Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
Two tightenings on /auth/native/authorize (a public pre-auth route):
- Per-IP pending cap (8): the broker store is capacity-bounded fail-closed
at 256 entries with a 600s TTL, so one unauthenticated spammer could fill
it and deny native sign-in gateway-wide for the pending window. Pending
entries now record the requester IP and each address is capped well above
any legitimate concurrent-login count; other addresses keep signing in.
- Loopback redirect_uri accepts IP literals only (127.0.0.1 / ::1):
'localhost' can be re-pointed via the hosts file or a hostile resolver
(RFC 8252 \u00a78.3 says to use loopback IP literals); the desktop always
sends 127.0.0.1, so nothing legitimate used the name.
3 new tests: per-IP cap enforced, cap frees on TTL expiry, localhost
redirect rejected at the route.
The Desktop app can now sign in to a gated gateway using the user's SYSTEM
browser and OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC 8252) instead of an embedded
Electron BrowserWindow, and authenticates with bearer tokens it holds itself
instead of relying on HttpOnly browser session cookies.
Why brokered: the upstream IDP (Nous Portal) binds client_id to the gateway
instance and only permits redirect_uris on the gateway's own origin, so a
desktop loopback redirect can't be a direct Portal client. The gateway
therefore acts as the authorization server TO the desktop and an OAuth client
TO the Portal, reusing the existing PKCE start_login/complete_login provider
path unchanged.
Server (Ben's dashboard-auth lane):
- native_flow.py: in-memory broker — binds the desktop's PKCE challenge to a
completed Session, mints a single-use, short-TTL, PKCE-verified gateway
authorization code. Constant-time compare, single-use (consumed before the
PKCE check so a wrong verifier can't be retried), capacity-bounded.
- routes.py: GET /auth/native/authorize (starts the brokered PKCE login,
loopback-only redirect_uri, S256-only), POST /auth/native/token (loopback
code + verifier -> tokens in the JSON body, never Set-Cookie), POST
/auth/native/refresh (desktop-held RT rotation). /auth/callback branches to
mint a loopback code + 302 to 127.0.0.1 when a broker_state rides the PKCE
cookie; the cookie/SPA path is untouched.
- middleware.py: the gate accepts Authorization: Bearer <access_token>,
verified via the same verify_session provider stack (no cookie set/read),
with the same "provider unreachable -> 503, not logout" semantics.
- web_server.py /api/status: advertise auth_flows (["cookie","native_pkce"])
so clients can detect the capability; native_pkce only when a brokerable
OAuth provider is registered.
Desktop (Ben's lane):
- native-oauth.ts: pure PKCE/capability/URL/callback/token helpers.
- native-oauth-login.ts: loopback-listener orchestration (system browser via
openExternal, ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listener, state/PKCE verification), all
I/O injected for testability.
- main.ts: capability-gated oauth-login IPC — native flow when advertised,
automatic fallback to the existing embedded-webview cookie flow otherwise;
tokens stored encrypted (safeStorage/OS keychain), REST + ws-ticket
authenticated by bearer, transparent refresh, logout clears both shapes.
Tests: 18 server pytest (broker unit + full authorize->callback->token E2E +
cookieless bearer auth of a gated route + ws-ticket mint + capability
advertisement + refresh); desktop node --test/vitest for both pure modules
(PKCE, capability detection, callback CSRF, loopback round trip, timeout,
browser-open failure). Electron project typechecks clean.
Docs: website/docs/guides/desktop-native-signin.md.
