Maintainer rework of #45580 (issue #54036) on top of the contributor's
cherry-pick, which targeted spectrum-ts 3.1.0 while main pins 8.0.0:
Sidecar (primary detection, new):
- stream-staleness.mjs: pure decision rules, executable under node.
* classifyProbeRejection: only a not-found-shaped rejection of the
synthetic-id read counts as a completed round-trip (ALIVE); any other
rejection is INCONCLUSIVE — never alive. The original /probe treated
ANY rejection as alive, which was too loose.
* shouldProbe: probe only after 10+ min of stream silence (configurable
via PHOTON_STREAM_SILENCE_PROBE_MS; <=0 disables) with a cooldown.
* isZombieSuspect: zombie only on silence past threshold AND a
probe-proven live channel. Silence alone NEVER degrades (shared lines
can be quiet for hours); inconclusive probes NEVER degrade (network
may be down — the iterator will throw and the re-subscribe loop
recovers on its own).
- index.mjs: track last inbound-iterator yield (noteInboundYield), run a
30s watchdog tick, and on a confirmed zombie feed markStreamDegraded ->
the existing exit-75 restart path. /healthz gains a stream.staleness
block (silentForMs, threshold, lastProbeOutcome, zombieSuspected).
/probe reworked to strict semantics: 200 only on a proven round-trip,
503 with outcome hung|inconclusive otherwise.
Adapter (second layer, reworked):
- _probe_once returns tri-state alive|hung|inconclusive; only a hung
sidecar HTTP call counts toward the respawn counter — inconclusive
resets nothing and triggers nothing.
- default probe_interval_seconds 60 -> 600 (conservative; avoid restart
storms on quiet lines).
- _monitor_sidecar_health surfaces zombieSuspected from /healthz as a
warning; the fatal UPSTREAM_STREAM_DEGRADED path is unchanged and fires
when the sidecar escalates.
Tests: test_zombie_stream_watchdog.py executes the real node decision
module and drives the adapter against mocked /healthz responses;
test_presence_watchdog.py updated for the tri-state probe.
Also adds contributor mappings for nickkarhan (#53283) and vaibhavjnf
(#45580).
Follow-up to the URL markdown fix: extract the /send builder decision into
sidecar/send-format.mjs and rewrite test_url_send_path.py to execute the real
module under node (format+text in -> chosen builder out) instead of regex-
grepping index.mjs source, which is a banned test pattern in this repo.
spectrum-ts's live-stream consumer (consumeLive in spectrum-ts 3.x) only
reconnects when its inbound async iterator throws or ends. A half-open
("zombie") gRPC socket — where the TCP connection stays ESTABLISHED but the
peer is gone (NAT idle-timeout, network blip, laptop sleep) — makes the
iterator hang forever: no error, no end. The SDK exposes no gRPC keepalive
knob (createClient takes only {address, tls, token}; grpc.keepalive_time_ms
defaults to -1 = pings off), so the inbound stream silently dies and stays
dead until the gateway is restarted. Symptom: the agent's iMessage line goes
"online but deaf" — Photon's cloud-side fallback answers users with "the agent
isn't online right now" and inbound never reaches the gateway.
Fix, entirely in the code we own (no SDK fork):
- Sidecar gains a POST /probe endpoint that drives a cheap unary read
(space.getMessage on a synthetic id) over the SAME gRPC channel the inbound
stream uses. A live channel round-trips in ms (server returns not-found,
which is success for liveness); a zombie hangs. It sends nothing to any user
and creates no chat (space.get is local in shared/dedicated mode; only the
message read touches the wire).
- The adapter runs a presence watchdog: it probes on an interval, skips the
probe when natural inbound traffic already proved liveness within the
window, and after N consecutive failed probes respawns the sidecar — a fresh
Spectrum() re-subscribes the stream and re-registers presence. Successful
probes double as application-level keepalive, helping prevent the zombie
from forming at all. Respawn is lock-guarded against double-spawn and the
watchdog is torn down cleanly on disconnect.
Behavioural settings live in config.yaml (extra), bridged to env per the
.env-is-secrets-only convention:
probe_interval_seconds (60), probe_timeout_seconds (10),
probe_max_failures (3). A non-positive interval disables the watchdog.
Tests: tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_presence_watchdog.py covers config
resolution, the disable switch, probe alive/dead(500)/timeout/no-client, the
core N-failures->one-respawn detection, success-resets-failures, stop-then-
start respawn ordering, and lock-guarding — all without spawning Node or
hitting the network.
Contributed by Vaibhav Sharma (X: @vabbyshabby).
The `clarify` tool's multiple-choice prompts flattened to a numbered text
list on Photon/iMessage, even though iMessage has a native poll bubble and
spectrum-ts already exposes it via the `poll()` content builder. Two gaps
caused the flattening:
* Outbound: the sidecar only had `/send` (text); there was no way to send
a poll, so the base adapter's numbered-text fallback was used.
* Inbound: `normalizeContent()` handled only text/attachment/voice, so a
poll vote (`poll_option`) was dropped on the floor ("[Photon content
type not handled: poll_option]") and never resolved the clarify.
Fix, end to end:
* Sidecar: import `poll` from spectrum-ts; add a `/send-poll` route
(`space.send(poll(title, ...options))`); serialize inbound `poll_option`
(the vote: chosen title + selected bool) and `poll` content in
`normalizeContent()`.
* Adapter: override `send_clarify` — for choices, send a native poll via
`_sidecar_send_poll` and call `mark_awaiting_text` so the gateway's
existing pending-clarify text-intercept resolves the answer; open-ended
clarifies keep the plain-text path. Inbound `poll_option` selections are
dispatched as a plain-text MessageEvent carrying the chosen option
(deselections / empty votes are dropped). If the poll send fails (an
older sidecar without `/send-poll`, or a send error) it falls back to the
numbered-text clarify, so nothing regresses on a half-upgraded restart.
No new model tool, no new env var, no core change — the capability lives at
the platform edge. The poll vote reuses the existing clarify text-intercept
resolution path, so no new gateway resolution mechanism is introduced.
Tests: tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_poll_clarify.py — inbound vote ->
choice text, deselection/empty-vote dropped, send_clarify sends a poll +
enables text-capture, open-ended stays text, and poll-failure falls back to
the text list. Full photon suite green.
Contributed by Vaibhav Sharma (X: @vabbyshabby).
Maintainer follow-up to the #51193 salvage:
- _send_with_retry: permanent classes (auth_or_config, target_not_allowed)
now short-circuit BEFORE the unconditional plain-text fallback resend,
including when a retry attempt surfaces one — no more double-sends of
permanently-failing requests.
- sidecar classifySidecarError: new structured code target_not_allowed for
Spectrum's 'Target not allowed for this project' AuthenticationError
(shared/free-tier lines cannot initiate outbound sends to new targets).
Classification applies to every handler sharing the catch-all
serverError path (/send, /send-attachment, /react, /typing, ...).
- _standalone_send now parses the structured error body too (it reads
sidecar responses independently of _sidecar_call) and returns
error_class/retryable alongside the message.
- target_not_allowed maps to a canonical user-facing message in both
paths; raw upstream error text never leaks through the structured code.
Closes the actionable halves of #50971, #51897, #52794.
Photon's Node sidecar intentionally hides raw handler exceptions, but the Python adapter still needs a safe failure class and retryability bit so delivery retries do not collapse into an opaque generic 500.
Constraint: Sidecar responses must not leak raw stack traces or private exception text
Rejected: Retry every internal sidecar error | masks permanent auth/config failures
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep sidecar error text generic; extend safe error classes instead of exposing raw SDK failures
Tested: uv run --with pytest-timeout pytest tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_overflow_recovery.py -q
Tested: uv run --with pytest-timeout pytest tests/plugins/platforms/photon -q
Tested: uv run ruff check plugins/platforms/photon/adapter.py tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_overflow_recovery.py
Tested: python3 -m py_compile plugins/platforms/photon/adapter.py tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_overflow_recovery.py
Tested: node --check plugins/platforms/photon/sidecar/index.mjs
Tested: git diff --check
Tested: python3 scripts/check-windows-footguns.py --diff origin/main
Not-tested: Live Photon/Spectrum delivery against a real iMessage account
Related: #50971
`PhotonAdapter._start_sidecar` is `async`, but it ran the Spectrum
mixed-attachment patch script with a bare `subprocess.run(...)`: it spawns
node and *waits* for it, with `timeout=10`. Executed inline that holds the
shared gateway event loop for the whole window, so no other platform's
messages, heartbeats, or sessions are serviced until it returns.
The same function already establishes this exact invariant twenty lines
above, where the stale-dependency reinstall hops to a worker thread:
# Runs off the event loop so a cold install can't freeze every other
# platform's traffic.
if _sidecar_deps_stale():
await asyncio.to_thread(_reinstall_sidecar_deps)
The patch spawn never got the same treatment. It is not startup-only
either — `_start_sidecar` is called from `connect()`, which takes
`is_reconnect`, so an ordinary Photon reconnect (network blip, sidecar
death) re-runs it and stalls a live gateway that is actively serving
Discord/Telegram/Slack traffic.
Dispatch it via `asyncio.to_thread` like its sibling. Same off-the-loop
class as the inbound-image decision (#66688) and the cron-fire verifier.
Adds a regression test asserting the spawn executes on a worker thread
rather than the loop thread.
`_reap_stale_sidecar` is `async`, but it identified the processes holding
the sidecar port with two blocking helpers called inline:
* `_find_listener_pids` -> `subprocess.run(["lsof", ...], timeout=5.0)`
* `_pid_is_sidecar` -> `subprocess.run(["ps", ...], timeout=5.0)`, once
per candidate pid
so the inspection can hold the shared gateway loop for 5 + 5·N seconds
while nothing else on it is serviced. It only runs once the /healthz probe
finds something already listening — the orphaned-sidecar recovery path —
and `_reap_stale_sidecar` is awaited from `_start_sidecar`, which runs on
every reconnect (`connect(is_reconnect=True)`). The stall therefore lands
on a live gateway that is still serving every other platform, right when a
crashed sidecar has already left an orphan behind.
Move the whole inspection to one `asyncio.to_thread` hop (one hop rather
than N+1 round trips). The reaping semantics are untouched: SIGTERM for
verified orphans, SIGKILL escalation, and both foreign-listener
RuntimeErrors behave exactly as before.
Same off-the-loop class as the inbound-image decision (#66688) and the
cron-fire verifier.
Adds a regression test asserting both the lsof lookup and the per-pid ps
check execute on a worker thread rather than the loop thread.
Fixes#73159.
When the Photon sidecar exits unexpectedly, _supervise_sidecar()
(running as self._sidecar_supervisor_task) correctly detects
SIDECAR_CRASHED and calls self._notify_fatal_error(). The Gateway's
fatal-error handler answers that by calling adapter.disconnect(),
which calls _stop_sidecar() -- from INSIDE the very task that's
currently executing this whole chain.
_stop_sidecar()'s cleanup unconditionally cancelled
self._sidecar_supervisor_task. Cancelling the currently-running task
raises CancelledError at its own next await point (inside
_notify_fatal_error() or _stop_sidecar() itself). Since
asyncio.CancelledError inherits from BaseException (not Exception),
the Gateway's `except Exception` guards around the fatal-error handler
don't catch it -- the handler aborts before ever reaching the
"queue platform for background reconnection" step. Photon then stays
permanently in `retrying` state until the whole process is manually
restarted, even though detection worked correctly and the underlying
transient upstream outage had long since recovered.
Fix: in _stop_sidecar()'s cleanup, check whether
self._sidecar_supervisor_task is asyncio.current_task() before
cancelling it. A task cannot legally cancel itself in any useful way
anyway (the cancellation only takes effect at its own next await,
which is exactly the corruption described above) -- when we're inside
the supervisor's own call stack, it's already in the process of
finishing on its own once _notify_fatal_error() returns, so skip the
cancel and just clear the reference.
This mirrors an existing precedent in the same file: disconnect()
already guards its OTHER task-cancellation (self._sidecar_health_task)
the same way (`if task is not asyncio.current_task()`), just not the
supervisor task in _stop_sidecar().
Per the issue's own note that existing tests mock out
_notify_fatal_error() entirely (so this integration chain was never
exercised), added two tests that drive the REAL chain: one runs
_supervise_sidecar() as an actual asyncio task with a real
_notify_fatal_error() that calls the real disconnect() -> _stop_sidecar(),
confirming the task completes without CancelledError and that the
post-disconnect reconnect-queue step actually executes; a second
confirms the OTHER call path (external cleanup, a different task)
still correctly cancels a running supervisor exactly as before.
Reverting only the adapter.py fix (keeping the new test) reproduces
the exact CancelledError from the bug report, confirming this is a
genuine regression test.
2 new tests pass; 113/113 in the full tests/plugins/platforms/photon/
directory (no regression to sidecar lifecycle, overflow recovery, or
health-monitoring behavior).
Follow-up to #69112. That PR hardened the shared gateway dispatch path in
gateway/run.py against the *caller* being cancelled. A second, self-referential
cancellation specific to PhotonAdapter sits one layer underneath it and survived
that fix.
PhotonAdapter is the only platform adapter that awaits _notify_fatal_error()
inline, on the same task that detected the fault. Both _monitor_sidecar_health
and _supervise_sidecar run as self._sidecar_health_task /
self._sidecar_supervisor_task, and the notification routes into
GatewayRunner._handle_adapter_fatal_error_impl, which tears the adapter down via
_safe_adapter_disconnect -> disconnect(). disconnect() then cancels
self._sidecar_health_task and awaits it -- which, when the health task is what
raised the notification, means disconnect() cancels its own caller several
plain-await frames up.
disconnect()'s `task is not asyncio.current_task()` guard does not catch this.
The current task where that guard evaluates is the wrapper
_await_adapter_cleanup_with_timeout creates around disconnect() via
asyncio.ensure_future, not the health task further up the chain, so the guard
passes and the cancel lands.
CancelledError stopped subclassing Exception in Python 3.8, so the
`except Exception` that wrapped the inline notify call never saw it. The health
task died silently mid-handoff: no log line, no "exception never retrieved"
warning (cancellation is normal asyncio), and no retry. The platform stayed
stranded until the gateway was restarted by hand.
Fix: dispatch the notification onto a new task, the same pattern
DiscordAdapter._handle_bot_task_done already uses for this reason. disconnect()
can then cancel the health/supervisor task freely without that cancellation
reaching the code still running the handoff, so the handoff always reaches the
reconnect queue. Both Photon fatal call sites are converted: the health-poll
path (observed wedging) and the sidecar-crash path (same shape, not yet
observed). gateway/run.py is untouched.
Observed twice on a self-hosted gateway, ~4h38m and ~52min of silent inbound
outage, both cleared only by a manual restart, both post-dating #69112's merge.
In each case the fatal log line appears and `queued for background reconnection`
never does.
Tests: new tests/plugins/platforms/photon/test_fatal_notify_self_cancel.py
covers the self-cancellation (fails with CancelledError without this change),
that the dispatch does not block its caller, that a failing notification warns
rather than raising, and a source guard against reintroducing either inline
await. Two assertions in test_overflow_recovery.py that drove these coroutines
directly now drain pending tasks before asserting delivery, since the
notification is deliberately no longer awaited inline.
Prepared with agent assistance and reviewed before submission.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sibling of #64686: _run_agent's empty-final_response early return dropped
failure_reason (and #64686 only fixed the non-empty path), so downstream
consumers (TUI billing surface, transient-failure persistence) lost the
structured reason exactly when a failed run produced no text.
Also hardens the two BasePlatformAdapter identity checks (edit_message /
delete_message) with getattr so duck-typed adapters without the attribute
mean 'capability absent', not AttributeError — this was crashing the
send_progress_messages path for minimal adapters and test fakes.
Sibling of #65254 (main-slot endpoint preservation): the auxiliary scope of
POST /api/model/set dropped the request's base_url/api_key on the floor, so
an aux slot pinned to a custom/local endpoint silently depended on
model.base_url — and broke the moment the main slot switched away and
cleared it. The aux resolver already reads auxiliary.<task>.base_url/api_key
(_resolve_task_provider_model); this persists them.
Desktop side: setAuxiliaryToMain / applyAuxiliaryDraft now carry the
user-defined provider's api_url as base_url, mirroring applyMainModel.
Consolidates the native-transport half of PR #73636 by @ScaleLeanChris
onto the merged adapter: persistent NIP-42-authenticated Nostr WebSocket
subscription as the default inbound path (transport=auto|websocket|poll),
kind-44100 membership events for live DM discovery, since-timestamp
resume on reconnect with bounded exponential backoff, and automatic
fallback to CLI polling when the WS can't be established. Events route
through the same _handle_event() pipeline as the poll loop, so de-dupe,
mention gating, p-tag DM latching, and allow-lists behave identically on
both transports. Outbound stays on the CLI (one-shot sends never race a
WS auth handshake — his design).
E2E verified against a real in-process websockets relay: NIP-42
challenge -> signed kind-22242 AUTH (event id re-derived server-side) ->
REQ subscription -> EVENT dispatch -> clean disconnect.
Co-authored-by: ScaleLeanChris <chris@scalelean.com>
Two independent cross-PR collisions red on main (slice 8/8):
1. fd4f756492 (salvaged from stale #54514) added an early 'drop U+FFFC
placeholder' return at the top of _dispatch_inbound — written before
the deferred-wait handler (6b91b50c6e/afab7ed46e) existed further
down the same function. The early return shadowed it: _pending_fffc
never populated, no attachment-timeout tracking, 4 tests red. Remove
the duplicate block; the deferred handler already drops the
placeholder AND tracks/cancels/warns.
2. 9cf2046081 tightened sidecar_deps_installed() to require
node_modules/spectrum-ts, but test_runtime_record's _patch_spawn
fixture still created only bare node_modules/ — 2 tests red. Mirror
a real completed install.
tests/plugins/platforms/photon: 164/164 after; 158/164 before.
Two follow-ups from the voice PR (#70509).
1. macOS ARM64 onnx migration. Existing users who pinned
openwakeword.inference_framework=onnx before the tflite fix landed kept a
wake word that arms but never fires (ONNX's embedding model is broken on
Apple Silicon, upstream #336). New resolve_inference_framework() honors an
explicit framework everywhere ONNX actually works, but coerces the one
provably-dead combination (explicit onnx + macOS ARM64) to tflite with a
one-time warning. No config mutation; empty still falls back to the platform
default. Both read sites (engine init + requirements check) route through
the shared resolver.
2. Voice turn-timeout leak. Each listen cycle reassigned turnTimeoutRef
without clearing the prior 60s timer, so a stale timer from an earlier
cycle could fire handleTurn() mid-way through a later listen — after enough
idle re-listens this wedged the loop into a non-re-arming state (the
'voice chat deactivates after ~a minute' report). Clear before re-arm.
Tests: 64 wake tests (added onnx-coercion / intel-kept / tflite-kept /
empty-default cases; updated the stale 'explicit onnx kept on ARM64' test
that encoded the old broken behavior), 39 desktop voice/wake vitest, tsc +
eslint clean.
'photon:any;-;+1555...' targets matched no parser pattern, so
_handle_send bounced them off the channel directory and failed
resolution even though the adapter accepts the GUID verbatim (the
react handler already passed them through). Recognize the DM chat
GUID shape (mirrors the adapter's _DM_CHAT_GUID_RE) in
_parse_target_ref for photon only.
The sidecar auth token is generated at spawn (secrets.token_hex) and
existed only in the gateway process memory + sidecar child env, so
_standalone_send from cron subprocesses, hermes send, or the dashboard
structurally could not authenticate (#69960).
The adapter now writes <hermes-home>/runtime/photon-sidecar.json
({port, token, pid}, 0600, atomic tempfile+os.replace) once the sidecar
passes its /healthz readiness check, and deletes it in _stop_sidecar,
on every startup-failure path, and at disconnect so a stale record
never outlives a dead sidecar. _standalone_send falls back to the
record when PHOTON_SIDECAR_TOKEN is unset, validating the recorded pid
is alive first; a stale record yields a clear 'gateway appears to be
down' error. Docs note the gateway-must-be-running requirement and the
Photon-side shared-line initiation policy (#51897).
Maintainer follow-up: _cmd_setup now validates existing tokens (#72763
salvage); the pre-existing setup tests monkeypatch a stored token, so
without stubbing check_photon_token_valid they'd hit the real dashboard
API and hang.
Addresses teknium1 review on #50983:
- cli.py's `hermes photon status` and adapter.py's _start_sidecar() still
used the old node_modules/-existence check while check_requirements()
had moved to a spectrum-ts content check. Extracted the check into a
shared sidecar_deps_installed(), used by all three, so an
empty/partial node_modules/ (aborted npm install) is rejected
consistently instead of only in check_requirements().
- _install_sidecar()'s success-path _NPM_ERROR_LOG.unlink() only caught
FileNotFoundError, so a PermissionError/OSError on a locked file would
propagate. Broadened to OSError.
- npm stderr was truncated only when read back in check_requirements();
an unbounded stderr was written to disk on every failed install. Now
truncated to _NPM_ERROR_LOG_MAX_CHARS before write_text().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Problema
--------
Quando o npm install do sidecar Photon falhava, o Hermes descartava toda
evidencia e continuava normalmente - deixando o adapter de iMessage
silenciosamente ausente, sem nenhuma mensagem de erro acionavel.
Tres falhas independentes formavam o caminho de falha silenciosa:
1. check_requirements() sem logging
Cada branch de return False retornava sem emitir nenhum log. O core em
platform_registry.py so consome o bool de check_fn() e loga uma mensagem
generica com o install_hint - sem acesso ao motivo real da falha.
if not HTTPX_AVAILABLE: return False # sem log
if not shutil.which(node): return False # sem log
if not node_modules.exists: return False # sem log
2. node_modules/ parcialmente criado passava o guard (Risk 2)
npm cria node_modules/ antes de abortar em ENOSPC, timeout de rede ou
EACCES. O diretorio existia, check_requirements() retornava True (falso
positivo), o adapter era registrado, e o crash acontecia em runtime com
um erro de modulo ausente aparentemente nao relacionado ao setup.
3. stderr do npm descartado (Risk 3)
subprocess.run sem stderr=PIPE. O output de erro aparecia no terminal
durante o setup e sumia depois - diagnostico impossivel em CI/CD, Docker,
VPS headless, e qualquer reinstalacao posterior.
Correcoes
---------
adapter.py - check_requirements() agora loga por branch:
- httpx ausente -> logger.warning com nome do pacote
- node nao no PATH -> logger.warning com nome do binario e env var
- spectrum-ts ausente -> logger.debug com path do sidecar + ultimo erro npm
(DEBUG nao WARNING: estado normal pre-setup; check_fn() e chamado de
5 hot paths do core incluindo polling do /api/status)
adapter.py - content check em vez de existence check (Risk 2):
antes: if not (_SIDECAR_DIR / node_modules).exists()
depois: if not (_SIDECAR_DIR / node_modules / spectrum-ts).exists()
spectrum-ts e a unica dependencia do package.json. Checar sua presenca
garante que instalacao parcial/abortada e detectada no boot do gateway,
nao na primeira mensagem recebida via gRPC.
cli.py - stderr capturado e persistido (Risk 3):
subprocess.run passa agora stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True em ambas as
chamadas (npm ci e npm install fallback). O stderr capturado e:
- impresso em sys.stderr imediatamente (output visivel no terminal)
- persistido em _NPM_ERROR_LOG = sidecar/.photon-npm-error.log se
returncode != 0, limitado a 300 chars
- apagado de _NPM_ERROR_LOG se returncode == 0 (evita erro stale)
check_requirements() le _NPM_ERROR_LOG quando spectrum-ts esta ausente e
inclui o conteudo no DEBUG log - o erro do npm sobrevive ao terminal, ao
restart do gateway e a reinicializacao da maquina.
sidecar/.gitignore - adicionado node_modules/ e .photon-npm-error.log.
Isolamento - sem impacto no core:
- check_fn() continua retornando apenas bool; core nao e modificado
- Logging usa namespace plugins.platforms.photon.adapter, isolado de
gateway.* e hermes_cli.*
- Cada plugin tem seu proprio check_requirements() independente
- OSError no write/read de _NPM_ERROR_LOG e silenciado - nunca propaga
Testes - 24/24 passando:
test_check_requirements_risks.py (7 testes):
WARNING emitido quando httpx ausente
WARNING emitido quando node nao no PATH
DEBUG emitido (nao WARNING) quando spectrum-ts ausente, com path
node_modules/ vazio agora retorna False (Risk 2 resolvido)
_NPM_ERROR_LOG escrito no stderr do npm em falha
_NPM_ERROR_LOG apagado apos npm bem-sucedido
erro npm aparece no DEBUG log quando node_modules ausente
test_npm_error_log_regression.py (9 testes - vetores de falha da solucao):
return code contrato intacto (0 em sucesso, nao-zero em falha)
OSError no write do log silenciado, exit code ainda propagado
OSError no read do log silenciado, check_requirements() retorna False
stderr vazio nao cria arquivo de log
proc.stderr=None nao lanca AttributeError
log stale apagado apos reinstall bem-sucedido
DEBUG emitido mesmo sem log de erro (setup pela primeira vez)
Closes#50981
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hermes photon setup unconditionally called regenerate_project_secret()
on every re-run, invalidating the credential held by a running sidecar
and causing all outbound sends to fail with AuthenticationError.
Now validates existing credentials via a lightweight list_users call
before deciding to regenerate. Only rotates when no credentials exist
or the existing ones are invalid, and warns the user to restart the
gateway when rotation occurs.
Fixes#50755
store_photon_token/store_project_credentials/store_user_numbers read-modify-
wrote auth.json without hermes_cli/auth.py's _auth_store_lock(), the
cross-process flock every other writer of that file (credential_pool
refresh, model_switch, fallback_cmd, nous_portal adapter, etc.) already
holds. A concurrent write from either side during the unlocked
load-mutate-save window silently drops the other side's update.
Review follow-up: if os.fdopen() raised before taking ownership of the
descriptor returned by os.open(), the cleanup handler unlinked the temp
file but leaked the fd. Close it explicitly on that path, mirroring the
credential-writer cleanup from #62837.
Strengthen the tests so the old writer could not pass them: an os.open
spy asserts O_CREAT | O_EXCL and an explicit 0o600 mode (the final-mode
check alone was also satisfied by the post-write chmod), and a forced
fdopen-failure test asserts the raw fd is closed and no temp file is
left behind.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
_save_auth() wrote the bearer token with tmp.open('w') — created at
process umask (typically 0o644) — and only chmod'ed to 0o600 after the
write, leaving a window where the token sat world-readable. The temp
name was also fixed and predictable (auth.json.tmp), so it could be
pre-planted (symlink attack).
Create the temp file with os.open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0o600) and a
per-process random suffix, fsync before the atomic replace, and clean
the temp file up on failure. Mirrors hermes_cli/auth.py:_save_auth_store
(#19673, #21148), which hardened the same pattern in the core writer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up on top of #65554 (@the3asic):
- Lower FTS5 'usermerge' to its minimum of 2 (persisted in the config
shadow table, applied once per SessionDB instance). Without this a
positive-rank 'merge' skips any level holding fewer than 4 segments
(SQLite FTS5 §6.8), so the fragmented-index case the cadence targets
never converges.
- Run up to _FTS_MERGE_COMMANDS_PER_PASS (4) bounded merge commands per
index per cadence, stopping early on the documented no-progress
signal (total_changes delta < 2). Each command is its own implicit
transaction, so the write lock is released between commands.
- Skip a missing messages_fts instead of raising: the chunked
optimize-storage rebuild legitimately drops + backfills FTS tables
while writers keep running; warning every 1000 writes for the whole
backfill window would be noise, and optimize_fts() has always
treated missing tables as skippable.
- Replace traced-SQL shape assertions with behavioral tests: real
fragmented-index convergence (automerge suppressed, 60 segments) and
a 3-segment below-default-usermerge compaction test that fails
against a bare positive-rank merge (sabotage-verified).
Validation on a sqlite3.backup() copy of a real 10.7 GB production
state.db (1.49M messages, 1.3 GB + 2.9 GB FTS shadow tables):
worst per-command write-lock hold 41.8 ms (was 9.2 s / 18.1 s per
index with 'optimize'), search results byte-identical, fts5
integrity-check and PRAGMA integrity_check clean, steady-state pass
0.0 ms.
Sibling of the test_auxiliary_client.py cleanup — these two assertions
pinned the OpenRouter/Nous aux default as a frozen literal and broke on
the 3.6-flash bump (CI slice 5). Reference _OPENROUTER_MODEL/_NOUS_MODEL
instead so the next default rotation can't break them.
gemini-2.5-flash shuts down Oct 16 2026 (Google deprecation schedule)
and gemini-3-flash-preview is superseded. Update every hardcoded
default to the current GA flash model:
- gemini_native_adapter: probe_gemini_tier + _create_chat_completion
default params; free-tier guidance de-pinned from a specific model's
RPD number so it doesn't stale again
- auxiliary_client: gemini/kilocode fallback aux models,
_OPENROUTER_MODEL, _NOUS_MODEL -> google/gemini-3.6-flash
(verified live on both OpenRouter and Nous portal /models)
- provider plugins: kilocode + vertex default_aux_model
- hindsight memory plugin: gemini provider default
- setup wizard gemini list: 3-flash-preview -> 3.6-flash (matches the
curated picker catalog)
- tests: aux-client assertions that pinned the old default literal now
reference the _NOUS_MODEL constant, so the next default bump can't
break them (change-detector cleanup)
Fixes#32360.
Photon (iMessage) has no real edit API for already-sent messages. When
streaming completes, the gateway attempts to edit the message to remove
the streaming cursor (▉). Without edit support, this cursor gets stuck
in the final message, corrupting Unicode characters.
This change sets SUPPORTS_MESSAGE_EDITING=False on PhotonAdapter, which
causes the gateway to suppress the streaming cursor entirely for this
platform (via _effective_cursor in gateway/run.py). This prevents the
stale tofu square (▉) from appearing in streamed iMessage responses.
Fixes#49253
Command providers legitimately reference their own API keys in shell
templates (curl one-liners). The #70342 scrub removes ALL provider keys,
which would break such setups. Add a per-provider env_passthrough list
(TTS + STT) that copies named variables back from the parent env, plus
docs and tests. Scrub stays the default; passthrough is explicit opt-in.
Port the progress-based idle-timeout pattern from _run_command_tts
(PR #50087, @CleanDev-Fix) to _run_command_stt: the timeout resets on
any stdout/stderr output, so a slow-but-alive STT provider survives
while a silently stalled one is killed. Stuck detection stays
progress-based, never wall-clock.
`transcribe_audio` reads a local file and hands it to the configured STT
provider — for the hosted providers (Groq, OpenAI, Mistral, xAI, ElevenLabs)
that ships the file's bytes to a third-party API. The same local-input read
guard was added to image-gen (587be5b5b) and xAI video-gen (104232979) to keep
the agent from feeding credential/secret stores to a provider, but STT was
missed.
Call `get_read_block_error(file_path)` at the top of `transcribe_audio`, before
validation/dispatch, so a `.env`, `auth.json`, `.anthropic_oauth.json`,
`mcp-tokens/`, etc. is refused up front instead of being transcribed (and, for
hosted providers, exfiltrated). This is defense-in-depth, not a security
boundary — the guard's own message says so — but it restores parity with the
image/video-gen tools.
Regression test: a `.env` file is refused with the shared read-guard message
before any provider dispatch (mutation-verified).
HERMES_LOCAL_STT_COMMAND rendered quoted placeholders into a
user-configured template and passed the result to shell=True. Shell
metacharacters in the template therefore remained executable syntax even
though the placeholder values themselves were quoted.
Tokenize the rendered template and invoke it as an argv list while
preserving the existing timeout, closed stdin, and Windows creation flags.
Lock the invocation contract with metacharacter regression coverage and
document explicit shell wrapping for trusted templates that need it.
Salvages #32694
Co-authored-by: Ernest Hysa <takis312@hotmail.com>
