OSC-11 asks the terminal for its actual background at startup (env
heuristics are blind on xterm.js hosts) and the theme re-derives against
the answer: desktop-contract adaptation (contrast floors + fill polarity),
a shared list-row selection primitive instead of per-picker panel fills,
paired light_colors/dark_colors skin blocks with a machine audit, and a
/theme auto|light|dark pin (display.tui_theme) for hosts whose probe lies.
E2E coverage for the OSC reply chain + /theme-info diagnostics.
The /api/status gateway_updated_at field and the gateway /health/detailed
updated_at field passed through whatever gateway_state.json contained,
untyped. All current writers emit RFC3339 via _utc_now_iso(), but legacy
gateways wrote unix epoch floats, and a corrupt or hand-edited state file
can inject numbers or arbitrary garbage — while the frontend types
(web/src/lib/api.ts) declare string | null.
Add normalize_updated_at() in gateway/status.py as the single funnel:
- str: accepted iff datetime.fromisoformat parses (trailing Z tolerated);
naive timestamps coerced to UTC; canonical isoformat returned
- int/float: treated as unix epoch seconds -> UTC ISO string, with a
plausibility guard (reject < 2000-01-01, > now+1day, non-finite)
- bool: rejected explicitly (int subclass, but never a timestamp)
- anything else: None
Apply it at both emit sites: the dashboard /api/status handler (covers
both the local read_runtime_status() branch and the remote
/health/detailed cross-container fallback branch) and the gateway API
server's /health/detailed response.
Contract tests: parametrized /api/status normalization (epoch float/int,
garbage string, None, bool, dict, absent key), remote-health numeric and
garbage bodies, dashboard shape test round-trip assertion, direct
normalize_updated_at units (range guards, Z suffix, naive coercion,
non-finite floats), and a write_runtime_status -> read_runtime_status
round-trip proving the writer side stays tz-aware parseable.
The dashboard's own liveness surface could report healthy while every
authenticated request 500'd (e.g. wedged state DB) — /api/status carried
gateway-only fields, no storage/dashboard signal, and no middleware
counted unhandled exceptions.
- DashboardHealth state holder: rolling 5-min deque of unhandled-error
timestamps + last self-test result. last_error_type/last_error_path
are internal-only diagnostics — snapshot() exports counts/enums/
timestamps exclusively (PUBLIC_API_PATHS no-secrets contract).
- Outermost @app.middleware('http') (registered last) wraps call_next
in try/except: records + re-raises unhandled exceptions, and records
responses with status >= 500.
- /api/status gains 'components' {gateway, storage, dashboard,
platforms} + top-level 'overall' ok|degraded. storage reuses the
gateway readiness state_db probe (read-only, 1s-bounded) in an
executor; platforms derive ok/degraded from existing
gateway_platforms states.
- Authenticated self-test task started in the lifespan: every 60s an
in-process httpx ASGITransport GET of /api/sessions?limit=1 with the
real _SESSION_TOKEN, feeding the dashboard component. Skips cleanly
when httpx is unavailable and while the OAuth gate is engaged (the
legacy token is not honoured there).
Tests: middleware increments on raising route and on 5xx, window
expiry, components shape + overall, storage degraded when the state_db
probe fails, dashboard degraded after an error, no secret-bearing
fields in the public payload, self-test pass/fail recording (mocked
client) + a real ASGI round trip.
start_background_mcp_discovery() sets _mcp_discovery_started once and never
resets it. If the first background run exits without connecting any MCP
server (startup cancellation, OOM restart, transient network failure), every
later call returns immediately and the process is permanently stuck with
zero MCP tools until a full restart.
Fix: when discovery is marked started but the thread is dead and no server
is connected, reset the flag and spawn a fresh discovery thread. Also log a
WARNING when a discovery run completes with zero connected servers, so the
condition is visible instead of silent.
Caught in production on a long-running gateway fleet where a gateway
restarted under memory pressure and came back with all MCP tools missing.
PR #63455 shipped the flock without tests. Cover the three contention
paths: contended+dist serves stale without a second build, uncontended
builds under the lock (creating the lock file), and contended+no-dist
blocks then skips the rebuild because the staleness re-check runs under
the lock and sees the winner's stamp. Also pin the lock filename into
.gitignore via a regression assertion.
Replace mtime-based web UI dist staleness with a content-hash stamp under HERMES_HOME, matching the desktop build freshness model.
This avoids false stale/fresh decisions when git operations rewrite source mtimes without changing bytes, while preserving the existing stale-dist fallback. Also treats malformed or missing stamp data as needing a rebuild.
mount_spa degrades to a JSON 404 catch-all when the dist directory is
fully missing, but _serve_index read index.html unguarded — so a dist
dir that exists while index.html is missing (partial build, wiped dist,
permissions) raised FileNotFoundError on EVERY request instead of
returning a useful error.
Catch OSError around the read and return the same JSON 404 payload the
fully-missing-dist path uses, so clients get a consistent signal. The
route recovers automatically once a rebuild restores the file.
--skip-build with a missing web_dist/index.html previously hard-failed
with sys.exit(1) (issue #59288). The desktop launcher passes
--build-mode skip on every boot, so a wiped or never-populated dist
bricked the dashboard until the user manually rebuilt.
Now the default-dist path logs a clear warning and attempts exactly ONE
recovery build through the existing _build_web_ui path. If the recovery
build also fails to produce index.html, the original fatal behavior is
preserved with a clear message. A custom HERMES_WEB_DIST stays fail-fast:
the build writes to the default dist location and cannot populate a
caller-managed directory.
Closes#59288
Adds kanban_db.repair_db() — a structured, non-raising wrapper around
the same narrow repair policy as the connect-time guard: probe with
PRAGMA integrity_check under the board's cross-process init flock;
quarantine the corrupt bytes FIRST via the content-addressed backup;
REINDEX only when every integrity message is index-scoped; re-check;
report ok / repaired / corrupt / missing. Locked/busy OperationalError
still propagates raw (a locked healthy DB is not corruption and gets
no quarantine), and a repair invalidates the per-process healthy-path
cache so the next connect() re-probes.
The CLI verb reports status human-readably (or --json), exits 0 for
ok/repaired/missing and 1 when the DB is still corrupt (non-index
corruption stays fail-closed with manual-recovery guidance). It
dispatches BEFORE kanban_command's auto-init: init_db() raises
KanbanDbCorruptError on a corrupt board, which previously would have
made a repair verb unreachable on exactly the boards that need it.
CLI tests drive the real argparse surface (build_parser +
kanban_command) against real corrupted SQLite fixtures.
Kanban connections set wal_autocheckpoint=100, but SQLite's passive
autocheckpoint backs off whenever any reader holds an open snapshot —
on a busy multi-process board the -wal file can grow without bound
between gateway restarts.
After each successful dispatch tick, while still holding the board's
single-writer dispatch flock, run PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)
best-effort at a coarse interval (>=5 min since this process last
checkpointed that board; module-level per-path monotonic timestamp, so
multi-board dispatchers checkpoint each board on its own clock).
Success and busy/locked skips are both logged at DEBUG; a failing
checkpoint can never fail the tick.
Content-addressed quarantine backups dedupe identical corrupt bytes,
but corruption that keeps mutating between failures (partial repairs,
further damage across dispatcher retries, multi-profile fleets) mints a
new sha-named backup every round — a user accumulated 124
.corrupt.*.bak files with no bound.
After each NEW backup is created, prune oldest-by-mtime backups beyond
_CORRUPT_BACKUP_RETENTION (module constant, default 10), including the
copied -wal/-shm sidecars. The just-created backup is always exempt
(copy2 preserves the source mtime, which can be older than existing
backups). Pruning is best-effort and never masks the corruption error
about to be raised; dedupe of identical corrupt bytes is unchanged.
_guard_existing_db_is_healthy previously failed closed on ANY
integrity_check failure, including the index-scoped class ('wrong # of
entries in index <name>' / 'row N missing from index <name>') where the
table b-trees are intact and REINDEX rebuilds the damaged indexes
losslessly. Boards hit by that class were bricked until manual surgery
even though SQLite can fix them in-place.
Now, when integrity_check output consists ONLY of index-scoped errors
(index name parsed generically from the message — no hardcoded list):
1. quarantine the corrupt bytes FIRST via the existing content-
addressed _backup_corrupt_db,
2. under the caller-held cross-process init flock, REINDEX each named
index (falling back to bare REINDEX if a parsed name doesn't
resolve),
3. re-run integrity_check and proceed only if it comes back clean.
Any non-index error class (page corruption, malformed image, freelist
damage) — or a REINDEX whose re-check is still dirty — fails closed
exactly as before: backup + KanbanDbCorruptError, no silent recreation.
Transient OperationalError (locked/busy) still propagates raw with no
quarantine.
Tests build a real board DB and corrupt a live index via the
writable_schema/partial-index REINDEX trick to produce the genuine
'wrong # of entries in index' shape, then assert auto-repair recovers
with data intact, page corruption still raises, and a dirty re-check
fails closed.
* feat(desktop): configure repository discovery
* fix(config): preserve additive default migration
* fix(desktop): stabilize session-actions-menu gateway mock for repo-scan subscribe
projects.ts now runs $gateway.subscribe(syncReposScanning) at module load, and
nanostores fires the subscriber synchronously. session-actions-menu.test.ts
reaches projects.ts transitively via the session store but mocked
@/store/gateway without $gateway, crashing the whole desktop vitest suite
("No \ export is defined"). Simply adding $gateway: atom(null) exposed a
second issue: the synchronous subscriber calls the mock's activeGateway()
during the transitive import, before the module-level const initializes (TDZ).
Hoist the mock fns via vi.hoisted() so activeGateway is defined before the
hoisted vi.mock factory runs, and add $gateway: atom(null) to the mock. Mirrors
the self-contained mock pattern already used in projects.test.ts. Also maps the
PR author's commit email for attribution.
Supersedes #67630; incorporates review feedback from that PR.
Co-authored-by: Rudimar Ronsoni <rudimar@outlook.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Rudimar Ronsoni <rudimar@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Austin Pickett <austinpickett@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(secrets): one-command token rotation + actionable startup errors for all secret sources
When a Bitwarden machine-account token expired, users saw a raw Rust
error dump (invalid_client + Location: + backtrace hints) and the only
fix was manually editing .env or re-running the whole setup wizard.
- New `hermes secrets bitwarden token` / `hermes secrets onepassword
token`: paste a new token (masked prompt or flag), the command probes
the backend BEFORE persisting — a rejected token changes nothing; a
good one is written to .env and the fetch caches are cleared.
- New optional SecretSource.remediation(kind, cfg) hook: startup
warnings now print a '→ Run `hermes secrets <name> token`…' fix-it
line after any fetch error, for bundled AND plugin sources (generic
per-ErrorKind defaults in the ABC).
- bws stderr is summarized to its cause line (Location:/backtrace noise
dropped) and invalid_client/invalid_grant/400 identity rejects are
now classified AUTH_FAILED (was INTERNAL) with a plain-English
explanation naming the token env var.
- op whoami probe accepts a candidate token so rotation validates the
NEW credential, not the ambient one.
Additive hook with defaults — no SECRET_SOURCE_API_VERSION bump.
* docs: fix MDX parse error in secret-source-plugin hook table
Escaped backticks around a <name> placeholder made MDX parse it as an
unclosed JSX tag, breaking the docs-site build. Use a plain code span
instead.
Add regression tests locking in the new behavior: a JWT carrying a
chatgpt_account_id claim causes the probe to send ChatGPT-Account-Id,
while a malformed token omits the header instead of crashing.
* fix(billing): rename user-facing "terminal billing" copy to Remote Spending
The capability was renamed Remote Spending on the portal (consent CTA:
"Allow Remote Spending"; per-terminal states Granted/Stopped), but the
terminal, desktop, and docs still said "terminal billing" everywhere.
- Feature name: Remote Spending in titles/labels, lowercase mid-sentence.
- Step-up action verb is now "allow", matching the portal consent CTA.
- Kill-switch-off recovery copy points at the actual control ("a billing
admin can turn it on from the portal's Hermes Agent page") instead of
the dead-end "manage it on the portal".
- Per-terminal revoke copy uses the portal vocabulary ("stopped").
- Wire identifiers (cli_billing_enabled, cli_billing_disabled, ...) are
unchanged; copy, comments, docs, and test expectations only.
* fix(billing): correct the post-step-up denial diagnosis + finish the desktop rename
Adversarial review findings: (1) a repeated insufficient_scope after a
successful step-up is a per-terminal authorization failure, but the copy
blamed the org kill-switch and pointed at the wrong recovery control —
now: "Remote Spending still isn't active for this terminal — the
authorization didn't take. Retry, or make this change on the portal."
(2) the desktop step-up flow started in Remote Spending vocabulary but
finished in "billing management access" — renamed both end states.
(3) prettier formatting on the touched files (matches the post-merge
fmt bot).
Sync with main after the contribution-shell refactor (#60638) and the backendConnectionState extraction (#65885) landed. Seven conflicts, all resolved in favor of main's new architecture with the SSH lifecycle ported on top:
- electron/main.ts: adopt backendConnectionState (attempt tokens, attachProcess, clearPromiseForAttempt) as the sole owner of the primary backend; drop the branch's raw hermesProcess/connectionPromise globals and commitConnectionFailure call site. SSH liveness-streak classification, teardown, and the SSH quit path are layered onto the new ownership model; before-quit combines SSH transactional teardown with the Windows sandbox marker (#38216).
- desktop-controller.tsx: deleted on main; its SSH beforeConnectionSwitch cleanup (preserved-route fresh draft, overlay return-route reset, project-tree reset, close-all-terminals) moves to contrib/wiring.tsx's useGatewayBoot call.
- use-session-actions/index.ts: keep main's onFreshDraftRouteIntent (fires unconditionally); preserveRoute gates only the navigate.
- gateway-settings.tsx: keep main's acceptSavedConfig/connectedCloudUrl; every save/sign-in/sign-out success path routes through acceptSavedConfig with the branch's stale-async seq guards intact.
- boot-failure-reauth.ts: keep both sshFailureMessage and main's isRemoteReauthFailure formatting.
- Both test harnesses take the union of props.
Validation: tsc -b clean; desktop suite 1704 passed / 1 skipped; electron SSH/connection modules 225 passed; python SSH + web_server suites 508 passed.
Both providers share the same models.dev ID (kimi-for-coding) but
have different API keys (KIMI_API_KEY vs KIMI_CN_API_KEY) and base
URLs (moonshot.ai vs moonshot.cn). The /model picker was only
showing one because the dedup key was mdev_id alone.
Changes in list_authenticated_providers():
- Resolve canonical provider profile name and skip alias hermes_ids
(e.g. "kimi", "moonshot" → "kimi-coding") so only canonical
entries are processed.
- Deduplicate by slug (hermes_id) instead of mdev_id so distinct
profiles sharing a models.dev ID (kimi-coding vs kimi-coding-cn)
both appear.
- Prefer PROVIDER_REGISTRY name for the display label so the CN
variant shows "Kimi / Moonshot (China)" instead of the generic
models.dev name.
Adds test coverage for all three key scenarios:
- Only KIMI_CN_API_KEY set → only kimi-coding-cn appears
- Only KIMI_API_KEY set → only kimi-coding appears
- Both keys set → both providers appear, aliases not duplicated
Closes#10526
A single Kimi credential surfaced two rows in the `/model` picker — the
bare alias `kimi` (PROVIDER_TO_MODELS_DEV pass) and the canonical
`kimi-coding` (CANONICAL_PROVIDERS cross-check, section 2b) — both backed
by the same `kimi-for-coding` provider.
`kimi`, `moonshot` and the canonical `kimi-coding` all map to one
models.dev id (`kimi-for-coding`). The seen_mdev_ids guard collapses them
to the first key in section 1, but that key is the bare alias, so 2b
re-emits the canonical name as a second row.
Emit the row under the canonical Hermes slug instead: resolve the alias
via _PROVIDER_ALIASES (`kimi` -> `kimi-coding`) before appending, so 2b's
seen_slugs check collapses the pair. This matches the picker's other alias
rows (copilot, gemini) and the overlay slug-resolution contract, and keeps
the surviving row resolvable to the real provider. A defensive seen_slugs
guard prevents emitting a duplicate canonical row.
Distinct providers keep their own row: `kimi-coding-cn` has its own
KIMI_CN_API_KEY and is still emitted by section 2b.
Regression tests assert the single-key case yields one `kimi-coding` row
(fails on clean main, which shows both `kimi` and `kimi-coding`) and that
the China endpoint is preserved.
Fixes#49439
TestPtyWebSocket's two python-resolution tests and the sibling fixture in
test_tui_resume_flow.py hard-linked sys.executable into pytest's tmp_path.
On machines where /tmp is a different filesystem than the venv (tmpfs vs
disk home) os.link raises OSError EXDEV and the tests fail before reaching
any assertion. copy2 preserves the executable bit and works across devices.
c253b0738 added clear_model_endpoint_credentials() to scrub an old endpoint's
inline secret (api_key, the legacy `api` alias, api_mode) when the web UI
switches the main model to a different provider. But _apply_main_model_assignment
gates the key-scrub path on model_cfg["api_key"] being truthy, so when the stale
secret lives only under the legacy `api` alias (no api_key), a provider switch
never clears it — the secret survives in config.yaml.
model.api is a live credential read path (_resolve_openrouter_runtime reads
`for k in ("api_key", "api")`), so the old endpoint's key contaminates a later
custom resolution — the exact harm clear_model_endpoint_credentials documents.
The sibling persistence sites (the gateway model-picker paths and the aux-slot
path) call the helper unconditionally on a non-custom switch and already scrub
`api`; only this caller had the api_key-only gate.
Widen the guard to fire on either field. The same-provider re-pick and
explicit-new-key paths are unchanged. Adds the api-alias case to the assignment
test (it fails without the fix).
Follow-up widening for salvaged PRs #67115, #67685, #67620:
- _PROVIDER_MODELS: add kimi-k3 atop kimi-coding / moonshot / opencode-go
curated lists (kimi-coding-cn covered by cherry-picked #67620)
- setup.py _DEFAULT_PROVIDER_MODELS: kimi-k3 for kimi-coding(-cn) + opencode-go
- model_metadata: align DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS kimi-k3 entry to 1,048,576
(matches endpoint-scoped override, models.dev, and OpenRouter live metadata)
- anthropic_adapter: classify the bare Coding Plan slug 'k3' (and k3.x/k3-*)
as Kimi family so adaptive thinking applies on proxied endpoints
- moonshot_schema: is_moonshot_model matches bare 'k3' so tool-schema
sanitization runs on the chat-completions path
- contributor mappings for githubespresso407, datachainsystems, Punyko8
Tests: 582 passed across 11 targeted files; hermetic E2E verifies picker
order (kimi-k3 first), no dupes, and 1M context resolution.
activate_custom_endpoint copies the endpoint's base_url and api_key onto
cfg["model"]. delete_custom_endpoint pops the providers entry and saves —
it never touches that mirror.
So deleting the endpoint the agent is currently using leaves both behind:
DELETE /api/providers/custom-endpoints/acme -> 200
providers entry gone : True
model.api_key : sk-CUSTOM-ENDPOINT-SECRET
model.base_url : https://llm.acme.corp/v1
Two consequences, both silent:
* The agent keeps authenticating to the deleted host with the deleted key.
model.api_key outranks the environment at client construction, so this
also shadows whatever the operator configures next — the persistent-401
shape credential_lifecycle.py documents as #62269.
* A credential the operator just removed through the dashboard stays
sitting in config.yaml.
Scrub the main-slot mirror on delete, but only when it actually names the
deleted provider — an endpoint deleted while a different one is active must
leave that active assignment untouched. Both directions are pinned by tests.
_write_custom_endpoint builds a fresh entry dict from the request body and
assigns it over providers[endpoint_id], carrying nothing forward but api_key.
A providers.<name> block is not owned by that panel. It can carry keys the
dashboard has no field for, all of them load-bearing:
api_mode the protocol the endpoint speaks
key_env where the credential comes from
extra_headers per-provider HTTP headers (may carry credentials)
request_overrides extra body params
and a models map with more than the one model the panel names.
So an edit that only changes the default model destroys the rest:
BEFORE api_mode, base_url, extra_headers, key_env, model, models,
name, request_overrides
AFTER base_url, discover_models, model, models, name
FIELDS DESTROYED: ['api_mode', 'extra_headers', 'key_env',
'request_overrides']
The provider is left with no credential wiring (key_env gone, no api_key),
talking the wrong protocol, missing its proxy auth header — from a UI action
that said nothing about any of that. The models map also collapses to the one
named model, dropping the others and their context_length.
Merge onto the existing entry instead of replacing it, and merge the models
map rather than overwriting it. Managed fields still win, so the edit itself
still applies; a brand-new endpoint is unchanged. api_key keeps its previous
semantics — a supplied key overwrites, an omitted one leaves the stored key
in place (now via the merge rather than an explicit carry-forward branch).
POST /api/model/set accepts an api_key and threads it into
_apply_main_model_assignment. The custom-endpoint work then added a
provider-entry fallback right after it — but unconditionally:
if not base_url and provider_entry.get("base_url"):
base_url = provider_entry["base_url"] # explicit wins
model_cfg = _apply_main_model_assignment(..., base_url, api_key)
if provider_entry.get("api_key"):
model_cfg["api_key"] = provider_entry["api_key"] # explicit LOSES
The two lines disagree about precedence. base_url fills only a gap; api_key
overwrites whatever the caller sent.
So rotating a key through this endpoint returns 200 and silently keeps the
old one:
request api_key : sk-NEW-ROTATED-KEY
stored api_key : sk-STORED-OLD-KEY
That matters beyond the write itself: model.api_key outranks the environment
at client construction, so the stale key keeps authenticating and shadows
anything the operator configures next — the persistent-401 shape
credential_lifecycle.py documents as #62269.
A regression, not long-standing. Against 3d9789357^ the same request stores
sk-NEW-ROTATED-KEY.
Gate the fallback on `not api_key`, matching the base_url line directly above
it. Switching to a configured provider with no key in the request still adopts
the entry's key — pinned by its own test so the feature's intent doesn't
regress in the other direction.
Transform of salvaged PR #34250 per maintainer direction: arbitrary
config keys are a supported pattern (top-level scalars bridge into
os.environ for skills and external apps), so hard-refusing unknown
keys would break legitimate writes. Keep the contributor's schema
walker and did-you-mean suggestion engine, but write the value first
and print a post-write notice — no more bare success for
plausible-but-wrong paths like
gateway.discord.gateway_restart_notification, and no blocked writes.
--force suppresses the notice for scripted use.
Since #34067 validation, config set refuses unknown top-level keys, so
test_config_set_requires_confirmation_then_writes must target a valid
path. Switch console.test -> telegram.test (PlatformConfig open-dict).
Address hermes-sweeper review on #34250:
- Accept top-level platforms.<name>.* and gateway.platforms.<name>.*
(current docs + gateway/config.py resolve platforms under these paths;
PlatformConfig.extra keeps them open below the platform-name segment).
- Remove approvals from open-dict whitelist so approvals.<typo> is
schema-validated and refused instead of silently written.
- Tests for canonical platform paths and unknown approvals key rejection.
The schema validation added in this PR (#34250) rejected underscore-
prefixed config keys like '_test.shim_marker', breaking the Docker
privilege-drop test suite (tests/docker/test_docker_exec_privilege_drop.py)
which writes such markers via 'hermes config set _test.<marker> 1' to
probe config.yaml file ownership after the UID-drop shim runs.
Ten Docker tests failed in build-amd64 CI for this reason:
test_shim_drops_root_to_hermes_uid (_test.shim_marker)
test_shim_short_circuits_for_non_root (_test.shim_short_circuit)
test_shim_opt_out_keeps_root (_test.opt_out)
test_shim_opt_out_strict_truthiness[*] (_test.falsy) x6
test_e2e_login_then_supervised_gateway (_test.e2e_marker)
Fix: treat a leading underscore on the TOP-LEVEL segment as an
internal/test marker that bypasses schema validation. Mirrors Python's
own '_private' convention. The escape is narrow:
- Only the first segment is checked, so a genuine typo in a sub-key
under a known top-level key (e.g. 'agent._max_turns') is still
flagged.
- Real typos ('agent.max_turn' -> 'agent.max_turns') still caught.
- The headline #34067 bug ('gateway.discord.gateway_restart_notification')
still caught.
Tests (5 new in TestValidateConfigKey):
- 4 parametrized cases for accepted underscore-prefixed keys
(_test.shim_marker, _internal, _test.nested.deep.marker, _x)
- test_underscore_only_first_segment_escapes: confirms agent._max_turns
(underscore in a SUB-key, not the top) is still rejected.
All 58 tests in test_set_config_value.py pass.
Refs: #34067#34250
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
CI caught test_config_set_usage_marks_placeholders failing on this PR's
new usage line ('Usage: hermes config set [--force] <key> <value>' vs
the previous 'Usage: hermes config set <key> <value>').
The usage change is intentional — it documents the --force escape hatch
this PR adds for bypassing schema validation. Update the assertion to
require the placeholder markers and --force keyword without pinning the
exact wording, so future doc tweaks (e.g. wrapping or color codes) don't
re-break this test.
Confirmed locally: 4/4 placeholder tests pass.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Fixes#34067. 'hermes config set <unknown.key.path> <value>' silently
accepted arbitrary key paths, wrote them to config.yaml, and reported
success — but the runtime/gateway never read them.
The headline case from the issue: a user typing
hermes config set gateway.discord.gateway_restart_notification false
gets success, but the value lands at config.yaml:gateway.discord.* where
nothing reads it. The correct path is discord.gateway_restart_notification
(platform configs live at the top level of DEFAULT_CONFIG, not under
a 'platforms' namespace). The user reasonably believes the change took
effect, then loses time debugging behavior that hasn't changed.
Fix: schema-validate the dotted key path against DEFAULT_CONFIG before
writing. Walk DEFAULT_CONFIG along the user's segments and:
- Reject unknown top-level keys with a fuzzy-match suggestion
- Reject unknown sub-keys by suggesting the closest sibling
- Accept anything below open-dict shapes (mcp_servers.<name>.command,
providers.<openrouter>.api_key, etc.)
- Accept anything below schema-defined-extensible shapes (platform
configs like discord.*, telegram.* — PlatformConfig has dynamic
'extra' fields, so deep validation is unsafe)
- Special-case 'platforms.X' → suggest 'X' (the actual top-level layout)
Bypass with --force for forward-compatibility with keys a newer Hermes
version adds but the running version doesn't recognize yet:
hermes config set --force brand_new_future_key value
API-key style names (OPENROUTER_API_KEY, *_TOKEN, etc.) still route to
.env before schema validation runs, so this is non-breaking for that path.
Adds 21 regression tests across TestSchemaValidation + TestValidateConfigKey
covering: unknown top-level keys, unknown sub-keys (the headline bug),
platforms.* prefix suggestions, fuzzy-match top-level typos, sibling-
suggestion sub-key typos, --force bypass, and that known config keys
(simple, platform-extensible, open-dict) still work.
Also updates 2 pre-existing tests that used non-canonical paths
(platforms.telegram.* and 'verbose') which schema validation correctly
flags — switched to canonical paths (telegram.* and agent.gateway_timeout).
All 53 tests in test_set_config_value.py pass.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* feat(desktop): inline TTS voice/model settings in the Capabilities tab
The Capabilities > Tools > Text-to-Speech panel only surfaced API keys per
provider — voice and model settings (e.g. tts.openai.voice) lived exclusively
in Settings > Voice, so users couldn't select or type a voice/model name where
they configure the backend.
- web_server: TTS provider rows now carry their tts_provider config key
(the section holding that backend's voice/model settings)
- desktop: new VoiceProviderFields renders the provider's config fields
inline in the toolset panel, deriving the key list from the curated
Settings > Voice section so the two surfaces can't drift; shared
ConfigField extracted to config-field.tsx
- voice/model name fields are now free-input comboboxes (Input + datalist)
instead of closed Selects — custom voice IDs (ElevenLabs cloned voices,
xAI custom voices, Edge's 400+ catalog) are typeable, known values remain
suggestions
- refreshed the stale OpenAI voice list (adds ash/ballad/cedar/coral/marin/
sage/verse) and added suggestion lists for edge/gemini/minimax/mistral/
kittentts/piper/neutts models and voices
- config.py: added missing tts.minimax and tts.kittentts default blocks and
deepinfra model/voice fields to the Voice section so those providers are
configurable from the GUI at all
* test(desktop): await effect-driven panel content in post-setup CTA tests
The auto-expand effect renders the provider's inner panel one re-render
after the row; with the QueryClientProvider wrapper the extra provider
tick made the synchronous getByRole race it (~10% local flake, failed on
CI). Await the panel content with findBy* instead.
Follow-up to the salvaged transport-failure auto-pause (#54387): the PR
branch predates the CLI completion gate merged in #67985, so that new
judge_goal consumer (hermes_cli/kanban.py) needed the 5-value unpack too
— otherwise it would fail open again via the swallowed ValueError.
Also migrates the two remaining 4-value mocks in
tests/cli/test_cli_goal_interrupt.py flagged on the earlier PR #27760.
When a goal_judge model has a broken API key (401), DNS failures, or
timeouts, the judge falls through to 'continue' (fail-open) but the
consecutive transport failures were not counted — only parse failures
were tracked. With 3 consecutive parse failures the loop auto-pauses,
but with transport failures it looped forever (the Xiaomi 401 bug).
Changes:
- Add DEFAULT_MAX_CONSECUTIVE_TRANSPORT_FAILURES = 5
- Add consecutive_transport_failures counter to GoalState
- judge_goal() now returns a 5-tuple (verdict, reason, parse_failed,
wait_directive, transport_failed) instead of 4-tuple
- Transport errors (API 401/5xx, timeouts) set transport_failed=True
- evaluate_after_turn() auto-pauses when consecutive transport failures
reach the threshold, with a clear message naming the failing model
- All 101 tests updated and passing
Follow-up to the cherry-picked CLI judge gate (#55854): the gate carried
the same 3-value unpack bug just fixed on the tool path in PR #67973 —
the ValueError would have been swallowed by the fail-open handler,
silently disabling the gate.
Also: test mock now returns the real 4-value judge contract (the old
3-value mock masked the bug), tests track complete_task invocations and
assert the rejection path never writes, and the unused _make_goal_task
helper is dropped.
The three-commit hardening series (Issue #38367, PR #55408) added a
pre-completion judge gate to `tools/kanban_tools.py:_handle_complete`
(the kanban_complete tool used by agent tool-calls). The structurally
identical `hermes_cli/kanban.py:_cmd_complete` (the `hermes kanban
complete` CLI subcommand) was left unguarded.
A goal_mode worker with terminal tool access — the overwhelming default
for coding agents — can bypass the judge entirely by running:
hermes kanban complete <task_id>
This transitions the task to `done` status with no judge verdict, making
the acceptance-criteria enforcement worthless on that path.
Fix: apply the same gate in _cmd_complete before calling kb.complete_task.
When a judge is reachable and returns anything other than "done", the
command prints an actionable rejection message and exits non-zero without
modifying the task. The fail-open policy (no judge configured → allowed)
is preserved to match the tool-call path.
The first commit's gate sat inside ``_get_named_custom_provider`` —
which only handles user-defined custom blocks. Built-in provider names
(``openai`` / ``anthropic`` / ``openrouter`` / ``gemini`` / ...) have
their own resolution paths in ``resolve_runtime_provider`` (pool /
explicit / generic / ``resolve_provider``) and bypass that gate.
So a user who flipped ``providers.openrouter.enabled: false`` would
still see OpenRouter resolved when something explicitly requested it
(e.g. a fallback chain entry). That defeats the point of the flag.
This commit moves the gate one level up: right after
``requested_provider`` is computed, before any custom / built-in /
Azure short-circuit. It now raises a typed ``ValueError`` referencing
the YAML path, so callers can recognise it and advance to the next
fallback instead of silently using a disabled provider.
3 new tests cover:
* disabled custom provider raises
* disabled built-in provider raises
* enabled provider doesn't hit the gate
All 20 tests in the providers suite pass.
A ``providers.<name>`` block in ``config.yaml`` can now opt out of being
listed anywhere by setting ``enabled: false`` — without removing the
block, so re-enabling it stays a one-line edit. Missing or ``true`` keeps
the previous behaviour (enabled), so this is fully backwards-compatible.
The flag is honoured in four places:
* ``hermes_cli/model_switch.py`` — model-override validation (the
allow-list that the picker consults to accept a non-public model id)
and the picker's own endpoint iteration. A disabled provider no longer
appears as a row and its models can't be silently accepted via
override.
* ``hermes_cli/runtime_provider.py`` — the runtime resolver skips
disabled blocks, so an explicit ``--provider X`` against a disabled
entry fails fast instead of using stale base_url / api_key from the
ignored block.
* ``hermes_cli/doctor.py`` — the doctor's "configured providers" set
excludes disabled entries, so health checks don't flag missing API
keys for providers the user has turned off.
Motivation: when a user has 20+ providers wired up in ``config.yaml``
(many of them only used occasionally) the picker becomes noisy and the
runtime resolver may pick a suboptimal one on ambiguous --provider names.
There's currently no way to hide a provider short of deleting its block
— which loses the api_key + base_url + custom routing config the user
spent time wiring. ``enabled: false`` lets them keep the config but get
it out of the way.
The helper ``is_provider_enabled()`` in ``hermes_cli/config.py``
centralises the gate (and accepts YAML-stringified booleans like
``"false"`` for hand-edited configs). 17 unit tests cover the defaults
and edge cases.
A follow-up PR can wire ``hermes provider enable/disable <name>`` and a
dashboard toggle on top of this primitive — they reduce to mutating the
flag.
Add claude-sonnet-5 to the static curated lists for Anthropic, OpenRouter,
Nous Portal, Copilot, GMI, OpenCode Zen, and AWS Bedrock so the model
appears in hermes model / /model picker discovery.
Fixes#55846
The 'Unknown top-level config key' warning (f5bacee27) assumed a
closed-world allowlist of valid roots, but top-level scalars in
config.yaml are deliberately bridged into os.environ (gateway/run.py,
hermes send) so skills and external apps Hermes drives can read
arbitrary env-style keys (DISCORD_HOME_CHANNEL, MY_APP_TOKEN, ...).
An allowlist can never enumerate those — two widening follow-ups
(7c2ece53c, 3c7217706) already proved the whack-a-mole. Drop the
generic warning entirely; keep the targeted provider-like-field
misplacement hint (base_url/api_key at root).
