Defense-in-depth for the dashboard plugin auto-import path. The web server
auto-imports and mounts the Python backend (dashboard/manifest.json -> api file)
of plugins found in ~/.hermes/plugins/ (user) and ./.hermes/plugins/ (project),
not just bundled plugins. So any plugin that reaches one of those dirs gets
arbitrary Python executed on the next dashboard start.
NOTE ON THREAT MODEL: #43719's originally-documented delivery chain (a public
--insecure dashboard + open API used to git clone a malicious repo into
~/.hermes/plugins/) is ALREADY mitigated on main — since the June 2026
hermes-0day hardening, a non-loopback bind ALWAYS requires an auth provider and
--insecure no longer bypasses the auth gate. This change is therefore NOT
closing that (now-authenticated) network path; it removes the residual
'arbitrary code executes merely because a plugin is on disk' hazard, which still
applies when a plugin arrives by other means: a socially-engineered git clone,
a supply-chain drop, an authenticated-but-malicious actor, or a future
regression in the auth gate. Untrusted on-disk code should not auto-execute.
Restrict dashboard backend Python auto-import to BUNDLED plugins only. User and
project plugins may still extend the dashboard UI via static JS/CSS, but their
api Python file is never auto-imported. Two layers: _discover_dashboard_plugins
scrubs api/_api_file for user/project sources (and bundled wins name conflicts
so a non-bundled plugin cannot shadow a trusted backend route);
_mount_plugin_api_routes re-refuses user/project at mount time. Tightens the
prior GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j / #29156 hardening (bundled+user) to bundled-only.
Salvaged from #44472 (@egilewski) onto current main.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
35 new tests across 5 classes covering every layer of the
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j defence. Each class corresponds to one chokepoint
so a regression in any single layer is caught by the named class:
* ``TestProjectPluginsEnvGate`` (13 cases) — parametrised over both
the documented truthy values (``1`` / ``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``
+ uppercase variants) and the previously-bypassing falsy strings
(``0`` / ``false`` / ``no`` / ``off`` / ``""`` / ``False``). The
falsy half is the direct env-bypass repro: pre-fix any non-empty
string enabled the project source.
* ``TestApiPathSanitizer`` (16 cases) — unit-level coverage of the
new ``_safe_plugin_api_relpath`` helper. Absolute paths
(``/etc/passwd``, ``/tmp/payload.py``, ``/usr/bin/python``),
``..``-traversal payloads (including nested ``subdir/../../..``),
and non-string / empty / whitespace-only values must all return
``None``. Safe relative paths (``api.py``, ``backend/routes.py``)
round-trip unchanged so legitimate plugins keep working.
* ``TestDiscoveryScrubsApiField`` (3 cases) — end-to-end through
``_discover_dashboard_plugins`` with a real manifest on disk.
Verifies that the cached plugin entry's ``_api_file`` is
scrubbed *at discovery time* (``None`` + ``has_api: False``) so
any downstream consumer can't be tricked into re-deriving the
unsafe path from cache.
* ``TestMountApiRoutesRefusesUntrusted`` (3 cases) — pokes
synthetic plugin entries with each refusal vector directly into
the cache and patches ``importlib.util.spec_from_file_location``
to assert it is *not* invoked for project-source / traversal
payloads, and *is* invoked normally for bundled / user plugins.
* ``TestEndToEndPocBlocked`` (1 case) — reproduces the original
advisory PoC: operator sets ``HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_PLUGINS=0``
believing project plugins are off, attacker plants a manifest in
CWD's ``.hermes/plugins/`` with ``api`` pointing at an absolute
payload path. Asserts that the importer is never called against
the payload path *and* that ``hermes_dashboard_plugin_evil`` is
not in ``sys.modules`` after the mount routine runs.
An autouse fixture busts ``_dashboard_plugins_cache`` before and
after each test so the production cache (populated by the
import-time ``_mount_plugin_api_routes()`` call) can't bleed in.
All 12 pre-existing dashboard-plugin tests in
``test_web_server.py`` still pass unchanged.
