Sibling-site fix for the flaw addressed in the global 'Configure all
platforms' flow: the per-platform checklist also returned to the menu
without opening provider setup when a selected toolset was already
enabled but lacked provider configuration. Adds a matching regression
test.
* fix(env): recognize export-prefixed .env lines in save/remove (#40041)
load_env() parses bash-compatible 'export KEY=value' lines (#6659), so a
hand-added 'export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_...' shows as set (green light) in the
desktop Tools & Keys page. But save_env_value/remove_env_value only matched
plain 'KEY=' lines:
- DELETE /api/env 404'd ('not found in .env') — the token could not be
removed through the UI
- PUT /api/env appended a SECOND line; a later delete removed the new line
while the export line silently resurrected the old value
Both writers now match assignments through a shared _env_line_defines_key()
helper that understands the export prefix. Commented-out lines are still
ignored.
Regression tests drive the real dashboard endpoint handlers against a temp
HERMES_HOME with runtime-constructed classic-PAT-shaped fixtures, covering
save-does-not-500, export-line remove, export-line replace-without-duplicate,
and the plain-line path staying intact.
Fixes#40041
* fix(credentials): unify provider key delete/update across .env, auth.json, config.yaml (#51071#59761#62269)
A provider API key can live in three stores at once: ~/.hermes/.env,
auth.json credential_pool (env-seeded 'env:<VAR>' entries persisted by the
pool loader), and config.yaml mirrors (model.api_key, auxiliary.*.api_key,
custom_providers[*].api_key). The desktop/dashboard endpoints and the TUI
gateway RPCs only ever mutated .env, so the stores diverged:
- #51071/#59761: DELETE /api/env removed the key from .env but left the
credential_pool entry (the loader is additive-only and never prunes),
so the provider kept appearing in the model picker — surviving restart
via the stale pool entry + provider_models_cache.json row.
- #62269: PUT /api/env rewrote .env but left the OLD key in config.yaml
(model.api_key wins over env at client construction), producing 401s
with a key the UI no longer showed.
New hermes_cli/credential_lifecycle.py is the single choke point:
- remove_provider_env_credential(): clears the .env entry, prunes
env:<VAR> pool entries across ALL providers (a shared var like
GITHUB_TOKEN can seed several), suppresses the env source so a lingering
shell export can't re-seed it (matching 'hermes auth remove' semantics),
drops the affected providers' model-cache rows, and scrubs value-matched
config.yaml api_key mirrors. Returns 'found' spanning every store so a
stale pool-only entry is cleanable through the same delete button.
- save_provider_env_credential(): writes .env, rotates any config.yaml
mirror that held the PREVIOUS value (value-matched — an unrelated inline
key is untouched), and lifts a prior env-source suppression so re-adding
behaves like 'hermes auth add'.
OAuth preservation: only entries with source == 'env:<VAR>' are pruned.
OAuth/device-code/manual/borrowed pool entries and providers.<id> OAuth
token blocks are never touched by a key-only delete. (model.disconnect in
the TUI gateway still clears OAuth via clear_provider_auth — that surface
is a full provider disconnect, which is the documented intent there.)
Rerouted call sites: PUT/DELETE /api/env (dashboard + desktop),
tui_gateway model.save_key / model.disconnect, save_env_value_secure
(TUI/gateway secret capture), and hermes config set/unset for env-shaped
keys.
E2E tests drive the real endpoint handlers against temp-HERMES_HOME
fixtures (.env + auth.json + config.yaml with runtime-constructed fake
keys) and assert cross-store consistency after delete/update, pool-reload
survival ('restart'), OAuth preservation, models-cache invalidation, and
the suppress/unsuppress round-trip.
Fixes#51071Fixes#59761Fixes#62269
* fix(desktop): compute truthful per-provider readiness for Capabilities tool config
Backend: GET /api/tools/toolsets/{name}/config now sends a per-provider
'status' field ('ready' | 'needs_keys' | 'needs_auth' | 'needs_setup')
computed by the new provider_readiness_status() in tools_config:
- env vars declared: all set -> ready, else needs_keys
- Nous-managed rows: Portal login + per-category tool-gateway entitlement
(MANAGED_FEATURE_COVERAGE_CATEGORY) -> ready, else needs_auth
- post_setup 'xai_grok' rows: Grok OAuth or XAI_API_KEY -> ready, else
needs_auth
- other keyless post_setup rows: installed-state predicate
(_POST_SETUP_READY: kittentts/piper/ddgs/langfuse via find_spec,
agent_browser via _has_agent_browser, cua_driver via PATH probe);
unknown hooks fall back to is_active as the setup-completed signal
- genuinely-free keyless rows (Edge TTS) stay ready
Existing fields are untouched; 'status' is additive so older desktops
keep working.
* fix(desktop): render server readiness status in Capabilities provider pills
The panel's providerConfigured() heuristic pilled every zero-env-var
provider 'Ready' — including logged-out Nous Subscription rows, xAI TTS
without Grok OAuth, and never-installed KittenTTS/Piper. Render the
backend's per-provider 'status' instead:
- ready -> existing 'Ready' pill
- needs_auth -> warn pill 'Needs sign-in'
- needs_setup -> warn pill 'Needs setup'
- needs_keys -> no pill (env-var fields are the signal)
Keyed rows keep deriving ready/needs_keys from local envState so saving
or clearing a key updates the pill without a refetch. Older backends
without 'status' fall back to the legacy env-var heuristic (narrow
compat path, desktop/runtime update on separate clocks).
Adds the warn tone to the settings Pill primitive and needsSignIn /
needsSetup strings to all locale catalogs (en, zh, zh-hant, ja).
The per-message ephemeral context prompt re-renders every turn, and
any byte change (Discord auto-thread rename, reset notes, voice
channel state) both breaks the provider prompt-cache prefix at the
head of every request and changes the gateway agent-cache signature,
forcing a full agent rebuild per message. Pin the rendered block per
session keyed by a hash of exactly the fields it renders, so only a
real input change (rename, topic edit, /sethome, redact_pii flip)
re-renders; deliver one-shot per-turn facts (auto-reset note,
first-contact intro, voice-channel changes) on the current user
message via the api_content sidecar instead of the system prompt; sort
get_connected_platforms for byte-stable ordering.
_manage_thinking_signatures treated every Kimi-family endpoint with the
#13848-era contract: strip signed Anthropic thinking blocks from replayed
history, assuming the upstream cannot validate Anthropic signatures.
Live probing shows that contract is outdated for the whole Kimi family:
- Kimi For Coding (api.kimi.com/coding) issues AND validates its own
thinking signatures (K3+): both verbatim and content-mutated signed
blocks replay with HTTP 200;
- Moonshot's Anthropic surface (api.moonshot.cn/anthropic) accepts signed
blocks the same way (200 on both verbatim and mutated);
- every other harness that replays signed blocks to KFC (Claude Code, pi,
Kilo Code) round-trips fine.
Stripping signed blocks there silently discarded the model's prior
chain-of-thought in multi-turn conversations — e.g. a two-turn recall
probe loses the reasoning between turns while the text answer survives
(agent.log: turn-2 input ≈ turn-1 input + a few dozen tokens instead of
+thinking). With this change, the same probe recalls the exact hidden
values from turn-1 thinking (+230 tokens on turn 2).
So: on _is_kimi_family_endpoint, keep signed and unsigned thinking blocks
unchanged on replay — one uniform rule for the whole Kimi family, no
/coding-vs-Moonshot split. DeepSeek keeps the #16748 contract (strip
signed, preserve unsigned). Third-party and direct-Anthropic behavior is
untouched.
Add tests/agent/test_anthropic_kimi_signed_thinking_replay.py pinning the
unified behavior (Kimi /coding + Moonshot keep signed and unsigned) and
the unchanged neighbors (DeepSeek strips, direct Anthropic keeps).
Follow-up to the cherry-picked fix: the same UnicodeEncodeError bind
failure was live at sibling sites the PR didn't cover —
- api_content sidecar (append_message, _insert_message_rows,
set_latest_user_api_content): bound raw; a surrogate in the composed
api_content aborted the whole row/UPDATE. Scrubbing is wire-accurate:
the conversation loop already scrubs every outgoing payload, so the
scrubbed form IS what was sent.
- tool_name (both INSERT sites): raw bind.
- sanitize_title: session titles from LLM title generation or /title
could carry surrogates; scrub before validation.
E2E-verified each site raised UnicodeEncodeError on main and persists
after this commit. Tests added for all five paths.
sqlite3 encodes bound str parameters as UTF-8 and raises
UnicodeEncodeError on lone surrogates (U+D800..U+DFFF), but
SessionDB._encode_content returned str content untouched. One such code
point anywhere in a message therefore aborted the entire message write.
The path is reachable with ordinary input — the same scraped web/social
text that crashed the guardrail hasher in fb0217c65:
1. a tool result carrying a lone surrogate is appended to the canonical
`messages` history unsanitized;
2. the proactive sanitizer only cleans the `api_messages` *copy*
(conversation_loop.py), so the API call succeeds;
3. because the API never raises, the UnicodeEncodeError recovery
sanitizer (guarded by `isinstance(api_error, UnicodeEncodeError)`)
never runs and the history keeps the surrogate;
4. the DB flush hits it and run_agent swallows the failure with
`logger.warning("Session DB append_message failed")`.
Because replace_messages re-sends the whole history every turn, the
poisoned row stays and every later save raises too: the session freezes
at its last good state while the live conversation grows, and everything
after that point is gone on resume. Observed: persisted rows stuck at 2
while history reached 12, with only a warning in the log.
Scrub at the DB write boundary with the canonical _sanitize_surrogates
(surrogate -> U+FFFD): in _encode_content, which both INSERT sites share,
and on the raw-bound reasoning / reasoning_content columns. The JSON
branch already defaults to ensure_ascii=True and was safe. Well-formed
text — accents, CJK, emoji — round-trips byte-identically, matching
_encode_content's stated intent that persistence never fails.
Adds regression tests for content, reasoning, the multi-turn freeze, and
benign-Unicode passthrough.
Background-review forks share the live parent's session_id for prompt-cache
warmth but are _persist_disabled — they can never write to the transcript.
Without this, every review fork on an active session would (a) trip a false
cross-agent overlap warning against the parent's real turn, sending the
#64934 route investigation the wrong way, and (b) pop the parent's in-flight
slot at its own persist, making a real overlap right after a review go
unreported. Both legs now skip persist-disabled agents symmetrically.
+2 tests.
note_turn_start kept its in-flight marker on the agent object, but the
gateway caches agents per routing key (_agent_cache) while transcripts
are owned by session_id — and switch_session (/resume from a second
surface, CLI-continuity rebinding, async-delegation pinning,
topic-binding tip-walks) maps multiple routing keys onto one session_id
without any cross-key check. Two keys mapped to one session run
concurrent turns on two different agent objects, so the per-agent
tripwire could never fire for exactly the dispatch route #64934 is
waiting to identify.
Add a module-level session_id-keyed in-flight registry alongside the
per-agent marker. Same philosophy as the original tripwire: log-only,
takes ownership on overlap, under-reports rather than double-reports
(a same-agent overlap warns once, not twice). The persist-time clear
pops the session id stamped at turn start, so a mid-turn compression
rotation of agent.session_id cannot strand the slot.
Follow-ups on the salvaged unknown-root-key warning from PR #67345:
- Add image_gen, video_gen, plugins, smart_model_routing, platform_toolsets,
session_reset, multiplex_profiles, profile_routes, platforms,
require_mention, unauthorized_dm_behavior, and signal to
_EXTRA_KNOWN_ROOT_KEYS — all are read from the raw user YAML (gateway,
registries, plugin CLI) or written by our own setup wizard, but absent
from DEFAULT_CONFIG. Without this, doctor would warn on configs Hermes
itself wrote.
- Convert tests/hermes_cli/test_config_validation.py back to LF line
endings (the PR's rewrite introduced CRLF).
Two config-hygiene improvements (warning-only, non-blocking):
1) Unknown top-level config keys now surface a warning naming the key (known roots derived from DEFAULT_CONFIG.keys() as single source of truth) so typos like 'skillz:'/'secrity:' are no longer silently ignored. Provider.* unknown-key behavior preserved.
2) hermes doctor reports deprecated/legacy config keys (display.tool_progress_overrides, delegation.max_async_children, compression.summary_*) and legacy env vars (HERMES_TOOL_PROGRESS*, TERMINAL_CWD, QQ_HOME_CHANNEL*) with their modern replacements, as non-failing warnings. No auto-delete/migrate.
Tests: config_validation + doctor suites green (100 passed).
The ineffective-compression counter is not durable; when it is the sole
reason the gate is blocked there is nothing in the DB that could unblock
it, so re-reading the guard rows on every gate check for the rest of the
session is pure waste. Guard test pins the no-DB-touch behavior.
Follow-up on the salvaged #64511 commit:
- _automatic_compression_blocked() now refreshes durable guard state
(cooldown + fallback streak) when — and only when — the in-memory
snapshot says blocked, then re-evaluates. The should_compress()
pre-gates (preflight/turn paths) consult this before ever reaching
compress_context, and a stale fallback streak has no expiry timer, so
without a gate-level refresh a cleared durable row could never unblock
a prebound agent. The unblocked hot path pays no DB reads.
- A refresh that finds no durable cooldown row no longer clears a live
local cooldown whose DB persist FAILED (_cooldown_persist_failed):
an empty row is not evidence another agent cleared it, and honouring
it would reopen the #11529 thrash window. A successful durable
round-trip (record or read) makes the DB authoritative again.
- Guard tests for both directions (red on the pre-fix code), including
a hot-path test asserting the unblocked gate never touches the DB.
A final response generated but not confirmed-delivered was the one
artifact the gateway could lose without a trace: crash or planned
restart between finalize and platform ACK dropped it silently, and the
resume path re-ran the whole turn at full cost (#58818 P1, #41696,
#63695's gateway half).
gateway/delivery_ledger.py records each outbound final response in
state.db (same conventions as the async-delegation ledger: WAL, owner
pid + process-start-time liveness, bounded retention):
pending -> attempting -> delivered | failed
startup sweep on dead-owner rows -> redeliver | abandoned
Contract (the lessons from the closed delivery-outbox attempt #61790):
- obligation recorded BEFORE the first send attempt; cleared only on
SendResult.success (destination acceptance, #51184)
- ambiguity is labeled, never silently retried: rows that were mid-send
when the process died redeliver with a visible '♻️ Recovered reply —
may be a duplicate' prefix (honest at-least-once)
- stable ids from session_key + inbound message id + content, so
distinct threads/topics can never collide
- poison rows bounded: 3 attempts / 24h freshness -> abandoned; claim
atomically re-stamps ownership so racing sweeps can't double-claim
- redelivery clears resume_pending for the session so the resume path
never re-runs a turn whose answer the ledger already holds
- best-effort everywhere: ledger failure can never block or delay a send
- slash-command/ephemeral/empty responses are not recorded; cron and
proactive delivery stay on DeliveryRouter (separate subsystem)
Config: gateway.delivery_ledger (default on; no version bump needed).
Validation: 30 ledger+producer tests; 352 blast-radius gateway tests
green; cross-process E2E (record in process A, kill it mid-send, claim
+ marker + redeliver in a fresh process B against the same state.db).
_is_real_user_message no longer accepts a user-role compaction summary as
the human anchor, so _compress_context restores the original user turn
after the summary; update the lifecycle-status test's expectation.
Follow-up hardening on top of the salvaged #66637 commits:
- _insert_real_user_anchor could place the restored human turn directly
next to user-role scaffolding (index-0 insert before a leading synthetic
user turn, or a scaffolding-only transcript), breaking the strict
alternation contract (#55677). Restoration now merges into trailing
scaffolding (anchor text leads, synthetic flags cleared) and appends
after a user-role compaction summary instead of inserting adjacent.
- _is_real_user_message now also rejects user-role compaction summaries
(the compressor pins the summary to role=user when the tail opens with
an assistant turn), so a summary can no longer satisfy the human-anchor
check and skip restoration.
- _latest_user_task_snapshot reuses the same real-user predicate, so the
deterministic task snapshot can no longer anchor on todo snapshots,
truncation notices, or background-process reports.
- The Historical Task Snapshot rewrite keeps the section terminated with
a blank line; the previous replacement consumed the boundary newlines,
gluing the next '## ' heading mid-line and deleting all later sections
on the next iterative compaction.
- Drop _length_continuation_synthetic (no producer anywhere).
- AUTHOR_MAP entry for enzo-adami.
Rebased onto current main, where _ensure_session_db grew a per-profile
cache (get_hermes_home()-keyed) for /p/<profile>/ multiplex — after this
PR's base. The PR's async rewrite assumed the old single-self._session_db
model, so on current main `session_db=self._session_db` in _create_agent
would pass None in production (the real DB lives in the per-home cache).
Split the concern: keep a SYNC _ensure_session_db (per-profile, used by
_create_agent + the many sync-patching create_agent tests) and add an
async _ensure_session_db_async that captures the profile home on the loop
thread then offloads only the SQLite open via to_thread (single-flight).
Both share _open_and_cache_session_db. Request handlers use the async
variant; _create_agent reverts to the sync call. Updated the first-request
test's FakeDB to accept db_path to match main's SessionDB(db_path=...).
Co-authored-by: necoweb3 <sswdarius@gmail.com>
Surface the session's first-class Project in both chat surfaces: the
Desktop status bar (project name as the workspace label, full cwd in the
tooltip) and the TUI status label + /status output.
One source of truth. The per-profile projects.db is the authority, read
in tui_gateway via _project_info_for_cwd (backed by
projects_db.project_for_path) and threaded through every session.info
emission path the TUI consumes. The Desktop already caches that truth in
$projectTree, so it DERIVES the label from it (projectNameForCwd) instead
of carrying a second per-session $currentProject atom fed from
session.info.
That drops the parallel state #64721 introduced and the entire
reset/reconciliation surface it required (resume, agentless cwd.set,
gateway-switch, fresh-draft): the label is purely derived, so it stays
correct whenever the cwd or the project tree changes. Only explicit,
named projects resolve on both surfaces, so an auto-discovered repo root
keeps the cwd-leaf label everywhere.
Excludes the unrelated markdown shell-fence change bundled in #64721.
- Make create sequence (check + insert + title) atomic via single
_execute_write call with BEGIN IMMEDIATE, closing the TOCTOU window
where two concurrent same-ID creates could both return 201.
- Offload _ensure_session_db() to asyncio.to_thread with single-flight
lock so first-request SQLite init doesn't block the event loop.
- Add concurrent same-ID create test (one 201, one 409) and
first-request path test covering the initialization.
The first LLM call of every gateway turn gets ~0% provider prompt-cache
hit rate (in-turn calls: 97-99%) because the bytes sent for a turn's
user message are not the bytes replayed next turn: memory-prefetch and
pre_llm_call context are injected into the API copy only, the #48677
persist override writes cleaned content to the DB row, and
get_messages_as_conversation sanitize/strips user and assistant content
on load. Any of these diverges the request prefix at that message and
re-prefills everything after it — measured 27.9s for the first call vs
2.4-5.8s cached at a median ~156k-token context.
Persist what you send: a nullable messages.api_content column stores the
exact content string sent to the API when it differs from the clean
stored content, and replay substitutes it verbatim (no sanitize, no
strip). The injection composition lives in one helper
(turn_context.compose_user_api_content); the turn prologue stamps its
output onto the live user message, the api_messages build sends the
stamped bytes, and every outgoing copy pops the field so it never
reaches a provider. The crash-resilience user-turn persist moves after
prefetch/pre_llm_call so the user row is written once with its final
sidecar; _ensure_db_session stays before preflight compression (session
rotation needs the parent row under PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON). The
current-turn index trackers are re-anchored after compaction rebuilds
the message list, in-place preflight compaction backfills the stamp onto
the already-inserted row, and gateway replay forwards the sidecar only
when the replay pipeline did not rewrite the content. Rewrite paths that
would leave stale bytes (historical image strip, merge-summary-into-
tail, consecutive-user repair merge, stale-confirmation redaction) drop
the sidecar; the chat-completions transport and the max-iterations
summary path strip it defensively. codex_app_server and MoA turns are
excluded from stamping because their wire bytes differ from the
composition. A missing or dropped sidecar degrades to today's behavior
(one cache-boundary miss), never to wrong content.
Extract the inline pure-tool-call tail check to a named helper using
flatten_message_text (canonical content extraction). Fix a SQLite
durability regression: the incremental tool-call persist
(conversation_loop.py:4990) stamps _DB_PERSISTED_MARKER on the assistant
row, so the next _persist_session flush skips it — the filled content
reaches the in-memory transcript but NOT the durable store, and /resume
reloads content="". Pop the marker so the next flush re-writes the row.
Tests pass, ruff clean.
`finalize_turn` guarantees the invariant "delivered final_response =>
assistant row in transcript" (#43849 / #44100) for recovery paths that
return a response without appending a closing assistant message. It
enforces it by checking only the tail's ROLE:
if _tail_role != "assistant":
messages.append({"role": "assistant", "content": final_response})
A tail that is a *pure tool-call turn* — `assistant(tool_calls=[...])`
with no text of its own — satisfies that check while carrying none of the
delivered answer. The append is skipped and the response is never
persisted, so the durable transcript ends at an assistant row the user
never saw as the reply. On the next turn the model replays the user
backlog and re-answers it: exactly the symptom the block was added to
prevent, just reached through a different tail shape.
Observed with the real finalizer: with messages ending
`user -> assistant(content="", tool_calls=[t1])` and
`final_response="Here is your answer."`, the persisted transcript keeps
`content=""` and the answer is absent.
Fill that row's empty content instead of appending. This keeps the
invariant without disturbing the tool-call structure and without creating
an assistant->assistant pair. A tail tool-call row that already carries
model text is left untouched, so no model output is ever overwritten.
Adds regression tests for both: the empty tool-call tail is filled, and a
tool-call tail with existing text is not clobbered.
session.resume built two projections of the same lineage with two separate
get_messages_as_conversation calls — the model-fed copy (tip rows, alternation-
repaired) and the display copy (full lineage, verbatim). The display fetch
already reads a superset of the model fetch (the tip rows are part of the
lineage), so the second call re-scanned the same messages.
Add SessionDB.get_resume_conversations(): one lineage SELECT, split into the tip
(model) and full (display) projections in memory via the extracted
_rows_to_conversation helper. Byte-identical to the two separate reads
(test_get_resume_conversations_matches_separate_reads covers a lineage with a
dangling tool-call tail so repair diverges the two lengths, a single session,
and replayed-user dedup). Both session.resume build paths (deferred + eager) now
use it; the subagent single-read path is unchanged.
From the Desktop performance audit (P1: "Remove repeated resume transcript
work") — the gateway half. The renderer's concurrent REST prefetch is left as-is
(the audit flags dropping it as measure-first).
The sidebar refresh fired three /api/profiles/sessions calls (recents, cron,
messaging), and each one reopened every selected profile's state.db and re-ran
list_sessions_rich + session_count — ~3N DB opens/counts per refresh, on every
turn/broadcast/reconnect.
Add GET /api/profiles/sessions/sidebar: one pass that opens each profile DB
once and runs the three source-scoped queries together (recents scoped to the
active profile; cron + messaging cross-profile), returning the three windows in
one payload. Same read-only projection, 300s active heuristic, and caller-
supplied source taxonomy (recents_exclude / messaging_exclude / source=cron) as
the per-slice endpoint.
Renderer refreshSessions now makes one listSidebarSessions call and distributes
recents/cron/messaging to their stores (cron *jobs* stay a separate getCronJobs
API). Electron splices remote profiles per slice via fetchProfilesSessionSlice
(reusing the proven per-slice merge) so remote correctness is preserved; the
no-remote common case gets the single-open fast path.
From the Desktop performance audit (P1: "Batch sidebar session slices").
The Telegram gateway could go silently deaf for hours: the reconnect ladder
stalled mid-way (e.g. "attempt 4/10, reconnecting in 40s" then nothing) while
the process stayed active(running), so Restart=always never fired.
Root class: every recovery path — the ladder's re-entry
(_schedule_polling_recovery), the pending-update probe (_probe_pending_updates),
and PTB's error callback — gates new recovery on _polling_error_task.done(). If
that single task wedges on any hung await, all recovery returns early forever
and nothing retries.
The heartbeat loop is a separate task, so make it an independent, cause-agnostic
watchdog: if the same recovery task stays in-flight past
_POLLING_ERROR_TASK_STUCK_TIMEOUT (300s — well beyond a healthy ladder attempt's
bounded stop+drain+start+backoff), force a retryable-fatal so the background
reconnector rebuilds the adapter instead of relying on the frozen ladder. This
guarantees progress regardless of *where* the stall is (issue direction #1),
tracked locally so no task-assignment site needs to change.
Also salvages @koduri-mahesh-bhushan-chowdary's #66492 (drain-await timeout),
which closes the one concrete wedge vector documented in the incident
(_drain_polling_connections' unbounded shutdown()/initialize() on a wedged
CLOSE-WAIT pool). The watchdog covers the rest of the class.
Co-authored-by: Koduri Mahesh Bhushan Chowdary <mkoduri73@gmail.com>
_drain_polling_connections() awaited polling_req.shutdown() and
.initialize() without a timeout. When the getUpdates httpx connection is
wedged on a stale CLOSE-WAIT socket, that close can block forever, hanging
_handle_polling_network_error (the tracked _polling_error_task). The task
never completes, so every escalation path — _schedule_polling_recovery,
_probe_pending_updates, the heartbeat verifier — stays gated behind its
in-flight guard, the ladder freezes mid-way, _set_fatal_error is never
reached, and Restart=always never fires: the gateway is alive but silently
dead.
Wrap both drain awaits in asyncio.wait_for with a new module-level
_DRAIN_TIMEOUT (15.0s, matching _UPDATER_STOP_TIMEOUT), mirroring the
existing bounded stop()/start_polling() sites. On timeout the drain logs and
continues, so the handler task completes and the ladder always advances
toward the fatal-restart escalation.
Adds test_reconnect_continues_if_drain_hangs, which wedges the drain and
asserts the handler still reaches start_polling within a hard bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Direct-Anthropic requests used a single shared _anthropic_client, and the
stale/interrupt watchdog closed + rebuilt it from the poll (stranger) thread
at four sites (non-streaming stale/interrupt, streaming stale/interrupt).
Closing a client whose TLS socket a worker thread was still reading released
the FD from a stranger thread; the kernel recycled it under a live SSL BIO,
which then wrote a 24-byte TLS record into an unrelated SQLite header
(cron/executions.db), bricking every cron on the profile. Same shape as the
OpenAI-only #29507 fix, but the Anthropic path never got the owner-thread
contract.
Extend the #29507 ownership contract to Anthropic: build a per-request client
(_create_request_anthropic_client), register it with the request-client
holder tagged by kind, and route _close_request_client_once by kind — a
stranger thread only shuts the request client's sockets down
(_abort_request_anthropic_client), while the owning worker performs the SDK
close (_close_request_anthropic_client). The shared _anthropic_client is now
never closed from inside a request (streaming or non-streaming), including the
worker retry-cleanup sites, since each attempt builds a fresh request client.
The #28161 no-hang guarantee is preserved: the poll-thread socket abort
unblocks the worker immediately.
Salvages the approach from #51688 (@raymondyan-zhijie), reimplemented onto
current main (non-streaming dispatch was refactored into
_dispatch_nonstreaming_api_request; streaming grew _cancel_current_stream_attempt
and worker retry-cleanup sites). Tests updated to the request-local mechanism
(incl. replacing a banned source-reading test with a behavior test) plus new
regression coverage proving the watchdog aborts the request client and never
touches the shared client.
Co-authored-by: raymondyan-zhijie <32435458+raymondyan-zhijie@users.noreply.github.com>
Hot-reload and multi-entry load_hermes_dotenv can hit the same UTF-32
file repeatedly; gate the refuse-to-mangle warning on a module-level
seen-set (house style: _WARNED_KEYS sibling) so logs are not spammed.
Notepad "Unicode" saves write UTF-16 with a BOM. The sanitizer decoded
those bytes as utf-8-sig with errors=replace, glued U+FFFD onto the first
key name, stripped NULs, and rewrote the mangled content permanently.
Sniff leading BOMs before any text decode (UTF-32 before UTF-16, because
UTF-32-LE's BOM starts with UTF-16-LE's FF FE). Decode UTF-16 correctly
and rewrite as clean UTF-8. Refuse UTF-32 (leave untouched + warning).
After errors=replace, do not persist a first line that starts with U+FFFD.
Does not touch _load_dotenv_with_fallback (#65124's surface).
_quote_env_value previously left internal spaces unquoted (only #/"/'
and leading/trailing whitespace triggered). Spaced macOS paths written
via hermes setup SSH / Google Chat SA path / hermes config set produced
lines that python-dotenv still parsed but shell `set -a; . file` word-split.
Extend needs_quoting with any(c.isspace()); escaping dialect unchanged.
The salvaged unit tests hand-construct completed futures to lock the
_run_on_mcp_loop contract. Add a live-loop test that reproduces the actual
field trigger: an inner asyncio.wait_for expiry stores a real TimeoutError
on a real future scheduled on the MCP loop. Asserts the fixed loop surfaces
it once, promptly -- not spinning to the outer deadline (which both leaked
memory and masked the real error behind the generic wrapper message).
