Set max_result_size_chars=100_000 on the read_file registry entry (was
float('inf')), closing the Layer 2 defense-in-depth gap in
tool_result_storage.py. The existing Layer 1 guard inside
_handle_read_file already returns a JSON error for oversized reads;
this aligns the registry cap with every other tool.
Update test_read_file_never_persisted → test_read_file_result_size_cap
to assert 100_000, and add test_read_file_registry_cap_is_100k as an
explicit regression guard against re-introducing float('inf').
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
_write_to_sandbox interpolated storage_dir and remote_path directly into
a shell command passed to env.execute(). Paths containing shell
metacharacters (spaces, semicolons, $(), backticks) could trigger
arbitrary command execution inside the sandbox.
Fix: wrap both paths with shlex.quote(). Clean paths (alphanumeric +
slashes/hyphens/dots) are left unmodified by shlex.quote, so existing
behavior is unchanged. Paths with unsafe characters get single-quoted.
Tests added for spaces, $(command) substitution, and semicolon injection.
- DEFAULT_RESULT_SIZE_CHARS: 50K -> 100K (match current _LARGE_RESULT_CHARS)
- DEFAULT_PREVIEW_SIZE_CHARS: 2K -> 1.5K (match current _LARGE_RESULT_PREVIEW_CHARS)
- Per-tool overrides all set to 100K (terminal, execute_code, search_files)
- Remove pre-read byte guard (no behavioral regression vs current main)
- Revert limit signature change to int=500 (match current default)
- Restore original read_file schema description
- Update test assertions to match 100K thresholds
