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9 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ethernet
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48be2e0e4d
|
test: use subprocesses for each test file (#29016)
* ci(tests): install ripgrep from prebuilt tarball instead of apt
apt-get update + install of ripgrep takes ~4 min on the GHA Ubuntu
runners (the apt-get update against archive.ubuntu.com is the slow
part; ripgrep itself is small). Switching to the upstream musl
binary tarball cuts the step to a few seconds.
- Pinned to ripgrep 15.1.0 with sha256 verification (same hash as
published in the releases sha256 sidecar file).
- Drops the `rg` binary into /usr/local/bin so it is on PATH for
every subsequent step without GITHUB_PATH manipulation.
- Applied to both the test and e2e jobs in tests.yml.
* fix(cli): compile syntax check to tempdir, not source __pycache__
`_validate_critical_files_syntax` runs `py_compile.compile()` on each
critical bootstrap file after a successful `git pull`. The default
`py_compile` writes the resulting `.pyc` next to the source under
`__pycache__/`, which causes two real problems:
1. Parallel test workers walking the same source tree (e.g. running
the suite under per-file process isolation) can race against each
other on the `__pycache__` write — manifests as flaky 'directory
not empty' errors during teardown.
2. In production, the post-pull syntax check leaves a `.pyc` behind
that the next interpreter run might pick up — fine when the
interpreter version matches, sketchy if it doesn't.
Fix: write the compiled output to a `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()`
that's discarded on function exit. We only care about the compile-or-not
signal, not the artifact.
* test(runner): per-file process isolation, drop manual state reset + xdist
Replace fragile manual _reset_module_state test fixtures with robust
per-file subprocess isolation. Each test file runs in a fresh
`python -m pytest <file>` subprocess via ThreadPoolExecutor. No xdist,
no custom pytest plugin, no shared worker state.
Key changes:
* scripts/run_tests_parallel.py — new runner: discovers test files,
runs N in parallel via ThreadPoolExecutor, captures stdout per file,
treats exit code 5 (no tests collected) as pass, kills all children
on exit. Change from cpu_count to cpu_count*2. The runner is
I/O-bound (waiting on subprocess.communicate() from pytest children)
The parent process does almost no CPU work, so 2x oversubscription
keeps more pipes full. When a file fails, immediately show the last
30 lines of pytest output (stack traces + FAILED summary) plus a
ready-to-copy repro command:
python -m pytest tests/agent/test_auxiliary_client.py
* scripts/run_tests.sh — delegates to run_tests_parallel.py
* .github/workflows/tests.yml — test step: python
scripts/run_tests_parallel.py
* pyproject.toml — drop pytest-xdist, pytest-split; simplify addopts
* tests/conftest.py — remove ~200 lines of manual state-reset fixtures
* AGENTS.md — update Testing section for per-file design
* test(runner): speed gateway test antipattern scan up
* fix(test): web search provider plugin test missing xai
* fix(tests): make 14 test files pass under per-file subprocess isolation
Tests that relied on cross-file state pollution from xdist workers
fail when run in isolation (per-file subprocess model). Root causes
and fixes:
Tool registry not populated:
- test_video_generation_tool_surface_matrix: add discover_builtin_tools()
- test_web_providers_brave_free/ddgs/searxng/general: autouse fixtures
registering all 8 bundled web providers, reset after each test
- test_website_policy: same provider registration pattern
- test_web_tools_tavily: same pattern across 3 dispatch test classes
- Also add is_safe_url/check_website_access mocks where SSRF check
blocks example.com (DNS resolution fails in isolated envs)
Stale check_fn cache:
- test_kanban_tools: invalidate_check_fn_cache() + _clear_tool_defs_cache()
in both kanban guidance tests (prior test cached False for kanban_show)
- test_discord_tool: cache invalidation in setup/teardown
- test_homeassistant_tool: invalidate_check_fn_cache() before registry queries
Module-level state pollution:
- test_auxiliary_client: autouse fixture clearing _aux_unhealthy_until cache
- test_skill_commands: set_session_vars() instead of patch.dict(os.environ)
(ContextVar takes precedence over os.environ)
- test_dm_topics: overwrite sys.modules + separate telegram.constants mock
+ force-reimport of gateway.platforms.telegram
- test_terminal_tool_requirements: removed duplicate class declaration,
autouse _clear_caches fixture
* change(tests): run_tests.sh explicitly includes env vars
instead of manually dropping some vars, now we just only include some
* fix(tests): 5 more isolation/NixOS fixes
- test_approval_plugin_hooks: isolate HERMES_HOME so real user's
command_allowlist doesn't short-circuit the approval path
- test_google_chat: skipif when Platform.GOOGLE_CHAT not in enum
(feature not merged on this branch)
- test_write_deny: test systemd prefix against tmp_path instead of
/etc/systemd which resolves to /nix/store on NixOS
- test_pty_bridge: use shutil.which('cat') instead of /bin/cat
(doesn't exist on NixOS)
- profiles.py: rmtree onexc handler chmod's parent dirs too, fixing
profile deletion when copytree preserved read-only modes from
nix store
* fix(tests): clear unhealthy cache in autouse fixture for auxiliary_client
* fix(tests): skip send_message when telegram not installed; handle missing worker_id in browser_supervisor
* fix: py3.11 rmtree onexc compat + belt-and-suspenders unhealthy cache clear for expired codex test
* fix: address PR #29016 review feedback
- Remove tracked .pytest-cache/ artifact and add to .gitignore
- Fix stale 'xdist worker' comment in conftest.py
- Deduplicate web provider registration into tests/tools/conftest.py
shared helper (register_all_web_providers), replacing 8 copy-pasted
blocks across 6 test files
- Update PR description: remove stale recovered-test-files claim,
fix worker count to match code (cpu_count*2)
* fix: eliminate race in stale-cache achievements test
The background scan thread could complete and overwrite _SNAPSHOT_CACHE
before evaluate_all() returned the stale data — only 10 fake sessions
made the scan finish instantly. Added scan_delay param to _FakeSessionDB
and set it to 2s in the stale-cache test so the background thread can't
win the race.
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kshitijk4poor
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21e3a863bb |
feat(web): firecrawl plugin natively supports crawl; delete legacy inline path
The web-provider migration originally left firecrawl crawl as the only
provider-specific code remaining inline in tools/web_tools.py (~250
lines of Firecrawl-specific crawl orchestration that didn't fit the
plugin's existing surface). This commit closes that gap.
What this adds
--------------
1. plugins/web/firecrawl/provider.py: implement async ``crawl(url, **kwargs)``
- Accepts the same kwargs as the dispatcher passes to any crawl
provider (``instructions``, ``depth``, ``limit``); Firecrawl's
/crawl endpoint ignores ``instructions`` and ``depth`` so we log
and drop with a clear info message.
- Wraps the sync SDK ``crawl()`` call in asyncio.to_thread so the
gateway event loop isn't blocked on a multi-page crawl.
- Preserves the response-shape normalization across pydantic /
typed-object / dict variants that the legacy inline code did.
- Preserves per-page website-policy re-check (catches blocked
redirects after the SDK returns).
- Returns the same {"results": [...]} shape so the dispatcher's
shared LLM-summarization post-processing path works unchanged.
- Sets supports_crawl() to True so the dispatcher routes through
the plugin instead of the legacy fallthrough.
2. tools/web_tools.py: delete the entire legacy firecrawl crawl block
that used to run after "No registered provider supports crawl" —
~270 lines including:
- check_firecrawl_api_key gate + typed error
- inline SSRF + website-policy seed-URL gate (dispatcher already
does this)
- Firecrawl client setup with crawl_params
- 100+ lines of pydantic/dict/typed-object normalization
- Per-page LLM-processing loop (kept in the dispatcher's shared
post-processing path; that's where it always belonged)
- trimming + base64 image cleanup (still done in the dispatcher's
shared path)
Replaced with a single typed-error branch when no crawl-capable
provider is available: "web_crawl has no available backend. Set
FIRECRAWL_API_KEY (or FIRECRAWL_API_URL for self-hosted), or set
TAVILY_API_KEY for Tavily."
Test updates
------------
- tests/tools/test_website_policy.py:
- test_web_crawl_short_circuits_blocked_url: dispatcher seed-URL
gate still runs on web_tools.check_website_access (no change to
that patch), but the firecrawl client lockdown moved to the
plugin module — patch firecrawl_provider._get_firecrawl_client
instead of web_tools._get_firecrawl_client. The dispatcher
short-circuits before the plugin runs, so the test still passes.
- test_web_crawl_blocks_redirected_final_url: patch the per-page
policy gate at plugins.web.firecrawl.provider.check_website_access
(where it now runs) AND on web_tools (where the seed-URL gate
still runs). Patch firecrawl_provider._get_firecrawl_client for
the FakeCrawlClient injection. Both checks flow through the same
fake_check function.
- tests/plugins/web/test_web_search_provider_plugins.py:
- Update parametrized capability-flag spec: firecrawl supports_crawl
is now True.
- Add test_firecrawl_crawl_returns_error_dict_when_unconfigured —
verifies inspect.iscoroutinefunction(p.crawl) is True and that
the async crawl returns a per-page error dict (not a raise) when
FIRECRAWL_API_KEY is missing.
Verified
--------
- 218/218 web tests pass (was 173, +44 plugin tests + 1 new firecrawl
crawl test from this commit = 218 with the test deduplication).
- Compile-clean (py_compile passes on both files).
- Provider capabilities matrix confirmed end-to-end:
name search extract crawl async-extract? async-crawl?
firecrawl True True True True True
tavily True True True False False
Both crawl-capable providers exercise the dispatcher's
inspect.iscoroutinefunction async-or-sync detection.
Net diff
--------
- tools/web_tools.py: -254 lines (legacy inline crawl gone)
- plugins/web/firecrawl/provider.py: +185 lines (crawl method)
- test_website_policy.py: +14/-9 lines (patch locations)
- test_web_search_provider_plugins.py: +22/-1 lines (capability flag
+ new firecrawl crawl test)
- Total: -32 net LoC; tools/web_tools.py is now 1509 lines (was 1763
before this commit, 2227 before the migration started).
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kshitijk4poor
|
5e54330e27 |
fix(web): preserve firecrawl crawl + website-policy gate after migration
Two regressions discovered by running the full tests/tools/ suite after
the dispatcher cutover, both fixed in this commit:
1. web_crawl_tool incorrectly errored "search-only" for firecrawl
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The cutover treated any provider with supports_crawl()==False as a
search-only backend and returned the typed search-only error. But
firecrawl can crawl via the legacy multi-page-extract path inside
web_crawl_tool — it just doesn't expose supports_crawl on the plugin
(adding native firecrawl crawl is a clean follow-up).
Fix: only emit the search-only error when the provider supports
NEITHER crawl NOR extract (brave-free / ddgs / searxng). When the
provider supports extract but not crawl (firecrawl), fall through to
the legacy firecrawl-via-extract path below.
2. firecrawl plugin's check_website_access wasn't patchable
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The plugin imported `from tools.website_policy import check_website_access`
INSIDE the extract() function body, so monkeypatching the name on
plugins.web.firecrawl.provider had no effect — the inner import re-bound
the name on every call.
Fix: hoist the import to module level. Cheap (website_policy itself
has no heavy deps) and makes the standard
monkeypatch.setattr(firecrawl_provider, "check_website_access", ...)
pattern work.
Test updates (tests/tools/test_website_policy.py — 4 tests):
- test_web_extract_short_circuits_blocked_url
- test_web_extract_blocks_redirected_final_url
Both: patch the gate at plugins.web.firecrawl.provider (where it
runs after migration) and force the firecrawl plugin to be the
active extract provider via FIRECRAWL_API_KEY.
- test_web_crawl_short_circuits_blocked_url
- test_web_crawl_blocks_redirected_final_url
Both: unchanged — the dispatcher-level gate at tools.web_tools.py
line 1651 still uses the imported `check_website_access` name and
the firecrawl-fallthrough path is exercised as before.
Verified: 22/22 tests/tools/test_website_policy.py pass.
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Teknium
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1e896b0251
|
fix: resolve 7 failing CI tests (#3936)
1. matrix voice: _on_room_message_media unconditionally overwrote media_urls with the image cache path (always None for non-images), wiping the locally-cached voice path. Now only overrides when cached_path is truthy. 2. cli_tools_command: /tools disable no longer prompts for confirmation (input() removed in earlier commit to fix TUI hang), but tests still expected the old Y/N prompt flow. Updated tests to match current behavior (direct apply + session reset). 3. slack app_mention: connect() was refactored for multi-workspace (creates AsyncWebClient per token), but test only mocked the old self._app.client path. Added AsyncWebClient and acquire_scoped_lock mocks. 4. website_policy: module-level _cached_policy from earlier tests caused fast-path return of None. Added invalidate_cache() before assertion. 5. codex 401 refresh: already passing on current main (fixed by intervening commit). |
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Teknium
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ab548a9b5e
|
fix(security): add SSRF protection to browser_navigate (#3058)
* fix(security): add SSRF protection to browser_navigate browser_navigate() only checked the website blocklist policy but did not call is_safe_url() to block private/internal addresses. This allowed the agent to navigate to localhost, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and private network IPs via the browser. web_tools and vision_tools already had this check. Added the same is_safe_url() pre-flight validation before the blocklist check in browser_navigate(). * fix: move SSRF import to module level, fix policy test mock Move is_safe_url import to module level so it can be monkeypatched in tests. Update test_browser_navigate_returns_policy_block to mock _is_safe_url so the SSRF check passes and the policy check is reached. * fix(security): harden browser SSRF protection Follow-up to cherry-picked PR #3041: 1. Fail-closed fallback: if url_safety module can't import, block all URLs instead of allowing all. Security guards should never fail-open. 2. Post-redirect SSRF check: after navigation, verify the final URL isn't a private/internal address. If a public URL redirected to 169.254.169.254 or localhost, navigate to about:blank and return an error — prevents the model from reading internal content via subsequent browser_snapshot calls. --------- Co-authored-by: 0xbyt4 <35742124+0xbyt4@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Teknium
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0791efe2c3
|
fix(security): add SSRF protection to vision_tools and web_tools (hardened)
* fix(security): add SSRF protection to vision_tools and web_tools Both vision_analyze and web_extract/web_crawl accept arbitrary URLs without checking if they target private/internal network addresses. A prompt-injected or malicious skill could use this to access cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost services, or private network hosts. Adds a shared url_safety.is_safe_url() that resolves hostnames and blocks private, loopback, link-local, and reserved IP ranges. Also blocks known internal hostnames (metadata.google.internal). Integrated at the URL validation layer in vision_tools and before each website_policy check in web_tools (extract, crawl). * test(vision): update localhost test to reflect SSRF protection The existing test_valid_url_with_port asserted localhost URLs pass validation. With SSRF protection, localhost is now correctly blocked. Update the test to verify the block, and add a separate test for valid URLs with ports using a public hostname. * fix(security): harden SSRF protection — fail-closed, CGNAT, multicast, redirect guard Follow-up hardening on top of dieutx's SSRF protection (PR #2630): - Change fail-open to fail-closed: DNS errors and unexpected exceptions now block the request instead of allowing it (OWASP best practice) - Block CGNAT range (100.64.0.0/10): Python's ipaddress.is_private does NOT cover this range (returns False for both is_private and is_global). Used by Tailscale/WireGuard and carrier infrastructure. - Add is_multicast and is_unspecified checks: multicast (224.0.0.0/4) and unspecified (0.0.0.0) addresses were not caught by the original four-check chain - Add redirect guard for vision_tools: httpx event hook re-validates each redirect target against SSRF checks, preventing the classic redirect-based SSRF bypass (302 to internal IP) - Move SSRF filtering before backend dispatch in web_extract: now covers Parallel and Tavily backends, not just Firecrawl - Extract _is_blocked_ip() helper for cleaner IP range checking - Add 24 new tests (CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, fail-closed behavior, parametrized blocked/allowed IP lists) - Fix existing tests to mock DNS resolution for test hostnames --------- Co-authored-by: dieutx <dangtc94@gmail.com> |
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Teknium
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4433b83378
|
feat(web): add Parallel as alternative web search/extract backend (#1696)
* feat(web): add Parallel as alternative web search/extract backend Adds Parallel (parallel.ai) as a drop-in alternative to Firecrawl for web_search and web_extract tools using the official parallel-web SDK. - Backend selection via WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND env var (auto/parallel/firecrawl) - Auto mode prefers Firecrawl when both keys present; Parallel when sole backend - web_crawl remains Firecrawl-only with clear error when unavailable - Lazy SDK imports, interrupt support, singleton clients - 16 new unit tests for backend selection and client config Co-authored-by: s-jag <s-jag@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: add PARALLEL_API_KEY to config registry and fix web_crawl policy tests Follow-up for Parallel backend integration: - Add PARALLEL_API_KEY to OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS (hermes doctor, env blocklist) - Add to set_config_value api_keys list (hermes config set) - Add to doctor keys display - Fix 2 web_crawl policy tests that didn't set FIRECRAWL_API_KEY (needed now that web_crawl has a Firecrawl availability guard) * refactor: explicit backend selection via hermes tools, not auto-detect Replace the auto-detect backend selection with explicit user choice: - hermes tools saves WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND to .env when user picks a provider - _get_backend() reads the explicit choice first - Fallback only for manual/legacy config (uses whichever key is present) - _is_provider_active() shows [active] for the selected web backend - Updated tests, docs, and .env.example to remove 'auto' mode language * refactor: use config.yaml for web backend, not env var Match the TTS/browser pattern — web.backend is stored in config.yaml (set by hermes tools), not as a WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND env var. - _load_web_config() reads web: section from config.yaml - _get_backend() reads web.backend from config, falls back to key detection - _configure_provider() saves to config dict (saved to config.yaml) - _is_provider_active() reads from config dict - Removed WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND from .env.example, set_config_value, docs - Updated all tests to mock _load_web_config instead of env vars --------- Co-authored-by: s-jag <s-jag@users.noreply.github.com> |
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teknium1
|
6fc76ef954 |
fix: harden website blocklist — default off, TTL cache, fail-open, guarded imports
- Default enabled: false (zero overhead when not configured) - Fast path: cached disabled state skips all work immediately - TTL cache (30s) for parsed policy — avoids re-reading config.yaml on every URL check - Missing shared files warn + skip instead of crashing all web tools - Lazy yaml import — missing PyYAML doesn't break browser toolset - Guarded browser_tool import — fail-open lambda fallback - check_website_access never raises for default path (fail-open with warning log); only raises with explicit config_path (test mode) - Simplified enforcement code in web_tools/browser_tool — no more try/except wrappers since errors are handled internally |
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teknium1
|
30c417fe70 |
feat: add website blocklist enforcement for web/browser tools (#1064)
Adds security.website_blocklist config for user-managed domain blocking
across URL-capable tools. Enforced at the tool level (not monkey-patching)
so it's safe and predictable.
- tools/website_policy.py: shared policy loader with domain normalization,
wildcard support (*.tracking.example), shared file imports, and
structured block metadata
- web_extract: pre-fetch URL check + post-redirect recheck
- web_crawl: pre-crawl URL check + per-page URL recheck
- browser_navigate: pre-navigation URL check
- Blocked responses include blocked_by_policy metadata so the agent
can explain exactly what was denied
Config:
security:
website_blocklist:
enabled: true
domains: ["evil.com", "*.tracking.example"]
shared_files: ["team-blocklist.txt"]
Salvaged from PR #1086 by @kshitijk4poor. Browser post-redirect checks
deferred (browser_tool was fully rewritten since the PR branched).
Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
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