After the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain campaign (May 2026) and the litellm
compromise (March 2026), codify the dependency pinning policy that was
established in PRs #2810 and #9801 but never written down for contributors.
Changes:
- pyproject.toml: Add tight upper bounds to the 5 deps that slipped
through as review escapes from external contributor PRs:
- hindsight-client>=0.4.22,<0.5 (was >=0.4.22)
- aiosqlite>=0.20,<0.23 (was >=0.20)
- asyncpg>=0.29,<0.32 (was >=0.29)
- alibabacloud-dingtalk>=2.0.0,<3 (was >=2.0.0)
- youtube-transcript-api>=1.2.0,<2 (was >=1.2.0)
Pre-1.0 packages get <0.(current_minor+2) — tight enough to block
hostile minor releases but loose enough to not require bumps every week.
- CONTRIBUTING.md: Add 'Dependency pinning policy' section under Security
with the full rationale, table of source types + treatments, and examples.
- AGENTS.md: Add concise 'Dependency Pinning Policy' section for AI coding
agents with the decision table and step-by-step checklist.
- supply-chain-audit.yml: Add dep-bounds job that fails PRs introducing
PyPI deps without <ceiling upper bounds. Fires on pyproject.toml changes.
Posts a PR comment with the specific unbounded specs found.
Refs: #2796#2810#9801#24205
PR #12681 removed the audit entirely because it fired on nearly every PR
(Dockerfile edits, dependency bumps, Actions version strings, plain
base64 usage, etc.) — reviewers were ignoring it like cancer warnings.
Restore it with aggressive scope reduction:
Kept (real attack signatures):
- .pth file additions (litellm-attack mechanism)
- base64 decode + exec/eval on the same line
- subprocess with base64/hex/chr-encoded command argument
- install-hook files (setup.py, sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py,
__init__.pth)
Removed (low-signal noise that fired constantly):
- plain base64 encode/decode
- plain exec/eval
- outbound requests.post / httpx.post / urllib
- CI/CD workflow file edits
- Dockerfile / compose edits
- pyproject.toml / requirements.txt edits
- GitHub Actions version-tag unpinning
- marshal / pickle / compile usage
Also gates the workflow itself on path filters so it only runs on PRs
touching Python or install-hook files — no more firing on docs/CI PRs.
The workflow still fails the check and posts a PR comment on
critical findings, but by design those findings are now rare and
worth inspecting when they occur.
- Docker build only triggers on main push (code/config changes) and
releases, no longer on every PR
- Tests skip markdown-only and docs-only changes
- Remove supply-chain-audit workflow
The GITHUB_TOKEN for fork PRs is read-only — gh pr comment fails with
'Resource not accessible by integration'. This caused the supply chain
scan to show a red X on every fork PR even when no findings were detected.
The scan itself still runs and the 'Fail on critical findings' step
still exits 1 on real issues. Only the comment posting is gracefully
skipped for fork PRs.
Closes#6679
Co-authored-by: SHL0MS <SHL0MS@users.noreply.github.com>
