Covers the two bugs salvaged from PR #15161:
- test_batch_runner_checkpoint: TestFinalCheckpointNoDuplicates asserts
the final aggregated completed_prompts list has no duplicate indices,
and keeps a sanity anchor test documenting the pre-fix pattern so a
future refactor that re-introduces it is caught immediately.
- test_model_tools: TestCoerceNumberInfNan asserts _coerce_number
returns the original string for inf/-inf/nan/Infinity inputs and that
the result round-trips through strict (allow_nan=False) json.dumps.
TUI auto-resolves `display.personality` at session init, unlike the base CLI.
If config contains `agent.personalities: null`, `_resolve_personality_prompt`
called `.get()` on None and failed before model/provider selection.
Normalize null personalities to `{}` and surface a targeted config warning.
Tolerating null top-level keys silently drops user settings (e.g.
`agent.system_prompt` next to a bare `agent:` line is gone). Probe at
session create, log via `logger.warning`, and surface in the boot info
under `config_warning` — rendered in the TUI feed alongside the existing
`credential_warning` banner.
YAML parses bare keys like `agent:` or `display:` as None. `dict.get(key, {})`
returns that None instead of the default (defaults only fire on missing keys),
so every `cfg.get("agent", {}).get(...)` chain in tui_gateway/server.py
crashed agent init with `'NoneType' object has no attribute 'get'`.
Guard all 21 sites with `(cfg.get(X) or {})`. Regression test covers the
null-section init path reported on Twitter against the new TUI.
Follow-up to the canonical-identity session-key fix: pull the
JID/LID normalize/expand/canonical helpers into gateway/whatsapp_identity.py
instead of living in two places. gateway/session.py (session-key build) and
gateway/run.py (authorisation allowlist) now both import from the shared
module, so the two resolution paths can't drift apart.
Also switches the auth path from module-level _hermes_home (cached at
import time) to dynamic get_hermes_home() lookup, which matches the
session-key path and correctly reflects HERMES_HOME env overrides. The
lone test that monkeypatched gateway.run._hermes_home for the WhatsApp
auth path is updated to set HERMES_HOME env var instead; all other
tests that monkeypatch _hermes_home for unrelated paths (update,
restart drain, shutdown marker, etc.) still work — the module-level
_hermes_home is untouched.
Hermes' WhatsApp bridge routinely surfaces the same person under either
a phone-format JID (60123456789@s.whatsapp.net) or a LID (…@lid),
and may flip between the two for a single human within the same
conversation. Before this change, build_session_key used the raw
identifier verbatim, so the bridge reshuffling an alias form produced
two distinct session keys for the same person — in two places:
1. DM chat_id — a user's DM sessions split in half, transcripts and
per-sender state diverge.
2. Group participant_id (with group_sessions_per_user enabled) — a
member's per-user session inside a group splits in half for the
same reason.
Add a canonicalizer that walks the bridge's lid-mapping-*.json files
and picks the shortest/numeric-preferred alias as the stable identity.
build_session_key now routes both the DM chat_id and the group
participant_id through this helper when the platform is WhatsApp.
All other platforms and chat types are untouched.
Expose canonical_whatsapp_identifier and normalize_whatsapp_identifier
as public helpers. Plugins that need per-sender behaviour (role-based
routing, per-contact authorization, policy gating) need the same
identity resolution Hermes uses internally; without a public helper,
each plugin would have to re-implement the walker against the bridge's
internal on-disk format. Keeping this alongside build_session_key
makes it authoritative and one refactor away if the bridge ever
changes shape.
_expand_whatsapp_aliases stays private — it's an implementation detail
of how the mapping files are walked, not a contract callers should
depend on.
Exposes hermes --tui over a PTY-backed WebSocket so the dashboard can
embed the real TUI rather than reimplement its surface. The browser
attaches xterm.js to the socket; keystrokes flow in, PTY output bytes
flow out.
Architecture:
browser <Terminal> (xterm.js)
│ onData ───► ws.send(keystrokes)
│ onResize ► ws.send('\x1b[RESIZE:cols;rows]')
│ write ◄── ws.onmessage (PTY bytes)
▼
FastAPI /api/pty (token-gated, loopback-only)
▼
PtyBridge (ptyprocess) ── spawns node ui-tui/dist/entry.js ──► tui_gateway + AIAgent
Components
----------
hermes_cli/pty_bridge.py
Thin wrapper around ptyprocess.PtyProcess: byte-safe read/write on the
master fd via os.read/os.write (not PtyProcessUnicode — ANSI is
inherently byte-oriented and UTF-8 boundaries may land mid-read),
non-blocking select-based reads, TIOCSWINSZ resize, idempotent
SIGHUP→SIGTERM→SIGKILL teardown, platform guard (POSIX-only; Windows
is WSL-supported only).
hermes_cli/web_server.py
@app.websocket("/api/pty") endpoint gated by the existing
_SESSION_TOKEN (via ?token= query param since browsers can't set
Authorization on WS upgrades). Loopback-only enforcement. Reader task
uses run_in_executor to pump PTY bytes without blocking the event
loop. Writer loop intercepts a custom \x1b[RESIZE:cols;rows] escape
before forwarding to the PTY. The endpoint resolves the TUI argv
through a _resolve_chat_argv hook so tests can inject fake commands
without building the real TUI.
Tests
-----
tests/hermes_cli/test_pty_bridge.py — 12 unit tests: spawn, stdout,
stdin round-trip, EOF, resize (via TIOCSWINSZ + tput readback), close
idempotency, cwd, env forwarding, unavailable-platform error.
tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py — TestPtyWebSocket adds 7 tests:
missing/bad token rejection (close code 4401), stdout streaming,
stdin round-trip, resize escape forwarding, unavailable-platform ANSI
error frame + 1011 close, resume parameter forwarding to argv.
96 tests pass under scripts/run_tests.sh.
(cherry picked from commit 29b337bca7)
feat(web): add Chat tab with xterm.js terminal + Sessions resume button
(cherry picked from commit 3d21aee8 by emozilla, conflicts resolved
against current main: BUILTIN_ROUTES table + plugin slot layout)
fix(tui): replace OSC 52 jargon in /copy confirmation
When the user ran /copy successfully, Ink confirmed with:
sent OSC52 copy sequence (terminal support required)
That reads like a protocol spec to everyone who isn't a terminal
implementer. The caveat was a historical artifact — OSC 52 wasn't
universally supported when this message was written, so the TUI
honestly couldn't guarantee the copy had landed anywhere.
Today every modern terminal (including the dashboard's embedded
xterm.js) handles OSC 52 reliably. Say what the user actually wants
to know — that it copied, and how much — matching the message the
TUI already uses for selection copy:
copied 1482 chars
(cherry picked from commit a0701b1d5a)
docs: document the dashboard Chat tab
AGENTS.md — new subsection under TUI Architecture explaining that the
dashboard embeds the real hermes --tui rather than rewriting it,
with pointers to the pty_bridge + WebSocket endpoint and the rule
'never add a parallel chat surface in React.'
website/docs/user-guide/features/web-dashboard.md — user-facing Chat
section inside the existing Web Dashboard page, covering how it works
(WebSocket + PTY + xterm.js), the Sessions-page resume flow, and
prerequisites (Node.js, ptyprocess, POSIX kernel / WSL on Windows).
(cherry picked from commit 2c2e32cc45)
feat(tui-gateway): transport-aware dispatch + WebSocket sidecar
Decouples the JSON-RPC dispatcher from its I/O sink so the same handler
surface can drive multiple transports concurrently. The PTY chat tab
already speaks to the TUI binary as bytes — this adds a structured
event channel alongside it for dashboard-side React widgets that need
typed events (tool.start/complete, model picker state, slash catalog)
that PTY can't surface.
- `tui_gateway/transport.py` — `Transport` protocol + `contextvars` binding
+ module-level `StdioTransport` fallback. The stdio stream resolves
through a lambda so existing tests that monkey-patch `_real_stdout`
keep passing without modification.
- `tui_gateway/ws.py` — WebSocket transport implementation; FastAPI
endpoint mounting lives in hermes_cli/web_server.py.
- `tui_gateway/server.py`:
- `write_json` routes via session transport (for async events) →
contextvar transport (for in-request writes) → stdio fallback.
- `dispatch(req, transport=None)` binds the transport for the request
lifetime and propagates it to pool workers via `contextvars.copy_context`
so async handlers don't lose their sink.
- `_init_session` and the manual-session create path stash the
request's transport so out-of-band events (subagent.complete, etc.)
fan out to the right peer.
`tui_gateway.entry` (Ink's stdio handshake) is unchanged externally —
it falls through every precedence step into the stdio fallback, byte-
identical to the previous behaviour.
feat(web): ChatSidebar — JSON-RPC sidecar next to xterm.js terminal
Composes the two transports into a single Chat tab:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────┐
│ xterm.js / PTY (emozilla #13379) │ ChatSidebar │
│ the literal hermes --tui process │ /api/ws │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┘
terminal bytes structured events
The terminal pane stays the canonical chat surface — full TUI fidelity,
slash commands, model picker, mouse, skin engine, wide chars all paint
inside the terminal. The sidebar opens a parallel JSON-RPC WebSocket
to the same gateway and renders metadata that PTY can't surface to
React chrome:
• model + provider badge with connection state (click → switch)
• running tool-call list (driven by tool.start / tool.progress /
tool.complete events)
• model picker dialog (gateway-driven, reuses ModelPickerDialog)
The sidecar is best-effort. If the WS can't connect (older gateway,
network hiccup, missing token) the terminal pane keeps working
unimpaired — sidebar just shows the connection-state badge in the
appropriate tone.
- `web/src/components/ChatSidebar.tsx` — new component (~270 lines).
Owns its GatewayClient, drives the model picker through
`slash.exec`, fans tool events into a capped tool list.
- `web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx` — split layout: terminal pane
(`flex-1`) + sidebar (`w-80`, `lg+` only).
- `hermes_cli/web_server.py` — mount `/api/ws` (token + loopback
guards mirror /api/pty), delegate to `tui_gateway.ws.handle_ws`.
Co-authored-by: emozilla <emozilla@nousresearch.com>
refactor(web): /clean pass on ChatSidebar + ChatPage lint debt
- ChatSidebar: lift gw out of useRef into a useMemo derived from a
reconnect counter. React 19's react-hooks/refs and react-hooks/
set-state-in-effect rules both fire when you touch a ref during
render or call setState from inside a useEffect body. The
counter-derived gw is the canonical pattern for "external resource
that needs to be replaceable on user action" — re-creating the
client comes from bumping `version`, the effect just wires + tears
down. Drops the imperative `gwRef.current = …` reassign in
reconnect, drops the truthy ref guard in JSX. modelLabel +
banner inlined as derived locals (one-off useMemo was overkill).
- ChatPage: lazy-init the banner state from the missing-token check
so the effect body doesn't have to setState on first run. Drops
the unused react-hooks/exhaustive-deps eslint-disable. Adds a
scoped no-control-regex disable on the SGR mouse parser regex
(the \\x1b is intentional for xterm escape sequences).
All my-touched files now lint clean. Remaining warnings on web/
belong to pre-existing files this PR doesn't touch.
Verified: vitest 249/249, ui-tui eslint clean, web tsc clean,
python imports clean.
chore: uptick
fix(web): drop ChatSidebar tool list — events can't cross PTY/WS boundary
The /api/pty endpoint spawns `hermes --tui` as a child process with its
own tui_gateway and _sessions dict; /api/ws runs handle_ws in-process in
the dashboard server with a separate _sessions dict. Tool events fire on
the child's gateway and never reach the WS sidecar, so the sidebar's
tool.start/progress/complete listeners always observed an empty list.
Drop the misleading list (and the now-orphaned ToolCall primitive),
keep model badge + connection state + model picker + error banner —
those work because they're sidecar-local concerns. Surfacing tool calls
in the sidebar requires cross-process forwarding (PTY child opens a
back-WS to the dashboard, gateway tees emits onto stdio + sidecar
transport) — proper feature for a follow-up.
feat(web): wire ChatSidebar tool list to PTY child via /api/pub broadcast
The dashboard's /api/pty spawns hermes --tui as a child process; tool
events fire in the python tui_gateway grandchild and never crossed the
process boundary into the in-process WS sidecar — so the sidebar tool
list was always empty.
Cross-process forwarding:
- tui_gateway: TeeTransport (transport.py) + WsPublisherTransport
(event_publisher.py, sync websockets client). entry.py installs the
tee on _stdio_transport when HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL is set, mirroring
every dispatcher emit to a back-WS without disturbing Ink's stdio
handshake.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py: new /api/pub (publisher) + /api/events
(subscriber) endpoints with a per-channel registry. /api/pty now
accepts ?channel= and propagates the sidecar URL via env. start_server
also stashes app.state.bound_port so the URL is constructable.
- web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx: generates a channel UUID per mount,
passes it to /api/pty and as a prop to ChatSidebar.
- web/src/components/ChatSidebar.tsx: opens /api/events?channel=, fans
tool.start/progress/complete back into the ToolCall list. Restores
the ToolCall primitive.
Tests: 4 new TestPtyWebSocket cases cover channel propagation,
broadcast fan-out, and missing-channel rejection (10 PTY tests pass,
120 web_server tests overall).
fix(web): address Copilot review on #14890
Five threads, all real:
- gatewayClient.ts: register `message`/`close` listeners BEFORE awaiting
the open handshake. Server emits `gateway.ready` immediately after
accept, so a listener attached after the open promise could race past
the initial skin payload and lose it.
- ChatSidebar.tsx: wire `error`/`close` on the /api/events subscriber
WS into the existing error banner. 4401/4403 (auth/loopback reject)
surface as a "reload the page" message; mid-stream drops surface as
"events feed disconnected" with the existing reconnect button. Clean
unmount closes (1000/1001) stay silent.
- web-dashboard.md: install hint was `pip install hermes-agent[web]` but
ptyprocess lives in the `pty` extra, not `web`. Switch to
`hermes-agent[web,pty]` in both prerequisite blocks.
- AGENTS.md: previous "never add a parallel React chat surface" guidance
was overbroad and contradicted this PR's sidebar. Tightened to forbid
re-implementing the transcript/composer/PTY terminal while explicitly
allowing structured supporting widgets (sidebar / model picker /
inspectors), matching the actual architecture.
- web/package-lock.json: regenerated cleanly so the wterm sibling
workspace paths (extraneous machine-local entries) stop polluting CI.
Tests: 249/249 vitest, 10/10 PTY/events, web tsc clean.
refactor(web): /clean pass on ChatSidebar events handler
Spotted in the round-2 review:
- Banner flashed on clean unmount: `ws.close()` from the effect cleanup
fires `close` with code 1005, opened=true, neither 1000 nor 1001 —
hit the "unexpected drop" branch. Track `unmounting` in the effect
scope and gate the banner through a `surface()` helper so cleanup
closes stay silent.
- DRY the duplicated "events feed disconnected" string into a local
const used by both the error and close handlers.
- Drop the `opened` flag (no longer needed once the unmount guard is
the source of truth for "is this an expected close?").
## Problem
When a pooled HTTPS connection to the Bedrock runtime goes stale (NAT
timeout, VPN flap, server-side TCP RST, proxy idle cull), the next
Converse call surfaces as one of:
* botocore.exceptions.ConnectionClosedError / ReadTimeoutError /
EndpointConnectionError / ConnectTimeoutError
* urllib3.exceptions.ProtocolError
* A bare AssertionError raised from inside urllib3 or botocore
(internal connection-pool invariant check)
The agent loop retries the request 3x, but the cached boto3 client in
_bedrock_runtime_client_cache is reused across retries — so every
attempt hits the same dead connection pool and fails identically.
Only a process restart clears the cache and lets the user keep working.
The bare-AssertionError variant is particularly user-hostile because
str(AssertionError()) is an empty string, so the retry banner shows:
⚠️ API call failed: AssertionError
📝 Error:
with no hint of what went wrong.
## Fix
Add two helpers to agent/bedrock_adapter.py:
* is_stale_connection_error(exc) — classifies exceptions that
indicate dead-client/dead-socket state. Matches botocore
ConnectionError + HTTPClientError subtrees, urllib3
ProtocolError / NewConnectionError, and AssertionError
raised from a frame whose module name starts with urllib3.,
botocore., or boto3.. Application-level AssertionErrors are
intentionally excluded.
* invalidate_runtime_client(region) — per-region counterpart to
the existing reset_client_cache(). Evicts a single cached
client so the next call rebuilds it (and its connection pool).
Wire both into the Converse call sites:
* call_converse() / call_converse_stream() in
bedrock_adapter.py (defense-in-depth for any future caller)
* The two direct client.converse(**kwargs) /
client.converse_stream(**kwargs) call sites in run_agent.py
(the paths the agent loop actually uses)
On a stale-connection exception, the client is evicted and the
exception re-raised unchanged. The agent's existing retry loop then
builds a fresh client on the next attempt and recovers without
requiring a process restart.
## Tests
tests/agent/test_bedrock_adapter.py gets three new classes (14 tests):
* TestInvalidateRuntimeClient — per-region eviction correctness;
non-cached region returns False.
* TestIsStaleConnectionError — classifies botocore
ConnectionClosedError / EndpointConnectionError /
ReadTimeoutError, urllib3 ProtocolError, library-internal
AssertionError (both urllib3.* and botocore.* frames), and
correctly ignores application-level AssertionError and
unrelated exceptions (ValueError, KeyError).
* TestCallConverseInvalidatesOnStaleError — end-to-end: stale
error evicts the cached client, non-stale error (validation)
leaves it alone, successful call leaves it cached.
All 116 tests in test_bedrock_adapter.py pass.
Signed-off-by: Andre Kurait <andrekurait@gmail.com>
Bedrock's aws_sdk auth_type had no matching branch in
resolve_provider_client(), causing it to fall through to the
"unhandled auth_type" warning and return (None, None). This broke
all auxiliary tasks (compression, memory, summarization) for Bedrock
users — the main conversation loop worked fine, but background
context management silently failed.
Add an aws_sdk branch that creates an AnthropicAuxiliaryClient via
build_anthropic_bedrock_client(), using boto3's default credential
chain (IAM roles, SSO, env vars, instance metadata). Default
auxiliary model is Haiku for cost efficiency.
Closes#13919
## Problem
`get_model_context_length()` in `agent/model_metadata.py` had a resolution
order bug that caused every Bedrock model to fall back to the 128K default
context length instead of reaching the static Bedrock table (200K for
Claude, etc.).
The root cause: `bedrock-runtime.<region>.amazonaws.com` is not listed in
`_URL_TO_PROVIDER`, so `_is_known_provider_base_url()` returned False.
The resolution order then ran the custom-endpoint probe (step 2) *before*
the Bedrock branch (step 4b), which:
1. Treated Bedrock as a custom endpoint (via `_is_custom_endpoint`).
2. Called `fetch_endpoint_model_metadata()` → `GET /models` on the
bedrock-runtime URL (Bedrock doesn't serve this shape).
3. Fell through to `return DEFAULT_FALLBACK_CONTEXT` (128K) at the
"probe-down" branch — never reaching the Bedrock static table.
Result: users on Bedrock saw 128K context for Claude models that
actually support 200K on Bedrock, causing premature auto-compression.
## Fix
Promote the Bedrock branch from step 4b to step 1b, so it runs *before*
the custom-endpoint probe at step 2. The static table in
`bedrock_adapter.py::get_bedrock_context_length()` is the authoritative
source for Bedrock (the ListFoundationModels API doesn't expose context
window sizes), so there's no reason to probe `/models` first.
The original step 4b is replaced with a one-line breadcrumb comment
pointing to the new location, to make the resolution-order docstring
accurate.
## Changes
- `agent/model_metadata.py`
- Add step 1b: Bedrock static-table branch (unchanged predicate, moved).
- Remove dead step 4b block, replace with breadcrumb comment.
- Update resolution-order docstring to include step 1b.
- `tests/agent/test_model_metadata.py`
- New `TestBedrockContextResolution` class (3 tests):
- `test_bedrock_provider_returns_static_table_before_probe`:
confirms `provider="bedrock"` hits the static table and does NOT
call `fetch_endpoint_model_metadata` (regression guard).
- `test_bedrock_url_without_provider_hint`: confirms the
`bedrock-runtime.*.amazonaws.com` host match works without an
explicit `provider=` hint.
- `test_non_bedrock_url_still_probes`: confirms the probe still
fires for genuinely-custom endpoints (no over-reach).
## Testing
pytest tests/agent/test_model_metadata.py -q
# 83 passed in 1.95s (3 new + 80 existing)
## Risk
Very low.
- Predicate is identical to the original step 4b — no behaviour change
for non-Bedrock paths.
- Original step 4b was dead code for the user-facing case (always hit
the 128K fallback first), so removing it cannot regress behaviour.
- Bedrock path now short-circuits before any network I/O — faster too.
- `ImportError` fall-through preserved so users without `boto3`
installed are unaffected.
## Related
- This is a prerequisite for accurate context-window accounting on
Bedrock — the fix for #14710 (stale-connection client eviction)
depends on correct context sizing to know when to compress.
Signed-off-by: Andre Kurait <andrekurait@gmail.com>
Bedrock model IDs use dots as namespace separators (anthropic.claude-opus-4-7,
us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-v1:0), not version separators.
normalize_model_name() was unconditionally converting all dots to hyphens,
producing invalid IDs that Bedrock rejects with HTTP 400/404.
This affected both the main agent loop (partially mitigated by
_anthropic_preserve_dots in run_agent.py) and all auxiliary client calls
(compression, session_search, vision, etc.) which go through
_AnthropicCompletionsAdapter and never pass preserve_dots=True.
Fix: add _is_bedrock_model_id() to detect Bedrock namespace prefixes
(anthropic., us., eu., ap., jp., global.) and skip dot-to-hyphen
conversion for these IDs regardless of the preserve_dots flag.
A child running a legitimately long-running tool (terminal command,
browser fetch, big file read) holds current_tool set and keeps
api_call_count frozen while the tool runs. The previous stale check
treated that as idle after 5 heartbeat cycles (~150s), stopped
touching the parent, and let the gateway kill the session.
Split the threshold in two:
- _HEARTBEAT_STALE_CYCLES_IDLE=5 (~150s) — applied only when
current_tool is None (child wedged between turns)
- _HEARTBEAT_STALE_CYCLES_IN_TOOL=20 (~600s) — applied when the child
is inside a tool call
Stale counter also resets when current_tool changes (new tool =
progress). The hard child_timeout_seconds (default 600s) is still
the final cap, so genuinely stuck tools don't get to block forever.
Bug 3 — Stale OAuth token not detected in 'hermes model':
- _model_flow_anthropic used 'has_creds = bool(existing_key)' which treats
any non-empty token (including expired OAuth tokens) as valid.
- Added existing_is_stale_oauth check: if the only credential is an OAuth
token (sk-ant- prefix) with no valid cc_creds fallback, mark it stale
and force the re-auth menu instead of silently accepting a broken token.
Bug 4 — macOS Keychain credentials never read:
- Claude Code >=2.1.114 migrated from ~/.claude/.credentials.json to the
macOS Keychain under service 'Claude Code-credentials'.
- Added _read_claude_code_credentials_from_keychain() using the 'security'
CLI tool; read_claude_code_credentials() now tries Keychain first then
falls back to JSON file.
- Non-Darwin platforms return None from Keychain read immediately.
Tests:
- tests/agent/test_anthropic_keychain.py: 11 cases covering Darwin-only
guard, security command failures, JSON parsing, fallback priority.
- tests/hermes_cli/test_anthropic_model_flow_stale_oauth.py: 8 cases
covering stale OAuth detection, API key passthrough, cc_creds fallback.
Refs: #12905
Moves the Spotify integration from tools/ into plugins/spotify/,
matching the existing pattern established by plugins/image_gen/ for
third-party service integrations.
Why:
- tools/ should be reserved for foundational capabilities (terminal,
read_file, web_search, etc.). tools/providers/ was a one-off
directory created solely for spotify_client.py.
- plugins/ is already the home for image_gen backends, memory
providers, context engines, and standalone hook-based plugins.
Spotify is a third-party service integration and belongs alongside
those, not in tools/.
- Future service integrations (eventually: Deezer, Apple Music, etc.)
now have a pattern to copy.
Changes:
- tools/spotify_tool.py → plugins/spotify/tools.py (handlers + schemas)
- tools/providers/spotify_client.py → plugins/spotify/client.py
- tools/providers/ removed (was only used for Spotify)
- New plugins/spotify/__init__.py with register(ctx) calling
ctx.register_tool() × 7. The handler/check_fn wiring is unchanged.
- New plugins/spotify/plugin.yaml (kind: backend, bundled, auto-load).
- tests/tools/test_spotify_client.py: import paths updated.
tools_config fix — _DEFAULT_OFF_TOOLSETS now wins over plugin auto-enable:
- _get_platform_tools() previously auto-enabled unknown plugin
toolsets for new platforms. That was fine for image_gen (which has
no toolset of its own) but bad for Spotify, which explicitly
requires opt-in (don't ship 7 tool schemas to users who don't use
it). Added a check: if a plugin toolset is in _DEFAULT_OFF_TOOLSETS,
it stays off until the user picks it in 'hermes tools'.
Pre-existing test bug fix:
- tests/hermes_cli/test_plugins.py::test_list_returns_sorted
asserted names were sorted, but list_plugins() sorts by key
(path-derived, e.g. image_gen/openai). With only image_gen plugins
bundled, name and key order happened to agree. Adding plugins/spotify
broke that coincidence (spotify sorts between openai-codex and xai
by name but after xai by key). Updated test to assert key order,
which is what the code actually documents.
Validation:
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_plugins.py \
tests/hermes_cli/test_tools_config.py \
tests/hermes_cli/test_spotify_auth.py \
tests/tools/test_spotify_client.py \
tests/tools/test_registry.py
→ 143 passed
- E2E plugin load: 'spotify' appears in loaded plugins, all 7 tools
register into the spotify toolset, check_fn gating intact.
Three quality improvements on top of #15121 / #15130 / #15135:
1. Tool consolidation (9 → 7)
- spotify_saved_tracks + spotify_saved_albums → spotify_library with
kind='tracks'|'albums'. Handler code was ~90 percent identical
across the two old tools; the merge is a behavioral no-op.
- spotify_activity dropped. Its 'now_playing' action was a duplicate
of spotify_playback.get_currently_playing (both return identical
204/empty payloads). Its 'recently_played' action moves onto
spotify_playback as a new action — history belongs adjacent to
live state.
- Net: each API call ships 2 fewer tool schemas when the Spotify
toolset is enabled, and the action surface is more discoverable
(everything playback-related is on one tool).
2. Spotify skill (skills/media/spotify/SKILL.md)
Teaches the agent canonical usage patterns so common requests don't
balloon into 4+ tool calls:
- 'play X' = one search, then play by URI (not search + scan +
describe + play)
- 'what's playing' = single get_currently_playing (no preflight
get_state chain)
- Don't retry on '403 Premium required' or '403 No active device' —
both require user action
- URI/URL/bare-ID format normalization
- Full failure-mode reference for 204/401/403/429
3. Surfaced in 'hermes setup' tool status
Adds 'Spotify (PKCE OAuth)' to the tool status list when
auth.json has a Spotify access/refresh token. Matches the
homeassistant pattern but reads from auth.json (OAuth-based) rather
than env vars.
Docs updated to reflect the new 7-tool surface, and mention the
companion skill in the 'Using it' section.
Tests: 54 passing (client 22, auth 15, tools_config 35 — 18 = 54 after
renaming/replacing the spotify_activity tests with library +
recently_played coverage). Docusaurus build clean.
- probe_api_models: add api_mode param; use x-api-key + anthropic-version
headers for anthropic_messages mode (Anthropic's native Models API auth)
- probe_api_models: add User-Agent header to avoid Cloudflare 403 blocks
on third-party OpenAI-compatible endpoints
- validate_requested_model: pass api_mode through from switch_model
- validate_requested_model: for anthropic_messages mode, attempt probe with
correct auth; if probe fails (many proxies don't implement /v1/models),
accept the model with an informational warning instead of rejecting
- fetch_api_models: propagate api_mode to probe_api_models
Regression test for #14981. Verifies that _session_expiry_watcher fires
on_session_finalize for each session swept out of the store, matching
the contract documented for /new, /reset, CLI shutdown, and gateway stop.
Verified the test fails cleanly on pre-fix code (hook call list missing
sess-expired) and passes with the fix applied.
When the primary provider raises AuthError (expired OAuth token,
revoked API key), the error was re-raised before AIAgent was created,
so fallback_model was never consulted. Now both gateway/run.py and
cron/scheduler.py catch AuthError specifically and attempt to resolve
credentials from the fallback_providers/fallback_model config chain
before propagating the error.
Closes#7230
Two small fixes triggered by a support report where the user saw a
cryptic 'HTTP 400 - Error 400 (Bad Request)!!1' (Google's GFE HTML
error page, not a real API error) on every gemini-2.5-pro request.
The underlying cause was an empty GOOGLE_API_KEY / GEMINI_API_KEY, but
nothing in our output made that diagnosable:
1. hermes_cli/dump.py: the api_keys section enumerated 23 providers but
omitted Google entirely, so users had no way to verify from 'hermes
dump' whether the key was set. Added GOOGLE_API_KEY and GEMINI_API_KEY
rows.
2. agent/gemini_native_adapter.py: GeminiNativeClient.__init__ accepted
an empty/whitespace api_key and stamped it into the x-goog-api-key
header, which made Google's frontend return a generic HTML 400 long
before the request reached the Generative Language backend. Now we
raise RuntimeError at construction with an actionable message
pointing at GOOGLE_API_KEY/GEMINI_API_KEY and aistudio.google.com.
Added a regression test that covers '', ' ', and None.
Claude-style and some Anthropic-tuned models occasionally emit tool
names as class-like identifiers: TodoTool_tool, Patch_tool,
BrowserClick_tool, PatchTool. These failed strict-dict lookup in
valid_tool_names and triggered the 'Unknown tool' self-correction
loop, wasting a full turn of iteration and tokens.
_repair_tool_call already handled lowercase / separator / fuzzy
matches but couldn't bridge the CamelCase-to-snake_case gap or the
trailing '_tool' suffix that Claude sometimes tacks on. Extend it
with two bounded normalization passes:
1. CamelCase -> snake_case (via regex lookbehind).
2. Strip trailing _tool / -tool / tool suffix (case-insensitive,
applied twice so TodoTool_tool reduces all the way: strip
_tool -> TodoTool, snake -> todo_tool, strip 'tool' -> todo).
Cheap fast-paths (lowercase / separator-normalized) still run first
so the common case stays zero-cost. Fuzzy match remains the last
resort unchanged.
Tests: tests/run_agent/test_repair_tool_call_name.py covers the
three original reports (TodoTool_tool, Patch_tool, BrowserClick_tool),
plus PatchTool, WriteFileTool, ReadFile_tool, write-file_Tool,
patch-tool, and edge cases (empty, None, '_tool' alone, genuinely
unknown names).
18 new tests + 17 existing arg-repair tests = 35/35 pass.
Closes#14784
Previously 'hermes auth spotify' crashed with 'HERMES_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID
is required' if the user hadn't manually created a Spotify developer
app and set env vars. Now the command detects a missing client_id and
walks the user through the one-time app registration inline:
- Opens https://developer.spotify.com/dashboard in the browser
- Tells the user exactly what to paste into the Spotify form
(including the correct default redirect URI, 127.0.0.1:43827)
- Prompts for the Client ID
- Persists HERMES_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID to ~/.hermes/.env so subsequent
runs skip the wizard
- Continues straight into the PKCE OAuth flow
Also prints the docs URL at both the start of the wizard and the end
of a successful login so users can find the full guide.
Adds website/docs/user-guide/features/spotify.md with the complete
setup walkthrough, tool reference, and troubleshooting, and wires it
into the sidebar under User Guide > Features > Advanced.
Fixes a stale redirect URI default in the hermes_cli/tools_config.py
TOOL_CATEGORIES entry (was 8888/callback from the PR description
instead of the actual DEFAULT_SPOTIFY_REDIRECT_URI value
43827/spotify/callback defined in auth.py).
Streamable HTTP MCP servers may garbage-collect their server-side
session state while the OAuth token remains valid — idle TTL, server
restart, pod rotation, etc. Before this fix, the tool-call handler
treated the resulting "Invalid or expired session" error as a plain
tool failure with no recovery path, so **every subsequent call on
the affected server failed until the gateway was manually
restarted**. Reporter: #13383.
The OAuth-based recovery path (``_handle_auth_error_and_retry``)
already exists for 401s, but it only fires on auth errors. Session
expiry slipped through because the access token is still valid —
nothing 401'd, so the existing recovery branch was skipped.
Fix
---
Add a sibling function ``_handle_session_expired_and_retry`` that
detects MCP session-expiry via ``_is_session_expired_error`` (a
narrow allow-list of known-stable substrings: ``"invalid or expired
session"``, ``"session expired"``, ``"session not found"``,
``"unknown session"``, etc.) and then uses the existing transport
reconnect mechanism:
* Sets ``MCPServerTask._reconnect_event`` — the server task's
lifecycle loop already interprets this as "tear down the current
``streamablehttp_client`` + ``ClientSession`` and rebuild them,
reusing the existing OAuth provider instance".
* Waits up to 15 s for the new session to come back ready.
* Retries the original call once. If the retry succeeds, returns
its result and resets the circuit-breaker error count. If the
retry raises, or if the reconnect doesn't ready in time, falls
through to the caller's generic error path.
Unlike the 401 path, this does **not** call ``handle_401`` — the
access token is already valid and running an OAuth refresh would be
a pointless round-trip.
All 5 MCP handlers (``call_tool``, ``list_resources``, ``read_resource``,
``list_prompts``, ``get_prompt``) now consult both recovery paths
before falling through:
recovered = _handle_auth_error_and_retry(...) # 401 path
if recovered is not None: return recovered
recovered = _handle_session_expired_and_retry(...) # new
if recovered is not None: return recovered
# generic error response
Narrow scope — explicitly not changed
-------------------------------------
* **Detection is string-based on a 5-entry allow-list.** The MCP
SDK wraps JSON-RPC errors in ``McpError`` whose exception type +
attributes vary across SDK versions, so matching on message
substrings is the durable path. Kept narrow to avoid false
positives — a regular ``RuntimeError("Tool failed")`` will NOT
trigger spurious reconnects (pinned by
``test_is_session_expired_rejects_unrelated_errors``).
* **No change to the existing 401 recovery flow.** The new path is
consulted only after the auth path declines (returns ``None``).
* **Retry count stays at 1.** If the reconnect-then-retry also
fails, we don't loop — the error surfaces normally so the model
sees a failed tool call rather than a hang.
* **``InterruptedError`` is explicitly excluded** from session-expired
detection so user-cancel signals always short-circuit the same
way they did before (pinned by
``test_is_session_expired_rejects_interrupted_error``).
Regression coverage
-------------------
``tests/tools/test_mcp_tool_session_expired.py`` (new, 16 cases):
Unit tests for ``_is_session_expired_error``:
* ``test_is_session_expired_detects_invalid_or_expired_session`` —
reporter's exact wpcom-mcp text.
* ``test_is_session_expired_detects_expired_session_variant`` —
"Session expired" / "expired session" variants.
* ``test_is_session_expired_detects_session_not_found`` — server GC
variant ("session not found", "unknown session").
* ``test_is_session_expired_is_case_insensitive``.
* ``test_is_session_expired_rejects_unrelated_errors`` — narrow-scope
canary: random RuntimeError / ValueError / 401 don't trigger.
* ``test_is_session_expired_rejects_interrupted_error`` — user cancel
must never route through reconnect.
* ``test_is_session_expired_rejects_empty_message``.
Handler integration tests:
* ``test_call_tool_handler_reconnects_on_session_expired`` — reporter's
full repro: first call raises "Invalid or expired session", handler
signals ``_reconnect_event``, retries once, returns the retry's
success result with no ``error`` key.
* ``test_call_tool_handler_non_session_expired_error_falls_through``
— preserved-behaviour canary: random tool failures do NOT trigger
reconnect.
* ``test_session_expired_handler_returns_none_without_loop`` —
defensive: cold-start / shutdown race.
* ``test_session_expired_handler_returns_none_without_server_record``
— torn-down server falls through cleanly.
* ``test_session_expired_handler_returns_none_when_retry_also_fails``
— no retry loop on repeated failure.
Parametrised across all 4 non-``tools/call`` handlers:
* ``test_non_tool_handlers_also_reconnect_on_session_expired``
[list_resources / read_resource / list_prompts / get_prompt].
**15 of 16 fail on clean ``origin/main`` (``6fb69229``)** with
``ImportError: cannot import name '_is_session_expired_error'``
— the fix's surface symbols don't exist there yet. The 1 passing
test is an ordering artefact of pytest-xdist worker collection.
Validation
----------
``source venv/bin/activate && python -m pytest
tests/tools/test_mcp_tool_session_expired.py -q`` → **16 passed**.
Broader MCP suite (5 files:
``test_mcp_tool.py``, ``test_mcp_tool_401_handling.py``,
``test_mcp_tool_session_expired.py``, ``test_mcp_reconnect_signal.py``,
``test_mcp_oauth.py``) → **230 passed, 0 regressions**.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`_normalize_for_deepseek` was mapping every non-reasoner input into
`deepseek-chat` on the assumption that DeepSeek's API accepts only two
model IDs. That assumption no longer holds — `deepseek-v4-pro` and
`deepseek-v4-flash` are first-class IDs accepted by the direct API,
and on aggregators `deepseek-chat` routes explicitly to V3 (DeepInfra
backend returns `deepseek-chat-v3`). So a user picking V4 Pro through
the model picker was being silently downgraded to V3.
Verified 2026-04-24 against Nous portal's OpenAI-compat surface:
- `deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash` → provider: DeepSeek,
model: deepseek-v4-flash-20260423
- `deepseek/deepseek-chat` → provider: DeepInfra,
model: deepseek/deepseek-chat-v3
Fix:
- Add `deepseek-v4-pro` and `deepseek-v4-flash` to
`_DEEPSEEK_CANONICAL_MODELS` so exact matches pass through.
- Add `_DEEPSEEK_V_SERIES_RE` (`^deepseek-v\d+(...)?$`) so future
V-series IDs (`deepseek-v5-*`, dated variants) keep passing through
without another code change.
- Update docstring + module header to reflect the new rule.
Tests:
- New `TestDeepseekVSeriesPassThrough` — 8 parametrized cases covering
bare, vendor-prefixed, case-variant, dated, and future V-series IDs
plus end-to-end `normalize_model_for_provider(..., "deepseek")`.
- New `TestDeepseekCanonicalAndReasonerMapping` — regression coverage
for canonical pass-through, reasoner-keyword folding, and
fall-back-to-chat behaviour.
- 77/77 pass.
Reported on Discord (Ufonik, Don Piedro): `/model > Deepseek >
deepseek-v4-pro` surfaced
`Normalized 'deepseek-v4-pro' to 'deepseek-chat'`. Picker listing
showed the v4 names, so validation also rejected the post-normalize
`deepseek-chat` as "not in provider listing" — the contradiction
users saw. Normalizer now respects the picker's choice.
Install tini in the container image and route ENTRYPOINT through
`/usr/bin/tini -g -- /opt/hermes/docker/entrypoint.sh`.
Without a PID-1 init, orphans reparented to hermes (MCP stdio servers,
git, bun, browser daemons) never get waited() on and accumulate as
zombies. Long-running gateway containers eventually exhaust the PID
table and hit "fork: cannot allocate memory".
tini is the standard container init (same pattern Docker's --init flag
and Kubernetes pause container use). It handles SIGCHLD, reaps orphans,
and forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to the entrypoint so hermes's existing
graceful-shutdown handlers still run. The -g flag sends signals to the
whole process group so `docker stop` cleanly terminates hermes and its
descendants, not just direct children.
Closes#15012.
E2E-verified with a minimal reproducer image: spawning 5 orphans that
reparent to PID 1 leaves 5 zombies without tini and 0 with tini.
Concurrent Hermes processes (e.g. cron jobs) refreshing a Nous OAuth token
via resolve_nous_runtime_credentials() write the rotated tokens to auth.json.
The calling process's pool entry becomes stale, and the next refresh against
the already-rotated token triggers a 'refresh token reuse' revocation on
the Nous Portal.
_sync_nous_entry_from_auth_store() reads auth.json under the same lock used
by resolve_nous_runtime_credentials, and adopts the newer token pair before
refreshing the pool entry. This complements #15111 (which preserved the
obtained_at timestamps through seeding).
Partial salvage of #10160 by @konsisumer — only the agent/credential_pool.py
changes + the 3 Nous-specific regression tests. The PR also touched 10
unrelated files (Dockerfile, tips.py, various tool tests) which were
dropped as scope creep.
Regression tests:
- test_sync_nous_entry_from_auth_store_adopts_newer_tokens
- test_sync_nous_entry_noop_when_tokens_match
- test_nous_exhausted_entry_recovers_via_auth_store_sync
Extracts pool-rotation-room logic into `_pool_may_recover_from_rate_limit`
so single-credential pools no longer block the eager-fallback path on 429.
The existing check `pool is not None and pool.has_available()` lets
fallback fire only after the pool marks every entry as exhausted. With
exactly one credential in the pool (the common shape for Gemini OAuth,
Vertex service accounts, and any personal-key setup), `has_available()`
flips back to True as soon as the cooldown expires — Hermes retries
against the same entry, hits the same daily-quota 429, and burns the
retry budget in a tight loop before ever reaching the configured
`fallback_model`. Observed in the wild as 4+ hours of 429 noise on a
single Gemini key instead of falling through to Vertex as configured.
Rotation is only meaningful with more than one credential — gate on
`len(pool.entries()) > 1`. Multi-credential pools keep the current
wait-for-rotation behaviour unchanged.
Fixes#11314. Related to #8947, #10210, #7230. Narrower scope than
open PRs #8023 (classifier change) and #11492 (503/529 credential-pool
bypass) — this addresses the single-credential 429 case specifically
and does not conflict with either.
Tests: 6 new unit tests in tests/run_agent/test_provider_fallback.py
covering (a) None pool, (b) single-cred available, (c) single-cred in
cooldown, (d) 2-cred available rotates, (e) multi-cred all cooling-down
falls back, (f) many-cred available rotates. All 18 tests in the file
pass.
The least_used strategy selected entries via min(request_count) but
never incremented the counter. All entries stayed at count=0, so the
strategy degenerated to fill_first behavior with no actual load balancing.
Now increments request_count after each selection and persists the update.
The Copilot provider resolved context windows via models.dev static data,
which does not include account-specific models (e.g. claude-opus-4.6-1m
with 1M context). This adds the live Copilot /models API as a higher-
priority source for copilot/copilot-acp/github-copilot providers.
New helper get_copilot_model_context() in hermes_cli/models.py extracts
capabilities.limits.max_prompt_tokens from the cached catalog. Results
are cached in-process for 1 hour.
In agent/model_metadata.py, step 5a queries the live API before falling
through to models.dev (step 5b). This ensures account-specific models
get correct context windows while standard models still have a fallback.
Part 1 of #7731.
Refs: #7272
Raw GitHub tokens (gho_/github_pat_/ghu_) are now exchanged for
short-lived Copilot API tokens via /copilot_internal/v2/token before
being used as Bearer credentials. This is required to access
internal-only models (e.g. claude-opus-4.6-1m with 1M context).
Implementation:
- exchange_copilot_token(): calls the token exchange endpoint with
in-process caching (dict keyed by SHA-256 fingerprint), refreshed
2 minutes before expiry. No disk persistence — gateway is long-running
so in-memory cache is sufficient.
- get_copilot_api_token(): convenience wrapper with graceful fallback —
returns exchanged token on success, raw token on failure.
- Both callers (hermes_cli/auth.py and agent/credential_pool.py) now
pipe the raw token through get_copilot_api_token() before use.
12 new tests covering exchange, caching, expiry, error handling,
fingerprinting, and caller integration. All 185 existing copilot/auth
tests pass.
Part 2 of #7731.
When using GitHub Copilot as provider, HTTP 401 errors could cause
Hermes to silently fall back to the next model in the chain instead
of recovering. This adds a one-shot retry mechanism that:
1. Re-resolves the Copilot token via the standard priority chain
(COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN -> GH_TOKEN -> GITHUB_TOKEN -> gh auth token)
2. Rebuilds the OpenAI client with fresh credentials and Copilot headers
3. Retries the failed request before falling back
The fix handles the common case where the gho_* OAuth token remains
valid but the httpx client state becomes stale (e.g. after startup
race conditions or long-lived sessions).
Key design decisions:
- Always rebuild client even if token string unchanged (recovers stale state)
- Uses _apply_client_headers_for_base_url() for canonical header management
- One-shot flag guard prevents infinite 401 loops (matches existing pattern
used by Codex/Nous/Anthropic providers)
- No token exchange via /copilot_internal/v2/token (returns 404 for some
account types; direct gho_* auth works reliably)
Tests: 3 new test cases covering end-to-end 401->refresh->retry,
client rebuild verification, and same-token rebuild scenarios.
Docs: Updated providers.md with Copilot auth behavior section.
Pass an explicit HOME into Copilot ACP child processes so delegated ACP runs do not fail when the ambient environment is missing HOME.
Prefer the per-profile subprocess home when available, then fall back to HOME, expanduser('~'), pwd.getpwuid(...), and /home/openclaw. Add regression tests for both profile-home preference and clean HOME fallback.
Refs #11068.
Two narrow fixes motivated by #15099.
1. _seed_from_singletons() was dropping obtained_at, agent_key_obtained_at,
expires_in, and friends when seeding device_code pool entries from the
providers.nous singleton. Fresh credentials showed up with
obtained_at=None, which broke downstream freshness-sensitive consumers
(self-heal hooks, pool pruning by age) — they treated just-minted
credentials as older than they actually were and evicted them.
2. When the Nous Portal OAuth 2.1 server returns invalid_grant with
'Refresh token reuse detected' in the error_description, rewrite the
message to explain the likely cause (an external process consumed the
rotated RT without persisting it back) and the mitigation. The generic
reuse message led users to report this as a Hermes persistence bug when
the actual trigger was typically a third-party monitoring script calling
/api/oauth/token directly. Non-reuse errors keep their original server
description untouched.
Closes#15099.
Regression tests:
- tests/agent/test_credential_pool.py::test_nous_seed_from_singletons_preserves_obtained_at_timestamps
- tests/hermes_cli/test_auth_nous_provider.py::test_refresh_token_reuse_detection_surfaces_actionable_message
- tests/hermes_cli/test_auth_nous_provider.py::test_refresh_non_reuse_error_keeps_original_description
Cron jobs can now specify a per-job working directory. When set, the job
runs as if launched from that directory: AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md /
.cursorrules from that dir are injected into the system prompt, and the
terminal / file / code-exec tools use it as their cwd (via TERMINAL_CWD).
When unset, old behaviour is preserved (no project context files, tools
use the scheduler's cwd).
Requested by @bluthcy.
## Mechanism
- cron/jobs.py: create_job / update_job accept 'workdir'; validated to
be an absolute existing directory at create/update time.
- cron/scheduler.py run_job: if job.workdir is set, point TERMINAL_CWD
at it and flip skip_context_files to False before building the agent.
Restored in finally on every exit path.
- cron/scheduler.py tick: workdir jobs run sequentially (outside the
thread pool) because TERMINAL_CWD is process-global. Workdir-less jobs
still run in the parallel pool unchanged.
- tools/cronjob_tools.py + hermes_cli/cron.py + hermes_cli/main.py:
expose 'workdir' via the cronjob tool and 'hermes cron create/edit
--workdir ...'. Empty string on edit clears the field.
## Validation
- tests/cron/test_cron_workdir.py (21 tests): normalize, create, update,
JSON round-trip via cronjob tool, tick partition (workdir jobs run on
the main thread, not the pool), run_job env toggle + restore in finally.
- Full targeted suite (tests/cron/, test_cronjob_tools.py, test_cron.py,
test_config_cwd_bridge.py, test_worktree.py): 314/314 passed.
- Live smoke: hermes cron create --workdir $(pwd) works; relative path
rejected; list shows 'Workdir:'; edit --workdir '' clears.
agent/redact.py snapshots _REDACT_ENABLED from HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS at
module-import time. hermes_cli/main.py calls setup_logging() early, which
transitively imports agent.redact — BEFORE any config bridge has run. So
users who set 'security.redact_secrets: false' in config.yaml (instead of
HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=false in .env) had the toggle silently ignored in
both 'hermes chat' and 'hermes gateway run'.
Bridge config.yaml -> env var in hermes_cli/main.py BEFORE setup_logging.
.env still wins (only set env when unset) — config.yaml is the fallback.
Regression tests in tests/hermes_cli/test_redact_config_bridge.py spawn
fresh subprocesses to verify:
- redact_secrets: false in config.yaml disables redaction
- default (key absent) leaves redaction enabled
- .env HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=true overrides config.yaml
json.JSONDecodeError inherits from ValueError. The agent loop's
non-retryable classifier at run_agent.py ~L10782 treated any
ValueError/TypeError as a local programming bug and short-circuited
retry. Without a carve-out, a transient JSONDecodeError from a
provider that returned a malformed response body, a truncated stream,
or a router-layer corruption would fail the turn immediately.
Add JSONDecodeError to the existing UnicodeEncodeError exclusion
tuple so the classified-retry logic (which already handles 429/529/
context-overflow/etc.) gets to run on bad-JSON errors.
Tests (tests/run_agent/test_jsondecodeerror_retryable.py):
- JSONDecodeError: NOT local validation
- UnicodeEncodeError: NOT local validation (existing carve-out)
- bare ValueError: IS local validation (programming bug)
- bare TypeError: IS local validation (programming bug)
- source-level assertion that run_agent.py still carries the carve-out
(guards against accidental revert)
Closes#14782
