Follow-up fixes for salvaged PR #65637:
1. Clear _dirty_transcripts in rewrite_transcript + rewind_session —
stale pending messages were re-inserted after /retry, /undo, /compress.
2. Narrow _is_fts_corruption_error to specific SQLite error strings —
bare 'fts' substring matched 'shifts', 'gifts', etc.
3. Move DB write outside _transcript_retry_lock — holding the lock
during writes serialized all sessions' transcript appends and blocked
during FTS rebuild. Now the lock guards only the pending queue.
4. Push rebuild_fts() into SessionDB — SessionStore was reaching into
_conn/_lock private attrs. SessionDB.rebuild_fts() follows the same
pattern as optimize_fts().
5. Cap pending per session at 200 — prevents unbounded memory growth
when DB is persistently broken. Oldest messages dropped with warning.
Added 4 new tests: dirty-clear on rewrite/rewind, FTS matcher false
positives, pending cap enforcement.
Unifies the two gateway subsystems that were fighting each other: the
'never lose a session' recovery machinery (#54878 stale-route self-heal,
find_latest_gateway_session_for_peer reopening agent_close/ws_orphan_reap
rows) and the session reset/expiry machinery (expiry watcher, /new,
/resume, resume_pending freshness gate).
The unified contract:
- INTENTIONAL boundaries (expiry finalization, auto-reset, /new,
/resume switch) are recorded durably via promote_to_session_reset(),
which upgrades accidental recoverable end_reasons (agent_close,
ws_orphan_reap) to the explicit boundary while preserving other
explicit reasons (compression, etc.). Recovery then correctly refuses
to resurrect them.
- ACCIDENTAL ends (crash, cleanup bug, mistaken reaper) stay
recoverable — genuine crash recovery is untouched.
On top of the cherry-picked contributor commits:
- promote_to_session_reset widened to ws_orphan_reap + parameterized
reason so auto-reset paths stay auditable (idle/daily/suspended/
resume_pending_expired) (#61220, #61993, #63539)
- get_or_create_session auto-reset, reset_session (/new), and
switch_session (/resume) all write through the promote path — the
first-reason-wins end_session no-op could previously leave a reset
session resurrectable behind a stale agent_close row (#61993)
- resume_pending freshness gate now honors session_reset.mode=none:
explicit opt-out of automatic resets also opts out of the zombie
gate (#61052)
- resume recovery note extracted to build_resume_recovery_note() and
made adapter-aware via a new interactive_resume capability flag:
webhook/api_server auto-resume turns now CONTINUE the interrupted
task instead of emitting an unanswerable 'session restored'
acknowledgement that abandoned the work (#57056)
- tests updated to call the real note builder instead of mirroring it
E2E-validated against a real SessionDB + SessionStore in a temp
HERMES_HOME: expiry->agent_close->no-resurrection, /new promote,
crash recovery preserved, mode=none opt-out, routing-table flag sync.
When a gateway session with resume_pending=True is not recovered within the
auto-continue freshness window (e.g. because repeated API calls timed out on a
large context), get_or_create_session correctly creates a new session. However
two gaps existed:
1. The user received no notification — resume_pending_expired fell through the
generic "inactive for Xh" else-branch in run.py, which produces wrong wording
and (for session_reset.mode: none users) is gated on policy.notify that
evaluates to False.
2. The old session was ended in state.db with the hardcoded generic reason
"session_reset", making it impossible to distinguish from a normal idle/daily
reset in post-mortem analysis.
Fix:
- gateway/run.py: add an explicit resume_pending_expired case for the agent
context note ("gateway restart recovery timed out") and the user-facing
notification. Always notify for this reason — like suspended — because the
user had an active session that was silently replaced.
- gateway/session.py: pass auto_reset_reason as the DB end_reason instead of
the hardcoded "session_reset", so all auto-reset paths are auditable.
- tests: extend TestResumePendingExpiredAutoReset in test_session_reset_notify.py
with five new cases that cover the reason, activity flag, DB end_reason,
non-regression of the idle path, and freshness-disabled bypass.
Closes#58933
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
When the session expiry watcher finalizes a session (daily/idle reset)
and the next message triggers the #54878 self-healing path
(get_or_create_session detects sessions.json / state.db mismatch),
the recovered session was silently reopened without checking whether
it should have been reset. This caused sessions to persist indefinitely
across reset boundaries.
Fix: after dropping the stale sessions.json entry in the self-healing
path, call _should_reset() against the old entry's updated_at. If a
reset is due, set db_end_session_id to skip DB recovery and create a
fresh session — matching the normal reset flow.
Address review feedback on #63068:
1. Replace unconditional reopen_session() + end_session() with a
conditional promote_to_session_reset() method in SessionDB.
The new method only promotes live rows or rows ended with
agent_close — explicit boundaries (compression, session_reset,
new_command) are preserved via first-writer-wins semantics.
2. Rewrite tests to use real SessionDB instead of MagicMock:
- 7 unit tests for promote_to_session_reset edge cases
- 3 integration tests verifying the actual recovery contract
in find_latest_gateway_session_for_peer after promotion
A turn that persists a user row with no assistant row (suppressed reply,
or two concurrent turns interleaving their flushes) leaves a user;user
pair in state.db. The defensive pre-request repair_message_sequence then
re-fires on EVERY request for the rest of the session's life — it mutates
only the per-request list, never the stored transcript.
Add repair_alternation (default False) to get_messages_as_conversation
and pass it from the three live-replay restore sites (gateway
load_transcript, CLI session resume x2). Inspection/export consumers
(trace upload, context guard, api_server history) keep the verbatim
default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GatewayRunner._prepare_inbound_message_text() interpolated
source.user_name — the platform-supplied, user-settable display name —
directly into the message text of every turn in a shared multi-user
session: f"[{source.user_name}] {message_text}". Shared sessions are the
default for any threaded conversation (thread_sessions_per_user defaults
to False) and apply to any group with group_sessions_per_user=False, so
no special configuration is needed to reach this path.
An unescaped display name containing embedded newlines could therefore
masquerade as a new markdown section (a fake "## Override" heading)
inside the live conversation the model reads on every turn — the same
indirect-prompt-injection vector gateway/session.py's
build_session_context_prompt() already guards against for the identical
user_name field via _format_untrusted_prompt_value(), which was never
applied to this sibling call site.
Add neutralize_untrusted_inline_text() alongside the existing helper in
gateway/session.py: it collapses embedded newlines/control characters to
a single inert line without JSON-quoting, so inline "[Name] message"
formatting is preserved byte-for-byte for the common case (unlike
reusing _format_untrusted_prompt_value directly, which would add visible
quote marks to every sender prefix). Wire it into the sender-prefix
construction in gateway/run.py.
Two follow-ups observed after deploying profile routing:
1. sessions.profile_name was NULL even when the agent ran inside the
routed profile scope. _insert_session_row never wrote it,
get_or_create_session / reset_session never passed it through, and
the agent-side _ensure_db_session fallback had no way to read it.
- Declare profile_name TEXT in SCHEMA_SQL so _reconcile_columns
auto-adds it on existing DBs.
- _insert_session_row takes profile_name and writes it.
- SessionStore passes source.profile (or old_entry.origin.profile
on reset) into db_create_kwargs.
- _ensure_db_session reads the active profile via
get_active_profile_name() inside _profile_runtime_scope.
2. DiscordAdapter._text_batch_key called build_session_key without
profile=, so the batch key always landed in agent:main even when
the routed profile differed — diverging from the agent session
key namespace (agent:crypto-trader, agent:ai-expert, ...).
Pass event.source.profile through so both namespaces agree.
Live verification (jth-server-2, 2026-06-28): a test message in a
routed #coin thread produced agent:crypto-trader:discord🧵...
in the batch log and profile_name=crypto-trader in the sessions
row. Default-routed chat still produced agent:main / NULL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
prune_old_entries' active-process guard failed open: when
has_active_processes_fn raised, the except block logged at debug and
fell through to the age check, so sessions with live background
processes attached could still be pruned — violating the documented
invariant that such sessions are never dropped. Add a continue so an
exception in the safety check fails safe (the entry is kept).
Commit 6b408e131 fixed the session_key/session_id mismatch in this
same guard but left the exception path failing open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Whitelist ws_orphan_reap alongside agent_close in
find_latest_gateway_session_for_peer so gateway stale-routing
self-heal can reopen wrongly-reaped messaging sessions instead of
minting empty replacements. Layer A prevention already landed in #60609.
The second lock block in get_or_create_session held self._lock during six
blocking operations on every inbound message: _is_session_ended_in_db
(SQLite SELECT), _should_reset (callback), _save (SQLite write + JSON write
+ os.fsync), and _recover_session_from_db (SQLite SELECT + UPDATE).
A code comment at line 1607 claimed 'SQLite calls are made outside the
lock' -- true only for _compression_tip_for_session_id, which was moved
out in a prior fix. The remaining I/O was never addressed.
Restructure into a four-phase lock/no-lock split that mirrors the pattern
already established at the bottom of the function:
Phase 1 (lock) -- read entry + session_id
Phase 1b (no lock) -- stale check + reset policy
Phase 2 (lock) -- apply decisions to _entries, capture snapshot + flags
Phase 3 (no lock) -- recovery DB query, _save from snapshot, end/create
_save_entries(snapshot) replaces _save() to avoid dict-mutation races when
called outside the lock. _query_recoverable_session splits the DB I/O out
of _recover_session_from_db so only the _entries assignment needs the lock.
Three early returns inside the lock block are eliminated in favour of a
unified save + return path.
The CWE-22 traversal guard in SessionEntry.from_dict rejects any
interior '/' in session_key, but session_key is a logical routing
key (never used as a filesystem path) and Google Chat resource names
legitimately contain '/' (spaces/<id>, spaces/<id>/threads/<id>).
All Google Chat sessions were silently dropped on gateway start.
Split the validation: session_id keeps the strict _is_path_unsafe
guard (it's the value used as a filename); session_key now uses a
relaxed _is_session_key_unsafe helper that only blocks genuine
traversal vectors (parent-dir '..', leading '/', leading '\', leading
Windows drive-letter prefix) and allows interior '/'.
Follow-up to #9006/#58899. The gateway routing index (session_key ->
SessionEntry) now lives in a new gateway_routing table in state.db as the
primary store; sessions.json is demoted to an optional legacy mirror.
- hermes_state.py: schema v19 — gateway_routing table (scope + session_key
PK; scope = resolved sessions_dir so multiple stores sharing one state.db
never cross-contaminate) with save/replace/load/delete methods
- gateway/session.py: _save() writes the whole index atomically to the DB
(mirrors the old full-file JSON rewrite semantics) and only falls back to
JSON when the DB write fails; _ensure_loaded reads the DB first and folds
in legacy sessions.json entries for keys the DB lacks (pre-migration
import; DB entries win over stale JSON)
- gateway/config.py + hermes_cli/config.py: new write_sessions_json flag
(default true for compat/downgrade safety); gateway.write_sessions_json:
false stops producing the file entirely
- sessions.json _README updated to say it's a legacy mirror + how to
disable it
Rehydration is now lossless across restarts even with sessions.json deleted:
suspended/resume_pending/model_override/token state all round-trip through
the DB (the old sessions-table recovery only rebuilt the bare key mapping).
Moves gateway routing metadata (display_name, origin_json, expiry_finalized)
into state.db, making SQLite the single source of truth for gateway session
discovery. Eliminates the dual-file (sessions.json + state.db) polling
dependency that caused the mcp_serve new-conversation race (#8925).
- hermes_state.py: schema v18 (3 new sessions columns + sessions.json
backfill migration), record_gateway_session_peer gains
display_name/origin_json, new set_expiry_finalized(),
list_gateway_sessions(), find_session_by_origin()
- gateway/session.py: peer recorder persists display_name + full origin
JSON; new SessionStore.set_expiry_finalized() single write-path
- gateway/run.py: expiry watcher success + give-up paths use the store
helper so the flag lands in both sessions.json and state.db
- mcp_serve.py: routing index reads state.db first (sessions.json fallback
for pre-migration DBs); _poll_once collapses to a single state.db mtime
check — the #8925 race is structurally impossible now
- gateway/mirror.py, gateway/channel_directory.py, hermes_cli/status.py:
query state.db first, sessions.json fallback
Closes#9006
Inbound Telegram/WeChat/Discord messages are written by the background
gateway, not the desktop websocket that drives local chats. Without
explicit polling the messaging sidebar and the open transcript stay
frozen until the user manually refreshes.
Desktop:
- MESSAGING_POLL_INTERVAL_MS (10 s): interval poll of the messaging
session list so new platform sessions surface automatically.
- ACTIVE_MESSAGING_SESSION_POLL_INTERVAL_MS (5 s): poll the currently-
viewed messaging transcript and re-hydrate the chat state when the
FNV-1a signature changes (hash covers role + timestamp + content).
- sameCronSignature now compares lineage_root_id / source / profile /
preview / message_count / last_active / ended_at so stale previews
and activity times are no longer silently ignored.
- sessionMatchesStoredId helper de-dups the id / _lineage_root_id check.
- refreshMessagingSessions exposed from useSessionListActions so the
controller can use it in the poll effect.
Gateway:
- SessionStore._compression_tip_for_session_id: look up the latest
compression continuation for a session id.
- SessionStore._heal_compression_tip_locked: rewrite a stale entry to
the compression child before returning it, so a restart or failed send
no longer leaves the store pinned to the compressed parent.
Co-authored-by: lawyer112 <lawyer112@users.noreply.github.com>
Follow-up to the cherry-picked #31856 fix. The contributor's guard defers
idle-TTL eviction until the session store reports the session expired, so the
expiry watcher can tear the agent down and fire MemoryProvider.on_session_end()
with the live transcript. Two gaps remained:
1. Memory-leak regression for mode='none' sessions. _is_session_expired()
returns False forever for the 'none' reset policy, so the naive guard would
never idle-evict those agents — reopening the unbounded-cache leak the idle
sweep (#11565) exists to relieve. Added SessionStore.is_session_finalizable()
(a public predicate: will the expiry watcher EVER finalize this session?) and
gate the deferral on it. mode='none' agents fall through to soft eviction as
before.
2. on_session_end still dropped on the LRU-cap path. Both cache-pressure paths
(_enforce_agent_cache_cap and _sweep_idle_cached_agents) soft-evict via
_release_evicted_agent_soft, which by design does NOT fire on_session_end.
If cache pressure evicts a finalizable-but-not-yet-expired agent before it
expires, the watcher later finds no cached agent and the hook is skipped.
Added _commit_memory_before_soft_evict(): at LRU eviction, if the session is
finalizable and not yet expired, commit end-of-session extraction via the
live agent's own (fully-scoped) memory manager using commit_memory_session()
— extraction WITHOUT provider teardown, so the eviction stays soft and a
resumed turn keeps working. Skipped for mode='none' (no missed boundary to
compensate) and expired sessions (the watcher tears those down directly).
This closes#11205 for ALL eviction paths and reset policies, not just the
idle-sweep + finite-policy case, while preserving the soft-eviction
resumability contract (never calls close() on a live session).
Tests: 5 new cases in test_agent_cache.py (mode='none' still reaped, LRU-cap
commits for finalizable / skips for none, real is_session_finalizable
predicate); all mutation-checked. Contributor's original 2 tests updated to
assert the finalizable path explicitly.
Replace the webhook delivery-close path's direct reach into private
SessionStore._entries (which also bypassed the store lock) with a public,
lock-held peek_session_id(session_key) accessor. Mirrors the existing
lookup_by_session_id inverse helper. Keeps a getattr fallback for older
stores / test doubles. Adds a unit test for the accessor.
Per-session /model overrides (_session_model_overrides) were in-memory only,
so a gateway restart silently reverted every session to the global default
model. Persist the non-secret parts (model/provider/base_url ONLY — never
api_key) into the session entry in sessions.json and lazily rehydrate them
on first use after a restart, re-resolving credentials through the normal
runtime provider resolution.
- gateway/session.py: SessionEntry.model_override field with
sanitize_model_override() (allowlist: model/provider/base_url) applied on
both serialization and deserialization; SessionStore.set_model_override /
get_model_override accessors. reset_session() already creates a fresh entry,
so /new keeps its clear-on-reset semantics — a restart cannot resurrect an
override the user reset away.
- gateway/slash_commands.py: write-through at both /model set sites (text
command + picker) after storing the in-memory override.
- gateway/run.py: _rehydrate_session_model_override() called from
_resolve_session_agent_runtime(); in-memory state always wins, credentials
are re-resolved per provider (credential-less fallback on failure). Session
expiry finalization also drops the persisted override.
- tests/gateway/test_session_model_override_persistence.py: restart
round-trip, /new clearing, api_key-never-serialized (including tampered
sessions.json), rehydration + live-state precedence + credential-failure
degradation.
Salvaged from #3659 by @Git-on-my-level, narrowed to the restart-persistence
gap confirmed in triage.
A crash-interrupted session marked resume_pending is returned by
get_or_create_session so its transcript reloads intact. The idle/daily
reset policy (#54442) keys on updated_at, which is bumped to now on every
message — so a zombie session that keeps receiving messages never trips
it and resumes stale context forever (context bleed reported on Telegram
and Feishu).
Gate the resume_pending branch on last_resume_marked_at (set once at
resume-mark, never bumped per-message) against the auto-continue freshness
window. If resume has been pending past the window, fall through to
auto-reset with reason "resume_pending_expired". A window <= 0 disables
the gate (opt-out for the pre-fix always-fresh behaviour).
Also hoist auto_continue_freshness_window() into gateway/session.py as the
single source of truth; gateway/run._auto_continue_freshness_window() now
delegates to it (keeps the existing import/patch surface).
Fixes#46934
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <noreply@nousresearch.com>
When /compress rotates the session, the handler repointed the live
session entry onto the new (empty) continuation session_id and _save()d
that BEFORE writing the compressed transcript — and rewrite_transcript
swallowed DB write failures at DEBUG. A transient write failure (SQLite
lock under concurrent writes, ENOSPC, disk/IO error) left the session
pointing at an empty id while the handler still reported a cheerful
'Compressed: N → M' success. The active conversation vanished from view.
- gateway/session.py: rewrite_transcript now returns bool (True on write
success or no-DB, False on canonical write failure). /retry, /undo, and
yuanbao recall ignore the result, so their behavior is unchanged.
- gateway/slash_commands.py: _handle_compress_command persists the
compressed transcript FIRST and treats a write failure as fatal (raises
into the outer handler's 'compress failed' banner). Only repoints +
_save()s the session on a successful write. Widened beyond the original
rotation case to also cover in-place compaction (#38763): a failed
in-place write would otherwise leave the DB untouched while still
reporting success.
- tests: regression tests for both the rotation and in-place write-failure
paths — assert a failure banner, unchanged session_id, and no _save().
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <agent@nousresearch.com>
Two independent bugs evicted the cached gateway AIAgent on every turn,
preventing the prompt cache from ever warming:
1. Model normalization mismatch: the post-run fallback-eviction check
compared _agent.model (stripped in AIAgent.__init__) against the raw
_resolve_gateway_model() config string. For vendor-prefixed config on
native providers (e.g. 'deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro' vs 'deepseek-v4-pro')
this was always unequal, so the agent was evicted after every
successful run. Normalize _cfg_model the same way (skip aggregators).
2. Discord triggering message_id leaked into the cached system prompt via
build_session_context_prompt()'s Discord IDs block. message_id changes
every turn, so the agent-cache signature (computed from the ephemeral
prompt) changed every Discord turn -> rebuild every message. The id is
now injected per-turn into the user message (where per-turn content
belongs and does not touch the cache signature); the cached IDs block
carries a static pointer to it, preserving reply/react/pin via the
discord tools.
Adapted from #28846. Bug #1 fix is the contributor's; bug #2 reworked to
be non-destructive (keeps the triggering-id capability instead of deleting
it). Redundant auto-reset eviction (already on main via #9893/#48031) and
the wrong-premise reset_context_note plumbing from the original PR were
dropped.
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <hermes@nousresearch.com>
Detect a routing key whose session is already ended in state.db
(end_reason set) inside get_or_create_session and drop the stale entry
instead of silently routing the message into a closed session.
Previously the only runtime cleanup of sessions.json was the startup
_prune_stale_sessions_locked (#52808/#54138), which requires a restart.
A session ended while the gateway stays alive — any path that finalizes
the DB row without clearing sessions.json — left a live routing key
pointing at a closed session. get_or_create_session never consulted
end_reason, so it returned that stale entry and every subsequent message
was silently dropped (no log, no error, no response) until the next
restart. This is the live-gateway variant of #52804/FM9, which needed an
actual gateway crash.
The guard drops the stale entry and falls through to
_recover_session_from_db, which reopens agent_close-ended rows and
resumes the SAME session_id (transcript preserved); if the row ended for
a non-recoverable reason (e.g. /new) it correctly starts a fresh
session. A warning is logged so the event is visible (the field
incident reported zero log output).
Adds tests/gateway/test_session_store_runtime_stale_guard.py covering
the _is_session_ended_in_db helper and the end-to-end routing self-heal
(recover-vs-fresh, live-entry untouched, stale-wins-over-suspended,
force_new short-circuit).
Closes#54878.
Co-authored-by: David Gutowsky <david.gutowsky@gmail.com>
Gateway half of relay-platform-parity Phase 2.5 (D-Q2.5). The relay wire's
platform-neutral scope discriminator is renamed guild_id → scope_id; this is the
hermes-agent side of the cross-repo wire-compatible migration.
- SessionSource: scope_id is canonical; guild_id kept as @deprecated alias.
__post_init__ mirrors the two so all existing SessionSource(guild_id=...)
constructors across native adapters keep working unchanged. to_dict dual-WRITES
scope_id+guild_id; from_dict dual-READS scope_id ?? guild_id.
- relay/adapter.py: capture + outbound metadata dual-read/write scope_id.
- relay/ws_transport.py: _frame_to_event dual-reads scope_id ?? guild_id.
- docs/relay-connector-contract.md: document scope_id (canonical) + guild_id
(deprecated alias) in the §3 SessionSource field table (conformance test).
250 relay+session+contract tests green. Solo lane (relay).
Widen #5961's _format_untrusted_prompt_value coverage to the Matrix
room display name (**Matrix Room:**), a sibling attacker-controllable
field the original fix missed. chat_name is user-settable, so an
injected room name could render as literal markdown in the system
prompt. Adds a regression test.
reset_had_activity gated on entry.total_tokens, which is never written
(token counts migrated to agent-direct persistence) so it was always 0.
That suppressed session-reset notifications for sessions that genuinely
had activity. Switch to last_prompt_tokens, which is updated on every
turn.
A hard gateway crash (exit code 1) skips the graceful shutdown path, so
sessions.json is never cleared and is left pointing at sessions already
ended in state.db. On the next startup get_or_create_session() reuses
those stale entries as long as the time/policy reset checks pass — it
never consults end_reason — so every incoming message is silently routed
into a closed session, with no log or error (#52804).
SessionStore._ensure_loaded_locked() now calls a new
_prune_stale_sessions_locked() that drops any entry whose session_id has
end_reason IS NOT NULL in state.db. Idempotent, _db=None / legacy-absent
safe, DB errors non-fatal, sessions.json rewritten only when something
was pruned. Self-heals into a fresh session on the next message.
Reported and diagnosed by @terry197913 (#52808).
Background processes (e.g. http.server preview) that Hermes starts and
forgets about previously blocked session idle/daily reset indefinitely.
The reset guard in session.py checked has_active_for_session() with no
max age — a 3-day-old preview server blocked reset the same as a task
started 30 seconds ago.
Changes:
- Add max_active_age parameter to has_active_for_session() in
process_registry.py. Processes older than this threshold are ignored.
- Add MAX_ACTIVE_PROCESS_AGE constant (24h / 86400s).
- Wire max_active_age into the gateway's session store callback in
run.py so stale processes no longer block session lifecycle.
- Add debug logging when reset is skipped due to active processes.
- Add 3 tests covering recent, stale, and legacy (None) max age.
Fixes#29177
When the gateway persists a user message after a transient provider
failure (429/timeout/auth error), subsequent retries of the same
Telegram message could stack duplicate user turns in the transcript,
causing the agent to fall behind by 1-2 messages.
Add has_platform_message_id() to SessionDB (using the existing
idx_messages_platform_msg_id partial index) and a SessionStore wrapper.
The gateway's transient-failure path checks this before
append_to_transcript -- if the platform_message_id is already
persisted, the duplicate write is skipped.
Salvaged from #47869 by @davidgut1982. Adapted to current main which
has additional append sites and an existing content-based dedupe in
the exception handler path.
Closes#47237
* fix(relay): authorize relay-delivered events by delivery, not source.platform
The #52190 upstream-authz fix keyed _is_user_authorized off
source.platform via _adapter_authorization_is_upstream(source.platform).
But a relay *message* inbound carries the UNDERLYING platform
(source.platform == discord/telegram/...), NOT Platform.RELAY, because
ws_transport._event_from_wire maps the connector's wire payload
(platform="discord") straight onto SessionSource for session-keying and
egress. The relay adapter is registered only under Platform.RELAY, so
adapters.get(Platform.DISCORD) misses, the trusted-upstream branch is
skipped, and the user hits the env-allowlist default-deny:
WARNING gateway.run: Unauthorized user: <id> (<name>) on discord
(Live staging bug: alpha tester linked successfully, then every
follow-up DM was silently dropped.)
Fix: the authentic trust signal is that the event was delivered over the
per-instance-authenticated relay WS, not which platform it underlies. Add
a wire-INVISIBLE SessionSource.delivered_via_upstream_relay flag, stamped
by the relay transport in _event_from_wire, and authorize on it. The flag
is excluded from to_dict/from_dict so a peer can neither forge it across
the wire nor have it restored from persistence. The existing adapter-flag
check is retained for events whose source.platform IS Platform.RELAY
(interaction-passthrough). A direct Discord event on a multiplexing
gateway (direct + relay adapters) is unmarked and still default-denies.
* fix(relay): use identity check on delivery marker to avoid MagicMock fail-open
A MagicMock() source (used by test_signal.py and other gateway tests) auto-
vivifies source.delivered_via_upstream_relay as a truthy Mock, which a bare
truthiness check would treat as authorized — flipping
test_signal_in_allowlist_maps from False to True. The marker is a real bool on
SessionSource, so check 'is True' explicitly: refuses to authorize any non-bool
stand-in, defensive against accidental fail-open.
Corrupted sessions.json entries (e.g. a bare bool where a dict is
expected) caused TypeError on 'origin' in data' which escaped the
(ValueError, KeyError) inner except and aborted loading ALL remaining
sessions, not just the corrupted one.
Two-layer fix:
- Loop level: isinstance(entry_data, dict) guard before from_dict
- from_dict: isinstance(data['origin'], dict) instead of bare truthiness
- Added TypeError to the inner except as defense-in-depth
Closes#46994
Users who inspect ~/.hermes/sessions/sessions.json see only gateway entries
(e.g. agent:main:whatsapp:dm:...) and mistake it for the session index that
hermes sessions list / /sessions read — which is actually state.db. Issue
#49361 reported CLI sessions as 'invisible' on this premise.
- gateway/session.py: write a self-documenting _README sentinel at the top of
sessions.json explaining it's the gateway routing index and that ALL sessions
(CLI/TUI/gateway) live in state.db; skip _-prefixed keys on load so the
sentinel never round-trips into a SessionEntry.
- Harden every sessions.json reader against the sentinel: mcp_serve loader,
gateway/mirror.py, gateway/channel_directory.py all skip _-prefixed keys.
- docs/user-guide/sessions.md: warning callout naming the exact symptom.
- tests: assert prune ignores metadata sentinels; add round-trip coverage.
Follow-up to the salvaged #9560 fix:
- Replace the _TRAVERSAL_RE regex with an explicit _is_path_unsafe() helper
(drops the now-unused `import re`); catches a path separator ANYWHERE,
not just leading, so a non-leading Windows backslash can't slip through.
- Switch the per-entry skip in _ensure_loaded_locked from print() to
logger.warning to match the module's logging conventions.
- Add AUTHOR_MAP entry for the contributor.
- Add regression tests for the non-leading-separator case.
Extends the CWE-22 path traversal guard to cover Windows absolute paths
of the form C:/... and D:\... — previously only leading / and \ were
checked, which missed drive-letter prefixes. Replaces the inline
startswith check with a compiled module-level regex (_TRAVERSAL_RE) that
covers all three attack patterns: .., leading /\, and leading X: drives.
Adds two regression tests for C:/windows/system32 and D:\\path\\to\\file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses PR #9560 review comments: applies the CWE-22 fix to current main
(post-PR #458 rebase) and adds the requested regression tests.
- SessionEntry.from_dict now raises ValueError for session_key or session_id
containing '..' or starting with '/' or '\' (directory traversal guard)
- SessionStore._ensure_loaded moves per-entry validation inside the loop so
one malicious/corrupt entry is skipped with a warning instead of aborting
the entire sessions.json load
- Adds TestSessionEntryFromDictTraversalValidation (5 cases) and
TestEnsureLoadedSkipsInvalidEntries covering the skip-not-abort behavior
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Serve webhook inbound for multiple profiles off the one shared listener via a
URL prefix, with no second port bound.
- SessionSource gains a 'profile' field (round-trips through to_dict/from_dict;
omitted when unset so existing serialization is unchanged). It carries which
profile an inbound message was routed to.
- WebhookAdapter registers /p/{profile}/webhooks/{route_name} alongside the
existing /webhooks/{route_name}. _resolve_request_profile validates the
prefix against profiles_to_serve(): None when absent or multiplexing is off
(ignored, handled as default — no spurious 404), the profile name when valid,
_PROFILE_REJECTED (→ 404) when the profile isn't served. The resolved profile
is stamped onto the SessionSource.
- session-key namespacing and the per-turn home/credential scope now prefer
source.profile: SessionStore._resolve_profile_for_key(source),
_session_key_for_source fallback, and _resolve_profile_home_for_source all
honor it (→ the agent turn resolves that profile's config/skills/credentials
via the Phase 2 _profile_runtime_scope).
Constraint: routing inbound needs no per-profile platform credential, but the
agent still needs the routed profile's provider key — delivered by Phase 2's
secret scope. api_server (OpenAI-compatible surface) profile routing is a
focused follow-on; its source-construction path differs from webhook's.
Tests: SessionSource.profile round-trip + namespace drive; _resolve_request_
profile accept/reject/ignore matrix.
Foundations for serving multiple profiles from one gateway process, inert
when off:
- gateway.multiplex_profiles config flag (default false), round-trips through
GatewayConfig and load_gateway_config (top-level + nested gateway.* form).
- hermes_cli.profiles.profiles_to_serve(multiplex): the single chokepoint for
which (profile, HERMES_HOME) pairs the gateway serves. Lightweight dir scan;
active-profile-only when off, default + all named profiles when on.
- build_session_key gains a profile= namespace slot. Default/None reuse the
historical 'agent:main:...' literal BYTE-IDENTICALLY (no session migration,
positional parsers unaffected); a named profile becomes 'agent:<profile>:...'
so two profiles on the same platform/chat never collide.
- SessionStore._resolve_profile_for_key + _session_key_for_source fallback
resolve the namespace from the flag (legacy when off, active profile when on).
Tests: byte-identical-when-off (parametrized), namespace isolation, positional
layout preserved, config round-trip, profiles_to_serve enumeration.
* feat(mcp): raise default tool-call timeout 120s -> 300s
Port from openai/codex#28234. Long-running MCP tools (web fetches,
sandboxed builds, deep-research servers) routinely exceed 120s, causing
spurious timeout failures. Codex bumped its default MCP tool timeout from
120 to 300 for the same reason.
- _DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT 120 -> 300 in tools/mcp_tool.py (per-server
'timeout' config override unchanged)
- update test_default_timeout assertion
- document the default in mcp-config-reference.md
* refactor: remove agent-callable send_message tool
The agent should not decide on its own to fire off cross-platform
messages or reactions. Outbound platform messaging is handled outside
the agent loop — cron delivery, the gateway kanban notifier
(dashboard-toggled), and the `hermes send` CLI.
Removes the model-tool registration only; the send engine in
send_message_tool.py (_send_to_platform, _send_via_adapter,
_parse_target_ref, per-platform _send_* helpers) is kept intact for
those non-agent callers. Drops the now-empty 'messaging' toolset and
its `hermes tools` toggle. Yuanbao DM guidance now points at the
native yb_send_dm tool.
