git remote set-url with an embedded password (https://PASSWORD@github.com)
leaked the credential into agent output — the redaction engine only masked
user:pass@ DB connection strings, never the colon-less bare-token userinfo
form a git remote uses.
Add _URL_BARE_TOKEN_RE: scheme://TOKEN@host for web/transport schemes
(http/https/wss/git/ssh/ftp), 8+ char floor to skip short usernames, token
class forbidding /:@ so an @ in a path/query is never treated as userinfo.
Deliberately scoped to the bare-token form only. The user:pass@ colon form
and query-string tokens stay passing through (#34029, 'pass web URLs through
unchanged') so magic-link / OAuth round-trip skills keep working — a bare
credential in userinfo is never a workflow token (those live in the query
string), so masking it can't break a skill.
The salvaged #35519 regression guard asserted that default (non-file_read)
mode keeps a head/tail `ghp_S1...Pn2T` mask for a `token: <key>` line. On
current main the YAML config pass (`_YAML_ASSIGN_RE`, key `token`) re-masks
the already-prefix-masked value to `***`, so the assertion was stale. Switch
to a bare-token context so the guard isolates what it claims (prefix-mask
head/tail shape in default mode) without depending on the YAML collapse.
When security.redact_secrets is on (default), read_file/search_files/cat
applied redact_sensitive_text(code_file=True) to file content, which still
ran prefix masking. An API key in config.yaml (ghp_..., sk-..., xai-..., etc.)
came back as a head/tail mask like `ghp_S1...Pn2T` — a plausible-looking
truncated key. When an agent read that and wrote it back to config, the masked
value replaced the real credential, silently breaking auth (401). Production
evidence: a config.yaml found containing the exact 13-char masked GitHub PAT.
The two community PRs (#35529, #35534) fixed the corruption by NOT redacting
prefixes for config reads — but that exposes the user's real keys to the agent
context, model, and logs (a security regression). This takes the safer route:
keep redacting, but for file content emit a NON-REUSABLE sentinel.
- New `_mask_token_nonreusable`: prefix secrets -> `«redacted:ghp_…»` (vendor
label preserved for debuggability; zero secret bytes; angle-bracket/ellipsis
wrapper is syntactically invalid as a token so it can't be mistaken for or
written back as a usable key).
- New `redact_sensitive_text(file_read=True)` routes prefix matches through it
(implies code_file=True). Default/log/display mode is UNCHANGED — `_mask_token`
still keeps head/tail (fine for logs, never written back).
- Wired the 3 file_tools.py call sites (read_file / search_files / cat) to
file_read=True.
Fixes both the corruption AND avoids the secret-exposure of the un-redact
approach. 6 new tests (sentinel shape, no-leak, not-a-plausible-key, default
mode unchanged, file_read implies code_file, sk- prefix); 88 redact tests pass;
mutation-verified (reverting to the old mask fails the sentinel/leak tests).
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: adammatski1972 <289282750+adammatski1972@users.noreply.github.com>
Closes#35519. Supersedes #35529, #35534.
* fix(security): redact secrets in background process + foreground env-dump output
Terminal-output redaction was incomplete (#43025):
- Gap 1: process(action=poll/log/wait) returned background stdout verbatim —
no redaction at all. A background printenv/server/test emitting a key leaked
raw to the model, session.db, and CLI display. Same for the gateway
background-process watcher's completion/progress notifications.
- Gap 2: the foreground terminal path hardcoded code_file=True, which skips the
ENV-assignment pass, so an opaque token (no vendor prefix) from env/printenv
leaked even there.
Adds agent.redact.redact_terminal_output(output, command) as the single policy
for ALL terminal-output surfaces: env-dump commands (env/printenv/set/export/
declare) get the ENV-assignment pass (code_file=False) to mask opaque tokens;
other commands stay on code_file=True to avoid false positives on source dumps.
Wired into terminal_tool, process_registry (_handle_process boundary), and the
gateway watcher. Respects security.redact_secrets (no force) — opt-out preserved.
* docs: add infographic for #43025 terminal-output redaction fix
Two related redaction bugs from #43083:
1. build_assistant_message redacted tool-call arguments in-memory. That dict
feeds both the replayed conversation history and state.db (which is itself
replayed verbatim on session resume), so the model read back its own
PGPASSWORD='***' psql call and copied the placeholder, breaking every
credential-dependent command on the second turn. The masking gave no real
protection either — the same secret still leaks through tool OUTPUT. Remove
it. Keeping secrets out of the replayable store is a separate
tokenization/vault concern (security.redact_secrets still governs
storage-time redaction elsewhere).
2. _AUTH_HEADER_RE's greedy \S+ credential class ate a closing quote when the
token sat flush against it (Authorization: Bearer sk-.."), turning value
corruption into syntax corruption (unterminated quote -> shell EOF /
SyntaxError). Exclude " and ' from the token class; real credentials never
contain them.
Closes#43083.
Secret redaction is display/output-scoped on main — write_file writes
content verbatim, terminal/execute_code redact only output not the
command/source. The real bug is in displayed tool OUTPUT (read_file,
terminal, execute_code):
_DB_CONNSTR_RE's password group [^@]+ was greedy across newlines, so on a
multi-line block it scanned past the DSN line to the next stray '@' (a
Python @decorator), replacing every intervening character — including line
breaks — with ***. That dropped lines and concatenated the next line onto
the f-string line, making read_file output look corrupted (the file on disk
was always correct). Reported in #33801.
Fix:
- Forbid whitespace in the userinfo/password groups ([^:\s]+ / [^@\s]+) so
the match can never span a line break. A real DSN password never contains
whitespace. This alone kills the catastrophic line-dropping.
- Under code_file=True, preserve a password group that is a pure {...} brace
expression — f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}" is an f-string template,
not a live credential. Literal passwords are still masked.
- Pass code_file=True at the terminal and execute_code output redaction call
sites (file_tools already did) so code-execution output isn't corrupted by
ENV/JSON/template false positives. Real prefixes, auth headers, JWTs, and
private keys are still redacted.
Verified E2E against the reporter's exact pydantic-settings module: file
written verbatim, read_file shows the DSN f-string + @model_validator intact
with zero *** corruption, while a literal postgresql://admin:pw@host DSN and
a real sk- key are still masked.
Reported-by: koishi70
Reported-by: pfrenssen
The secret redactor only matched uppercase env-style keys ([A-Z0-9_]),
so config-file assignments like spring.datasource.password=secret,
app.api.key=xyz, and YAML password: secret leaked verbatim when the
agent ran cat/grep on application.properties or .env files (issue #16413).
Adds three case-insensitive config-key matchers that run only in a
config-file context, preserving the existing #4367 (lowercase code/prose)
and web-URL-passthrough carve-outs:
- _CFG_DOTTED_RE: namespaced keys (contain a dot) — unambiguously config
- _CFG_ANCHORED_RE: bare secret-word keys at line start (incl. export)
- _YAML_ASSIGN_RE: unquoted colon config (password: value)
Value capture stops at whitespace and '&' so form bodies stay pair-wise;
the '://' guard keeps intentional web-URL query-param passthrough intact.
Reported-by: Murtaza1211
Secret redaction only matched `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Other auth
headers passed through verbatim into logs, tool output, and transcripts:
- `Authorization: Basic <base64>` — leaks base64(user:password)
- `Authorization: token <pat>` / any non-Bearer scheme
- `Proxy-Authorization: ...`
- `x-api-key: <key>` (Anthropic and many providers) and `api-key`,
`x-goog-api-key`, `x-auth-token`, `x-access-token`, ... — opaque values with
no known vendor prefix were caught by nothing
A logged request or an echoed `curl -H "x-api-key: ..."` command therefore
leaked live credentials.
Generalize the Authorization rule to mask the credential for any scheme (and
Proxy-Authorization) while preserving the header name and scheme word for
debuggability, and add an api-key header rule for the single-opaque-value
headers. Bearer behavior is unchanged; plain prose containing the word
"authorization" (no colon-delimited value) is left untouched.
Adds regression tests for Basic/token/Proxy auth and the x-api-key/api-key
headers, including inside a curl command.
Keep request dump writes on the shared atomic JSON path, add regression coverage for request body/error/stdout redaction, and map the salvaged contributor email for release attribution.
Rewrite TestDiscordMentions as negative assertions (mentions survive the
redactor) and clean up the orphaned comment + dangling whitespace left by
removing _DISCORD_MENTION_RE. Follow-up to the salvaged #32259 fix for #35611.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
* fix(redact): pass web URLs through unchanged
Magic-link checkout URLs, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow,
and pre-signed share URLs were getting `?token=***` / `?code=***` /
`?signature=***` blanket-redacted by parameter NAME, which breaks any
skill that has to round-trip a URL through history (the model's tool
call arguments get sanitized before persistence — the live call fires
with the real URL, but the next turn sees `***`).
Joe Rinaldi Johnson hit this with a checkout-acceleration skill that
uses magic links in URLs.
Drops three call sites from `redact_sensitive_text`:
- `_redact_url_query_params` (was redacting `access_token`, `token`,
`api_key`, `code`, `signature`, `key`, `auth`, etc.)
- `_redact_url_userinfo` (was redacting `https://user:pass@host`)
- `_redact_http_request_target_query_params` (was redacting access-log
request targets like `"POST /hook?password=... HTTP/1.1"`)
The helpers themselves are kept in the module — still importable by
anything that wants to opt in explicitly.
Still redacted (unchanged):
- Vendor-prefix credential shapes (sk-, ghp_, AKIA, gAAAA, etc.)
anywhere they appear, including inside URLs — see the
`test_known_prefix_inside_url_still_redacted` case.
- JWTs (`eyJ...`)
- DB connection-string passwords (`postgres://admin:pw@host`) —
these are connection strings, not web URLs the agent navigates to.
- Authorization headers, ENV assignments, JSON `apiKey`/`token` fields,
Telegram bot tokens, private key blocks, Discord mentions, E.164
phone numbers, and form-urlencoded bodies (request bodies, not URLs).
Tests: replaces `TestUrlQueryParamRedaction` + `TestUrlUserinfoRedaction`
with `TestWebUrlsNotRedacted`, asserting representative URLs (OAuth
callback, magic link, S3 pre-signed, websocket, userinfo, access log)
pass through unchanged. Adds positive cases proving the prefix and DB
connstr nets still fire. 74 redact tests + 10 browser-exfil + 16 PII
redaction tests all pass.
* test(codex_app_server): drop URL-query assertion from stderr-tail redaction test
The test bundled (a) sk-live-* credential-prefix redaction with (b)
URL query-param redaction. (a) is still in effect via _PREFIX_RE;
(b) was the contract we just removed in the parent commit so the
'querysecret12345' assertion stopped holding. Keep the credential-shape
assertion, drop the URL-query one.
Send-message tool's local _URL_SECRET_QUERY_RE in tools/send_message_tool.py
is independent of agent/redact.py and unchanged — its tests
(test_top_level_send_failure_redacts_query_token,
test_http_error_redacts_access_token_in_exception_text) still pass.
xAI is a first-class provider in hermes-agent with its own credential
pool entry (XAI_API_KEY / xai-oauth). API keys follow the format
xai-<60+ alphanumeric chars> and were absent from _PREFIX_PATTERNS in
agent/redact.py.
When a key appears raw in log output, tool results, or error messages,
it passed through completely unmasked. The ENV-assignment and Bearer
header patterns catch the most common cases, but a raw token in a
stack trace or debug print had no protection.
Verified before fix:
redact_sensitive_text("using key xai-ABCD...rstu to call xAI", force=True)
# "using key xai-ABCD...rstu to call xAI" <- exposed
After fix:
# "using key xai-AB...rstu to call xAI" <- masked
Five unit tests added to TestXaiToken covering bare token masking,
env assignment, short-prefix false positive, company name false
positive, and visible prefix in masked output.
* feat(security): URL query param + userinfo + form body redaction
Port from nearai/ironclaw#2529.
Hermes already has broad value-shape coverage in agent/redact.py
(30+ vendor prefixes, JWTs, DB connstrs, etc.) but missed three
key-name-based patterns that catch opaque tokens without recognizable
prefixes:
1. URL query params - OAuth callback codes (?code=...),
access_token, refresh_token, signature, etc. These are opaque and
won't match any prefix regex. Now redacted by parameter NAME.
2. URL userinfo (https://user:pass@host) - for non-DB schemes. DB
schemes were already handled by _DB_CONNSTR_RE.
3. Form-urlencoded body (k=v pairs joined by ampersands) -
conservative, only triggers on clean pure-form inputs with no
other text.
Sensitive key allowlist matches ironclaw's (exact case-insensitive,
NOT substring - so token_count and session_id pass through).
Tests: +20 new test cases across 3 test classes. All 75 redact tests
pass; gateway/test_pii_redaction and tools/test_browser_secret_exfil
also green.
Known pre-existing limitation: _ENV_ASSIGN_RE greedy match swallows
whole all-caps ENV-style names + trailing text when followed by
another assignment. Left untouched here (out of scope); URL query
redaction handles the lowercase case.
* feat: replace kimi-k2.5 with kimi-k2.6 on OpenRouter and Nous Portal
Update model catalogs for OpenRouter (fallback snapshot), Nous Portal,
and NVIDIA NIM to reference moonshotai/kimi-k2.6. Add kimi-k2.6 to
the fixed-temperature frozenset in auxiliary_client.py so the 0.6
contract is enforced on aggregator routings.
Native Moonshot provider lists (kimi-coding, kimi-coding-cn, moonshot,
opencode-zen, opencode-go) are unchanged — those use Moonshot's own
model IDs which are unaffected.
Found via trace data audit: JWT tokens (eyJ...) and Discord snowflake
mentions (<@ID>) were passing through unredacted.
JWT pattern: matches 1/2/3-part tokens starting with eyJ (base64 for '{').
Zero false-positive risk — no normal text matches eyJ + 10+ base64url chars.
Discord pattern: matches <@digits> and <@!digits> with 17-20 digit snowflake
IDs. Syntactically unique to Discord's mention format.
Both patterns follow the same structural-uniqueness standard as existing
prefix patterns (sk-, ghp_, AKIA, etc.).
Add 5 regression tests from PR #4476 (gnanam1990) to prevent re-introducing
the IGNORECASE bug that caused lowercase Python/TypeScript variable assignments
to be incorrectly redacted as secrets. The core fix landed in 6367e1c4.
Tests cover:
- Lowercase Python variable with 'token' in name
- Lowercase Python variable with 'api_key' in name
- TypeScript 'await' not treated as secret value
- TypeScript 'secret' variable assignment
- 'export' prefix preserved for uppercase env vars
Co-authored-by: gnanam1990 <gnanam1990@users.noreply.github.com>
The _REDACT_ENABLED constant is snapshotted at import time, so
monkeypatch.delenv() alone doesn't re-enable redaction during tests
when HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=false is set in the host environment.
ElevenLabs (sk_), Tavily (tvly-), and Exa (exa_) keys were not covered
by _PREFIX_PATTERNS, leaking in plain text via printenv or log output.
Salvaged from PR #3790 by @memosr. Tests rewritten with correct
assertions (original tests had vacuously true checks).
Co-authored-by: memosr <memosr@users.noreply.github.com>
- test_plugins.py: remove tests for unimplemented plugin command API
(get_plugin_command_handler, register_command never existed)
- test_redact.py: add autouse fixture to clear HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS
env var leaked by cli.py import in other tests
- test_signal.py: same HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS fix for phone redaction
- test_mattermost.py: add @bot_user_id to test messages after the
mention-only filter was added in #2443
- test_context_token_tracking.py: mock resolve_provider_client for
openai-codex provider that requires real OAuth credentials
Full suite: 5893 passed, 0 failed.
redact_sensitive_text() now returns early for None and coerces other
non-string values to str before applying regex-based redaction,
preventing TypeErrors in logging/tool-output paths.
Cherry-picked from PR #2369 by aydnOktay.
When a skill declares required_environment_variables in its YAML
frontmatter, missing env vars trigger a secure TUI prompt (identical
to the sudo password widget) when the skill is loaded. Secrets flow
directly to ~/.hermes/.env, never entering LLM context.
Key changes:
- New required_environment_variables frontmatter field for skills
- Secure TUI widget (masked input, 120s timeout)
- Gateway safety: messaging platforms show local setup guidance
- Legacy prerequisites.env_vars normalized into new format
- Remote backend handling: conservative setup_needed=True
- Env var name validation, file permissions hardened to 0o600
- Redact patterns extended for secret-related JSON fields
- 12 existing skills updated with prerequisites declarations
- ~48 new tests covering skip, timeout, gateway, remote backends
- Dynamic panel widget sizing (fixes hardcoded width from original PR)
Cherry-picked from PR #723 by kshitijk4poor, rebased onto current main
with conflict resolution.
Fixes#688
Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
- Introduce a new test suite for the `redact_sensitive_text` function, covering various sensitive data formats including API keys, tokens, and environment variables.
- Ensure that sensitive information is properly masked in logs and outputs while non-sensitive data remains unchanged.
- Add tests for different scenarios including JSON fields, authorization headers, and environment variable assignments.
- Implement a redacting formatter for logging to enhance security during log output.
