Vulture + per-symbol verification (whole-repo grep incl. tests, string
literals, getattr, decorator/registry/argparse dispatch) confirmed each of
these has zero callers anywhere — not reachable via any dynamic-dispatch path,
not referenced by tests, not re-exported.
Removed:
- acp_adapter/tools.py: _build_patch_mode_content
- agent/anthropic_adapter.py: read_claude_managed_key (diagnostics-only, never called)
- agent/bedrock_adapter.py: get_bedrock_model_ids
- agent/browser_registry.py: get_active_browser_provider
- agent/chat_completion_helpers.py: _take_request_client (x2 nested closures, never invoked)
- gateway/platforms/weixin.py: _rewrite_headers_for_weixin, _rewrite_table_block_for_weixin
- hermes_cli/banner.py: _skin_branding
- hermes_cli/debug.py: _delete_hint
- hermes_cli/gateway.py: _setup_email, _setup_sms, _setup_yuanbao
(platform keys absent from the _builtin_setup_fn dispatch dict; handled by
the _setup_standard_platform fallback)
- hermes_cli/kanban_db.py: set_max_runtime, active_run
- hermes_cli/kanban_diagnostics.py: severity_of_highest, _latest_clean_event_ts
- hermes_cli/main.py: _build_provider_choices, cmd_portal
(portal subcommand is wired via portal_cli.add_parser, not this wrapper)
- hermes_cli/model_switch.py: CustomAutoResult (orphaned by the switch_model() extraction)
- hermes_cli/models.py: format_model_pricing_table, fetch_nous_account_tier
- hermes_cli/portal_cli.py: _nous_portal_base_url
- hermes_cli/proxy/server.py: handle_models_fallback (defined but never registered on the router)
- tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py: _parse_element, _is_arm_mac
- tools/file_operations.py: _get_safe_write_root (prod uses the imported
agent.file_safety.get_safe_write_root directly)
- tools/skills_tool.py: _load_category_description
Also dropped two imports left unused by the removals:
- tools/file_operations.py: get_safe_write_root alias
- tools/computer_use/cua_backend.py: import platform
Pure deletion: -551 LOC. No behavior change. Test files covering the edited
modules pass (640/640); the broader suite's pre-existing/env-dependent
failures reproduce unchanged on origin/main.
* fix(security): block AWS SDK creds from subprocess env
* fix(security): narrow Bedrock subprocess strip to inference bearer token only
Scopes the AWS_SDK subprocess strip down from the full AWS credential chain
to just AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK — the only Hermes-managed *inference* secret
(analogous to OPENAI_API_KEY). The general AWS credential chain
(AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / AWS_SESSION_TOKEN / AWS_PROFILE
/ config + role pointers) is intentionally left inheritable.
Why: per SECURITY.md §3.2 the local terminal is the user's trusted operator
shell. Hard-blocklisting the general chain would (a) regress *every* user who
runs aws/terraform/cdk/boto3 in the agent terminal — not just Bedrock users,
since PROVIDER_REGISTRY is iterated unconditionally at import — and (b) be
unrecoverable, because env_passthrough.py refuses to re-allow anything in
_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf). The narrow strip closes
the reported leak (opencode enumerating the Bedrock catalog off the leaked
bearer token) with no capability loss.
Keeps zapabob's self-healing auth_type=="aws_sdk" mechanism so any future
SDK-cred provider is covered automatically.
Tests: bearer token stripped + general chain preserved (no-regression guard),
on both the runtime strip path and the blocklist-membership path.
Co-authored-by: zapabob <1920071390@campus.ouj.ac.jp>
* feat: embedder environment-hint hook for the system prompt
Adds HERMES_ENVIRONMENT_HINT env var (and config.yaml agent.environment_hint)
so a host wrapping Hermes (sandbox runner, managed platform) can describe the
runtime environment — proxy, credential handling, mount layout — in the system
prompt's environment-hints block, without editing the identity slot (SOUL.md).
Read once at prompt-build time, so it lands in the stable, cache-safe portion
of the system prompt. Env var overrides the config key (build-time/container
mechanism). Empty by default — no behavior change for existing installs.
---------
Co-authored-by: zapabob <1920071390@campus.ouj.ac.jp>
Worker threads that dispatch Hermes tools started with an empty contextvars.Context and no thread-local approval/sudo callbacks. Add tools/thread_context.propagate_context_to_thread factoring that capture/install/clear lifecycle (mirrors the GHSA-qg5c-hvr5-hjgr pattern), and refactor agent/tool_executor onto it so the security-critical logic lives in one audited place. Update the contextvar-propagation source guard for the new call shape.
Refs #33057
After the legacy session-key path was removed, two parameters became dead
surface on the Nous runtime-resolution chain:
- min_key_ttl_seconds: del'd inside refresh_nous_oauth_pure and pass-through /
telemetry-only in refresh_nous_oauth_from_state, _try_import_shared_nous_state,
_nous_device_code_login, and resolve_nous_runtime_credentials. It controlled the
now-deleted agent-key mint TTL and drives no behavior.
- inference_auth_mode: with the legacy mode gone, AUTO and FRESH are behaviorally
identical; the value only fed _normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode validation and
oauth trace output, never a branch.
Removing inference_auth_mode orphaned its whole supporting cluster
(NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO/FRESH, NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODES,
_normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode), and dropping min_key_ttl_seconds orphaned
DEFAULT_AGENT_KEY_MIN_TTL_SECONDS — all deleted here.
Updated every caller (run_agent, auxiliary_client, credential_pool, proxy adapter,
runtime_provider, web_server, main, auth_commands, setup) and pruned the matching
test kwargs. Deleted two tests that exercised the removed surface
(test_legacy_auth_mode_is_rejected, test_try_refresh_..._accepts_explicit_auth_mode).
No behavior change: net -134 LOC of dead code.
The import-failure fallback returned any 3-segment token without scope/
expiry validation, a divergent reimplementation of the canonical
_nous_invoke_jwt_is_usable check. The import is from the same module that
provides resolve_nous_runtime_credentials, so a failure means the whole
auxiliary Nous path is unavailable anyway; return "" instead so the caller
falls through to the clear 'run: hermes auth add nous' guidance rather than
handing back an unvalidated token.
Tool Search read its catalog from the global registry (get_tool_definitions
with no toolset scope = 'start with everything'), so a restricted-toolset
session — subagent, kanban worker, curated gateway session — could:
1. tool_search the entire process registry, not just its granted tools, and
2. tool_call any registered plugin/MCP tool it was never given, because
registry.dispatch() has no enabled_tools gate for non-execute_code tools.
A scoped session (enabled_toolsets=['mcp-github']) reported total_available=26
and successfully invoked an out-of-scope plugin tool via tool_call.
Fix:
- handle_function_call gains enabled_toolsets/disabled_toolsets; the bridge
dispatch scopes get_tool_definitions to them (also stops polluting the
process-global _last_resolved_tool_names with out-of-scope tools, which
leaked into execute_code's sandbox-tool fallback).
- A defense-in-depth gate rejects any tool_call'd name not in the scoped
deferrable catalog.
- tool_executor's unwrap (both concurrent + sequential paths) enforces the
same scope before dispatch, since it unwraps tool_call -> underlying name
and bypasses the bridge branch. New _tool_search_scoped_names() helper,
cached per-agent on registry generation + toolset scope.
- New scoped_deferrable_names() helper in tool_search.py shared by both sites.
Tests: 4 new regression tests in TestRegression_ToolsetScoping (scoped
catalog, out-of-scope tool_call rejection, no global pollution, helper).
Adds Tool Search, a structured-tools progressive-disclosure layer that
replaces MCP and non-core plugin tools in the model-visible tools array
with three bridge tools (tool_search / tool_describe / tool_call) when
the deferrable surface would consume more than a configurable percentage
of the active model's context window. Core Hermes tools are never deferred.
Default mode is 'auto' with a 10% context threshold, so small toolsets
pay no overhead. Set tools.tool_search.enabled to 'on' to force or 'off'
to disable.
Design carefully reflects the OpenClaw production failure modes
documented in the openclaw-tool-search-report:
- Core tools never defer (toolsets._HERMES_CORE_TOOLS). Addresses the
'tools silently missing from isolated cron turns' regression class
(openclaw#84141) by construction: there is no code path that can
drop a core tool.
- Catalog is stateless across turns — rebuilt from the live tool-defs
list on every assembly. No session-keyed Map that can drift out of
sync with the registry.
- tool_call unwraps the bridge call before any hook fires, so plugin
pre/post hooks, guardrails, approval flows, and the activity feed
all see the underlying tool name, not the bridge (addresses
openclaw#85588 and the verbose-mode complaint on openclaw#79823).
- The unwrap happens in both the parallel and sequential paths of
agent/tool_executor.py and also in handle_function_call, so direct
callers (sandboxed code, eval harnesses) are covered too.
- Bridge tools cannot invoke each other (recursion guard) and cannot
invoke core tools (those must be called directly).
- Tools mode only — no JS-sandbox code-mode. Keeps the surface small.
- Token estimation via cheap char/4 heuristic; precision isn't needed
for the threshold decision.
Files:
- tools/tool_search.py — new module (BM25 retrieval, classification,
threshold gate, bridge dispatch, unwrap helper).
- tests/tools/test_tool_search.py — 35 tests including the OpenClaw
#84141 regression guard.
- model_tools.py — wires assembly into _compute_tool_definitions as the
final step, adds skip_tool_search_assembly kwarg so the bridge can
see the real catalog, dispatches the three bridge tools.
- agent/tool_executor.py — unwraps tool_call in both parallel and
sequential parsing loops so checkpointing, guardrails, plugin hooks,
and tool-progress callbacks all observe the underlying tool name.
- hermes_cli/config.py — DEFAULT_CONFIG['tools']['tool_search'] block.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/tool-search.md — user docs.
Validation:
- 35/35 new tests pass.
- Existing tool/registry/model_tools/config/coercion/executor tests
(82 + 74 + small adjacents) green.
- Live E2E: 20 fake MCP tools registered, get_tool_definitions returns
3 bridges, tool_search returns top 3 hits, tool_describe returns
full schema, tool_call dispatches to the real underlying handler
and the underlying result is what the model sees.
- Reserved-name recursion guard verified live.
- Core-tool refusal via tool_call verified live.
The chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex endpoint can spend tens of seconds in
backend admission / prompt prefill before emitting its first SSE event. The
12s no-byte TTFB cutoff aborted those still-valid streams, surfacing as
'Codex stream produced no bytes within 12s' through all retries (Discord
reports). The OpenAI SDK's own streaming read timeout is 600s, so 12s was
~50x more aggressive than the transport layer would have tolerated.
Default the no-byte cutoff to 120s and raise the openai-codex MAX cap default
to 120s so it no longer clamps the new default back to 20s. Disabling stays
available via HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=0; the 25k-token auto-disable,
_STRICT override, and post-first-event idle watchdog are unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Gille <4317663+helix4u@users.noreply.github.com>
A process running mismatched module versions — conversation_compression.py
re-imported with the post-#34351 lock code while a long-lived
hermes_state.SessionDB stays bound to the pre-#34351 class in memory — has
the try_acquire_compression_lock call site but not the method. The
AttributeError it raises is NOT a sqlite3.Error, so the method's own
fail-open guard never runs; the exception escapes to the outer agent loop,
which prints the error and retries. Compression never succeeds, the token
count never drops, and the loop re-triggers compaction forever (the
'API call #47/#48/#49 ... has no attribute try_acquire_compression_lock'
spin a user hit after an update).
Wrap the lock acquire so any unexpected exception fails OPEN: skip locking
and proceed with compression. Skipping the lock risks a rare
concurrent-compression session fork; an infinite no-progress loop that never
compresses at all is strictly worse. The remediation hint in the log points
at the real fix (restart / hermes update to resync the stale module).
Also guards get_compression_lock_holder against the same skew.
Adds a regression test simulating the version skew (real SessionDB wrapped
so only the lock methods raise AttributeError) — asserts _compress_context
proceeds and rotates instead of raising.
OAuth auto-open only checked _is_remote_session() (SSH + cloud-shell env
vars). On a headless/CLI-only Linux box with no GUI browser, none of those
trip, so webbrowser.open() resolved to a console browser (w3m/lynx/links)
and launched it INSIDE the terminal — hijacking the user's TTY with the
xAI 'Account Management' login page instead of letting them copy the URL.
Add _can_open_graphical_browser(): returns False when webbrowser would
resolve to a known console browser, when $BROWSER names one, when there's
no display server on Linux, or when no browser resolves at all. Gate all 5
OAuth auto-open callsites (xAI loopback, Spotify loopback, MiniMax device
code, Anthropic, Google) on it in addition to the existing remote check.
Headless boxes now print the URL / fall through to manual-paste instead.
xAI returns HTTP 403 (not 401) with unauthenticated:bad-credentials
when an OAuth2 access token has expired or is invalid. The existing
_is_auth_error() only checked for 401 status codes, so these tokens
were never refreshed and the 403 propagated as a generic permission
denied error.
Three fixes:
1. _is_auth_error: Recognize xAI's 403+bad-credentials pattern as
an auth failure, triggering token refresh instead of silent failure.
2. _refresh_provider_credentials: Add xai-oauth branch with
pool-level refresh (try_refresh_current with select to ensure
current entry) then fallback to singleton resolver with
force_refresh=True.
3. _recoverable_pool_provider: Map api.x.ai host to xai-oauth
pool for auto-resolved providers, matching existing pattern for
openai-codex/openrouter/nous/anthropic.
Includes 14 tests covering the new detection logic, host mapping,
and graceful fallback behavior.
Signed-off-by: moikapy <moikapy@devmoi.com>
Reporter diagnosed three independent gaps that together allowed infinite
'unblock → re-stuck' loops with no surfacing or escalation:
GAP 1: `_rule_stuck_in_blocked` resets timer on any `commented`/`unblocked`
event, so a task that cycles every few minutes is invisible to it
regardless of how many times it cycles.
Fix: new `_rule_block_unblock_cycling` rule (`hermes_cli/kanban_diagnostics.py`)
that counts block→unblock cycles in a sliding window. Default threshold
3 cycles within 24h, configurable via `block_cycle_threshold` /
`block_cycle_window_seconds`. Walks events in arrival order (event id)
since multiple events can share the same `created_at` second. Fires as a
warning with a CLI hint to inspect the block reasons.
GAP 2: Iteration-budget-exhausted runs in kanban workers map to
`kanban_block` (status=blocked, but a clean exit from the kernel's
perspective). `_rule_repeated_failures` reads `consecutive_failures`,
which `_record_task_failure` increments only for crashed/timed_out/
spawn_failed — `blocked` outcome bypasses the failure counter, so the
`kanban.failure_limit` circuit breaker never trips on budget-exhaustion
loops.
Fix: `agent/conversation_loop.py` budget-exhaustion path now calls
`_record_task_failure(outcome="timed_out")` instead of `kanban_block`.
Budget exhaustion is genuinely a timeout-shaped failure (the task ran out
of allowed iterations), so this is more honest semantics; it also routes
through the unified failure counter, so repeated budget exhaustions trip
the circuit breaker and the task auto-blocks with `gave_up` after
`failure_limit` retries.
GAP 3: `release_stale_claims` uses `_pid_alive(worker_pid)` only and
ignores `last_heartbeat_at`. Reporter observed a 91-min run that held
its claim with frozen heartbeat because the worker entered a logic loop
with no tool calls — `_pid_alive` kept returning True so the claim was
extended every 15 minutes indefinitely.
Fix: heartbeat-stale backstop. If `last_heartbeat_at` is set AND older
than `DEFAULT_CLAIM_HEARTBEAT_MAX_STALE_SECONDS` (default 1h), reclaim
even if the PID is alive. NULL `last_heartbeat_at` preserves backward
compatibility (no heartbeat yet = extend, as before). The reclaim event
payload now includes a `heartbeat_stale` boolean so operators see why a
live-PID worker was reclaimed.
This works cleanly in concert with PR #34418 (#31752 runtime → heartbeat
bridge): once `_touch_activity` keeps `last_heartbeat_at` fresh as a
side effect of normal API traffic, the backstop only fires for genuinely
wedged workers (no chunks, no tool results, no progress at all).
Co-authored-by: baofuen <45189813+baofuen@users.noreply.github.com>
Kanban workers run headless — no live user is on the other side of `clarify`,
so the call times out (~120s default) and the task sits silently in `running`
with no signal to the operator that input is needed. Reporter observed a real
incident where a worker asked 'promote to production, or check staging first?'
via clarify, the call timed out, the agent hallucinated a fallback, and the
task sat 'running' for hours.
Fix: explicit 'do not call clarify' bullet in two surfaces every kanban worker
sees —
- `agent/prompt_builder.py` KANBAN_GUIDANCE `## Do NOT` section (auto-injected
into every dispatcher-spawned worker run).
- `skills/devops/kanban-worker/SKILL.md` `## Do NOT` section (the bundled
worker skill).
Both point at the right pattern: `kanban_comment` (context) + `kanban_block`
(decision needed) — the task surfaces on the board as blocked, the operator
sees it, unblocks with their answer in a comment, and the worker respawns
with the thread.
Co-authored-by: kweiner <17778+kweiner@users.noreply.github.com>
When OpenAI Codex returns 401 token_invalidated or token_revoked, the
credential is broken upstream — retrying after a TTL cooldown cannot
fix it. The existing code treated every 401/429 the same way:
STATUS_EXHAUSTED with a TTL cooldown (5 min for 401, 1 hour for 429).
After the TTL elapsed, the broken credential re-entered rotation and
immediately failed again with the same 401, surfacing as 'Failed to
generate context summary' on every context-compression cycle.
Reporter observed 7 separate 401 token_invalidated failures from the
same revoked credential in a single day; the only workaround was
removing it manually via 'hermes auth'.
Add a STATUS_DEAD terminal state. Only 401 responses whose
error.code/reason matches a known terminal OAuth state (token_invalidated,
token_revoked, invalid_token, invalid_grant, unauthorized_client,
refresh_token_reused) transition to DEAD. Everything else keeps the
existing TTL semantics — 429 rate limits are transient and should
recover.
DEAD entries are excluded from rotation unconditionally. They only
clear when an explicit write-side re-auth sync rewrites the tokens
(the existing _sync_codex_pool_entries / _sync_*_entry_from_auth_store
paths already clear last_status to None). The read-side
auth.json-sync paths also now fire on DEAD so an in-flight pool entry
can adopt fresh tokens written by another process without needing
explicit re-auth.
After 24 hours, DEAD manual entries (source='manual:*') are pruned
from the pool automatically so dead state doesn't accumulate forever.
Singleton-seeded DEAD entries (source='device_code' etc.) are kept
because _seed_from_singletons would recreate them on the next load
with the same stale tokens — pruning would be pointless. The audit
trail stays visible (label, last_error_reason, timestamps).
Closes#32849.
The Bitwarden Secrets Manager disk cache introduced in #31968 stores
plaintext secret values at <hermes_home>/cache/bws_cache.json to avoid
re-fetching across back-to-back CLI invocations. The file was not added
to get_read_block_error()'s credential_file_names list, leaving the
agent able to read it directly via the read_file tool.
Add os.path.join("cache", "bws_cache.json") to credential_file_names
so both HERMES_HOME and the global root are covered, matching the
existing pattern used for auth.json, .anthropic_oauth.json, etc.
Other files under cache/ (images, documents, audio) are unaffected —
the check is an exact-file match, not a prefix match.
Verified: 11/11 exploit/regression scenarios pass; 38/38 existing
file_safety tests pass.
The xAI tool-schema sanitizers (strip_slash_enum, strip_pattern_and_format)
mutate their input in place — that's their documented contract. The two
call sites (chat_completion_helpers.build_api_kwargs and the auxiliary
client) were passing agent.tools straight through, so the first xAI
request would permanently strip slash-containing enum constraints and
pattern/format keywords from the per-agent tool registry.
Effect: any subsequent non-xAI call from the same agent (auxiliary task
routed to Anthropic, OpenRouter fallback, mid-session model switch) saw
the already-stripped schema with no way for the user to notice from
their config.
Fix: deepcopy tools_for_api before sanitizing at both call sites.
The slash-enum bug itself (xAI 400ing on enums with '/') was fixed
earlier by #32443 (Nami4D) — that PR landed the strip but used the
sanitizers directly without copying. This salvages #27907's correctness
contribution (the deepcopy) while skipping its redundant parallel
sanitizer (strip_xai_incompatible_enum_values is functionally
equivalent to the existing strip_slash_enum) and its preflight-
neutrality argument (we chose model-gated preflight in #32443).
3 new tests in tests/run_agent/test_run_agent_codex_responses.py:
- strips_slash_enum_from_outgoing_request — outgoing kwargs has no
slash-containing enum values (functional contract preserved).
- does_not_mutate_agent_tools — headline #27907 regression. Snapshot
agent.tools before build_api_kwargs, assert it survives intact
after. Pre-fix this assertion would have caught the mutation.
- is_idempotent_across_repeated_calls — three xAI requests in a row
each strip cleanly AND don't progressively erode the source schema.
344/344 across tests/agent/test_auxiliary_client.py,
tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py,
tests/run_agent/test_run_agent_codex_responses.py, and
tests/tools/test_schema_sanitizer.py.
Co-authored-by: Gabor Barany <barany.gabor@gmail.com>
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
* fix(codex): surface error code in Responses 'failed' status errors
When a Codex Responses turn ends with status=failed, the response carries
the failure details under `response.error` as
`{code, message, param, ...}`. The previous extractor pulled only
`message`, so users seeing a rate-limit failure got a bare "Slow down"
string indistinguishable from a generic stream truncation; an
internal_error with empty message degraded to a dict dump
("{'code': 'internal_error', 'message': ''}").
Extract a `_format_responses_error()` helper that:
- prefixes `code` when both code and message are present
(e.g. 'rate_limit_exceeded: Slow down')
- falls back to the bare `code` when message is empty
- accepts both dict and attribute-style payloads (SDK and JSON-RPC paths)
- preserves the prior status-only fallback when no error payload exists
Apply the same helper at the sibling site in
`codex_app_server_session.run_turn()` so codex-CLI subprocess turn
failures get the same treatment.
Tests:
- 8 new unit tests for `_format_responses_error` covering both shapes,
empty/missing fields, non-string fields, and the status-only fallback.
- 2 regression tests on `_normalize_codex_response` for failed status
with and without a code, asserting the exact RuntimeError message.
- All 3603 tests in tests/agent/ pass.
Adapted from anomalyco/opencode#28757.
* feat(prompt): universal task-completion guidance + local Python toolchain probe
Two cross-model failure modes get a single-line answer in the cached
system prompt. Both gated by config (default on), both add zero overhead
when not needed, both verified via real AIAgent prompt builds.
## What changed
`TASK_COMPLETION_GUIDANCE` — short prompt block applied to ALL models.
Targets two failure modes observed on a real Sarasota real-estate build
task: (1) Opus stopped after writing an 85-byte stub and gave a prose
response with finish_reason=stop on call #3 of 90; (2) DeepSeek pushed
through a PEP-668 wall, then returned fabricated listings instead of
admitting the blocker. Both behaviors are model-family-agnostic, so the
guidance lives outside the existing tool_use_enforcement gate (~192
tokens, paid once per session via prefix cache).
`tools/env_probe.py` — local Python toolchain probe. Detects
python3/pip/uv/PEP-668 state and emits ONE short line in the system
prompt when something is non-default. Emits NOTHING when the env is
clean (zero token cost for normal users). Skipped entirely for remote
terminal backends (docker/modal/ssh) — they have their own probe.
Example output on a broken environment (the actual case):
Python toolchain: python3=3.11.15 (no pip module),
python=missing (use python3), pip→python3.12 (mismatch),
PEP 668=yes (use venv or uv).
## Config
Both flags live under `agent.` in config.yaml, default True:
agent:
task_completion_guidance: true # universal "finish the job" block
environment_probe: true # local Python toolchain hints
Neither addition required a `_config_version` bump — deep-merge fills
defaults in for existing user configs.
## Validation
| Test surface | Result |
|---|---|
| tests/tools/test_env_probe.py | 10/10 pass (probe unit) |
| tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py — new classes | 8/8 pass (integration) |
| TestToolUseEnforcementConfig | 17/17 pass (no regression) |
| TestBuildSystemPrompt | 9/9 pass (no regression) |
| TestInvalidateSystemPrompt | 2/2 pass (no regression) |
| tests/agent/test_prompt_builder.py | 124/124 pass (no regression) |
| tests/hermes_cli/ | 5662/5662 pass (config defaults) |
| E2E AIAgent build (broken env) | Both blocks present, 2,178 chars |
| E2E AIAgent build (clean env) | 771-char net overhead, env probe silent |
* fix(compression): prevent session-id fork from concurrent compressions
When two AIAgent instances share the same session_id (most commonly the
parent-turn agent and its background-review fork, which inherits
session_id verbatim via background_review.py L451), both can call
compress_context() on overlapping snapshots of the same conversation.
Each ends the parent and creates its own NEW child session in state.db,
both parented to the same old id. The gateway SessionEntry only catches
one rotation; the other becomes an orphan that silently accumulates
writes — Damien's incident shape (parent 20260527_234659_e65f0e → two
children, only one visible).
Adds a state.db-backed per-session compression lock. Acquired before
the rotation in conversation_compression.compress_context(); on
failure, the caller returns messages unchanged so the auto-compress
retry loop stops cleanly. TTL (5min default) reclaims locks abandoned
by crashed compressors. Lock holder identity (pid:tid:agent:nonce) is
preserved for diagnostics via get_compression_lock_holder().
Schema bumped 13 -> 14 to track the new compression_locks table.
Reconciled additively via the existing declarative-column pattern;
no data migration needed for existing DBs.
Regression test reproduces Damien's shape: two threads racing
_compress_context on a shared parent_sid. Without the lock the test
deterministically produces 2 child sessions; with the lock, exactly 1.
Covers all six compression entry points (preflight in conversation_loop,
mid-turn fallback, hygiene compression in gateway, /compact, CLI
/compress, TUI /compress). ACP /compress was already protected by
nulling out _session_db before its compress call.
* ci: trigger rerun (transient GitHub API rate limit on CodeQL workflow)
The opencode-go relay defaults max_tokens to 262144 when none is sent,
but Xiami mimo-v2.5-pro only supports 131072 completion tokens — every
request 400s with "max_tokens is too large: 262144" before the agent
can do anything.
Add a get_max_tokens(model) hook on ProviderProfile (default returns
default_max_tokens) so profiles fronting multiple upstreams can vary
the cap per-model. Wire chat_completions transport through the hook.
Override on OpenCodeGoProfile with mimo-v2.5-pro=131072.
Only mimo-v2.5-pro is capped — other opencode-go models (kimi, glm,
qwen, minimax, other mimo variants) unchanged.
Kanban workers now scan the task body for local image paths and
http(s) image URLs and attach them to the worker's first user turn —
matching the CLI/gateway behaviour for inbound images. Before, a
user pasting `/home/me/screenshot.png` or `https://example.com/img.png`
into a kanban task description had it sent to the model as plain
text and the pixels were never seen.
How it works:
* agent/image_routing.py gains extract_image_refs(text) → (paths, urls)
that mirrors gateway/platforms/base.py:extract_local_files (absolute /
~-relative paths, image extensions only, ignores fenced/inline code).
* build_native_content_parts() accepts an optional image_urls= kwarg
and emits passthrough image_url parts for remote URLs alongside the
base64 data: URLs used for local paths.
* cli.py (single-query/quiet branch — the path every dispatcher-spawned
worker takes) detects HERMES_KANBAN_TASK, reads the task body via
kanban_db.get_task, runs extract_image_refs, and threads the results
into the existing image-routing decision (native vs text). Best-effort:
enrichment failures never block worker startup.
Tested:
* tests/agent/test_image_routing.py — 22 new tests for extract_image_refs
and URL pass-through in build_native_content_parts.
* tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_worker_image_extraction.py — 10 new tests
driving real kanban_db round-trip (create task → read body → extract
refs → build parts).
* E2E: created a fake kanban task with a body referencing both a local
PNG and an https URL; verified the worker pipeline produces a
multimodal user turn with 1 text part + 2 image_url parts (data URL
for the local file, passthrough URL for the remote).
Adds an optional `messages` keyword to the `MemoryProvider.sync_turn`
contract so external/community memory plugins can receive the OpenAI-style
conversation message list for the completed turn — including assistant tool
calls and tool result content — not just the final assistant text.
Dispatch uses signature inspection (`_provider_sync_accepts_messages`): only
providers that declare a `messages` parameter (or `**kwargs`) receive it; all
existing in-tree providers keep their legacy text-only signature and are
called unchanged. No structured-trace envelope is added to core — providers
reconstruct whatever they need from the standard message list.
Also documents Memori as a standalone community memory provider.
Salvaged from #28065 — rebased onto current main.
Co-authored-by: Dave Heritage <david@memorilabs.ai>
* fix(redact): pass web URLs through unchanged
Magic-link checkout URLs, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow,
and pre-signed share URLs were getting `?token=***` / `?code=***` /
`?signature=***` blanket-redacted by parameter NAME, which breaks any
skill that has to round-trip a URL through history (the model's tool
call arguments get sanitized before persistence — the live call fires
with the real URL, but the next turn sees `***`).
Joe Rinaldi Johnson hit this with a checkout-acceleration skill that
uses magic links in URLs.
Drops three call sites from `redact_sensitive_text`:
- `_redact_url_query_params` (was redacting `access_token`, `token`,
`api_key`, `code`, `signature`, `key`, `auth`, etc.)
- `_redact_url_userinfo` (was redacting `https://user:pass@host`)
- `_redact_http_request_target_query_params` (was redacting access-log
request targets like `"POST /hook?password=... HTTP/1.1"`)
The helpers themselves are kept in the module — still importable by
anything that wants to opt in explicitly.
Still redacted (unchanged):
- Vendor-prefix credential shapes (sk-, ghp_, AKIA, gAAAA, etc.)
anywhere they appear, including inside URLs — see the
`test_known_prefix_inside_url_still_redacted` case.
- JWTs (`eyJ...`)
- DB connection-string passwords (`postgres://admin:pw@host`) —
these are connection strings, not web URLs the agent navigates to.
- Authorization headers, ENV assignments, JSON `apiKey`/`token` fields,
Telegram bot tokens, private key blocks, Discord mentions, E.164
phone numbers, and form-urlencoded bodies (request bodies, not URLs).
Tests: replaces `TestUrlQueryParamRedaction` + `TestUrlUserinfoRedaction`
with `TestWebUrlsNotRedacted`, asserting representative URLs (OAuth
callback, magic link, S3 pre-signed, websocket, userinfo, access log)
pass through unchanged. Adds positive cases proving the prefix and DB
connstr nets still fire. 74 redact tests + 10 browser-exfil + 16 PII
redaction tests all pass.
* test(codex_app_server): drop URL-query assertion from stderr-tail redaction test
The test bundled (a) sk-live-* credential-prefix redaction with (b)
URL query-param redaction. (a) is still in effect via _PREFIX_RE;
(b) was the contract we just removed in the parent commit so the
'querysecret12345' assertion stopped holding. Keep the credential-shape
assertion, drop the URL-query one.
Send-message tool's local _URL_SECRET_QUERY_RE in tools/send_message_tool.py
is independent of agent/redact.py and unchanged — its tests
(test_top_level_send_failure_redacts_query_token,
test_http_error_redacts_access_token_in_exception_text) still pass.
Anthropic released Claude Opus 4.8 on 2026-05-27, available on
OpenRouter, Anthropic, Amazon Bedrock, and Claude Platform on AWS:
- https://openrouter.ai/anthropic/claude-opus-4.8
- https://openrouter.ai/anthropic/claude-opus-4.8-fast
The fast-mode variant is a separate model ID (anthropic/claude-opus-4.8-fast)
priced at 2x of the base model — a notable improvement over the 6x premium
on older Opus generations (4.6/4.7). It is NOT a `speed: "fast"` request
parameter like Opus 4.6; Anthropic's native fast-mode beta still only
covers Opus 4.6.
Changes:
hermes_cli/models.py
- Add anthropic/claude-opus-4.8 + anthropic/claude-opus-4.8-fast to
the OpenRouter fallback snapshot and the Nous Portal curated list
(live catalogs surface them automatically when reachable; the
fallback list matters when the manifest fetch fails).
- Add claude-opus-4-8 to the Anthropic-native picker list.
agent/model_metadata.py
- Register claude-opus-4-8 / claude-opus-4.8 in DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS
with 1M tokens (matches 4.6/4.7).
agent/anthropic_adapter.py
- Extend _XHIGH_EFFORT_SUBSTRINGS, _ADAPTIVE_THINKING_SUBSTRINGS, and
_NO_SAMPLING_PARAMS_SUBSTRINGS with "4-8"/"4.8". 4.8 inherits the
Opus 4.7 API contract: adaptive thinking only, xhigh effort level
supported, sampling parameters (temperature/top_p/top_k) return 400.
- Add claude-opus-4-8 to _ANTHROPIC_OUTPUT_LIMITS (128k max output,
same as 4.7). Matches by substring so claude-opus-4-8-fast and
date-stamped variants resolve correctly.
agent/usage_pricing.py
- Add anthropic/claude-opus-4-8: $5/$25 per MTok input/output, $0.50
cache read, $6.25 cache write (same as 4.6/4.7).
- Add anthropic/claude-opus-4-8-fast: $10/$50 per MTok (2x), $1.00
cache read, $12.50 cache write. Per OpenRouter, the 2x premium is
the only differentiator from regular Opus 4.8.
- OpenRouter routes still pull pricing from the live /models API, so
no static OpenRouter entry is needed.
tests/agent/test_model_metadata.py
- Extend the Claude 4.6+ context-length tag list with 4.8/4-8.
website/static/api/model-catalog.json
- Regenerated via `python scripts/build_model_catalog.py` to pick up
the new entries in the OpenRouter and Nous Portal fallback lists.
E2E verification (isolated sys.path import against the worktree):
- _supports_adaptive_thinking, _supports_xhigh_effort, _forbids_sampling_params
all return True for claude-opus-4.8 and claude-opus-4.8-fast.
- _supports_fast_mode (the `speed: "fast"` request-parameter gate) stays
False for 4.8 — fast mode is a separate model ID on OpenRouter, not a
parameter Anthropic accepts on the base model.
- DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LENGTHS resolves 1M for both notations.
- resolve_billing_route + _lookup_official_docs_pricing resolve the
correct $5/$25 (regular) and $10/$50 (fast) pricing for both
dot-notation and dash-notation inputs.
- 4.7 and 4.6 regression: behavior unchanged.
Unit tests: 305 passed across tests/agent/test_usage_pricing.py,
test_model_metadata.py, tests/hermes_cli/test_model_catalog.py,
test_models.py, test_model_validation.py, test_models_dev_preferred_merge.py.
* fix(agent): fallback immediately on provider content-policy blocks
Provider safety-filter refusals (e.g. OpenAI Codex 'flagged for possible
cybersecurity risk', OpenAI moderation 'violates our usage policies',
Anthropic safety-system rejections, Azure content_filter) are
deterministic decisions about a specific prompt. Retrying the same
prompt up to api_max_retries times just reproduces the same refusal and
burns paid attempts before surfacing the generic 'API failed after 3
retries — <provider message>' to Telegram / cron with no indication that
the failure came from the model provider rather than Hermes itself.
Classify these as a new FailoverReason.content_policy_blocked
(non-retryable, should_fallback=True) and route them through the
existing is_client_error path so the loop:
- skips the 3x retry backoff
- activates a configured fallback model immediately
- emits a clear provider-safety message to the user (not the generic
'Non-retryable error (HTTP None)') and surfaces actionable guidance
when no fallback is configured (rephrase, narrow context, or set
fallback_model in hermes config)
- returns a final_response that explicitly tells the user this came
from the model provider, so gateway delivery is unambiguous and
cron last_status reflects the safety block rather than a vague
'agent reported failure'
Patterns are intentionally narrow — verbatim refusal phrasings keyed to
specific provider safety pipelines, not generic words like 'policy' or
'violation' that would collide with billing / format / auth errors.
Regression guards in test_18028_content_policy_blocked.py verify
billing 402s, generic 400s, and OpenRouter account-level
provider_policy_blocked remain distinct classifications.
Salvaged from #18164 onto current main (file restructure: loop logic
moved from run_agent.py to agent/conversation_loop.py, _emit_status →
_buffer_status), broadened patterns beyond the original OpenAI Codex
cybersecurity case to cover OpenAI moderation, Anthropic safety system,
and Azure content_filter; added user-actionable guidance and a clear
final_response so cron/gateway surfaces the policy block instead of a
generic non-retryable error, and added a regression-guard test module
mirroring the is_client_error predicate.
Addresses #18028.
Co-authored-by: Kuan-Chieh Huang <kchuang1015@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: add kchuang1015 to AUTHOR_MAP
---------
Co-authored-by: Kuan-Chieh Huang <kchuang1015@users.noreply.github.com>
Users report that the CLI/gateway floods them with confusing retry chatter
during transient failures: a single 429 can produce 10+ "Provider/Endpoint/
Retrying in 5s..." lines before the request eventually succeeds. The same
firehose hits Telegram, Discord, Slack, etc. via _emit_status.
This patch defers all retry/fallback/compression status messages until we
know the outcome:
- if the turn ultimately succeeds (any path: primary recovers, fallback
activates, compression unsticks the request), the buffer is silently
dropped — the user sees nothing.
- if every retry and fallback exhausts and the turn fails, the buffer
is flushed at the terminal-failure return so the user sees the full
retry trace alongside the final error.
Backend logging (agent.log) is unchanged — every emission site still
writes to logger.warning/info, so post-mortem diagnosis is intact.
## What changed
run_agent.py: four new methods on AIAgent:
_buffer_status(msg) — defer an _emit_status call
_buffer_vprint(msg) — defer a _vprint(force=True) line
_clear_status_buffer() — drop pending messages on success
_flush_status_buffer() — replay pending messages on terminal failure
agent/conversation_loop.py:
- converted ~30 mid-process emit/vprint sites in the retry, fallback,
compression, empty-response, and stream-watchdog paths to the buffered
helpers
- added _flush_status_buffer() at every terminal-failure return so users
still see the trace when it actually matters
- added _clear_status_buffer() at the "non-empty assistant content"
point (NOT at "API call returned bytes" — empty responses still loop
through the empty-retry path and would otherwise lose their trace
between iterations)
- silenced the two "(´;ω;`) oops, retrying..." / "(╥_╥) error,
retrying..." spinner final-frame messages — the spinner now stops
cleanly so retries leave no visible residue
agent/chat_completion_helpers.py: same conversion for codex TTFB / stale-
stream / fallback-activation status messages.
agent/stream_diag.py: _emit_stream_drop now buffers instead of emitting
directly.
## Tests
tests/run_agent/test_retry_status_buffer.py: 7 unit tests covering
accumulate→flush, clear-on-success, mixed kinds, empty-buffer no-op,
re-buffer after flush, exception swallowing.
Updated 3 existing tests that mocked _emit_status to also mock (or use)
_buffer_status:
- tests/run_agent/test_run_agent.py::test_empty_response_emits_status_for_gateway
- tests/run_agent/test_stream_drop_logging.py (2 tests)
- tests/agent/test_codex_ttfb_watchdog.py (TTFB hint test)
## Validation
Live test: hermes chat -q against an unreachable endpoint with no fallback
exhausts retries and prints the full trace at the end. Same flow against
a working endpoint prints zero retry chatter.
The web_crawl_tool() function was an orphan — no model schema registered
it, no skill or CLI command called it, and the agent had no way to invoke
it. PR #32608 proposed wiring it up as a model-callable tool; we've
decided not to expose crawl as a separate capability since web_search +
web_extract cover the use cases we want models to have.
Removed:
- tools/web_tools.py: web_crawl_tool() (~230 LOC)
- plugins/web/firecrawl/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl()
- plugins/web/tavily/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl()
- plugins/web/xai/provider.py: supports_crawl() override
- agent/web_search_provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl() ABC methods
- agent/web_search_registry.py: get_active_crawl_provider() +
the 'crawl' branch in _resolve()
- agent/display.py: web_crawl tool-progress rendering
- hermes_cli/config.py: 'web_crawl' from TAVILY_API_KEY.tools
- tools/website_policy.py: stale comment reference
- Tests: removed TestWebCrawlTavily class, the two website-policy
web_crawl tests, the searxng/ddgs/brave-free crawl-error tests,
the integration test_web_crawl method, and the
test_unconfigured_crawl_emits_top_level_error test. Trimmed the
capability-flag parametrize list and the WebSearchProvider ABC
conformance tests.
- Docs: trimmed the Crawl column from capability tables in both EN
and zh-Hans, updated the developer-guide ABC table.
Net: 25 files, +115/-1067.
Closes#33762 (the schema-text bug only existed if #32608 landed).
Supersedes #32608.
api_messages is built once before the retry loop while the primary provider
is active. When a mid-conversation fallback switches to a require-side thinking
provider (DeepSeek/Kimi/MiMo), assistant turns built under a non-require primary
(e.g. Codex) go out without reasoning_content and the new provider rejects the
request with HTTP 400 ("reasoning_content must be passed back").
Re-apply the echo-back pad against the current provider immediately before
building the request kwargs. Idempotent and a no-op unless the active provider
enforces echo-back, so it covers all fallback paths without affecting normal or
reject-side operation.
Drafted by Claude (Opus 4.7) under human review while fixing a personal deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Condenses the substance of PRs #16453, #17453, #16451, #17600, and #13373
into a minimal generic host contract that external context engine plugins
(e.g. hermes-lcm) need to integrate cleanly. Drops scaffolding that
duplicated existing infrastructure or had marginal value.
Five concrete changes:
1. `_transition_context_engine_session()` on AIAgent — generic lifecycle
helper that fires on_session_end → on_session_reset → on_session_start
→ optional carry_over_new_session_context. Engines implement only the
hooks they need; missing hooks are skipped. Built-in compressor keeps
its existing reset-only behavior because callers default to no
metadata. `reset_session_state()` now optionally accepts
previous_messages / old_session_id / carry_over_context and delegates
to the transition helper when provided. (#16453)
2. `conversation_id` passed to `on_session_start()` — both the
agent-init call site and the compression-boundary call site now
forward `self._gateway_session_key` so plugin engines have a stable
conversation identity that survives session_id rotation (compression
splits, /new, resume). The key already existed on AIAgent; it just
wasn't reaching engines. (#16453)
3. Canonical cache buckets forwarded to engines — the usage dict passed
to `update_from_response()` now includes input_tokens, output_tokens,
cache_read_tokens, cache_write_tokens, and reasoning_tokens on top of
the legacy prompt/completion/total keys. Engines can make decisions on
cache-hit ratios and reasoning costs instead of only aggregates. ABC
docstring updated. (#17453)
4. Plugin-registered context engines visible in the picker —
`_discover_context_engines()` in plugins_cmd.py now also includes
engines registered via `ctx.register_context_engine()` from plugin
manifests, deduplicating by name so repo-shipped descriptions win on
collision. (#16451)
5. `_EngineCollector.register_command()` — context engines using the
standard `register(ctx)` pattern can now expose slash commands (e.g.
`/lcm`). Routes to the global plugin command registry with the same
conflict-rejection policy regular plugins use (no shadowing built-ins,
no clobbering other plugins). Previously these calls hit a no-op and
the slash commands silently never appeared. (#17600)
Dropped from the original 5 PRs:
- Compression boundary signal (`boundary_reason="compression"`) from
#16453 — already on main at `agent/conversation_compression.py:412-424`,
landed via the bg-review extraction.
- `discover_plugins()` before fallback in run_agent.py from #16451 —
redundant: `get_plugin_context_engine()` already routes through
`_ensure_plugins_discovered()` which is idempotent.
- Runtime identity diagnostics method + helpers from #13373 (+251 LOC) —
operators can already read engine state via `engine.get_status()`;
the diagnostics view added marginal value relative to its surface area.
- The 553-LOC slash-command machinery from #17600 — replaced with a
20-LOC `register_command` method on the collector that reuses the
existing plugin command registry instead of building a parallel one.
Net: ~215 LOC of host-contract changes + 282 LOC of focused tests, vs
~1,176 LOC across the original 5 PRs.
Co-authored-by: Tosko4 <1294707+Tosko4@users.noreply.github.com>
Closes#16453.
Closes#17453.
Closes#16451.
Closes#17600.
Closes#13373.
Related: stephenschoettler/hermes-lcm#68.
Snapshot review_agent._session_messages before teardown so close() can
clean per-session state without dropping the user-visible
self-improvement summary. Adds two regressions:
- bg-review summarizer receives captured review-agent tool messages
after review_agent.close() runs
- context-compressor protected-head handoff rehydration populates
_previous_summary and keeps the old handoff out of newly summarized
turns
Salvaged from PR #26039 onto current main after agent/background_review.py
extraction. Original commit 63eaf6055; bg-review test updated to patch
the module-level summarize_background_review_actions in
agent.background_review instead of the now-forwarder
AIAgent._summarize_background_review_actions.
Salvages the transport-side fix from #32911 (@xxxigm). Closes#32892.
The openai SDK's responses.stream() / responses.parse() eagerly call
_make_tools(tools), which iterates tools without a None guard. Passing
tools=None raises TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not iterable before
any HTTP request is issued (openai==2.24.0).
PR #33042 already removed responses.stream() from our own Codex call
paths, so the specific iteration crash inside _make_tools is no longer
on the hot path. But the right API contract is to omit tools entirely
when there are no functions to expose — passing tools=None to the
backend is semantically wrong regardless of the SDK's iteration
behavior, and we'd hit it again on any future code path that hasn't
migrated off responses.stream().
This applies the transport-level part of @xxxigm's fix: move
'tools': response_tools into the if response_tools: branch so the
key is omitted when there are no tools, just like tool_choice and
parallel_tool_calls already are. Skips the run_agent.py-side
_strip_sdk_none_iterables helper from their PR — that path is now
obsolete because the SDK helper that needed defending is gone.
Tests
- tests/run_agent/test_codex_no_tools_nonetype.py: 6 tests trimmed
from @xxxigm's original 13-test file. Drops the obsolete tests for
_strip_sdk_none_iterables and _RecordingResponsesStream (helpers
that don't exist on main anymore), keeps the transport behavior
tests + the SDK contract sanity check that ensures we notice if
upstream ever fixes _make_tools(None).
- 6/6 passing locally.
Co-authored-by: xxxigm <tuancanhnguyen706@gmail.com>
Salvages the intent of #33136 (@Brixyy) onto current main. The original PR
was written against the pre-refactor monolithic run_agent.py and added a
top-level _is_nonretryable_local_validation_error() helper. Both target
functions have since been extracted to agent/conversation_loop.py:2869,
so the salvage applies the equivalent guard inline at that canonical
location rather than reintroducing the helper.
## Why
After #33042 made our own Codex consumer structurally immune to NoneType
crashes, third-party shims, mocked clients, and any future code path that
hasn't migrated could still surface TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not
iterable as a wire-shape mismatch. The agent loop's classifier currently
treats ALL TypeError as a local programming bug and aborts non-retryable
— users on stale Telegram/gateway turns saw bare "Non-retryable error
(HTTP None)" with no recovery.
This is a provider/SDK shape mismatch, not a local programming bug. The
retry/fallback path should run, not be short-circuited.
## What
agent/conversation_loop.py: extend is_local_validation_error to exclude
TypeErrors whose message matches the NoneType-not-iterable shape (case-
insensitive, both "NoneType" and "not iterable" must appear).
tests/run_agent/test_jsondecodeerror_retryable.py:
- update the mirror predicate to match the production check
- add TestNoneTypeNotIterableIsRetryable class with 3 tests (the basic
shape, message variants, unrelated TypeErrors still abort)
- add TestAgentLoopSourceHasNoneTypeCarveOut to enforce the source-level
invariant matches the test mirror
## Validation
tests/run_agent/test_jsondecodeerror_retryable.py +
tests/run_agent/test_31273_402_not_retried.py → 14/14 passing
Co-authored-by: Brixyy <subrtt@gmail.com>
Closes#33368.
`_CodexCompletionsAdapter.create()` iterates `final.output` from the
Codex Responses stream. The event-driven consumer (introduced in #33042)
always sets `final.output` to a list, so this shape can't come from our
own code path. But:
- Mocked clients in tests can return a typed Response with `output=None`
- Third-party shims / compatibility layers that bypass the consumer can
do the same
- A future code path that wraps a different consumer could regress
The old code `getattr(final, "output", [])` returns `None` (not the
default `[]`) when the attribute EXISTS but is `None`. Iterating
`None` then raises `TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not iterable` —
the exact error logged by title-generation when this fires.
Fix: `getattr(final, "output", None) or []` — single-line defensive
coerce. Cheap; zero risk.
Regression test asserts the auxiliary path handles a final whose
`.output` is `None` (via monkey-patched consumer) without raising and
returns the expected chat.completions-shaped response.
Reporter: @pavegrid-1 (issue #33368).
Closes#33163.
When _try_activate_fallback() switches from one provider to another (e.g.
openai-codex → openrouter), the credential pool still belongs to the
primary provider. This causes two compounding bugs:
1. The pool retains the primary's base_url. Downstream pool recovery
(rate_limit / billing / auth) calls _swap_credential() with a primary
entry which overwrites the agent's base_url back to the primary's
endpoint. Every fallback request then 404s against the wrong host.
2. Pool recovery acting on errors from the FALLBACK provider mutates the
PRIMARY's pool state (#33088 reported a related corruption pattern),
exhausting/rotating entries that have nothing to do with the failure.
Two layered fixes:
a) try_activate_fallback (agent/chat_completion_helpers.py): on fallback
activation, clear agent._credential_pool when the fallback provider
doesn't match the pool's provider. Pool is preserved when the fallback
shares the pool's provider (e.g. multiple openrouter entries).
b) recover_with_credential_pool (agent/agent_runtime_helpers.py):
defensive guard rejects any pool mutation when agent.provider doesn't
match pool.provider. Defense-in-depth — should never fire after (a)
is in place, but covers any future path that attaches a stale pool.
Salvaged from @zccyman's PR #33217. The original PR was written against
the pre-refactor monolithic run_agent.py; both target functions have
since been extracted to module-level helpers. Behavior is identical —
the guards live in the canonical extracted locations.
Tests
- New tests/run_agent/test_fallback_credential_isolation.py (7 tests
covering: fallback clears mismatched pool, fallback preserves matching
pool, recovery rejects mismatched pool, recovery accepts matching
pool, 429-from-z.ai-doesn't-exhaust-codex-pool, _client_kwargs
base_url survives pool clear, _swap_credential doesn't restore
primary URL after fallback).
- Cross-verified: 77/77 passing across fallback isolation tests +
agent/test_credential_pool.py — no regression.
Co-authored-by: zccyman <16263913+zccyman@users.noreply.github.com>
Closes#33175.
switch_model() in agent/agent_runtime_helpers.py mutated agent.model and
agent.provider before rebuilding the client, with no try/except to restore
them on failure. If the rebuild raised (bad API key, network error,
build_anthropic_client failure, etc.) the agent was left with the new
model+provider name paired with the OLD client — producing HTTP 400s like
"claude-sonnet-4-6 is not supported on openai-codex" on the next turn.
Callers in cli.py, gateway/run.py, and tui_gateway/server.py already catch
the exception and warn the user, but the warning was misleading because
the swap had partially succeeded; the agent's state was torn.
Snapshot every mutated field before the swap, wrap the swap+rebuild block
in try/except, and restore the snapshot on failure before re-raising so
the caller's warning surfaces.
Reported by @amirariff91. Tests cover both branches (chat_completions and
anthropic_messages) and the cross-branch case (anthropic -> openai).
xAI's /v1/responses endpoint rejects service_tier with HTTP 400
"Argument not supported: service_tier" when users activate /fast mode.
Also add a safety-net strip_slash_enum call in _preflight_codex_api_kwargs
to catch any tool schemas that might slip through the caller-level
sanitization. xAI's Responses API grammar compiler rejects enum values
containing forward slashes (e.g. HuggingFace model IDs like
"Qwen/Qwen3.5-0.8B") with the opaque "Invalid arguments passed to the
model" error.
Fixes the root cause of "Invalid arguments passed to the model" errors
reported by xAI OAuth (SuperGrok) users.
reasoning.encrypted_content is sealed to the Responses endpoint that
minted it. When a session switches model providers mid-conversation —
say the user runs /model gpt-5.5 after several turns on grok-4.3, or
vice versa — the persisted codex_reasoning_items carry blobs the new
endpoint cannot decrypt, and every subsequent turn fails with HTTP 400
invalid_encrypted_content.
This is the cross-issuer prevention layer. Pairs with:
* PR #33035 — runtime recovery when the HTTP 400 fires anyway
* PR #33146 — prevention for transient rs_tmp_* items
Stamps each reasoning item with the issuer kind that minted it
(codex_backend / xai_responses / github_responses / other:<url>) at
normalize time, then drops items at replay time when the active
endpoint differs from the stamp. Unstamped (legacy) items pass
through for backwards compatibility.
Cherry-picked from @chaconne67's PR #31629. Conflict against current
main (#33035's replay_encrypted_reasoning parameter) resolved as
'keep both' — the two guards compose: replay_encrypted_reasoning=False
is the session-wide kill switch, current_issuer_kind is the per-item
filter that runs only when replay is still enabled.
