A webhook route that answered `[SILENT]` still delivered, whenever the model
added a sentence saying why it was staying quiet:
[SILENT]
The new inbound was the same email quoted back a second time, on a ticket
we already answered. Nothing new to reply to, so I closed it.
Webhook subscription prompts tell the agent to answer `[SILENT]` on a tick that
produced no story — a duplicate inbound, a stand-down because a sibling lane
already replied, a routine close. Nobody is waiting on the other end of a
webhook, so a "nothing happened" message has no reader.
Delivery went through the live gateway's `is_intentional_silence_response`,
which requires the response to be EXACTLY a marker. That rule is right for an
interactive chat: swallowing a real answer because it opens with a marker is
much worse than showing a stray marker. It is the wrong trade for an autonomous
lane, where a leaked non-story is a pointless notification on every tick and
models reliably append the explanation that flips the check back to "deliver".
Cron already resolved this the other way — `cron/scheduler.py` treats a marker
on its own first or last line as silence — so the two autonomous lanes
disagreed while the interactive path was fine.
Suppress in `WebhookAdapter.send`, before the deliver-type switch, so every
route (log, github_comment, cross-platform) behaves the same. Reuses cron's
`_is_cron_silence_response` rather than restating the rule, so the two lanes
cannot drift; prose that merely mentions a marker mid-sentence still delivers.
The interactive gateway path is untouched.
Tests: six cases in tests/gateway/test_webhook_adapter.py — bare marker,
marker + trailing prose (the reported shape), marker on the last line, a real
report, a report quoting a marker mid-sentence, and a `log` route. Verified
red-first: with the suppression removed the three silence cases fail
("Expected send to not have been awaited") while the three delivery cases still
pass, so the tests assert the fix rather than the framework.
The fix routes the Svix v1 comparison through _hmac_str_equal too, but the
existing non-ASCII tests only exercised the GitHub/GitLab/generic V1/V2
branches. Add a Svix case (valid svix-id + fresh svix-timestamp so it
reaches the v1,<sig> compare) with a non-ASCII signature, which raised
TypeError before the fix and now rejects cleanly.
_validate_signature backs the public webhook receiver. It compared each
attacker-supplied signature/token header (GitHub X-Hub-Signature-256,
GitLab X-Gitlab-Token, generic X-Webhook-Signature / -V2, and the Svix v1
header) against a computed hex/base64 digest with hmac.compare_digest on
two str values. compare_digest raises TypeError on a str containing
non-ASCII characters, and the header is raw client input on an
unauthenticated endpoint — so any internet client could POST a single
non-ASCII byte in the signature header and raise out of the handler,
returning a 500 instead of a clean 401. Fail-closed, but an on-demand
crash of the request path.
Route all five comparisons through a small _hmac_str_equal() helper that
encodes both sides to UTF-8 bytes before the constant-time compare
(compare_digest has no ASCII restriction on bytes). Semantics are
unchanged for valid signatures; a hostile non-ASCII header now fails
closed with a rejection instead of raising.
Adds regression tests: non-ASCII GitHub/GitLab/generic/V2 signature
headers return False (no raise), and a non-ASCII configured secret still
matches its exact token value.
Also maps drexux0@gmail.com in scripts/release.py AUTHOR_MAP.
Disable address reuse so an existing family-specific listener cannot silently split traffic with the webhook server. Normalize wildcard bind hosts for local CLI URLs and align setup documentation with the dual-stack default.
The webhook adapter defaulted to host='0.0.0.0' — IPv4 only. On Fly.io
hosted agents the edge router (hermes-agent-router) reverse-proxies public
webhook traffic to <app>.internal:8644 over 6PN, Fly's private network,
which is IPv6-only (.internal resolves to an fdaa:… address). An IPv4-only
listener is unreachable there, so public webhook POSTs to
https://<agent>.agents.nousresearch.com/webhooks/<route> never landed on
the adapter — the router's dial was refused.
Fix: DEFAULT_HOST = None, which makes aiohttp/asyncio create_server bind
BOTH address families. '::' is NOT a valid substitute: on hosts where the
kernel sets bindv6only=1 (verified on Fly machines) it yields an IPv6-only
socket, breaking the IPv4 loopback /health check and the AF_INET
port-conflict probe in connect(). None binds per-family regardless of the
sysctl. An explicit empty-string/null host in config now also normalises to
None (dual-stack) rather than an invalid host=''. Users can still pin a
specific host via platforms.webhook.extra.host.
Validated live on a Fly staging agent: with this default and no config
override, the adapter binds both v4 and v6 (127.0.0.1:8644 and [::1]:8644
both answer), and a public signed webhook POST through the router returns
202 (valid sig) / 401 (bad sig) instead of the router's 502.
Tests: new TestDualStackBind asserts the None default, config resolution
(missing/empty→None, pinned preserved), and a real dual-stack bind opens
both AF_INET and AF_INET6 listeners. Red-proof: these fail on the old
'0.0.0.0' default.
The webhook adapter enforced max_body_bytes only via the Content-Length
header; a Transfer-Encoding: chunked request (content_length=None) or a
spoofed small Content-Length bypassed the cap entirely and read the full
body (bounded only by aiohttp's implicit 1 MiB default, above any
operator-configured smaller limit).
- web.Application(client_max_size=max_body_bytes): aiohttp enforces the
cap on every read path, chunked included
- catch HTTPRequestEntityTooLarge -> 413 (was swallowed into generic 400)
- post-read length re-check as defense in depth
- chunked-upload regression test
Manual port of PR #3955 by @Gutslabs onto current main (handler had
been restructured since); authorship preserved.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
Operator misconfiguration is a client/setup error, not an internal server
exception. 403 "forbidden" more accurately reflects "this route refuses
to authenticate" than 500 "internal server error" — the latter triggers
incident alerting on operator monitoring and conflates real bugs with
config drift.
Follow-up tweak to PR #29629 by @m0n3r0.
Reject unsigned webhook requests when a route has no effective HMAC secret, even if the request handler is reached without the normal connect-time validation. Add regression coverage for the direct-handler path.
Follow-up to the previous commit:
- Add _is_loopback_host() helper covering 127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1,
ip6-localhost, ip6-loopback (case-insensitive). Empty/None host is
treated as non-loopback since unset usually means public default bind.
- Fix mixed-indent comment in the safety rail (comment now aligned with
the if-block) and collapse the nested-if into one condition.
- Add TestInsecureNoAuthSafetyRail covering rejection on 0.0.0.0, a LAN
IP, and empty host; allowance on 127.0.0.1/localhost; plus unit-level
parametrized coverage of _is_loopback_host for spellings we can't bind
in the hermetic test env (::1, ip6-localhost, ip6-loopback).
- Pin test_connect_starts_server + test_webhook_deliver_only defaults
to 127.0.0.1 so they keep passing under the new rail.
- Document the behavior in website/docs/user-guide/messaging/webhooks.md.
The webhook adapter stored per-request `deliver`/`deliver_extra` config in
`_delivery_info[chat_id]` during POST handling and consumed it via `.pop()`
inside `send()`. That worked for routes whose agent run produced exactly
one outbound message — the final response — but it broke whenever the
agent emitted any interim status message before the final response.
Status messages flow through the same `send(chat_id, ...)` path as the
final response (see `gateway/run.py::_status_callback_sync` →
`adapter.send(...)`). Common triggers include:
- "🔄 Primary model failed — switching to fallback: ..."
(run_agent.py::_emit_status when `fallback_providers` activates)
- context-pressure / compression notices
- any other lifecycle event routed through `status_callback`
When any of those fired, the first `send()` call popped the entry, so the
subsequent final-response `send()` saw an empty dict and silently
downgraded `deliver_type` from `"telegram"` (or `discord`/`slack`/etc.) to
the default `"log"`. The agent's response was logged to the gateway log
instead of being delivered to the configured cross-platform target — no
warning, no error, just a missing message.
This was easy to hit in practice. Any user with `fallback_providers`
configured saw it the first time their primary provider hiccuped on a
webhook-triggered run. Routes that worked perfectly in dev (where the
primary stays healthy) silently dropped responses in prod.
Fix: read `_delivery_info` with `.get()` so multiple `send()` calls for
the same `chat_id` all see the same delivery config. To keep the dict
bounded without relying on per-send cleanup, add a parallel
`_delivery_info_created` timestamp dict and a `_prune_delivery_info()`
helper that drops entries older than `_idempotency_ttl` (1h, same window
already used by `_seen_deliveries`). Pruning runs on each POST, mirroring
the existing `_seen_deliveries` cleanup pattern.
Worst-case memory footprint is now `rate_limit * TTL = 30/min * 60min =
1800` entries, each ~1KB → under 2 MB. In practice it'll be far smaller
because most webhooks complete in seconds, not the full hour.
Test changes:
- `test_delivery_info_cleaned_after_send` is replaced with
`test_delivery_info_survives_multiple_sends`, which is now the
regression test for this bug — it asserts that two consecutive
`send()` calls both see the delivery config.
- A new `test_delivery_info_pruned_via_ttl` covers the TTL cleanup
behavior.
- The two integration tests that asserted `chat_id not in
adapter._delivery_info` after `send()` now assert the opposite, with
a comment explaining why.
All 40 tests in `tests/gateway/test_webhook_adapter.py` and
`tests/gateway/test_webhook_integration.py` pass. Verified end-to-end
locally against a dynamic `hermes webhook subscribe` route configured
with `--deliver telegram --deliver-chat-id <user>`: with `gpt-5.4` as
the primary (currently flaky) and `claude-opus-4.6` as the fallback,
the fallback notification fires, the agent finishes, and the final
response is delivered to Telegram as expected.
- {__raw__} in webhook prompt templates dumps the full JSON payload (truncated at 4000 chars)
- _deliver_cross_platform now passes thread_id/message_thread_id from deliver_extra as metadata, enabling Telegram forum topic delivery
- Tests for both features
