Commit graph

9 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium
be89c2e4fa
ci(supply-chain): anchor install-hook regex at repo root (#31744)
The SETUP_HITS check matched any file ending in setup.py/setup.cfg/
sitecustomize.py/usercustomize.py at any path depth. This produced
false positives on every PR touching hermes_cli/setup.py (the CLI
setup wizard), which is unrelated to pip/site install hooks.

Only the top-level setup.py/setup.cfg execute during 'pip install',
and only top-level sitecustomize.py/usercustomize.py are auto-loaded
by site.py at interpreter startup. Anchor the regex with '^' so only
repo-root matches fire.

Symptom: PR #30916 (Mattermost plugin migration) flagged purely
because it deletes _setup_mattermost() from hermes_cli/setup.py.
Discord migration (#30591) hit the same false positive yesterday.
2026-05-24 17:46:08 -07:00
ethernet
2f320cb35a fix(ci): supply-chain-audit uses two-dot diff, causing false positives on stale-branch PRs
The workflow diffs base.sha..head.sha (two-dot), which compares the
tip-of-main tree directly against the PR tip. When files land on main
after a PR branched off, they appear in the diff even though the PR
never touched them — triggering false-positive findings.

Example: PR #30609 was flagged for hermes_cli/setup.py, a file added
to main by an unrelated commit after the PR branched.

Switch to three-dot diff (base.sha...head.sha), which diffs from the
merge base to the PR tip — only changes introduced by this PR are
included. Applied to all four diff commands in both jobs (scan and
dep-bounds).
2026-05-22 15:15:53 -07:00
dependabot[bot]
c4981167e6 chore(actions)(deps): bump actions/checkout from 4.3.1 to 6.0.2
Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 4.3.1 to 6.0.2.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](34e114876b...de0fac2e45)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-version: 6.0.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-05-19 03:27:54 -07:00
Siddharth Balyan
04b1fdaecf
security(deps): add upper bounds to 5 loose deps + document supply chain policy (#24226)
After the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain campaign (May 2026) and the litellm
compromise (March 2026), codify the dependency pinning policy that was
established in PRs #2810 and #9801 but never written down for contributors.

Changes:
- pyproject.toml: Add tight upper bounds to the 5 deps that slipped
  through as review escapes from external contributor PRs:
  - hindsight-client>=0.4.22,<0.5 (was >=0.4.22)
  - aiosqlite>=0.20,<0.23 (was >=0.20)
  - asyncpg>=0.29,<0.32 (was >=0.29)
  - alibabacloud-dingtalk>=2.0.0,<3 (was >=2.0.0)
  - youtube-transcript-api>=1.2.0,<2 (was >=1.2.0)

  Pre-1.0 packages get <0.(current_minor+2) — tight enough to block
  hostile minor releases but loose enough to not require bumps every week.

- CONTRIBUTING.md: Add 'Dependency pinning policy' section under Security
  with the full rationale, table of source types + treatments, and examples.

- AGENTS.md: Add concise 'Dependency Pinning Policy' section for AI coding
  agents with the decision table and step-by-step checklist.

- supply-chain-audit.yml: Add dep-bounds job that fails PRs introducing
  PyPI deps without <ceiling upper bounds. Fires on pyproject.toml changes.
  Posts a PR comment with the specific unbounded specs found.

Refs: #2796 #2810 #9801 #24205
2026-05-15 01:33:08 -07:00
Teknium
19db7fa3d1 ci(security): narrow supply-chain-audit to high-signal patterns only
PR #12681 removed the audit entirely because it fired on nearly every PR
(Dockerfile edits, dependency bumps, Actions version strings, plain
base64 usage, etc.) — reviewers were ignoring it like cancer warnings.

Restore it with aggressive scope reduction:

Kept (real attack signatures):
  - .pth file additions (litellm-attack mechanism)
  - base64 decode + exec/eval on the same line
  - subprocess with base64/hex/chr-encoded command argument
  - install-hook files (setup.py, sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py,
    __init__.pth)

Removed (low-signal noise that fired constantly):
  - plain base64 encode/decode
  - plain exec/eval
  - outbound requests.post / httpx.post / urllib
  - CI/CD workflow file edits
  - Dockerfile / compose edits
  - pyproject.toml / requirements.txt edits
  - GitHub Actions version-tag unpinning
  - marshal / pickle / compile usage

Also gates the workflow itself on path filters so it only runs on PRs
touching Python or install-hook files — no more firing on docs/CI PRs.

The workflow still fails the check and posts a PR comment on
critical findings, but by design those findings are now rare and
worth inspecting when they occur.
2026-04-19 16:25:21 -07:00
alt-glitch
2f67ef92eb ci: add path filters to Docker and test workflows, remove supply chain audit
- Docker build only triggers on main push (code/config changes) and
  releases, no longer on every PR
- Tests skip markdown-only and docs-only changes
- Remove supply-chain-audit workflow
2026-04-19 16:25:21 -07:00
Teknium
eed891f1bb
security: supply chain hardening — CI pinning, dep pinning, and code fixes (#9801)
CI/CD Hardening:
- Pin all 12 GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs (was mutable @vN tags)
- Add explicit permissions: {contents: read} to 4 workflows
- Pin CI pip installs to exact versions (pyyaml==6.0.2, httpx==0.28.1)
- Extend supply-chain-audit.yml to scan workflow, Dockerfile, dependency
  manifest, and Actions version changes

Dependency Pinning:
- Pin git-based Python deps to commit SHAs (atroposlib, tinker, yc-bench)
- Pin WhatsApp Baileys from mutable branch to commit SHA

Tool Registry:
- Reject tool name shadowing from different tool families (plugins/MCP
  cannot overwrite built-in tools). MCP-to-MCP overwrites still allowed.

MCP Security:
- Add tool description content scanning for prompt injection patterns
- Log detailed change diff on dynamic tool refresh at WARNING level

Skill Manager:
- Fix dangerous verdict bug: agent-created skills with dangerous
  findings were silently allowed (ask->None->allow). Now blocked.
2026-04-14 14:23:37 -07:00
SHL0MS
d5fd74cac2
fix(ci): don't fail supply chain scan when PR comment can't be posted on fork PRs (#6681)
The GITHUB_TOKEN for fork PRs is read-only — gh pr comment fails with
'Resource not accessible by integration'. This caused the supply chain
scan to show a red X on every fork PR even when no findings were detected.

The scan itself still runs and the 'Fail on critical findings' step
still exits 1 on real issues. Only the comment posting is gracefully
skipped for fork PRs.

Closes #6679

Co-authored-by: SHL0MS <SHL0MS@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-13 13:58:59 -07:00
Teknium
ac5b8a478a
ci: add supply chain audit workflow for PR scanning (#2816)
Scans every PR diff for patterns associated with supply chain attacks:

CRITICAL (blocks merge):
- .pth files (auto-execute on Python startup — litellm attack vector)
- base64 decode + exec/eval combo (obfuscated payload execution)
- subprocess with encoded/obfuscated commands

WARNING (comment only, no block):
- base64 encode/decode alone (legitimate uses: images, JWT, etc.)
- exec/eval alone
- Outbound POST/PUT requests
- setup.py/sitecustomize.py/usercustomize.py changes
- marshal.loads/pickle.loads/compile()

Posts a detailed comment on the PR with matched lines and context.
Excludes lockfiles (uv.lock, package-lock.json) from scanning.

Motivated by the litellm 1.82.7/1.82.8 credential stealer attack
(BerriAI/litellm#24512).
2026-03-24 08:56:04 -07:00