Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
kshitijk4poor
66827f8947 chore: prune unused imports and duplicate import redefinitions
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.

- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
  public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
  unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
  F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
  agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
  agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
  agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
  can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
  selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change

Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
  toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
  module still resolves
2026-05-28 22:26:25 -07:00
Teknium
46c1ae8b24
fix(tests): four pre-existing flakes from the security cluster merge (#32072)
All four failures were broken by the security cluster (#10082 / #10133 /
#4609 / symlink-reject batch) merging on May 25. They were red on
origin/main HEAD when #32042 and #32061 ran, gating PRs that touched
unrelated code.

1) tests/hermes_cli/test_update_zip_symlink_reject.py
   test_update_via_zip_accepts_normal_member called the real
   _update_via_zip without sandboxing PROJECT_ROOT — so the function's
   shutil.copytree() actually copied the fake README from the test ZIP
   over the real repo's README.md, which then made
   test_readme_mentions_powershell_installer fail in any test run that
   happened to pick this test up earlier. Mock PROJECT_ROOT to an
   isolated tmp_path / install_dir, stub subprocess so pip/uv reinstall
   doesn't actually run, and assert the fake README lands in the
   sandbox (not the real tree).

2) tests/tools/test_windows_native_support.py
   test_readme_mentions_powershell_installer was the victim of (1) —
   nothing wrong with the test itself, the fix in (1) clears it.

3) tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py
   test_proc_fd_other_not_blocked called _is_blocked_device('/proc/self/fd/3')
   expecting False. But _is_blocked_device runs realpath() and on
   pytest xdist workers fd 3 happens to be dup'd to /dev/urandom
   (because the worker subprocess inherits open fds from pytest's
   collection pipe machinery). Switch to the lower-level
   _is_blocked_device_path which is the path-pattern check the test
   actually means to exercise; realpath-resolution coverage already
   lives in test_symlink_to_blocked_device_is_blocked.

4) tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py
   Module installed a faster_whisper stub via sys.modules without
   setting __spec__, then later @pytest.mark.skipif called
   importlib.util.find_spec('faster_whisper') which raises
   'ValueError: __spec__ is None' for modules with a None spec attr.
   Set __spec__ on the stub to a real ModuleSpec.

Validation: 195/195 green across the 4 affected files.
2026-05-25 05:50:29 -07:00
codeblackhole1024
bd2756dd22 fix(update): reject symlink members in update ZIP
_update_via_zip downloads a source ZIP from GitHub and calls
zipfile.ZipFile.extractall. The existing zip-slip path guard validates
each member's path stays under tmp_dir, but does not check member type
— so a ZIP containing a symlink member would still be materialized by
extractall, and a symlink target could point outside the extracted
tree (or to a sensitive system path).

This isn't a high-likelihood threat for hermes-agent's actual GitHub
source ZIPs (we don't ship symlinks), but the extractall path runs as
the user's account and a compromised mirror could plant arbitrary files
via the symlink → target → write chain.

Reject any member whose Unix mode bits (upper 16 bits of external_attr)
are S_IFLNK before extractall. Hermes source ZIPs contain only regular
files and directories; a symlink member is unambiguously suspicious.

Regression tests cover: symlink member rejection (raises ValueError,
caught by the outer try/except as a clean SystemExit, no extraction),
and the happy-path verification that a normal ZIP doesn't trigger the
symlink reject message.

Salvaged from PR #15881 by @codeblackhole1024. The remaining pieces of
that PR were already on main or contradicted explicit design decisions:
- config.yaml write-deny: already in agent/file_safety.py's
  control_file_names denylist (the modern guard); the proposed addition
  to build_write_denied_paths was the legacy path.
- Quick commands danger detection: contradicts the explicit
  cli.py:8491-8492 comment 'shell=True is intentional: quick_commands
  are user-defined shell snippets from config.yaml — not agent/LLM
  controlled.'
- Memory plugin shlex.split for dep checks: already on main
  (hermes_cli/memory_setup.py:133).

Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-25 05:15:55 -07:00