Salvaged from PR #35130 (the safe subset of jnibarger01's security pass):
- threat_patterns.py: replace unbounded (?:\w+\s+)* filler with bounded
{0,8} + cap scan input at MAX_SCAN_CHARS (64KiB), and bound the .*
runs in the exfil/config-mod patterns. Kills catastrophic backtracking
on adversarial near-misses.
- hermes_state.py: cap FTS5 query length (MAX_FTS5_QUERY_CHARS) and
extract quoted phrases with a linear scan instead of a regex so
pathological quote runs can't induce backtracking.
- acp_adapter/edit_approval.py + agent/tool_dispatch_helpers.py: recognize
'*** Move File: src -> dst' V4A headers so patch-mode edits are
permissioned/traversal-checked (previously only Update/Add/Delete), and
surface a proposal for mode=patch V4A calls (previously replace-only).
Tests: +ReDoS-bound + FTS5-cap + Move-File-target + V4A-approval cases.
#28063 fixed the macOS `/tmp`→`/private/tmp` symlink issue by checking
the RAW path (pre-resolve) against startswith('/tmp/'). That works on
Linux + macOS but not on Windows — Path('/tmp/foo').resolve() returns
C:\\tmp\\foo and isn't the real Windows temp anyway.
Replace the hardcoded '/tmp/' prefix with Path(tempfile.gettempdir()).
resolve() + Path.relative_to() — same idiom as the cwd branch just
below. Works correctly on Linux (/tmp), macOS (/private/var/folders/...),
and Windows (%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Temp).
Test rewritten to use tempfile.gettempdir() so the assertion exercises
the same code path on every platform.
Conflict against the just-merged #28063 (raw_path approach) resolved
by replacing the whole raw_path block — tempfile.gettempdir() is
strictly better than that intermediate fix.
Salvage of #28262 by @Zyrixtrex.
