A cron job that sets `enabled_toolsets` to a list of *native* toolsets (e.g.
`["web", "terminal"]`) silently got ZERO MCP tools, while a job with no
per-job list got every globally-enabled MCP server. `_resolve_cron_enabled_
toolsets` returned the per-job list verbatim, bypassing the MCP-merge that the
platform-fallback branch performs via `_get_platform_tools`. So
`discover_mcp_tools()` registered the MCP tools into the registry, but
`get_tool_definitions(enabled_toolsets=...)` kept only the named native
toolsets — the agent then rejected every `mcp_*` call as "Unknown tool". (R2
of #23997.)
Fix: `_merge_mcp_into_per_job_toolsets` layers MCP membership onto a per-job
allowlist with the SAME semantics as `_get_platform_tools`:
* `no_mcp` sentinel present -> no MCP servers (sentinel stripped)
* one or more MCP server names already listed -> treat as an allowlist
* otherwise -> union in every globally-enabled MCP server
To avoid duplicating the "which MCP servers are enabled" computation (it
already existed inline in `_get_platform_tools`), this extracts a shared
`enabled_mcp_server_names(config)` helper in `hermes_cli.tools_config` and has
BOTH the gateway/CLI platform resolver and the cron per-job resolver call it —
so every path agrees on MCP membership (extend, don't duplicate).
Note: the issue's *headline* — bare MCP server names rejected, registry never
includes them — was already fixed on main (commits c10fea8d2 + 04918345e,
both before the issue was filed). This PR closes the remaining cron-specific
gap (R2). The `server:*` / `mcp:server` alias-notation rejection (R1) and the
quiet-mode silent-drop (R3) are tracked separately.
Salvaged from #32788 by sherman-yang (credited below). Reworked to reuse the
shared `enabled_mcp_server_names` helper instead of re-implementing the MCP
membership set in cron/scheduler.py.
Fixes#23997
Co-authored-by: sherman-yang <58446328+sherman-yang@users.noreply.github.com>
`cron/jobs.py` resolved `HERMES_DIR`/`JOBS_FILE` from `get_hermes_home()`,
which follows the active profile override. So a job created from a
profile-scoped agent session (`hermes -p myprofile chat`, where the in-process
`cronjob` tool calls `create_job`) was written to
`~/.hermes/profiles/myprofile/cron/jobs.json`, while the profile-less gateway
(`hermes gateway run`) reads only `~/.hermes/cron/jobs.json`. The job was
silently orphaned: `cronjob action=list` from the same profile reported it
healthy (same file), but the gateway ticker never saw it and it never fired.
`last_run_at` stayed null forever. (#32091)
Fix: resolve the cron store from `get_default_hermes_root()` — the
purpose-built "profile-level operations" root that returns `<root>` even when
`HERMES_HOME` is `<root>/profiles/<name>` (and handles Docker/custom layouts).
Now the creator, the gateway scheduler, and the dashboard all agree on a
single jobs.json at the root, so a job created under any profile is visible to
the gateway.
Scope: this is the storage-location half of the fix. Making a job *execute*
under its originating profile's config/skills (a per-job `profile` field +
runtime context scoping, the #48649 sibling) is a separate, riskier change and
will follow as its own PR — keeping this layer minimal and safe.
Salvaged from #32117 by @mohamedorigami-jpg (authorship preserved). The
comprehensive #33839 (@sweetcornna) takes the same Option-A storage approach
and additionally adds the per-job profile execution scoping; this PR lands the
safe storage layer first.
Tests: `tests/cron/test_cron_profile_storage.py` — asserts the store anchors
at `<root>/cron` under a profile HERMES_HOME (not `<profile>/cron`), and is
unchanged when no profile is active. Full `tests/cron/` suite: 511 passed.
Fixes#32091
Co-authored-by: mohamedorigami-jpg <mohamed.origami@gmail.com>
When a recurring job's execution time exceeds `interval + grace`, the
scheduler entered a perpetual "missed → fast-forward → skip" loop and the
job effectively never ran again. A real job (`hermes-upstream-contribution`)
logged 42 consecutive "missed" events over 9 hours without executing once.
Timeline (5-min interval, 150s grace, ~15-min execution):
14:00 due → advance next_run_at→14:05 → run (blocks 15 min)
14:15 finishes
14:16 tick: next_run_at=14:05, elapsed 660s > grace 150s → "missed!"
→ fast-forward to 14:21 → continue (SKIP) → does NOT run
... repeats forever for any job whose runtime > interval+grace.
The `continue` (skip execution) in `_get_due_jobs_locked` was designed to
prevent burst-catchup after *gateway downtime* — don't run 6 missed
instances of a 30-min job on restart. But it wrongly applied to a job that
missed its slot because it was *still running*, not because the gateway was
down.
Fix: keep the fast-forward (so accumulated missed slots are still collapsed
to a single next slot — no burst) but fall through to `due.append(job)` so
the job runs ONCE now. The log message is updated to be honest about the new
behavior ("Running now; next run fast-forwarded to: ...").
Behavior note: a recurring job missed during gateway downtime now also fires
once immediately on restart (rather than waiting for its next natural slot).
This is the intended trade-off — the same "run once, don't burst" rule now
applies uniformly to both downtime-misses and long-execution-misses.
Salvaged from #33318 by @liuhao1024 (authorship preserved). Also addresses
the diagnosis in #33361 (@agent-trivi), which proposed the same one-line fix.
Tests: updates `test_stale_past_due_skipped` →
`test_stale_past_due_runs_once_and_fast_forwards` (the old test encoded the
skip behavior); adds `test_long_execution_does_not_perpetually_defer` as a
direct regression for the production loop; updates the F2e timezone test that
relied on the old skip path. Full tests/cron/ suite: 510 passed.
Fixes#33315
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>
PR #22410 added three-mode Telegram topic routing to the live message path
(TelegramAdapter.send via the gateway DeliveryRouter), but the cron delivery
path never got it. cron/scheduler.py::_deliver_result sent through the live
adapter with a bare ``{"thread_id": ...}`` and fell back to the standalone
_send_telegram, neither of which addresses Bot API Direct Messages topics
correctly. After Bot API 10.0 (2026-05-08), sending to a private chat with a
bare ``message_thread_id`` is rejected/mis-routed, so cron deliveries to a
private DM topic landed in the General topic instead of the requested lane.
Fix: the cron live-adapter branch now routes the text send through the
gateway's ``DeliveryRouter._deliver_to_platform`` — the same canonical path
live messages use — so it inherits all three Telegram routing modes:
1. Forum/supergroup (negative chat_id) -> message_thread_id
2. Bot API DM topics (private chat_id + numeric topic id) ->
direct_messages_topic_id (the case #22773 reported)
3. Hermes-created named private DM-topic lanes -> ensure_dm_topic +
reply anchor
For mode 2, a private-chat target with a numeric topic id is passed as
``direct_messages_topic_id`` metadata (verified end-to-end:
TelegramAdapter._thread_kwargs_for_send turns it into
``{message_thread_id: None, direct_messages_topic_id: <int>}``), instead of a
bare message_thread_id. Forum/supergroup and home-channel deliveries are
unchanged. The standalone fallback (gateway down) is preserved.
No new config knob and no duplicated routing logic — this reuses the existing
DeliveryRouter rather than reimplementing topic routing in the cron path.
Salvaged from #42051 (stepanov1975) and #23249 (devsart95), which both
diagnosed the missing three-mode routing in the cron/standalone path;
reimplemented onto the canonical DeliveryRouter that landed since those PRs
were opened.
Co-authored-by: Alex <9785479+stepanov1975@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: devsart95 <devsart95@gmail.com>
A recurring cron job persists `next_run_at` as an absolute timestamp with a
UTC offset (e.g. `2026-05-19T21:00:00+10:00`). Cron expressions, however,
describe *local wall-clock* intent ("run at 21:00"). When Hermes/system
timezone changes after the timestamp was persisted, the stored instant is
re-interpreted in the new zone: `21:00+10:00` is the instant `13:00+02:00`,
which is `<= now` (13:02+02:00) — so the job fires HOURS EARLY, then
`compute_next_run` advances it via croniter to `21:00+02:00` the same day,
producing a SECOND fire. (#28934, recurrence of #24289.)
`_get_due_jobs_locked` now detects this precise migration case before the
due check: for a `cron` job whose converted instant looks due, whose stored
UTC offset differs from the current zone's, AND whose stored *wall-clock*
time is still in the future (distinguishing a migrated offset from a
genuinely missed run), it recomputes `next_run_at` from the schedule and
skips the early fire — preserving the local wall-clock intent.
Verified against the issue's reproducer: stored `21:00+10` under runtime
`+02:00` at wall-clock `13:02` is rescheduled to `21:00+02` instead of
firing early + again.
Salvaged from #28941 by @Tranquil-Flow (authorship preserved). Chosen over
the alternative approaches (#28951 normalize-to-UTC, #28985 rebase-and-match)
because UTC-normalization does not change the absolute-instant comparison and
so does not fix the early fire, and this guard is the tightest: it only acts
when all four conditions hold and reuses the existing `compute_next_run`.
Fixes#28934
The in-process cron ticker (cron/scheduler_provider.py) caught only
`Exception` and logged at DEBUG, so a `SystemExit`/`KeyboardInterrupt`
raised from a misbehaving provider SDK or agent retry path killed the
ticker thread silently. The gateway PROCESS stayed up, so `hermes cron
status` — which only checks `find_gateway_pids()` — kept reporting
"✓ jobs will fire automatically" while no jobs ever fired (#32612,
#32895).
This makes ticker death survivable and detectable:
- The ticker loop now catches `BaseException` and logs at ERROR with a
traceback, so a single bad tick no longer tears the thread down and
the failure is visible in the gateway log.
- The loop records a heartbeat (`cron/ticker_heartbeat`, epoch seconds)
on startup and after every tick — best-effort, never raised into the
loop. Both ticker entry points (the gateway and the desktop fallback
in web_server.py) funnel through `InProcessCronScheduler.start`, so one
heartbeat site covers both.
- `hermes cron status` now reads the heartbeat age: if the gateway is
running but the heartbeat is stale (> 200s, i.e. several missed ~60s
ticks), it reports the ticker as STALLED and suggests a restart instead
of falsely claiming jobs will fire. A missing heartbeat (older build /
never ran) is treated as "unknown", not "dead".
Adds tests for BaseException survival, per-iteration heartbeat recording,
heartbeat round-trip/age, staleness detection, and silent-write-failure.
Salvaged from #49660 (BaseException survival on current structure),
extended with the heartbeat + honest-status reporting that the earlier
(pre-refactor) watchdog PRs #35616 and #33849 proposed.
Fixes#32612Fixes#32895
Co-authored-by: banditburai <promptsiren@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: sweetcornna <96944678+sweetcornna@users.noreply.github.com>
Consolidates three cron-delivery defects in cron/scheduler.py::_deliver_result
that all stem from how the live-adapter send result is interpreted.
#38922 — duplicate message on confirmation timeout.
future.result(timeout=60) raising TimeoutError bubbled to the outer
except handler, which left delivered=False, so `if not delivered:` re-sent
the identical message via the standalone path. future.cancel() cannot
un-send a request already in flight on the wire, so a slow confirmation
deterministically produced a duplicate. The send was already dispatched onto
the gateway loop, so a bare timeout is now treated as delivered
(assume-delivered is safer than guaranteed-duplicate) and the standalone
fallback is skipped. The live-adapter media attempt is also skipped on
timeout since the contended loop would re-block each 30s media budget.
#47056 — silent drop when the gateway has an active session.
The old check `if send_result is None or not getattr(send_result,
"success", True)` let a result object missing a `success` attribute default
to True = counted as a successful delivery, so the scheduler logged
"delivered via live adapter" while the gateway never processed the message.
Delivery is now confirmed via _confirm_adapter_delivery(): only an explicit,
truthy `success` attribute counts; None or a `success`-less object falls
through to the standalone path so the message actually arrives.
A genuine send Exception (not a slow confirmation) still falls through to
the standalone path, and is caught by run_job's outer handler — it is
recorded as the job's last_error and never crashes the cron ticker.
#43014 — deliver=origin fails to resolve in CLI sessions.
A CLI-created job has no {platform, chat_id} origin, so deliver=origin (and
auto-detect / deliver=None) was unresolvable and emitted "no delivery target
resolved" on every run. An unresolvable origin with no configured home
channel is now treated as local (output stays in last_output), matching the
documented auto-deliver contract; a concrete unresolvable platform target
still reports a real error.
Salvaged from #41007 (timeout discriminator), folding in #47127's
_confirm_adapter_delivery hardening and #38937 / #43063's origin→local
fallback. Tests rewritten as behavior contracts (timeout => no duplicate;
None / success-less result => standalone fallback; confirmed success => no
fallback; CLI origin => local, explicit platform => still errors).
Co-authored-by: Evi Nova <66773372+Tranquil-Flow@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kyssta-exe <kyssta-exe@users.noreply.github.com>
Cron jobs created without an explicit `model` are stored as `model: null`.
At fire time `run_job` resolved `model = job.get("model") or os.getenv(
"HERMES_MODEL") or ""` and then `_model_cfg.get("default", model)`, so when
config.yaml had no `model.default` (or `model: {default: null}`) an empty
string flowed straight to the provider and surfaced as an opaque HTTP 400
("Model parameter is required" / "model: String should have at least 1
character"). The operator had to inspect jobs.json to discover the job was
stored with a null model.
This change makes cron model resolution robust and symmetric with the CLI:
- Coerce `model: null`/missing config to `{}` so a falsy default never
overwrites an already-resolved env value with `None`.
- Only overwrite `model` from `model.default` when the resolved value is
truthy; accept a `model.model` alias key, mirroring the sibling resolvers
in hermes_cli/oneshot.py, fallback_cmd.py and prompt_size.py.
- Resolve AFTER the managed-scope overlay so an administrator-pinned model
still wins.
- Fail fast with an actionable error (caught by run_job's outer handler and
recorded as the job's last_error — the cron ticker is unaffected) instead
of letting an empty model reach the API.
- The per-job model is re-read every tick, so a `cronjob action=update
model=...` after a failed run takes effect on the next tick (no cache).
Adds tests/cron/conftest.py pinning a default HERMES_MODEL so existing
run_job tests don't trip the new guard, plus regression tests covering env
fallback, config.default fallback, string-form config, the model alias key,
null-default-no-clobber, corrupt-config graceful degradation, fail-fast,
and the no-cache re-read property.
Salvaged from #24005, rebased onto current main, with additional test
coverage folded in from #45550 and the alias-key behavior from #43952.
Fixes#43899Fixes#23979Fixes#22761
Co-authored-by: szzhoujiarui-sketch <szzhoujiarui@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rayjun <rayjun0412@gmail.com>
next(iter(frozenset)) picked a different blocklist var each run
(PYTHONHASHSEED-dependent), hurting reproducibility. sorted()[0]
keeps the invariant-style assertion (any real blocklisted var)
while making failures reproducible.
Follow-up to salvaged PR #49207.
Cron no_agent and pre-check scripts ran with the full gateway/agent
environment, allowing scripts under HERMES_HOME/scripts/ to read provider
credentials. Apply _sanitize_subprocess_env like terminal and MCP paths
(SECURITY.md section 2.3).
Add regression test asserting blocklisted provider vars are absent in the
child process.
Phase 4F (F.1 + F.2 + F.3, agent side). F.4 is the operator-run live smoke
(needs a NAS deployment); recorded in the PR, not code.
F.1 — on_jobs_changed wiring:
- cron/scheduler.py: _notify_provider_jobs_changed() — resolve the active
provider, call on_jobs_changed(), swallow errors. Lives in scheduler.py (not
jobs.py) so the store stays free of provider imports (no import cycle).
- Wired at the consumer surfaces AFTER a successful mutation: the cronjob model
tool (tools/cronjob_tools.py, create/update/remove/pause/resume) — which the
`hermes cron` CLI also routes through — and the REST handlers
(gateway/platforms/api_server.py, same five). Built-in's no-op default = zero
behavior change on the default path. Sleeping-agent direct jobs.json writes
(no tool/CLI/REST) are covered by reconcile-on-wake in start().
F.2 — config: cron.chronos.{portal_url,callback_url,expected_audience,
nas_jwks_url}. All non-secret; the agent holds no scheduler creds and the
outbound provision call reuses the existing Nous token (no token key). Additive
deep-merge key, no version literal.
F.3 — docs:
- docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md: authoritative agent↔NAS wire contract
(the three agent-cron endpoints + inbound /api/cron/fire + the 3-hop trust
model + at-most-once/re-arm semantics). This is what the NAS-side agent builds
against.
- cron-internals.md: "Managed cron (Chronos) for scale-to-zero" section.
- cli-commands.md: cron.provider accepts chronos + the cron.chronos.* keys.
- User docs name no scheduler vendor (QStash is a NAS-internal detail).
INVARIANT re-verified: zero qstash/upstash hits across plugins/cron, gateway,
hermes_cli, tools, website/docs (the one remaining repo hit is an unrelated
Context7 MCP comment in tools/mcp_tool.py).
Tests: test_jobs_changed_notify (5) — notify calls provider hook, swallows
errors, built-in harmless, tool create/remove notify. Full cron + chronos +
webhook + config + api_server_jobs suites green (504 in the cron+chronos+webhook
run).
Phase 4C. claim_job_for_fire(job_id, *, claim_ttl_seconds=300) in cron/jobs.py:
under the existing _jobs_lock() file lock, claim a job for a single external
fire so that across N gateway replicas exactly ONE wins. Single-machine
deployments always win (unaffected).
Semantics:
- missing / disabled / paused job → False.
- a fresh fire_claim (younger than claim_ttl_seconds) already present → False
(someone else holds it). Stale claim (crashed winner) → overwrite, so a job
is never wedged forever.
- on win: stamp fire_claim={at, by:_machine_id()}; for recurring (cron/interval)
advance next_run_at (mirrors advance_next_run's at-most-once bump so a stale
re-delivery can't re-fire); one-shots keep next_run_at but the fresh claim
blocks a duplicate retry for the same fire.
- mark_job_run now clears fire_claim on completion so a re-armed recurring job
is claimable again next fire.
_machine_id() (HERMES_MACHINE_ID env, else hostname:pid) is attribution-only;
correctness is the file lock + fresh-claim check, not the id.
This is consumed by CronScheduler.fire_due (Phase 4B). tick is untouched — it
still uses advance_next_run, so the built-in single-machine path is unaffected.
Tests (real store, temp HERMES_HOME): claim-once-then-block + next_run advance,
one-shot no-double-claim, unknown→False, paused→False, stale-claim reclaimable,
mark_job_run clears the claim (recurring re-claimable). tests/cron/ 470 passed.
Phase 4B. Three NON-abstract hooks on the CronScheduler ABC, all with
built-in-safe defaults so the built-in inherits them without overriding and
test_abc_growth_stays_additive stays green (required surface still {name,
start}):
- on_jobs_changed(): post-mutation reconcile hook. Built-in no-op.
- fire_due(job_id): claim the job via the store CAS (claim_job_for_fire,
Phase 4C) then run it through the shared run_one_job (Phase 4A). Returns
False if the claim is lost or the job vanished (repeat-N exhausted between
arm and fire). The inbound webhook (Phase 4E) routes here.
- reconcile(): converge the external registry toward jobs.json. Built-in no-op.
fire_due imports claim_job_for_fire/get_job/run_one_job INSIDE the method, so
this commits cleanly before Phase 4C lands claim_job_for_fire (import-time is
unaffected; tests monkeypatch it with raising=False).
Tests: required-surface-unchanged guard, built-in inherits no-op defaults, and
fire_due's three paths (claim+run, lost-claim→no-run, missing-job→no-run).
tests/cron/ green (20 in test_scheduler_provider.py).
Phase 4A. Factor tick's per-job closure (_process_job: execute → save →
deliver → mark) into a module-level run_one_job(job, *, adapters, loop,
verbose) so the external Chronos provider's fire_due (Phase 4D) reuses the
IDENTICAL body — no duplicated correctness. tick's _process_job is now a thin
wrapper calling run_one_job; the pool/in-flight-guard/contextvars dispatch
logic is unchanged.
run_one_job fires ONE given job; it does NOT decide due-ness, claim, or compute
next_run (tick advances next_run_at under the file lock; an external provider
claims via the store CAS in Phase 4C). Pure refactor, no behavior change.
TDD: test_run_one_job.py characterizes the sequence through tick() first
(test_tick_process_job_sequence, passed pre-extraction), then unit-tests the
helper directly: success sequence, [SILENT]→skip delivery, empty-response soft
failure (#8585), failed-job-still-delivers, exception→mark-failed.
Verified: tests/cron/ 459 passed (was 453 + 6 new); tick behavior unchanged.
Phase 2 of the pluggable cron-scheduler refactor. Still no call-site changes;
this wires up provider SELECTION with a hard safety net.
Task 2.1: cron.provider config key (hermes_cli/config.py), empty = built-in.
Additive key — deep-merge picks it up into existing configs with no version
bump (verified: load_config() yields the key on a pre-existing config.yaml).
Task 2.2: plugins/cron/__init__.py — discovery machinery cloned near-verbatim
from plugins/memory/__init__.py, retargeted at CronScheduler /
register_cron_scheduler. Bundled (plugins/cron/<name>/) + user
(/plugins/<name>/) dirs, bundled wins collisions. The built-in is
NOT discovered here — it's core, so the fallback can't be removed.
Task 2.3: resolve_cron_scheduler() in cron/scheduler_provider.py — reads
cron.provider and ALWAYS degrades to built-in (missing / unavailable / load
error / typo all fall back with a warning). cron can never be left without a
trigger.
Deviation from plan: the plan's resolver snippet used cfg_get("cron.provider")
(dotted-string form). The real cfg_get signature is cfg_get(cfg, *keys,
default=) — corrected to cfg_get(load_config(), "cron", "provider", default=""),
matching plugins/memory/__init__.py:349. Tests monkeypatch load_config (not
cfg_get) so the real traversal runs.
Tests: default key empty, discovery returns list, unknown load returns None,
and the four resolver paths (empty→builtin, no-section→builtin,
unknown→builtin, unavailable→builtin, available→used). Full tests/cron/: 453
passed; config suite green (additive key, no migration break).
Phase 1 of the pluggable cron-scheduler refactor (Axis B — the trigger).
No call-site changes; this phase only makes the abstraction exist + tested
in isolation.
Task 1.1: cron/scheduler_provider.py — the EXPERIMENTAL CronScheduler ABC.
Required surface is name + start; is_available()/stop() carry safe defaults.
is_available has a no-network invariant. Docstring marks it experimental
until the Chronos provider (Phase 4) validates the shape.
Task 1.2: InProcessCronScheduler wraps the historical 60s ticker loop, calling
cron.scheduler.tick(sync=False) exactly as the raw ticker does. Uses
stop_event.wait(interval) for responsive stop (both raw tickers already do).
Tests: ABC-is-abstract, default-is_available, the InProcess loop drives tick
and stops, stop() no-op, and test_abc_growth_stays_additive (the forward-compat
guard: required abstractmethods must stay exactly {name, start}, so the three
Phase-4 hooks land as NON-abstract additions).
tick() internals in cron/scheduler.py are byte-unchanged (only new file added).
Phase 0 characterization tests still green. Full tests/cron/: 445 passed.
Route curator rollback through the same cross-process cron job lock, make save_jobs lock for legacy direct callers without deadlocking nested mutation paths, and harden the regression test so a second _jobs_lock caller really blocks across processes.
`hermes cron pause`/`resume`/`remove` run in their own CLI process (CLI →
cronjob tool → pause_job → update_job → save_jobs), entirely separate from
the gateway process that also writes jobs.json (mark_job_run, advance_next_run,
due-fast-forward in get_due_jobs). The only synchronization was a module-level
`threading.Lock`, which serializes writers *within a single process* but does
nothing across processes — and update_job/pause_job/remove_job/create_job did
not even take it.
The result is a classic lost update: a `cron pause` issued while the gateway is
live loads jobs.json, sets enabled=False, and saves; concurrently the gateway
loads the same file and saves back its run-bookkeeping, clobbering the pause.
The CLI prints "Paused" (it succeeded against its own in-memory copy) but the
job stays enabled and keeps firing, with no error surfaced. The scheduler's
`.tick.lock` flock can't be reused for this — it is held for the entire tick,
including multi-minute agent runs, so a CLI mutation would block for minutes.
Add `_jobs_lock()`: a short-held cross-process advisory file lock (fcntl/msvcrt
flock on `<hermes_home>/cron/.jobs.lock`) layered over the existing in-process
lock, and wrap every load→modify→save critical section with it — create_job,
update_job, remove_job, mark_job_run, advance_next_run, get_due_jobs,
rewrite_skill_refs. The lock degrades to in-process-only if neither fcntl nor
msvcrt is available, preserving prior behaviour. All critical sections are short
(field edits, no agent execution), so contention resolves in milliseconds.
Adds a regression test that proves the lock excludes a second process (an
in-process threading.Lock cannot).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: finish Automation Blueprints terminology rebrand
Replace leftover "Automation Templates" wording from the Cron Recipes
rebrand, rename the copy-paste cookbook guide to Automation Recipes, and
point the marketing gallery link at the blueprints catalog.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* docs: use Automation Blueprints instead of Recipes in guide
Rename the cookbook guide from automation-recipes to
automation-blueprints so sidebar and copy match the product term.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* docs: rename automation-blueprints-catalog to automation-blueprints
Drop the -catalog suffix from the reference page slug and title, and
move the copy-paste cookbook to automation-blueprint-examples so the
main Automation Blueprints doc is unambiguous.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Revert "docs: rename automation-blueprints-catalog to automation-blueprints"
This reverts commit 605f1eeab5.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Review fixes for the Cron Recipes stack before release:
- hydration-move: */90 in the cron minute field silently wraps to hourly
(croniter-verified) — 90/120-minute options never fired at their stated
cadence. Replaced with an hour-field step (0 9-17/2 * * 1-5) and an
interval_hours slot whose options (1/2/3h) all fire as labeled.
- fill_recipe: reject unknown slot names. A typo'd 'tiem=07:15' used to
silently create the job at the 08:00 default; now it 422s on the dashboard
form and errors on the slash/deep-link paths with the valid slot list.
- deliver slot: non-strict enum (options are suggestions, scheduler
validates downstream) so slack/whatsapp/etc. users aren't locked out;
GET /api/cron/recipes rewrites its options from cron_delivery_targets()
so the dashboard form only offers configured platforms; help text no
longer claims dashboard-created jobs deliver to 'the chat you set this
up from' (the endpoint strips origin — they go to the home channel).
- gateway: success/accept messages no longer point at /cron (cli_only);
surface-aware hint instead. Conversational fill now sends the
'Setting up X — I'll ask you a couple of things…' ack before the agent
turn, matching the CLI experience.
- important-mail catalog entry: reference the urgency classifier by module
path (python3 -m cron.scripts.classify_items) instead of baking an
absolute host path into the job prompt — stale after relocation and
nonexistent on remote terminal backends. cron/scripts is now a real
package and ships in the wheel (pyproject packages.find).
- export_recipe: interval schedules round-trip again — parse_schedule
stores 'minutes' but the renderer only read 'seconds', so every interval
job exported as the silent '0 9 * * *' fallback.
- skills_hub install: say so when a recipe suggestion is dropped
(latched dedup or pending cap) instead of printing nothing.
Targeted tests: 58 cron/recipe + 261 web_server pass; E2E-validated all
14 recipes fill+parse, hydration cadences via croniter, typo rejection on
slash + endpoint paths, surface-aware hints, and interval export round-trip.
Reworks the chat-line UX: pick a recipe by name and the agent asks you for
what it needs, one question at a time, instead of forcing you to hand-type a
slot=val command line.
- /cron-recipe -> lists the catalog
- /cron-recipe <name> -> forgiving name match (exact/prefix/substring/
fuzzy; ambiguous lists candidates), then seeds
the agent with a natural-language fill request
built from the recipe's typed slots + schedule
and prompt templates. The agent asks for each
value one at a time and calls the EXISTING
cronjob tool. No new tool.
- /cron-recipe <name> slot=val -> unchanged deterministic path (fill_recipe ->
create_job) for the dashboard/docs/power user.
Mechanism (no new plumbing, invariant-safe — the seed enters as a normal user
turn, never a synthetic injection):
- shared handler returns RecipeCommandResult{text, agent_seed}; match_recipe()
and build_recipe_seed() are the new shared pieces.
- gateway: dispatch rewrites event.text to the seed and falls through to the
agent (the same pattern /steer uses).
- CLI: handler sets a one-shot self._pending_agent_seed; the interactive loop
consumes it right after process_command() and runs it as the next turn.
The typed-slot schema stays the single source of truth (still validates the
form/inline path via fill_recipe); the agent path just renders those slots into
the questions to ask. Docs updated to lead with the name-then-ask flow.
A 'recipe' is a one-place definition of an automation that every surface
renders natively. The slot schema (cron/recipe_catalog.py) is the single
source of truth; four renderers consume it, and all paths end at the same
cron.jobs.create_job — no second job engine.
Form where there's a screen, conversation where there's a chat line:
- Dashboard / GUI app: a Recipes sub-tab on the Cron page renders each
recipe's typed slots as a form (time-picker, enum dropdown, free-text);
submit POSTs /api/cron/recipes/instantiate which fills + creates the job.
- CLI / TUI / messengers: /cron-recipe lists the catalog, shows a recipe's
fields, or fills + creates from a pasted 'key slot=val' command. The shared
handler (hermes_cli/cron_recipe_cmd.py) names any missing/invalid slot so
the agent can ask a targeted follow-up.
- Docs: a generated Cron Recipes catalog page (website, .mdx + React cards)
shows each recipe with a copy-paste command and a 'Send to App' button.
- Desktop: a hermes:// URL scheme (Electron single-instance lock +
setAsDefaultProtocolClient + open-url/second-instance) routes
hermes://cron-recipe/<key>?slot=val into the chat composer pre-filled.
Typed slots (time/enum/text/weekdays) with defaults: users never type raw
cron — recipes parameterize time-of-day and weekday sets and translate to
cron expressions; a free-text 'schedule' slot is the full-flexibility escape
hatch. Consent-first throughout: nothing schedules without an explicit submit
or send.
Core:
- cron/recipe_catalog.py — CronRecipe + RecipeSlot, 5 curated recipes,
recipe_form_schema / recipe_slash_command / recipe_deeplink /
recipe_catalog_entry renderers, fill_recipe (validate + translate to
create_job kwargs).
- hermes_cli/cron_recipe_cmd.py — shared /cron-recipe handler (CLI + TUI +
gateway never drift). CommandDef + dispatch in commands.py / cli.py /
gateway/run.py.
Dashboard: GET /api/cron/recipes + POST /api/cron/recipes/instantiate
(web_server.py), CronRecipes.tsx gallery+form, Segmented sub-tab on CronPage,
api.ts methods + types.
Desktop: hermes:// scheme end to end (main.cjs deep-link router + ready-queue,
preload onDeepLink/signalDeepLinkReady, global.d.ts types, desktop-controller
composer prefill, electron-builder protocols key).
Docs: extract-cron-recipes.py generator wired into prebuild.mjs,
cron-recipes-catalog.mdx + CronRecipesCatalog React component, sidebar entry.
Generated index json gitignored like skills.json.
Tests: 23 core (catalog/slots/schedule-resolution/validation/renderers/command
handler/generator) + 5 web_server endpoint tests. E2E verified end to end:
slot fill -> create_job -> persisted job with correct schedule/deliver/origin.
Hermes can propose automations and let the user accept them with one tap
via /suggestions, instead of making them assemble cron jobs by hand. Every
proposal — wherever it originates — flows through one surface.
Sources (the 'where suggestions come from'):
- catalog: curated starter automations (daily briefing, important-mail
monitor, weekly review, workday-start reminder) via /suggestions catalog
- recipe: installing a skill that carries a metadata.hermes.recipe block
registers a suggestion instead of auto-scheduling
- usage / integration: reserved for the background-review detector and
account-connect triggers (sources defined; emitters land next)
Pieces:
- cron/suggestions.py — the store. add/list/accept/dismiss, dedup+latch by
key (dismissed proposals never re-offered), pending cap so it can't become
a nag wall. Accepting calls the existing cron.jobs.create_job — there is
NO second job engine. Mirrors jobs.py storage (atomic writes, lock, 0600).
- cron/suggestion_catalog.py — the curated set. The important-mail monitor
entry is where the old proactive-monitor poll->classify->surface engine
lives now (cron/scripts/classify_items.py + the 'monitor' aux task), as ONE
catalog automation rather than a standalone feature.
- tools/recipes.py — recipe<->job bridge; register_recipe_suggestion() makes
a recipe source 'recipe' of this surface. recipe_to_job_spec() is the single
translation both the direct and suggestion paths share.
- hermes_cli/suggestions_cmd.py — shared /suggestions handler (CLI + gateway
never drift); /suggestions [accept N|dismiss N|catalog|clear].
- Wired: CommandDef + CLI dispatch (cli.py) + gateway dispatch (gateway/run.py)
+ aux 'monitor' task (config.py) + recipe-install hook (skills_hub.py).
Consent-first throughout: nothing auto-schedules; acceptance is always
explicit; dismissals latch.
Supersedes #41122 (proactive-monitor) and #41127 (recipes): both fold in here
as a catalog entry and a suggestion source respectively.
Tests: store (dedup/cap/accept/dismiss/latch), catalog seeding+idempotency,
recipe->suggestion bridge, command handler, aux config. E2E: recipe SKILL.md
-> parsed -> suggested -> accepted -> real cron job persisted to jobs.json.
Fully removes the cron per-job 'profile' arg added in #28124: the
cronjob tool schema field, CLI --profile flags on cron create/edit,
job-record storage/validation, the scheduler's _job_profile_context
wrapper, and the script-runner env override. Sequential-partition
logic reverts to workdir-only.
The context-local HERMES_HOME override in hermes_constants and the
subprocess bridging in tools/environments/local.py are kept — they
now have other consumers (dashboard multi-profile, TUI gateway).
The runtime assembled-prompt scan (#3968 lineage) selected its pattern
tier on has_skills alone. A script-driven, no-skills job injects its
script's stdout into the prompt, and that blob was scanned with the
STRICT user-prompt pattern set — so any command-shape string in the
data feed (e.g. a triage bot ingesting a bug report that quotes
`rm -rf /`) hard-blocked the job on every tick.
Script output and context_from output are runtime DATA produced by
operator-authored code — the same trust class as install-vetted skill
markdown, not a user-authored directive prompt. Select the scan tier by
what the assembled prompt CONTAINS: when it includes skill content OR
injected data, use the looser _scan_cron_skill_assembled set (keeps
unambiguous injection directives, drops command-shape patterns,
sanitizes invisible unicode instead of blocking).
Defense-in-depth is preserved:
- The raw user prompt is still strict-scanned at create/update
(api_server paths untouched) AND re-scanned strict at runtime even
when the looser tier was selected for the data blob.
- Plain no-script/no-skills jobs keep the strict scan on the whole
assembled prompt.
- Injection directives arriving via script stdout still block.
Rejected alternative: removing destructive_root_rm from the strict set
or a per-job skip_injection_scan flag — both weaken the guard globally.
A cron session's first message is the injected "[IMPORTANT: you are running as
a scheduled cron job …]" delivery hint, so with no explicit title the sidebar
and history rows fell back to that hint as their label.
Set the session title from the job (name → short prompt → id) with a run-time
suffix for uniqueness against the sessions.title index. Done after the run so
the agent's own INSERT keeps model/system_prompt — this only updates the title.
* fix: respect disabled auto-compaction on context overflow
Port from anomalyco/opencode#30749.
When compression.enabled is false, NO automatic compaction trigger may
fire. The proactive token-threshold paths (preflight + post-response
should_compress gate) already honoured the setting, but the three
provider-overflow recovery paths in the agent loop — long-context-tier
429, 413 payload-too-large, and context-overflow — called
_compress_context() unconditionally, silently compressing and rotating
the session against the user's explicit choice.
Add a single guard at the top of the overflow-recovery dispatch: when
compression is disabled and the error is one of those three overflow
classes, surface a terminal error (compaction_disabled: True) telling the
user to /compress manually, /new, switch to a larger-context model, or
reduce attachments. Manual /compress (force=True) is unaffected — it never
enters this loop.
Tests: new TestOverflowWithCompactionDisabled (413 + 400 overflow don't
compress when disabled; control case still compresses when enabled).
Existing overflow-recovery tests updated to enable compaction explicitly
(they verify the recovery fires); fixture defaults flipped to True to
match production (compression.enabled defaults to True).
* fix(dashboard): populate cron delivery dropdown from configured platforms
The dashboard cron-create/edit dropdown hardcoded five delivery options
(local, telegram, discord, slack, email), so users on Matrix — or any
other backend-supported platform — had no way to pick their channel even
though the cron scheduler delivers to all of them. It also offered
Telegram/Discord/etc. to users who never set those up.
- cron/scheduler.py: add cron_delivery_targets() — the single source of
truth. Intersects gateway-configured platforms with cron-deliverable
ones and reports whether each platform's home channel is set.
- web_server.py: GET /api/cron/delivery-targets exposes that list (+ the
implicit local option) to the dashboard.
- CronPage.tsx: both modals render options from the endpoint. Configured
platforms missing a home channel still appear, annotated "set a home
channel first" (option B), so the user knows what to fix. Edit modal
preserves a job's current target even if it's no longer configured.
Local-only state shows a "configure a platform under Channels" hint.
Validation: scheduler + endpoint E2E'd with a Matrix gateway (home set
and unset); 5 new tests; tests/cron + tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server
green (366 passed).
Follow-up on the parallel-dispatch decoupling: the sequential pass for
workdir/profile jobs still ran inline in the ticker thread, so a long
workdir/profile job reintroduced the exact starvation #37312 describes,
just for env-mutating jobs. And the MCP orphan sweep ran immediately
after dispatch in sync=False mode — before jobs finished — defeating its
own 'runs after every job' contract and racing jobs still spawning MCP
children.
- Sequential jobs now queue to a persistent single-thread cron-seq pool
(preserves one-at-a-time ordering across ticks, never blocks the tick).
- Same in-flight dedup guard now covers sequential jobs.
- MCP orphan sweep runs via a done-callback after the LAST dispatched job
completes in async mode; inline after as_completed in sync mode.
Verified E2E: tick(sync=False) returns in ~1ms with a 1.5s sequential job
in flight; sweep fires only after that job ends.
PR #13021 fixed serial starvation by adding ThreadPoolExecutor to tick(),
but kept as_completed(timeout=600) which still blocks the ticker thread
until the slowest job finishes. This causes the same starvation pattern:
when one job runs long (15+ min), other jobs' next_run_at expires past the
grace window and they get perpetually fast-forwarded instead of running.
This PR decouples dispatch from completion:
- Persistent ThreadPoolExecutor (reused across ticks, no auto-join)
- Fire-and-forget dispatch: tick submits and returns immediately
- Running-job guard: prevents re-dispatching active jobs
- sync parameter: defaults to True (backward compatible), callers opt
into sync=False for non-blocking behavior
- atexit shutdown handler for clean pool teardown
- gateway/run.py: production ticker opts into sync=False
Refs #33315 (complementary — that issue's PRs fix grace handling in
jobs.py; this PR prevents the grace from expiring in the first place)
A stray zero-width space (U+200B), BOM, or bidi control in loaded skill
markdown permanently killed any cron that loaded it. The skills-attached
assembled-prompt scan hard-blocked on any invisible-unicode char, even
though skill bodies are already install-time vetted by skills_guard.py and
the chars commonly appear in copy-pasted unicode docs / code examples.
The skills path now strips invisibles (logging the codepoints) and runs the
cleaned prompt. The raw user-prompt path (_scan_cron_prompt) keeps the hard
block — that is the actual #3968 injection surface, where a small directive
prompt with a ZWSP is a smoking gun, not prose. Stripping does not let a real
injection slip through: the directive still matches after sanitization.
_scan_cron_skill_assembled now returns (cleaned_prompt, error).
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
Two unrelated transient failures on PR #33661's initial CI run, both
pre-existing on main and recovered on rerun. Hardening:
1. tests/cron/test_scheduler.py::TestRunJobConfigLogging — added mocks for
resolve_runtime_provider() and discover_mcp_tools(). The yaml-warning
tests intend to exercise only the warning-log path, but
_run_job_impl continues into provider resolution and MCP discovery
after the warning. Both can spawn subprocesses / hit the network and
pushed the test over its 30s budget under GHA load.
2. tests/tools/test_browser_supervisor.py — wrapped Chrome teardown
against the stdlib subprocess._wait() race (bpo-38630). When SIGCHLD
arrives during proc.wait(), _try_wait(WNOHANG) can return a foreign
pid and the 'assert pid == self.pid or pid == 0' fires. Fixture now
catches AssertionError/TimeoutExpired, force-kills, and always reaps
so no zombie escapes. Same hardening applied to the early-skip branch.
The runtime cron prompt scanner (added in #3968 to plug the
"malicious skill carrying an injection payload" gap) reuses the same
critical-severity patterns as the create-time user-prompt scan against
the *assembled* prompt — which includes loaded skill markdown.
That works fine for narrow patterns like "ignore previous instructions"
which never legitimately appear in prose. It catastrophically false-
positives on command-shape patterns like `cat ~/.hermes/.env`,
`authorized_keys`, `/etc/sudoers`, and `rm -rf /`, which routinely
appear in security postmortems and runbooks as **descriptive prose**
about attacks, not as actual commands.
Concrete failure: the bundled `hermes-agent-dev` skill contains a
security postmortem section saying "the attacker could just
`cat ~/.hermes/.env`". Every PR-scout cron job that loaded this skill
was silently blocked with `Blocked: prompt matches threat pattern
'read_secrets'`. All 11 scout jobs failed for weeks.
Fix: split the scanner into two tiers and route by context:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` (strict, unchanged behavior) runs against
the small user-authored cron prompt at create/update and as a
runtime defense-in-depth when no skills are attached. A legit
user prompt has no business saying `cat .env`, so the strict
patterns still apply there.
- `_scan_cron_skill_assembled` (new, looser) runs against the
assembled prompt when skills are attached. It only catches
unambiguous prompt-injection directives ("ignore previous
instructions", "disregard your rules", "system prompt override",
"do not tell the user") plus invisible-unicode markers. Command-
shape patterns are dropped because they false-positive on prose.
This is defense-in-depth, not the only line of defense. Skill bodies
are already scanned at install time by `skills_guard.py`; the runtime
cron scan exists purely as a tripwire for an obvious injection
directive surviving a malicious install. Catching prose mentions of
commands was never the goal of #3968 — the test that planted a skill
containing `cat ~/.hermes/.env` was the wrong shape of test for the
threat model.
Tests:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` strict behavior preserved (56 existing tests
unchanged: bare `cat .env`, `rm -rf /`, etc. still block).
- New `TestScanCronSkillAssembled` class verifies the looser scanner:
injection / disregard / system-override / do-not-tell-the-user /
invisible-unicode still block; descriptive prose about attack
commands is allowed; GitHub auth-header allowlist still works.
- `test_skill_with_env_exfil_payload_raises` (planted `cat .env`
in skill body) replaced with `test_skill_with_env_exfil_command
_in_prose_is_allowed` documenting the new correct behavior with
the real-world postmortem-style example that triggered the bug.
- All 11 originally-failing PR-scout jobs validated end-to-end via
`_build_job_prompt` — assembled prompts now build successfully
with the `hermes-agent-dev` skill attached.
Total: 75/75 tests in cron + cronjob_tools + threat scanner pass;
544/544 across the wider cron / memory / threat-pattern surface.
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The bug: cron/scheduler.py:_resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets returns an
LLM-supplied per-job enabled_toolsets verbatim. The disabled_toolsets
passed to AIAgent was a hardcoded [cronjob, messaging, clarify] that
ignored agent.disabled_toolsets from config.yaml. An LLM could call
cronjob(action='add', enabled_toolsets=['terminal','file'],
prompt='...') and the cron-spawned agent would receive terminal+file
even when the operator had globally disabled them.
Fix: new _resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets() helper that ALWAYS layers
agent.disabled_toolsets on top of the cron baseline. AIAgent's
disabled_toolsets takes precedence over enabled_toolsets, so this
stops the bypass regardless of what the per-job override contains.
This is the disabled-side fix. Three concurrent PRs (#25842, #25815,
#25780) proposed intersection-side variants on _resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets;
this fix is more robust because it stops the leak at the precedence
boundary AIAgent itself enforces, not at a layer above.
Regression test reproduces the issue's PoC exactly:
config.yaml has agent.disabled_toolsets=[terminal,file]; cron job has
enabled_toolsets=[web,terminal,file]; assertion: AIAgent receives
disabled_toolsets containing terminal AND file.
Salvaged from PR #25786 by @Schrotti77. Simplified the implementation:
dropped a 23-line _normalize_toolset_list() helper (handled str/tuple/
set/garbage input shapes) in favor of the existing convention
(agent_cfg.get('disabled_toolsets') or []) used elsewhere in the
codebase. YAML always parses these as lists; the elaborate normalizer
was theatre for shapes we never produce.
Closes#25752
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
Add an official, production-grade WhatsApp integration via Meta's
Business Cloud API as a complement to the existing Baileys bridge.
No bridge subprocess, no QR codes, no account-ban risk — at the cost
of a Meta Business account and a public HTTPS webhook URL.
Setup is fully wizard-driven: 'hermes whatsapp-cloud' walks through
every credential with paste-time validation (catches the #1 trap of
pasting a phone number into the Phone Number ID field), generates a
verify token, and ends with copy-paste instructions for the
cloudflared / Meta-dashboard / Business Manager pieces that can't be
automated. The wizard also points users at Meta's Business Manager
for setting the bot's display name and profile picture.
Feature set:
- Inbound: text, images (with native-vision routing), voice notes
(STT), documents (small text inlined, larger cached), reply context.
- Outbound: text with WhatsApp-flavored markdown conversion, images,
videos, documents, opus voice notes via ffmpeg with MP3 fallback.
- Native interactive buttons for clarify, dangerous-command approval,
and slash-command confirmation flows — matches the Telegram /
Discord UX, graceful degrades to plain text.
- Read receipts (blue double-checkmarks) and typing indicator,
using Meta's combined endpoint so they fire in a single API call.
- Webhook security: X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC verification (raw body,
constant-time), wamid deduplication, group-shaped-message refusal
(groups deferred to v2 — Baileys still covers them).
- Full integration with the gateway's session, cron, display-tier,
prompt-hint, and auth-allowlist systems. Cloud and Baileys can run
side-by-side against different phone numbers.
Also wires STT (speech-to-text) through Nous's managed audio gateway
for Nous subscribers — previously the default stt.provider=local
required a separate faster-whisper install. New subscribers now get
voice-note transcription out of the box.
Docs: 418-line user guide at website/docs/user-guide/messaging/
whatsapp-cloud.md, sidebar entry, environment-variables reference,
ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md updated with the optional interactive-UX
contract for future adapter authors.
Tests: 100 dedicated tests for the adapter, 32 for the setup wizard,
20 for the Nous subscription STT wiring, plus regression coverage
across display_config, prompt_builder, and the cron scheduler.
Known limitations (deferred until clear demand signal):
- Group chats — use the Baileys bridge if you need them.
- Message templates for 24-hour-window outside-conversation sends —
reactive chat is unaffected; cron / delegate_task with gaps > 24h
will fail with a clear error. The agent's system prompt warns the
model about this so it knows to mention it when scheduling delayed
messages.
