Tirith redacts its own findings, but the approval-request callbacks built the
operator prompt from the RAW command string, so a credential-shaped value
Tirith flagged was sent verbatim to clients, undoing the redaction one layer up.
Two egress transports carried the leak; both are fixed via a shared
module-level seam _redact_approval_command() (redact_sensitive_text force=True):
1. chat platforms — _approval_notify_sync (gateway/run.py): redact before
both the button path (send_exec_approval) and the plain-text /approve
fallback.
2. SSE/API stream — _approval_notify (gateway/platforms/api_server.py):
redact event['command'] before it is enqueued to API/desktop clients.
(whole-bug-class: sibling call path on a separate transport.)
force=True so the prompt — a hard secret-egress boundary — honors redaction
even when security.redact_secrets is off. Clean commands pass through unchanged.
Tests bind the seam (synthetic credential-format fixtures, force-when-disabled) AND assert
BOTH callbacks ASSIGN the redacted result before the send/enqueue sink, via an
AST contract that rejects a discarded-result call. All mutation-checked.
Remove the dashboard --insecure auth-bypass, add an MCP persistence guard +
IOC blocklist, and raise the API-server key entropy floor.
Driven by the June 2026 hermes-0day campaign (r/hermesagent, live 854.media
instance): scanners find exposed Hermes dashboards/API servers, drive the
root agent to plant a 'command: bash' MCP entry that appends an attacker SSH
key to authorized_keys, which cron + startup then re-execute every tick.
- dashboard: --insecure no longer disables the auth gate. should_require_auth
returns True for every non-loopback bind; a public bind ALWAYS requires an
auth provider (bundled password provider or OAuth). --insecure kept as a
warned no-op for backward compat. Fail-closed error now points at the
password provider, not at --insecure.
- mcp_security: validate_mcp_server_entry now also rejects shell payloads that
write to OS persistence surfaces (authorized_keys/.ssh/pam.d/sudoers/cron/
rc files) and hard-rejects a hermes-0day IOC blocklist (attacker SSH key +
source IPs) anywhere in command/args/env. Runs at save AND spawn time.
- api_server: raise network-bind API_SERVER_KEY entropy floor 8->16 chars;
warn when a network-accessible API server runs an unsandboxed local backend.
* fix(api-server): stop silently promising async delivery on stateless HTTP path
terminal(notify_on_complete=True / watch_patterns) and delegate_task(background=True)
silently no-op'd on the API server / WebUI path (#10760): the watcher / detached
child registered, but every API-server route (OpenAI-spec /v1/chat/completions
and /v1/responses, plus the proprietary /v1/runs SSE stream) tears down its
channel when the turn ends, and APIServerAdapter.send() is a no-op stub. A
completion that fires after the response closed had nowhere to go — from the
agent side, indistinguishable from a hang.
There is no spec-compliant surface to wake the agent later on a stateless HTTP
client, so make the no-op honest instead of silent:
- Add a per-adapter capability flag supports_async_delivery (default True;
APIServerAdapter = False), propagated into a HERMES_SESSION_ASYNC_DELIVERY
contextvar via async_delivery_supported(). Toggle on the adapter, not a
hardcoded platform string — a future stateless adapter is correct-by-default.
- terminal: when delivery is unsupported, skip watcher registration, force
notify_on_complete off, and return a notify_unsupported note telling the
agent to process(action='poll').
- delegate_task: when delivery is unsupported, fall back to SYNCHRONOUS
execution (work runs and returns in the same response) with a note, instead
of handing out a handle that never resolves.
CLI (in-process completion_queue) and the real gateway platforms are unchanged.
Fixes#10760
* refactor(api-server): route session binding through a single no-delivery chokepoint
Add APIServerAdapter._bind_api_server_session() and route both agent-entry
paths (_run_agent for /v1/chat/completions + /v1/responses, and the /v1/runs
_run_sync path) through it. The helper hardwires platform="api_server" and
async_delivery=False with no async_delivery parameter to pass, so a future
route added to the API server physically cannot reintroduce the silent
no-op (#10760) by forgetting to mark the channel as non-delivering.
The binding stays request-scoped (cleared per turn), so a session resumed
later on a delivering interface (CLI / gateway platform) re-binds fresh and
is NOT blocked — the no-delivery decision tracks the interface handling the
current turn, never the session.
The OpenAI-compatible API server only enforced a hardcoded cap of 10
concurrent runs on /v1/runs, leaving /v1/chat/completions and
/v1/responses unbounded — a request flood could exhaust CPU, memory,
and upstream LLM quota (#7483).
- Add gateway.api_server.max_concurrent_runs (config.yaml, default 10,
0 disables). No env var.
- Shared concurrency gate across all three agent-serving endpoints,
counting both the chat/responses in-flight counter and the /v1/runs
stream set. Returns OpenAI-style 429 + Retry-After when at the cap.
- Remove the dead hardcoded _MAX_CONCURRENT_RUNS class attribute.
Closes#7483.
Follow-up cleanups on top of the busy/idle readout (PR #50103):
- web_server.py /api/status reused the single drain-timeout resolver
hermes_cli.gateway._get_restart_drain_timeout() (HERMES_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT
env -> agent.restart_drain_timeout config -> default) instead of inlining a
third hand-rolled copy of that precedence chain. Also fixes a subtle
divergence: the inline copy used os.environ.get() so a set-but-empty env var
was treated as a value rather than falling through to config; the shared
resolver .strip()s and falls through correctly.
- Added gateway.status.parse_active_agents() and routed BOTH HTTP surfaces
(/api/status and /health/detailed) through it, so the exposed active_agents
field is consistently clamped non-negative. Previously /api/status clamped
while /health/detailed exposed the raw file value, diverging on a corrupt
count.
- Added TestParseActiveAgents covering the shared coercion contract.
Give an external consumer (NAS) a trustworthy, always-reachable busy/idle
readout it can poll before a disruptive lifecycle action (restart,
migrate, stop, auto-update). The dashboard /api/status is the only HTTP
surface guaranteed up on a hosted agent regardless of which gateway
platforms are enabled, and it already reads gateway_state.json.
Add to /api/status (additive, non-breaking):
- active_agents — in-flight gateway-turn count (now refreshed
per-turn by the companion gateway-side commit)
- gateway_busy — running AND active_agents > 0
- gateway_drainable — running and live (a valid begin-drain target)
- restart_drain_timeout — resolved seconds, so the consumer can size its
poll deadline without out-of-band knowledge
(env HERMES_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT → config
agent.restart_drain_timeout → default)
The busy/drainable contract is defined once in gateway.status
(derive_gateway_busy / derive_gateway_drainable) and consumed by both
/api/status and /health/detailed so the two surfaces can never disagree.
Liveness keys off gateway_running (a live PID/health probe), NEVER
gateway_updated_at — a healthy idle gateway never advances that timestamp.
All derived fields degrade to safe falsy values when the gateway is down
or the status file is absent/corrupt (never a spurious "busy" that would
wedge the consumer). active_sessions (the 5-min DB recency heuristic the
SPA reads) is left exactly as-is — new signal, new fields.
Tests (behaviour contracts, not snapshots): the pure derivation contract
across every running/state/count/liveness combination; /api/status
integration for busy, idle-drainable, draining, down, stale-busy-file,
corrupt-count, and timeout surfacing; and /health/detailed parity.
Phase 4F (F.1 + F.2 + F.3, agent side). F.4 is the operator-run live smoke
(needs a NAS deployment); recorded in the PR, not code.
F.1 — on_jobs_changed wiring:
- cron/scheduler.py: _notify_provider_jobs_changed() — resolve the active
provider, call on_jobs_changed(), swallow errors. Lives in scheduler.py (not
jobs.py) so the store stays free of provider imports (no import cycle).
- Wired at the consumer surfaces AFTER a successful mutation: the cronjob model
tool (tools/cronjob_tools.py, create/update/remove/pause/resume) — which the
`hermes cron` CLI also routes through — and the REST handlers
(gateway/platforms/api_server.py, same five). Built-in's no-op default = zero
behavior change on the default path. Sleeping-agent direct jobs.json writes
(no tool/CLI/REST) are covered by reconcile-on-wake in start().
F.2 — config: cron.chronos.{portal_url,callback_url,expected_audience,
nas_jwks_url}. All non-secret; the agent holds no scheduler creds and the
outbound provision call reuses the existing Nous token (no token key). Additive
deep-merge key, no version literal.
F.3 — docs:
- docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md: authoritative agent↔NAS wire contract
(the three agent-cron endpoints + inbound /api/cron/fire + the 3-hop trust
model + at-most-once/re-arm semantics). This is what the NAS-side agent builds
against.
- cron-internals.md: "Managed cron (Chronos) for scale-to-zero" section.
- cli-commands.md: cron.provider accepts chronos + the cron.chronos.* keys.
- User docs name no scheduler vendor (QStash is a NAS-internal detail).
INVARIANT re-verified: zero qstash/upstash hits across plugins/cron, gateway,
hermes_cli, tools, website/docs (the one remaining repo hit is an unrelated
Context7 MCP comment in tools/mcp_tool.py).
Tests: test_jobs_changed_notify (5) — notify calls provider hook, swallows
errors, built-in harmless, tool create/remove notify. Full cron + chronos +
webhook + config + api_server_jobs suites green (504 in the cron+chronos+webhook
run).
Phase 4E (E.1 + E.2). The inbound side of Chronos: NAS POSTs the agent when a
one-shot fires; the agent verifies a NAS-minted JWT and runs the job.
E.1 — plugins/cron/chronos/verify.py:
- verify_nas_fire_token(token, expected_audience, jwks_or_key, issuer): verifies
signature against the NAS JWKS (RS/ES family; symmetric rejected), aud == this
agent, exp/nbf, iss, and purpose == "cron_fire" (so a general agent JWT can't
be replayed against the fire endpoint). Returns claims or None; never raises.
Crypto delegated to PyJWT[crypto] (already a declared dep) — no hand-rolled
JWT, no new dependency. No key configured → refuse (never unsigned-decode a
security boundary).
- get_fire_verifier(): pluggable indirection so the DQ-4 escape hatch
(direct per-job cron-key) can swap in with no handler change.
E.2 — gateway/platforms/api_server.py:
- POST /api/cron/fire (registered only when _CRON_AVAILABLE). Authenticated by
the NAS-JWT via get_fire_verifier() — NOT API_SERVER_KEY (NAS holds no API
key; this is the only inbound that triggers remote job execution, so it gets
its own purpose-scoped check). Verifier args come from cron.chronos.* config.
401 on bad/missing/forged token. 400 on missing job_id. On success: 202 +
fire_due runs in the background (so a long agent turn never trips NAS's HTTP
timeout); the store CAS claim inside fire_due de-dupes a scheduler retry.
Tests:
- test_chronos_verify (11): REAL RS256 signing — valid→claims, wrong-aud,
missing/wrong purpose, expired, wrong-iss, tampered-signature (attacker key),
no-key-refuse, empty-token, JWKS-URL key resolution, get_fire_verifier.
- test_cron_fire_webhook (5): valid→202+fire, invalid→401+no-fire, missing
token→401, missing job_id→400, and fire path does NOT require API_SERVER_KEY.
api_server regression suites (214) green.
E.3 (NAS endpoints) is a separate cross-repo PR; the wire contract lands next
(docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md).
The agent-facing cronjob tool scans the user prompt with _scan_cron_prompt()
before creating/updating a job (tools/cronjob_tools.py); the REST cron
endpoints (POST /api/jobs, PATCH /api/jobs/{id}) validated length but not
content. This adds the same scan to both handlers so an exfiltration/injection
prompt is rejected the same way regardless of which surface created the job.
NOT a security boundary, defense-in-depth / parity only: the REST cron
endpoints are authenticated (every handler runs _check_auth, and connect()
refuses to start without API_SERVER_KEY), and _scan_cron_prompt is a documented
in-process heuristic, not a containment boundary (SECURITY.md 3.2).
Raised externally via GHSA-fr3q-rjg3-x6mf (DNS-rebinding pre-auth RCE). The
report's load-bearing 'no auth by default' premise was already closed three
weeks after it was filed by the API_SERVER_KEY-required guard (commit
1a9ef8314); this lands the create/update prompt-validation parity the report
also pointed at. Scanner imported defensively so a missing scanner cannot
disable the cron REST API.
The ResponseStore.get() method calls json.loads(row[0]) without any
error handling. If the SQLite responses table contains corrupted JSON
data (e.g. from a crash mid-write or disk corruption), this raises
an unhandled JSONDecodeError that propagates to the caller.
Fix: wrap in try/except (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError). On parse
failure, log a warning, evict the corrupted entry from the cache, and
return None (consistent with the function's Optional return type).
Three separate code paths in the gateway's platform reconnect loop
leaked file descriptors every retry, exhausting the default 2560-fd
ulimit in ~12 hours of continuous failure and turning the gateway
into a zombie that raises OSError: [Errno 24] on every open() (#37011).
Root cause:
* APIServerAdapter.__init__ opens a ResponseStore SQLite connection
that holds 2 fds (db file + WAL sidecar).
* APIServerAdapter.disconnect() previously only stopped the aiohttp
web server — the ResponseStore connection was never closed.
* The reconnect watcher in _platform_reconnect_watcher constructs a
fresh adapter on every retry attempt. When the connect call fails
(3 paths: non-retryable error, retryable error, exception during
connect) the adapter is dropped without ever being installed on
self.adapters, so nothing else calls its disconnect(). Result: the
2 ResponseStore fds stay open until GC sweeps the unreachable
object, which Python's cyclic GC does not do promptly for
asyncio-bound native handles.
2 fds × 1 retry × (3600s / 300s backoff cap) ≈ 12 fds/hour.
2560 fds / 12 fds/hr ≈ 12h to ulimit exhaustion.
Fix:
* APIServerAdapter.disconnect() now also calls
self._response_store.close() (with a try/except so a SQLite
close failure doesn't abort the aiohttp teardown).
* New module-level helper _dispose_unused_adapter(adapter) in
gateway/run.py that calls adapter.disconnect() and swallows
any exception (so half-constructed adapters whose __init__
crashed don't kill the watcher loop).
* _platform_reconnect_watcher calls _dispose_unused_adapter() in
all three failure paths: non-retryable, retryable, and the
except Exception arm. adapter = None is initialized
before the try so the except arm can see the partial
construction.
Tests:
* New file tests/gateway/test_platform_reconnect_fd_leak.py with
7 regression tests covering all three failure paths, the
_dispose_unused_adapter helper (None + raising-disconnect cases),
and the APIServerAdapter ResponseStore close behavior (success +
close-exception cases). The _CountingAdapter fixture tracks
disconnect() invocations and an _open_fds counter that is
decremented on dispose, so the assertion is the literal
observable behavior of the leak.
Refs:
- Closes#37011 (the original fd-leak report)
- Supersedes #37018, #37110, #37238, #37260, #37394 (7 competing
open PRs all addressing the same root cause from different angles;
none of them rebased cleanly against current main, and none
covered all three failure paths in one fix with regression tests
for both the watcher and the platform-level close behavior)
* docs(code-execution): document HERMES_* env narrowing + passthrough workaround
The execute_code sandbox-child env scrub (108397726, #27303) deliberately
dropped the broad HERMES_ prefix passthrough, keeping only an operational
4-var allowlist (HERMES_HOME/PROFILE/CONFIG/ENV). A script that relied on a
non-secret HERMES_* var (HERMES_BASE_URL, HERMES_KANBAN_DB, HERMES_*_WEBHOOK,
or a plugin-defined one) now sees it unset in the child.
Document the behavior change and the two recovery routes (terminal.env_passthrough
in config.yaml, or required_environment_variables in skill frontmatter), plus
the debug log line that surfaces the drop for diagnosis.
* fix(api_server): emit per-turn transcript on run.completed (#34703)
WebUI clients lost intermediate (pre-tool-call) assistant text after
switching session pages mid-stream. The session-chat SSE stream delivers
all assistant text as assistant.delta events under one message_id
interleaved with tool.* events, then a single assistant.completed
carrying only the final reply — so a client accumulating deltas into one
buffer cannot reconstruct intermediate text segments that preceded tool
calls, and they vanish from the live view (state.db persists them
correctly).
run.completed now carries the authoritative per-turn transcript
(assistant + tool messages for this turn, in client-safe shape) so any
SSE consumer can reconcile its live view against ground truth without a
separate GET /messages round-trip. Purely additive — clients that ignore
the field are unaffected.
#33016 added GET /v1/skills + /v1/toolsets on the API server; the
capability flag introduced in this branch was placeholder-False. Flip
to True so capability probers see the truth.
Lets external clients enumerate the agent's skills and resolved toolsets
deterministically over the OpenAI-compatible API server, without standing
up the dashboard web server or sending a chat message and asking the model
to list them.
- GET /v1/skills — list installed skills (name, description, category)
- GET /v1/toolsets — list toolsets resolved for the api_server platform,
with enabled/configured state and the concrete tool names each expands
to
- Both gated by API_SERVER_KEY (same Bearer scheme as every other /v1/*
endpoint)
- /v1/capabilities advertises both new endpoints
Closes the gap a community user just hit asking how to list skills over
REST when only the OpenAI-compatible server is running.
Test plan
- python -m pytest tests/gateway/test_api_server.py -k "Skills or Toolsets or Capabilities" -o 'addopts=' -q
→ 9/9 pass
- python -m pytest tests/gateway/test_api_server.py -o 'addopts=' -q
→ 156/156 pass, no regressions
- E2E: started a real adapter on an isolated HERMES_HOME with a fake
skill installed; curl-equivalent calls to /v1/capabilities,
/v1/skills, /v1/toolsets returned the expected JSON; unauthenticated
calls returned 401 with the configured API_SERVER_KEY.
response_store.db (api server) holds conversation history including tool
payloads, prompts, and results. webhook_subscriptions.json holds per-route
HMAC secrets. Under a permissive umask (e.g. 0o022, default on most
distros) both files were created mode 0o644 — readable by other local
users on shared boxes.
- gateway/platforms/api_server.py: ResponseStore tightens itself + WAL/SHM
sidecars to 0o600 after __init__, then trusts the inode. (Original
contributor patch chmod'd after every _commit() — wasteful on a hot
api_server path; chmod-on-create is sufficient since SQLite preserves
mode bits across writes.)
- hermes_cli/webhook.py: _save_subscriptions writes via tempfile.mkstemp
(which itself creates the file with 0o600), chmods the temp before the
atomic rename, and re-asserts 0o600 on the destination so an existing
permissive file from before this fix gets narrowed.
Tests cover (a) creation under permissive umask leaves 0o600 and (b) an
existing 0o644 webhook_subscriptions.json gets narrowed on next save.
Tests guarded with skipif os.name=='nt' since POSIX mode bits don't apply
on Windows.
Salvaged from PR #30917 by @Hinotoi-agent. Reworked the api_server.py
side from chmod-on-every-commit to chmod-on-create.
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
ResponseStore.put() and .delete() now remove conversations rows that
reference evicted or deleted response IDs, preventing 404 errors when
a conversation name is reused after its backing response was purged.
Adds regression tests for delete, eviction, and handler-level reuse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace with for all literal-tuple
membership tests. Set lookup is O(1) vs O(n) for tuple — consistent
micro-optimization across the codebase.
608 instances fixed via `ruff --fix --unsafe-fixes`, 0 remaining.
133 files, +626/-626 (net zero).
Non-streaming /v1/chat/completions wrapped any AIAgent result \u2014 including
partial/failed runs \u2014 as a successful 200 with finish_reason='stop' and
the internal failure string substituted into message.content. API
clients had no way to distinguish 'agent answered: X' from
'agent crashed and the X you see is its error message'.
After the fix:
- completed: True \u2192 200 finish_reason='stop' (unchanged)
- partial + truncated text \u2192 200 finish_reason='length' + hermes extras
- partial + no text / failed \u2192 502 OpenAI error envelope (SDKs raise)
- other failures \u2192 200 finish_reason='error' + hermes extras
Adds X-Hermes-Completed / X-Hermes-Partial / X-Hermes-Error headers
plus a 'hermes' extras object on partial responses for clients that
want the full picture.
Closes#22496.
SQLite's WAL mode requires shared-memory (mmap) coordination and fcntl
byte-range locks that don't reliably work on network filesystems. Upstream
documents this explicitly:
https://www.sqlite.org/wal.html#sometimes_queries_return_sqlite_busy_in_wal_mode
On NFS / SMB / some FUSE mounts / WSL1, 'PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL' raises
'sqlite3.OperationalError: locking protocol' (SQLITE_PROTOCOL). Before
this change, every feature backed by state.db or kanban.db broke silently:
- /resume, /title, /history, /branch returned 'Session database not
available.' with no cause
- gateway logged the init failure at DEBUG (invisible in errors.log)
- kanban dispatcher crashed every 60s, driving the known migration race
(duplicate column name: consecutive_failures, #21708 / #21374)
Changes:
- hermes_state.apply_wal_with_fallback(): shared helper that tries WAL
and falls back to DELETE on SQLITE_PROTOCOL-style errors with one
WARNING explaining why
- hermes_state.get_last_init_error() + format_session_db_unavailable():
capture the init failure cause and surface it in user-facing strings
(with an NFS/SMB pointer for 'locking protocol')
- hermes_cli/kanban_db.connect(): use the shared helper
- gateway/run.py: bump SessionDB init failure log DEBUG -> WARNING
(matches cli.py's existing correct behavior)
- cli.py (4 sites) + gateway/run.py (5 sites): replace bare
'Session database not available.' with format_session_db_unavailable()
Tests: 12 new tests in tests/test_hermes_state_wal_fallback.py + 1 new
test in tests/hermes_cli/test_kanban_db.py. Existing suites (state,
kanban, gateway, cli) remain green for all tests unrelated to pre-existing
failures on main.
Evidence: real-world user on NFSv3 mount (172.26.224.200:d2dfac12/home,
local_lock=none) reporting 'Session database not available.' on /resume;
'locking protocol' appears in 4 distinct log entries across backup,
kanban, TUI, and CLI paths in the same session.
closes#22032
Reduces SSE event rate ~500/turn → ~20/turn via 50ms text-delta batching in
_dispatch(), which eliminates markdown re-render storms on Open WebUI. Also:
- Trim tool_call.arguments in the response.completed event to 100KB
(prevents silent hangs on 848KB+ single-line SSE events).
- Catch-all exception handlers in _write_sse_responses() + _write_sse_chat_completion()
emit a proper error chunk instead of TransferEncodingError from incomplete
chunked encoding when the agent crashes mid-stream.
- MAX_REQUEST_BYTES 1MB → 10MB; pass client_max_size to aiohttp Application to
avoid silent 400s on truncated request bodies for long conversations.
Salvage of #17552 (api_server portion only). The contrib/openwebui-filter/
payload from that PR — Open WebUI Filter Function + benchmark writeup — is
a client-side user-installable add-on and doesn't need to live in the repo;
dropped here. Closes#17537.
Co-authored-by: bogerman1 <93757150+bogerman1@users.noreply.github.com>
When context compression rotates the agent's session_id to a new
child session, the API server was still returning the stale parent
session_id in the X-Hermes-Session-Id response header.
This caused external clients to keep sending the old session_id,
loading uncompressed parent history instead of the compressed
continuation.
Fix: _run_agent() now includes the effective session_id in its
result dict, and the response header uses it instead of the
original provided session_id.
* feat(api-server): X-Hermes-Session-Key header for long-term memory scoping
API Server integrations (Open WebUI, custom web UIs) can now pass a stable
per-channel identifier via X-Hermes-Session-Key that scopes long-term memory
(Honcho, etc.) independently of the transcript-scoped X-Hermes-Session-Id.
This matches the native gateway's session_key / session_id split: one stable
key per assistant channel, many independent transcripts that rotate on /new.
- _create_agent and _run_agent accept gateway_session_key and pass it to
AIAgent(gateway_session_key=...), which is already honored by the Honcho
memory provider (plugins/memory/honcho/client.py resolve_session_name).
- New shared helper _parse_session_key_header applies the same API-key
gate, control-character sanitization, and a 256-char length cap as the
existing session-id header.
- All three agent endpoints honor the header: /v1/chat/completions,
/v1/responses, /v1/runs. JSON and SSE responses echo it back.
- /v1/capabilities advertises session_key_header so clients can
feature-detect.
Closes#20060.
Co-authored-by: Andy Stewart <lazycat.manatee@gmail.com>
* chore: AUTHOR_MAP entry for manateelazycat
---------
Co-authored-by: Andy Stewart <lazycat.manatee@gmail.com>
When run_conversation encounters a non-retryable client error (401, 400,
etc.), it returns a dict with failed=True instead of raising. The gateway's
_run_and_close only branched on exceptions, so it always emitted run.completed
even for failed runs — clients could not distinguish success from failure.
Inspect the result dict before emitting: if failed=True, emit run.failed
with the error message; otherwise emit run.completed as before. The existing
except Exception path is unchanged for genuine programming errors.
Fixes#15561
Address Copilot review on PR #16666:
1. **Duplicate event on every tool start** — both ``tool_progress_callback``
and ``tool_start_callback`` fire side-by-side in ``run_agent.py``, so
wiring both into chat completions emitted *two* ``hermes.tool.progress``
events per real tool call. Drop the legacy ``_on_tool_progress`` emit
entirely; ``_on_tool_start`` now produces a single unified event that
carries the legacy ``tool``/``emoji``/``label`` fields plus the new
``toolCallId``/``status`` correlation fields. Label is computed inline
via ``build_tool_preview`` so callers do not need to pre-format it.
2. **Weak per-event correlation in the regression test** — the previous
assertion checked that a ``toolCallId`` appeared *somewhere* in the
aggregate, which would have passed even if ``running`` lacked the id.
Collect ``(status, toolCallId)`` per event and assert each event
carries the correct pair, plus exactly two events on the wire (no
silent duplication regression).
The two existing chat-completions tool-progress tests are updated to fire
``tool_start_callback`` instead of ``tool_progress_callback``, matching
production reality where ``run_agent`` always pairs them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds two API server endpoints for external UIs and orchestrators:
- GET /v1/capabilities — machine-readable feature discovery so clients
can detect which Runs API / SSE / auth features this Hermes version
supports before depending on them.
- GET /v1/runs/{run_id} — pollable run status so dashboards can check
queued/running/completed/failed/cancelled/stopping state without
holding an SSE connection open.
Also moves request validation ahead of run allocation so invalid
payloads no longer leave orphaned entries in _run_streams waiting for
the TTL sweep.
task_id is intentionally kept as "default" for the Runs API to
preserve the shared-sandbox model used by CLI, gateway, and the
existing _run_agent_with_callbacks path. session_id is surfaced in
run status for external-UI correlation only.
Salvage of PR #17085 by @Magaav.
task.cancel() can't preempt the run_in_executor thread running
run_conversation(), so we rely on agent.interrupt() to wake the loop.
Without a timeout, a slow/unresponsive interrupt blocks the HTTP
response indefinitely. Wrap the await in wait_for(shield(task), 5.0)
and log a warning on timeout.
Also tidy one extra space in the module docstring's /stop entry.
Add ability to interrupt a running agent via the runs API. Previously
/v1/runs could start a run and subscribe to events, but there was no
way to cancel it. The new endpoint stores agent and task references
during execution, calls agent.interrupt() to stop LLM calls, then
cancels the asyncio task.
Includes 15 tests covering start, events, and stop scenarios.
Extends PR #15171 to also cover the server-side cancellation path (aiohttp
shutdown, request-level timeout) — previously only ConnectionResetError
triggered the incomplete-snapshot write, so cancellations left the store
stuck at the in_progress snapshot written on response.created.
Factors the incomplete-snapshot build into a _persist_incomplete_if_needed()
helper called from both the ConnectionResetError and CancelledError
branches; the CancelledError handler re-raises so cooperative cancellation
semantics are preserved.
Adds two regression tests that drive _write_sse_responses directly (the
TestClient disconnect path races the server handler, which makes the
end-to-end assertion flaky).
