Concurrent Hermes processes (e.g. cron jobs) refreshing a Nous OAuth token
via resolve_nous_runtime_credentials() write the rotated tokens to auth.json.
The calling process's pool entry becomes stale, and the next refresh against
the already-rotated token triggers a 'refresh token reuse' revocation on
the Nous Portal.
_sync_nous_entry_from_auth_store() reads auth.json under the same lock used
by resolve_nous_runtime_credentials, and adopts the newer token pair before
refreshing the pool entry. This complements #15111 (which preserved the
obtained_at timestamps through seeding).
Partial salvage of #10160 by @konsisumer — only the agent/credential_pool.py
changes + the 3 Nous-specific regression tests. The PR also touched 10
unrelated files (Dockerfile, tips.py, various tool tests) which were
dropped as scope creep.
Regression tests:
- test_sync_nous_entry_from_auth_store_adopts_newer_tokens
- test_sync_nous_entry_noop_when_tokens_match
- test_nous_exhausted_entry_recovers_via_auth_store_sync
The least_used strategy selected entries via min(request_count) but
never incremented the counter. All entries stayed at count=0, so the
strategy degenerated to fill_first behavior with no actual load balancing.
Now increments request_count after each selection and persists the update.
Two narrow fixes motivated by #15099.
1. _seed_from_singletons() was dropping obtained_at, agent_key_obtained_at,
expires_in, and friends when seeding device_code pool entries from the
providers.nous singleton. Fresh credentials showed up with
obtained_at=None, which broke downstream freshness-sensitive consumers
(self-heal hooks, pool pruning by age) — they treated just-minted
credentials as older than they actually were and evicted them.
2. When the Nous Portal OAuth 2.1 server returns invalid_grant with
'Refresh token reuse detected' in the error_description, rewrite the
message to explain the likely cause (an external process consumed the
rotated RT without persisting it back) and the mitigation. The generic
reuse message led users to report this as a Hermes persistence bug when
the actual trigger was typically a third-party monitoring script calling
/api/oauth/token directly. Non-reuse errors keep their original server
description untouched.
Closes#15099.
Regression tests:
- tests/agent/test_credential_pool.py::test_nous_seed_from_singletons_preserves_obtained_at_timestamps
- tests/hermes_cli/test_auth_nous_provider.py::test_refresh_token_reuse_detection_surfaces_actionable_message
- tests/hermes_cli/test_auth_nous_provider.py::test_refresh_non_reuse_error_keeps_original_description
A test in tests/agent/test_credential_pool.py
(test_try_refresh_current_updates_only_current_entry) monkeypatched
refresh_codex_oauth_pure() to return the literal fixture strings
'access-new'/'refresh-new', then executed the real production code path
in agent/credential_pool.py::try_refresh_current which calls
_sync_device_code_entry_to_auth_store → _save_provider_state → writes
to `providers.openai-codex.tokens`. That writer resolves the target via
get_hermes_home()/auth.json. If the test ran with HERMES_HOME unset (direct
pytest invocation, IDE runner bypassing conftest discovery, or any other
sandbox escape), it would overwrite the real user's auth store with the
fixture strings.
Observed in the wild: Teknium's ~/.hermes/auth.json providers.openai-codex.tokens
held 'access-new'/'refresh-new' for five days. His CLI kept working because
the credential_pool entries still held real JWTs, but `hermes model`'s live
discovery path (which reads via resolve_codex_runtime_credentials →
_read_codex_tokens → providers.tokens) was silently 401-ing.
Fixes:
- Delete test_try_refresh_current_updates_only_current_entry. It was the
only test that exercised a writer hitting providers.openai-codex.tokens
with literal stub tokens. The entry-level rotation behavior it asserted
is still covered by test_mark_exhausted_and_rotate_persists_status above.
- Add a seat belt in hermes_cli.auth._auth_file_path(): if PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST
is set AND the resolved path equals the real ~/.hermes/auth.json, raise
with a clear message. In production (no PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST), a single
dict lookup. Any future test that forgets to monkeypatch HERMES_HOME
fails loudly instead of corrupting the user's credentials.
Validation:
- production (no PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST): returns real path, unchanged behavior
- pytest + HERMES_HOME unset (points at real home): raises with message
- pytest + HERMES_HOME=/tmp/...: returns tmp path, tests pass normally
Salvaged from PR #10643 by kshitijk4poor, updated for current main.
Root causes fixed:
1. Telegram xdist mock pollution — new tests/gateway/conftest.py with shared
mock that runs at collection time (prevents ChatType=None caching)
2. VIRTUAL_ENV env var leak — monkeypatch.delenv in _detect_venv_dir tests
3. Copilot base_url missing — add fallback in _resolve_runtime_from_pool_entry
4. Stale vision model assertion — zai now uses glm-5v-turbo
5. Reasoning item id intentionally stripped — assert 'id' not in (store=False)
6. Context length warning unreachable — pass base_url to AIAgent in test
7. Kimi provider label updated — 'Kimi / Kimi Coding Plan' matches models.py
8. Google Workspace calendar tests — rewritten for current production code,
properly mock subprocess on api_module, removed stale +agenda assertions
9. Credential pool auto-seeding — mock _select_pool_entry / _resolve_auto /
_import_codex_cli_tokens to prevent real credentials from leaking into tests
Seed qwen-oauth credentials from resolve_qwen_runtime_credentials() in
_seed_from_singletons(). Users who authenticate via 'qwen auth qwen-oauth'
store tokens in ~/.qwen/oauth_creds.json which the runtime resolver reads
but the credential pool couldn't detect — same gap pattern as copilot.
Uses refresh_if_expiring=False to avoid network calls during discovery.
Seed copilot credentials from resolve_copilot_token() in the credential
pool's _seed_from_singletons(), alongside the existing anthropic and
openai-codex seeding logic. This makes copilot appear in the /model
provider picker when the user authenticates solely through gh auth token.
Cherry-picked from PR #9767 by Marvae.
_seed_from_singletons('anthropic') now checks
is_provider_explicitly_configured('anthropic') before reading
~/.claude/.credentials.json. Without this, the auxiliary client
fallback chain silently discovers and uses Claude Code tokens when
the user's primary provider key is invalid — consuming their Claude
Max subscription quota without consent.
Follows the same gating pattern as PR #4210 (setup wizard gate)
but applied to the credential pool seeding path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 24-hour default cooldown for 402-exhausted credentials was far too
aggressive — if a user tops up credits or the 402 was caused by an
oversized max_tokens request rather than true billing exhaustion, they
shouldn't have to wait a full day. Reduce to 1 hour (matching the
existing 429 TTL).
Inspired by PR #6493 (michalkomar).
* refactor: re-architect tests to mirror the codebase
* Update tests.yml
* fix: add missing tool_error imports after registry refactor
* fix(tests): replace patch.dict with monkeypatch to prevent env var leaks under xdist
patch.dict(os.environ) can leak TERMINAL_ENV across xdist workers,
causing test_code_execution tests to hit the Modal remote path.
* fix(tests): fix update_check and telegram xdist failures
- test_update_check: replace patch("hermes_cli.banner.os.getenv") with
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME") — banner.py no longer imports os
directly, it uses get_hermes_home() from hermes_constants.
- test_telegram_conflict/approval_buttons: provide real exception classes
for telegram.error mock (NetworkError, TimedOut, BadRequest) so the
except clause in connect() doesn't fail with "catching classes that do
not inherit from BaseException" when xdist pollutes sys.modules.
* fix(tests): accept unavailable_models kwarg in _prompt_model_selection mock
2026-04-07 17:19:07 -07:00
Renamed from tests/test_credential_pool.py (Browse further)
