Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
The stage2-hook auth.json seed is first-boot-only ([ ! -f auth.json ]) to avoid
clobbering rotated refresh tokens on restart. That guard means a container whose
Nous bootstrap session took a terminal invalid_grant (tokens cleared,
providers.nous.last_auth_error.relogin_required stamped) cannot recover from a
restart — it stays unauthenticated until the credential is replaced.
Add a self-heal path: an orchestrator that manages the container supplies a
freshly-issued session via HERMES_AUTH_JSON_REBOOTSTRAP (distinct from the
create-only *_BOOTSTRAP var). On boot, scripts/docker_rebootstrap_nous_session.py
swaps ONLY the providers.nous entry, and ONLY when the on-disk entry is provably
terminal (quarantine marker + no usable tokens). Healthy/rotating/absent/
unparseable auth.json is always a no-op, so the env is safe to leave set across
restarts and never clobbers a good token. Pure stdlib, runs as its own
subprocess, always exits 0 so a re-seed error never fails the boot.
Reuses the same terminal predicate as get_nous_session_validity() so we re-seed
only a session that is genuinely dead.
