=True) assert runner._is_user_authorized(_source(Platform.WECOM, chat_type="group")) is True # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Layer 2b: `dm_policy: pairing` is NOT blanket-trusted # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Regression: WeCom/Weixin document ``dm_policy: pairing`` and declare # ``enforces_own_access_policy=True``, but their intake helper only special-cases # ``disabled`` / ``allowlist`` — ``pairing`` falls through and forwards the DM so # the gateway can run its pairing handshake. With no env allowlist, the # adapter-trust shortcut above then authorized *every* unpaired sender, silently # degrading pairing mode to open access. The shortcut must skip pairing-mode DMs # so an unpaired sender falls through to default-deny (and gets a pairing code). # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Layer 3: unauthorized-DM behavior reads config dm_policy # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @pytest.mark.parametrize( "dm_policy, expected", [ ("allowlist", "ignore"), ("disabled", "ignore"), ("pairing", "pair"), ], ) def test_unauthorized_dm_behavior_follows_config_dm_policy(monkeypatch, dm_policy, expected): """A restrictive dm_policy drops unauthorized DMs; pairing opts back in.""" _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) config = GatewayConfig( platforms={Platform.WECOM: PlatformConfig(enabled=True, extra={"dm_policy": dm_policy})} ) runner, _adapter = _make_runner(Platform.WECOM, config, enforces=True) assert runner._get_unauthorized_dm_behavior(Platform.WECOM) == expected def test_unauthorized_dm_behavior_open_policy_keeps_default(monkeypatch): """``dm_policy: open`` is not restrictive → falls through to the default.""" _clear_auth_env(monkeypatch) config = GatewayConfig( platforms={Platform.WECOM: PlatformConfig(enabled=True, extra={"dm_policy": "open"})} ) runner, _adapter = _make_runner(Platform.WECOM, config, enforces=True) # No allowlist + no restrictive policy → open-gateway pairing default. assert runner._get_unauthorized_dm_behavior(Platform.WECOM) == "pair"