The auxiliary Codex adapter maintained its own chat->Responses conversion
loop that forwarded every non-system message's role verbatim into
Responses input[]. When flush_memories()/compression replayed session
history containing assistant tool_calls + role=tool results, those tool
messages leaked into the request and the Responses API rejected them with
HTTP 400: Invalid value: 'tool'.
Route _CodexCompletionsAdapter.create() through the same shared converter
the main agent transport uses (_chat_messages_to_responses_input), so tool
calls become function_call items and tool results become function_call_output
items with a valid call_id. Single conversion path means no future drift.
Also remove the now-dead _convert_content_for_responses() helper — its only
caller was the private conversion loop this change deletes.
Co-authored-by: ProgramCaiCai <techxacm@gmail.com>
Batch extraction of every remaining subcommand whose handler is top-level and
whose parser block is pure argparse: model, setup, postinstall, whatsapp, slack,
login, logout, auth, status, webhook, hooks, doctor, security, dump, debug,
backup, import, config, version, update, uninstall, dashboard, gui, logs,
prompt-size.
Each becomes hermes_cli/subcommands/<name>.py with build_<name>_parser() and an
injected handler (no main import). dashboard also injects cmd_dashboard_register
for its nested 'register' action.
Behavior-neutral: all 25 subcommands' --help output (and nested subaction help)
diff-verified byte-identical to pre-extraction. Two RawDescriptionHelpFormatter
epilogs (debug, logs) needed their multi-line string interiors preserved at
column 0 — caught by the --help diff, not compile.
main() 3297 -> 1798 LOC across this PR; add_parser calls in main.py 179 -> 89.
Validation: tests/hermes_cli/ 6476 passed / 0 failed under per-file process
isolation; new test_subcommands_batch.py smoke-tests all 25 builders + the
dashboard two-handler case.
Follow-on to the cron extraction in the same Phase 2 PR. Same pattern:
per-group build_<name>_parser() functions with injected handlers, no main
import.
- subcommands/profile.py: build_profile_parser (190-line block out of main()).
- subcommands/gateway.py: build_gateway_parser (gateway + proxy, 238-line block;
they shared one inline section). Imports argparse for SUPPRESS defaults.
- main(): two more inline blocks become single builder calls.
Behavior-neutral: 'profile [sub] --help' and 'gateway/proxy [sub] --help'
byte-identical to pre-extraction (diff-verified).
main() now 2723 LOC (was 3297 at Phase 2 start); add_parser calls in main.py
179 -> 141.
Validation: tests/hermes_cli/ 6476 passed / 0 failed under per-file process
isolation; new builder unit tests cover subactions, aliases, dispatch, flags.
Phase 2 of the god-file decomposition plan. main()'s argparse tree is 179
inline add_parser calls in one 3,297-line function. This establishes the
hermes_cli/subcommands/ package and extracts the first group (cron) as the
proof-of-pattern:
- hermes_cli/subcommands/_shared.py: shared parser helpers (add_accept_hooks_flag),
re-exported from main.py for backwards compat.
- hermes_cli/subcommands/cron.py: build_cron_parser(subparsers, cmd_cron=...).
Handler injected so the module never imports main (cycle avoidance).
- main()'s ~155-line inline cron block becomes one build_cron_parser() call.
Behavior-neutral: 'hermes cron create --help' output is byte-identical to
origin/main. main() 3297 -> 3143 LOC.
Validation: tests/hermes_cli/ 6466 passed / 0 failed under per-file process
isolation; new test_subcommands_cron.py covers subactions, aliases, options,
no-agent tristate, injected dispatch, and --accept-hooks.
Phase 1 of the god-file decomposition plan. run_conversation's ~470-line
once-per-turn setup block (stdio guarding, retry-counter resets, user-message
sanitization, todo/nudge hydration, system-prompt restore-or-build,
crash-resilience persistence, preflight compression, the pre_llm_call hook, and
external-memory prefetch) is moved verbatim into build_turn_context(), which
returns a TurnContext dataclass the loop unpacks.
Behavior-neutral move-and-name refactor: the builder mutates `agent` exactly as
the inline code did; only the locals the loop reads back are returned.
- run_conversation: 4602 -> 4217 LOC (-385)
- agent/conversation_loop.py: 4965 -> ~4580 LOC
- new agent/turn_context.py: focused, dependency-injected, unit-tested in isolation
Tests: tests/run_agent/ 1570 passed / 0 failed under per-file process isolation.
Relocation follow-ups: 413_compression mocks now patch both module references;
nudge/on_turn_start source-inspection guards point at the extracted module.
* fix(memory): make overflow errors instruct in-turn consolidation + retry
When bounded memory is full, the add/replace overflow errors now explicitly
tell the model to consolidate (merge/remove/shorten) and retry the write in
the same turn, matching the documented behavior. The replace-overflow path
now also echoes current_entries + usage for parity with add-overflow, so the
model has the same context to act on.
Closes#23378 (working-as-documented; this sharpens runtime to match docs).
* fix(memory): broaden overflow remediation hint beyond 'stale'
Say 'stale or less important' — entries don't have to be stale to be the
right ones to drop when making room.
Session-scoped /model and /reasoning overrides were silently lost on
Telegram DM/forum topics and after compression session splits (#30479).
Root cause: _handle_message_with_agent rewrites source.thread_id via
_recover_telegram_topic_thread_id (lobby/stripped reply -> the user's
bound topic) before deriving the session key. The /model and /reasoning
handlers derived their override key from the raw inbound event.source,
skipping that recovery, so the override was stored under one key and the
next message turn read a different key.
Fix: add _normalize_source_for_session_key (applies the same recovery a
message turn does) and use it in both handlers before deriving the key.
session_id rotation on compression was never the cause — overrides are
keyed by the durable session_key; the split path preserves it.
Author: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The conflict-retry path called asyncio.get_event_loop() to reschedule
itself when a retry's start_polling raised. On Python 3.11+ (our floor)
that raises 'RuntimeError: There is no current event loop in thread
MainThread' when no loop is attached to the thread, which is what
happens when PTB dispatches this error callback. The retry never gets
scheduled, the adapter goes silent-but-alive, and gateway --replace
keeps spawning fresh instances that hit the same wall — the crash loop
reported in #19471 (worse under multi-profile, where two bots hold the
same conflict open).
We are inside a coroutine here, so asyncio.get_running_loop() is the
correct, guaranteed-valid replacement. Only get_event_loop() call in
any platform adapter, so no sibling sites.
Fixes#19471
When a cron or background session compacts, it sets _previous_summary for
iterative updates. If that session ends without /new or /reset (which calls
on_session_reset()), the stale summary survives on the ContextCompressor
instance. A subsequent live messaging session's compaction then injects it as
'PREVIOUS SUMMARY:' into the summarizer prompt — contaminating the live
session with unrelated content from the prior session.
Add an else guard in compress(): when no handoff summary is found in the
current messages but _previous_summary is non-empty, discard it so
_generate_summary() starts fresh instead of iteratively updating a stale
cross-session summary.
Fixes#38788
build_session_key collapsed every DM that arrived without a chat_id into
one shared 'agent:main:<platform>:dm' key. A single cached AIAgent then
served multiple users' conversations, bleeding history across senders.
DMs now fall back to the sender's user_id_alt/user_id (mirroring the
group-path participant precedence and the telegram auth-path fallback)
before the bare per-platform sink. Telegram's normal event path always
sets chat_id, so this hardens the synthetic-source / non-standard-adapter
paths that don't.
The per-session compression lock prevents same-window concurrent forks but
not cross-turn ones: the background-review fork shares the parent's
session_id, so if it won a compression race its new child session was never
adopted by the gateway (the fork is single-lifecycle). The next foreground
turn then started from the stale parent and compressed it again, leaving the
same parent with two sibling children.
Set review_agent.compression_enabled = False so the fork never triggers
compression. Both trigger sites in conversation_loop.py gate on
compression_enabled before calling _compress_context, so the fork can never
rotate the shared parent. Review needs full context anyway — compressing
would degrade the memory/skill summary.
The per-session lock is kept as defense-in-depth for any future shared-session
path. Adds a regression test that fails without the flag and passes with it.
Closes#38727
Subagents delegated to a custom endpoint were misrouted when the parent
ran on a different custom endpoint. Both runtimes collapse to
provider="custom", so _resolve_child_credential_pool() treated them as
interchangeable and handed the child the parent's pool. Leasing from it
then overwrote the child's delegated base_url with the parent's endpoint
via _swap_credential() — the child sent the delegated model name to the
wrong endpoint.
Custom runtimes now resolve by endpoint identity (the custom:<name> pool
key derived from base_url). The parent pool is reused only when both
parent and child resolve to the same custom endpoint; unregistered raw
endpoints return None so the child keeps its fixed delegated credential.
Non-custom provider paths are unchanged.
Fixes#7833.
- web_server.py: after proc.poll() returns a non-None exit code, call
proc.wait() to reap the child and move the entry from _ACTION_PROCS
to _ACTION_RESULTS. Previously .poll() alone left <defunct> zombies.
- meet_bot.py: terminate and wait on the pcm_pump subprocess (paplay/
ffmpeg) during the finally-block teardown. Previously leaked on every
normal bot exit.
- tests: add test_action_status_reaps_completed_process and
test_action_status_ignores_wait_failure covering both the happy path
and the wait()-raises-OSError edge case.
Closes#38032
The copytree ignore lambda in _copy_dist_payload applied USER_OWNED_EXCLUDE
recursively at every directory depth. This caused nested directories whose
names matched exclude entries (bin, logs, cache, etc.) to be silently dropped
during distribution install/update.
Fix: only apply USER_OWNED_EXCLUDE filtering at the root of the staged tree,
matching the two-tier pattern used by _clone_all_copytree_ignore and
_default_export_ignore in profiles.py.
Add 5 tests covering nested bin/logs/cache preservation and top-level
filtering still working.
Fixes#37954
The WeChat iLink typing ticket has a 600-second TTL. When a long-running
session exceeds that window, the cached ticket evicts from TypingTicketCache.
Both send_typing and stop_typing silently returned early when the ticket was
None, meaning the TYPING_STOP=2 signal was never sent to iLink. The WeChat
client then showed the typing indicator indefinitely.
Fix: add _ensure_typing_ticket() that transparently refreshes the ticket
via getConfig when the cached one has expired or is missing. Both send_typing
and stop_typing now call this method instead of silently no-oping.
Fixes#38085
Problem: get_model_context_length() had an early return at the end of the
custom-endpoint probe branch (step 3) that returned DEFAULT_FALLBACK_CONTEXT
(256K) without ever consulting the hardcoded DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS catalog
(step 8). Models served through a custom/proxied gateway (e.g. corporate
Anthropic proxy) that didn't expose Ollama or local-server endpoints would
hit this path and get capped at 256K, even when the model name clearly
matched a known entry in the catalog (e.g. claude-opus-4-8 → 1M).
Changes:
- agent/model_metadata.py: Before returning DEFAULT_FALLBACK_CONTEXT at the
end of the custom-endpoint branch, consult DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS using
the same longest-key-first fuzzy matching as step 8. Only fall through
to 256K if no catalog entry matches.
- tests/agent/test_model_metadata.py: Updated existing test and added new
test covering the custom-endpoint → catalog fallback behavior.
Fixes#38865
Xiaomi MiMo (and potentially other providers) support multimodal user
messages but reject list-type tool message content with 400 'text is not
set'. Previously this was handled reactively — the API call would fail,
images would be stripped, and the request retried, losing visual info.
Fix: add supports_vision_tool_messages field to ProviderProfile (default
True). Xiaomi sets it to False. _tool_result_content_for_active_model
now checks this field proactively and returns a text summary instead of
list content, avoiding the round-trip failure entirely.
_supports_vision_override() in image_routing.py checked model.supports_vision
and providers.<name>.models, but not the legacy list-style custom_providers
config. A custom provider entry like:
custom_providers:
- name: my-provider
models:
my-model:
supports_vision: true
was ignored, causing image_input_mode=auto to route through the auxiliary
vision_analyze path instead of natively attaching images.
Fix: added a lookup step for custom_providers list entries, matching by
provider name (including 'custom:<name>' variants at runtime).
providers.<name>.models still takes precedence over custom_providers.
13 new tests covering: true/false override, custom: prefix matching,
no-match fallback, non-dict entries, empty lists, models key missing.
On older systemd versions that don't support RestartMaxDelaySec /
RestartSteps, the installed unit file has those directives silently
dropped. systemd_unit_is_current() did a strict text comparison, so
the unit was perpetually flagged as outdated.
Fix: _strip_optional_systemd_directives() removes RestartMaxDelaySec
and RestartSteps from both the installed and expected text before
comparison. Units that differ only by these optional directives are
now correctly considered current.
When summary_target_ratio is large (e.g. 0.45) and the context_length is
moderate (e.g. 96000), the soft_ceiling (token_budget * 1.5) can exceed
the total transcript size. _find_tail_cut_by_tokens walks the entire
transcript without breaking early, and the resulting compress window is
either empty (compress_start >= compress_end) or a single message whose
summary-of-one overhead saves ~0 tokens.
Both outcomes cause a no-op compression that does not increment
_ineffective_compression_count, so should_compress() returns True on
every subsequent turn and the loop repeats endlessly.
Fix (two layers):
1. _find_tail_cut_by_tokens: when the backward walk consumed the entire
transcript without breaking (cut_idx <= head_end and accumulated <=
soft_ceiling), re-walk with the raw (non-inflated) token budget to
find a meaningful cut that gives the summarizer a useful middle window.
2. compress(): when compress_start >= compress_end, increment
_ineffective_compression_count and log a warning so the existing
anti-thrashing guard in should_compress() can break the loop.
Fixes#40803
Two findings from Copilot's review on #15464, both addressed:
1. ``event.get("thread_ts")`` truthy vs
``event_thread_ts != ts``: the new channel branch treated ANY
truthy ``thread_ts`` as a real thread reply, but three lines below
``is_thread_reply`` is defined with the stricter
``event_thread_ts and event_thread_ts != ts`` invariant. If Slack
ever ships a payload where ``thread_ts == ts`` on a thread root,
the stricter check would treat it as a top-level message for the
``is_thread_reply`` path but as a thread reply for session keying
— divergent behaviour. Aligned this branch to the same
``and event_thread_ts_raw != ts`` invariant.
2. ``test_top_level_reply_to_id_stays_none_when_shared`` docstring
had the ternary logic backwards ("None != ts → reply_to_message_id
IS set"). The code reads
``reply_to_message_id = thread_ts if thread_ts != ts else None`` —
with ``thread_ts = None``, the condition is True so the expression
evaluates to ``thread_ts`` itself (None), meaning the reply stays
un-threaded. The test asserted the correct end-state; only the
explanatory docstring was wrong. Rewrote the docstring to match
the actual code flow, with the note that Copilot caught the
reversal.
7/7 tests still pass. No behaviour change for the existing
test_thread_reply_scopes_by_thread_even_when_shared case because
``event_thread_ts_raw = "1700000000.000000"`` and ``ts =
"1700000000.000005"`` are distinct — the new
``!= ts`` guard is a no-op there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Top-level Slack channel messages previously fell back to the message's
own ``ts`` as a synthetic ``thread_ts``:
thread_ts = event.get("thread_ts") or ts # ts fallback for channels
That value flows into ``build_source(thread_id=thread_ts)`` at
line 1247. The gateway session store keys sessions by
``(platform, channel_id, thread_id)``, so every top-level channel
message ended up on a unique session. Operators who set
``reply_in_thread: false`` in ``config.yaml`` expected all top-level
channel messages to share one session (the whole point of that flag)
— instead each one spawned a fresh conversation with no context
carry-over.
### Fix
Three explicit cases in the channel branch:
| event.thread_ts | reply_in_thread | thread_ts for session keying |
|---|---|---|
| non-null (real thread reply) | either | event.thread_ts |
| null (top-level) | true (default) | ts (legacy: own-thread sessions) |
| null (top-level) | false | **None** (shared channel session) |
The outbound-reply gate at line 1264 (``reply_to_message_id =
thread_ts if thread_ts != ts else None``) still works correctly in
all three cases without further changes: ``None != ts`` is True, so
shared-channel top-level messages don't get their reply threaded
either — matching the operator's ``reply_in_thread=false`` intent
end-to-end.
Genuine thread replies still scope per-thread under both modes so
multi-person threaded conversations can't collide with unrelated
channel chatter.
### Tests (7 new in ``tests/gateway/test_slack_channel_session_scope.py``)
All drive the real ``SlackAdapter._handle_slack_message`` code path
(not a re-implementation) via the standard pytest fixture pattern
used by ``tests/gateway/test_slack.py``. Messages @mention the bot
so the mention gate doesn't drop them — the tests are specifically
about what happens once the handler decides to emit a ``MessageEvent``.
* ``TestChannelSessionScopeDefault`` (2 cases):
- Explicit ``reply_in_thread: true`` keeps ``thread_id = ts``
(legacy behaviour — regression guard)
- Unset config behaves like ``reply_in_thread: true`` (pins the
default)
* ``TestChannelSessionScopeShared`` (3 cases):
- ``reply_in_thread: false`` + top-level → ``thread_id is None``
(the #15421 bug 1 fix)
- ``reply_to_message_id is None`` in the same case (no threaded
outbound reply)
- Genuine thread reply still scopes per-thread when shared mode is
on — only TOP-LEVEL messages collapse to the channel session
* ``TestThreadReplyAlwaysScopesByThread`` (2 parametrised cases):
- Thread replies get ``thread_id = event.thread_ts`` regardless of
``reply_in_thread`` — critical invariant for multi-thread
channels; a regression here would leak per-thread context across
threads
**Regression guard verified**: reverted the else-branch to the legacy
``thread_ts = event.get("thread_ts") or ts`` one-liner;
``test_top_level_maps_to_none_when_reply_in_thread_false`` correctly
failed (asserts ``thread_id is None`` but got ``"1700000000.000003"``).
Restored → 182 slack tests pass (175 existing + 7 new).
Scope: this fixes#15421 bug 1 only. Bug 2 (sessions.json not
persisting across compression) lives elsewhere in the session
manager and is left for a separate diff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The status-bar zap currently toggles per-session approval bypass (the same
scope as the TUI's Shift+Tab). This adds a global escape hatch: Shift+clicking
the zap flips the persistent approvals.mode in config.yaml between "off"
(bypass on) and "manual" (bypass off), affecting every session, the CLI, the
TUI, and cron — and it survives restarts.
- statusbar-controls: thread the click's shiftKey through onSelect via a new
StatusbarSelectModifiers arg.
- yolo-session: add setGlobalYolo() that calls config.set with scope="global".
- use-statusbar-items: branch toggleYolo on modifiers.shiftKey; plain click
stays per-session, Shift+click goes global.
- tui_gateway config.set "yolo" key: add scope="global" that reads/writes
approvals.mode through the gateway's own (mtime-cached) config view, honors
an explicit value, and re-emits session.info to every live session so each
window's zap reflects the flip immediately.
- i18n: tooltip copy in en/ja/zh/zh-hant notes Shift+click toggles globally.
Tests: two new tui_gateway tests cover the global toggle and explicit-value
paths; existing session/process-scope yolo tests still pass.
The todo list is re-injected into the model's context after every
context-compression event (TodoStore.format_for_injection), so an oversized
todo item or an unbounded number of items defeats the compression it is meant
to ride through. TodoStore.write/_validate previously enforced no size or count
bounds, so a single 50KB item produced a ~50KB re-injection block on every
subsequent turn.
Add two caps:
- MAX_TODO_CONTENT_CHARS (4000): per-item content is truncated with a marker.
Routed through a shared _cap_content() so the merge-update path (which writes
content directly, bypassing _validate) is capped too.
- MAX_TODO_ITEMS (256): total list length is bounded, keeping the
highest-priority head (list order is priority).
Both caps are generous relative to real plans — a todo item is a short task
description and active lists are a handful of items.
NOT a security fix. Raised externally via GHSA-5g4g-6jrg-mw3g, which framed a
caller-supplied conversation_history on the authenticated API server replaying
into _hydrate_todo_store as a DoS. That path is authenticated (the API server
refuses to start without API_SERVER_KEY) and self-scoped (the caller supplies
their own entire history and can only inflate their own response chain — forged
role=tool entries are never persisted to the session DB), so it is out of scope
as a vulnerability under SECURITY.md 3.2. These bounds are footgun containment
that also applies to the trusted agent path, where the model itself authors the
todos. Credit to the reporter for the observation.
Co-authored-by: YLChen-007 <30854794+YLChen-007@users.noreply.github.com>
Follow-up to #34306. The provider fix made SearXNG *usable* with a
config-only SEARXNG_URL, but tools/web_tools._has_env still read raw
os.getenv, so the backend auto-detect cascade and check_web_api_key
remained blind to it — SearXNG worked when explicitly selected but was
never auto-selected. Route _has_env (and the SearXNG diagnostic print)
through a config-aware _env_value helper mirroring the provider's
_searxng_url(). Fixing the shared helper covers every provider key in
one place. Adds regression tests for config-only auto-detect and
check_web_api_key. See #34290.
Desktop connected to a remote gateway can now attach images and PDFs and
display agent-written images. Previously the desktop passed a LOCAL file path
to image.attach; on a remote gateway that path doesn't exist, so the image was
silently dropped ("skipped unreadable path") and the vision model never saw it.
The reverse direction was also broken — images the agent wrote on the gateway
rendered as dead links in the remote client.
Gateway (tui_gateway/server.py):
- image.attach_bytes: base64 byte upload written into the gateway's own images
dir and queued via the existing native-image-attach pipeline. Magic-byte
extension sniffing, data-URL prefix + whitespace tolerance, 25 MB cap,
structured error codes. Accepts content_base64/filename (canonical) and
data/ext (older-desktop aliases).
- pdf.attach: renders each page to PNG via pdftoppm (poppler-utils) at 150 DPI
and queues the pages as images; 50 MB / 25-page caps. Accepts host path or
base64 upload.
- Shared helpers (_decode_attach_base64, _sniff_image_ext, _queue_attached_image)
so the two methods and the existing image.attach don't duplicate logic.
Gateway (hermes_cli/web_server.py):
- GET /api/media: returns a gateway-local image as a base64 data URL so remote
clients can display it. Auth-gated like every /api route, extension
allowlist + size cap, AND confined to the gateway's own media roots
(images/screenshots/cache, resolved symlink-safe) so an authed caller can't
read image-extension files anywhere on disk.
Desktop (apps/desktop):
- syncImageAttachmentsForSubmit uploads bytes via image.attach_bytes when the
connection mode is 'remote'; the local fast path is unchanged.
- media.ts gains isRemoteGateway() + gatewayMediaDataUrl(); directive-text and
markdown-text fetch images over /api/media in remote mode.
Consolidates the competing remote-media PRs (#38876, #40317, #21908, #39437)
into one coherent implementation, taking the strongest parts of each and adding
shared-helper cleanup plus the /api/media root-confinement hardening on top.
The per-profile gateway switching from #38876 is intentionally left out as a
separable feature. TUI file uploads (#40492) remain a separate surface.
Tested: 11 new tui_gateway tests + 5 /api/media endpoint tests + desktop
media.remote unit tests; full tui_gateway + web_server suites green (472
passed); tsc -b clean; E2E verified the full attach→disk→queue and
gateway-path→data-URL display round-trip plus the out-of-root security block.
Co-authored-by: Max Mitcham <maxmitcham@mac.home>
Co-authored-by: Justlrnal4 <Justlrnal4@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Cook <ccook@nvms.com>
Co-authored-by: Thomas Paquette <thomas.paquette@gmail.com>
The agent-facing cronjob tool scans the user prompt with _scan_cron_prompt()
before creating/updating a job (tools/cronjob_tools.py); the REST cron
endpoints (POST /api/jobs, PATCH /api/jobs/{id}) validated length but not
content. This adds the same scan to both handlers so an exfiltration/injection
prompt is rejected the same way regardless of which surface created the job.
NOT a security boundary, defense-in-depth / parity only: the REST cron
endpoints are authenticated (every handler runs _check_auth, and connect()
refuses to start without API_SERVER_KEY), and _scan_cron_prompt is a documented
in-process heuristic, not a containment boundary (SECURITY.md 3.2).
Raised externally via GHSA-fr3q-rjg3-x6mf (DNS-rebinding pre-auth RCE). The
report's load-bearing 'no auth by default' premise was already closed three
weeks after it was filed by the API_SERVER_KEY-required guard (commit
1a9ef8314); this lands the create/update prompt-validation parity the report
also pointed at. Scanner imported defensively so a missing scanner cannot
disable the cron REST API.
Follow-up on the deferred-cleanup salvage (#33774): _cleanup_workspace
returned early for a non-scratch ('dir'/'worktree') task and never ran the
parent sweep, so a scratch parent waiting on a 'dir' child would leak its
deferred workspace forever. Run the parent sweep before the early return.
Adds regression tests: deferred-while-child-active, swept-after-last-child,
and dir-child-unblocks-scratch-parent.
* feat(onboarding): opt-in structured profile-build path on first contact
On a user's very first gateway message, Hermes now optionally offers to
build a short profile of them — then, only with consent, gathers durable
facts and persists them to the user-profile memory store (memory tool,
target="user") so future sessions start already knowing who they are.
Inspired by Poke's zero-input onboarding, but consent-first by design:
- The agent OFFERS, never assumes. Declining stops it immediately.
- Before ANY external lookup it states what it will look up and asks.
- It never reads connected accounts (email/calendar) silently — the
exact privacy concern that made naive implementations feel invasive.
Wiring reuses existing infrastructure end-to-end:
- gateway/run.py first-message hook (was a plain self-intro) now swaps in
the profile-build directive when enabled and not yet offered.
- agent/onboarding.py gains profile_build_mode()/profile_build_directive()
+ PROFILE_BUILD_FLAG, latched once via the existing onboarding.seen
mechanism so the offer fires at most once per install.
- config default onboarding.profile_build: "ask" (set "off" to disable).
Added to an existing section, so no _config_version bump needed.
No new storage layer, no new injection path, no prompt-cache impact.
* fix(dashboard): fold onboarding into agent tab to avoid 1-field category
onboarding.profile_build is the only schema-surfaced onboarding field
(onboarding.seen is an internal latch dict), so the dashboard CONFIG_SCHEMA
single-field-category invariant rejected it. Merge onboarding -> agent like
the other small categories.
Compaction summaries now receive the current date and instruct the
summarizer to rewrite completed actions as absolute, dated, past-tense
facts (e.g. "email John about the proposal" -> "Sent the proposal email
to John on 2026-06-07"). A resumed conversation no longer re-issues work
that already happened or treats a finished action as still pending.
The date is resolved via hermes_time.now() (date-only, user-configured
timezone) inside _generate_summary. The compaction summary is a
mid-conversation message that is never part of the cached prefix, so the
date does not affect prompt-cache stability. Date resolution is
best-effort: a clock failure omits the rule rather than blocking
compaction. The rule rides the shared template, so both first-compaction
and iterative-update prompts carry it.
Inspired by Poke's summarization (temporal anchoring + semantic
preservation).
Three gateway tests broke on main after the component-auth security
hardening (test_discord_component_auth.py) made empty Discord component
allowlists fail-closed: a view built with allowed_user_ids=set() now
rejects every click instead of allowing anyone.
The clarify and model-picker BEHAVIOR tests still constructed their views
with an empty allowlist and expected the click to succeed — a stale
assumption from before the hardening. Fixed by giving each view an
allowlist containing the clicking user (the interaction's own id), which
is the realistic shape and what the security model requires.
Production code unchanged — this only updates the test fixtures to match
the intended (and separately pinned) fail-closed contract. The security
regression suite and these behavior suites now both pass.
Fixes:
- test_discord_clarify_buttons.py: test_choice_falls_back_to_label_text_when_entry_missing, test_other_flips_entry_to_awaiting_text
- test_discord_model_picker.py: test_model_picker_clears_controls_before_running_switch_callback
Salvage of the Discord half of PR #30964 by @LaPhilosophie. Discord
component button callbacks (ExecApprovalView, SlashConfirmView,
UpdatePromptView, ModelPickerView) bypass the normal message dispatch
authorization path. _component_check_auth previously returned True when
both the user and role allowlists were empty, so any guild member who
could see an approval prompt could click Approve on a dangerous command.
Fail closed instead: require DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS / DISCORD_ALLOWED_ROLES
/ GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS membership, or an explicit DISCORD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS
/ GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS opt-in for deliberately-open deployments.
Mirrors the Telegram (#24457) and Matrix fail-closed precedent.
The Slack half of #30964 is superseded by PR #33844's helper.
Reported via GHSA-mc26-p6fw-7pp6 (@whyiug).
Co-authored-by: LaPhilosophie <804436395@qq.com>
## What does this PR do?
The trajectory compressor could corrupt training trajectories by cutting a
conversation in the middle of a tool-call/tool-response pair. In the from/value
trajectory format a `tool` turn (carrying `<tool_response>` markers) is always
emitted immediately after the `gpt` turn whose `<tool_call>` it answers, so the
two turns must stay together. The compressible region's end boundary, however,
was chosen purely by token accumulation: the loop stopped at the first turn where
the accumulated tokens met the savings target, with no regard for turn roles. For
any over-budget trajectory whose savings boundary happened to land between a `gpt`
turn and its `tool` turn, the `gpt` (with its `<tool_call>`) was summarised away
into the replacement `human` message while the now-orphaned `tool` turn (with its
`<tool_response>`) was kept verbatim in the tail — producing an unmatched marker
and silently corrupting the training signal. The head boundary had the mirror
problem when the first tool turn was not protected.
This change snaps both compression boundaries to a clean turn boundary before the
region is extracted and replaced, so the summary always covers whole gpt+tool
blocks and a `tool` turn is never separated from the `gpt` turn that precedes it.
The boundary is moved forward when possible (folding an orphaned tool turn into
the region that already holds its gpt) and falls back to moving backward when no
clean boundary exists ahead, such as when the protected tail itself begins on a
tool turn.
## Related Issue
N/A
## Type of Change
- [x] 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
## Changes Made
- `trajectory_compressor.py`: added `_is_boundary_clean()` and `_snap_boundary()`
helpers on `TrajectoryCompressor`, and applied them to both the head and tail
compression boundaries in `compress_trajectory()` and
`compress_trajectory_async()`. When snapping collapses the region to nothing
safe to compress, the trajectory is returned unchanged and flagged as still
over the limit rather than being corrupted.
- `tests/test_trajectory_compressor.py`: added `TestCompressionToolPairIntegrity`
covering the sync and async paths plus direct unit tests for the boundary
snapping (forward skip and backward fallback).
## How to Test
1. Run the focused tests: `pytest tests/test_trajectory_compressor.py -q`.
2. The new sync/async cases build a trajectory of gpt/tool pairs with an oversized
middle gpt turn and choose a token target that forces the accumulation
boundary to stop between a `<tool_call>` and its `<tool_response>`. They assert
that `<tool_call>` and `<tool_response>` markers stay balanced after
compression and that every kept `tool` turn is immediately preceded by a `gpt`
turn (never the inserted summary or another tool turn).
## Checklist
### Code
- [x] I've read the [Contributing Guide](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [x] My commit messages follow [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/) (`fix(scope):`, `feat(scope):`, etc.)
- [x] I searched for [existing PRs](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pulls) to make sure this isn't a duplicate
- [x] My PR contains **only** changes related to this fix/feature (no unrelated commits)
- [x] I've run `pytest tests/ -q` and all tests pass
- [x] I've added tests for my changes (required for bug fixes, strongly encouraged for features)
- [x] I've tested on my platform: macOS 15 (Darwin 25.5)
### Documentation & Housekeeping
- [x] I've updated relevant documentation (README, `docs/`, docstrings) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `cli-config.yaml.example` if I added/changed config keys — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `CONTRIBUTING.md` or `AGENTS.md` if I changed architecture or workflows — or N/A
- [x] I've considered cross-platform impact (Windows, macOS) per the [compatibility guide](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#cross-platform-compatibility) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated tool descriptions/schemas if I changed tool behavior — or N/A
SIMPLEX_ALLOWED_USERS silently denied every contact when operators
listed display names instead of numeric contactIds. The SimpleX UI
never surfaces the numeric id, so display names are what operators
naturally put in the env var. _is_user_authorized only compared
source.user_id (the contactId), so the allowlist never matched.
Expand check_ids to include source.user_name for the simplex platform,
mirroring the existing WhatsApp phone-LID aliasing pattern. Adds doc +
setup-prompt clarification and three regression tests.
Salvaged from PR #40393. Adds manishbyatroy to release.py AUTHOR_MAP.
