"""Unit tests for gateway/relay/auth.py — the gateway-side relay auth primitives. Two layers: 1. **Self-consistency** — make_token/verify_token round-trip, delivery-signature verify, rotation verify list, tamper + skew + expiry rejection. 2. **Cross-implementation conformance** — frozen vectors generated by the connector's TypeScript (``src/core/relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken``/``sign``) are reproduced byte-for-byte by the Python port. If the connector ever changes its wire scheme, these vectors must be regenerated in lockstep (and that is the point — the test fails loudly on drift). Regenerate with: node -e 'import("./dist/core/relayAuthToken.js").then(m=>{ \ const s="00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"; \ console.log(m.makeToken("gw-instance-1", s, 0)); \ console.log(m.sign("1750000000."+JSON.stringify({a:1}), s)); })' """ from __future__ import annotations import json from gateway.relay.auth import ( DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER, DELIVERY_TS_HEADER, make_token, make_upgrade_token, sign, verify_delivery_signature, verify_signature, verify_token, ) # A fixed 256-bit hex secret used for the frozen connector vectors below. _SECRET = "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff" # ── Frozen vectors produced by the connector's TypeScript (relayAuthToken.ts). # Generated via dist/core/relayAuthToken.js makeToken/sign; see module docstring. _CONN_TOKEN = "Z3ctaW5zdGFuY2UtMTowOjM3YWE3YjE0NWU4NzY0ZDQwM2JhOWM2MzlmMjMwZGQ2M2RlOGVkOTliODhmZWQzNmFhMDI2MjVhOGE3ZTM1NjQ" # The EXACT bytes the connector signed: JS JSON.stringify emits compact JSON # (no spaces). The gateway verifies over the literal received body, so the # vector is the compact form — NOT Python's spaced json.dumps default. This is # the raw-byte-preservation discipline (a single differing byte breaks the HMAC). _CONN_BODY = '{"type":"message","event":{"text":"hi","source":{"chat_id":"c1"}}}' _CONN_TS = 1750000000 _CONN_SIG = "ac9509c8dae52b5590f06378260877334ff1adc4b1c96bafa4b514165fae6dc6" # ── Self-consistency ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── def test_upgrade_token_is_make_token_of_gateway_id(): assert make_upgrade_token("gw-1", _SECRET, 0) == make_token("gw-1", _SECRET, 0) def test_token_wrong_secret_rejected(): tok = make_token("p", _SECRET, 0) assert verify_token(tok, ["deadbeef" * 8]) is None def test_token_expired_rejected(): # ttl in the past -> exp < now -> rejected. tok = make_token("p", _SECRET, ttl_seconds=1) # Force expiry by signing with a manual past exp via the low-level helper. # Simpler: a 1s ttl token is still valid now; instead assert a clearly-old one. # Build an already-expired token by hand using the same scheme. import base64 signed = "p:1" # exp=1 (1970) -> long past sig = sign(signed, _SECRET) raw = f"{signed}:{sig}".encode() expired = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=") assert verify_token(expired, [_SECRET]) is None # And the fresh one is accepted. assert verify_token(tok, [_SECRET]) == "p" def test_verify_signature_constant_time_multi_secret(): payload = "1700000000.body" s = sign(payload, _SECRET) assert verify_signature(payload, s, ["wrong", _SECRET]) is True assert verify_signature(payload, s, ["wrong"]) is False assert verify_signature(payload, "zz", [_SECRET]) is False # bad hex # ── Delivery signature (connector -> gateway inbound) ────────────────────── def test_delivery_signature_skew_rejected(): body = "{}" ts = 1700000000 s = sign(f"{ts}.{body}", _SECRET) # Beyond the 300s replay window in either direction. assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts + 301) is False assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts - 301) is False assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts + 299) is True # ── Cross-implementation conformance (frozen connector vectors) ──────────── def test_python_make_token_matches_connector_byte_for_byte(): assert make_token("gw-instance-1", _SECRET, 0) == _CONN_TOKEN