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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium
39975613b1
test: prune wave 2 + speed fixes — 28,106 → 19,757 test functions, suite wall 315s → 294s
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.

Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
  (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
  mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
  silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
  cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
  shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
  MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
  (22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
  (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
  patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
  5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
  with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
  blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
  the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).

Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
2026-07-29 13:39:40 -07:00
Ray
6a58badfdc fix(browser): guard Camofox eval private pages
Extends the browser private-network eval guard to the Camofox backend.
On main, _browser_eval() returned early in Camofox mode before running the
shared private-URL literal pre-scan and before re-checking the page URL
after eval, leaving Camofox as a sibling backend that could execute
browser_console(expression=...) against private/internal targets.

- move the eval private-URL literal pre-scan before the Camofox early return
- add a Camofox current-page private-URL probe via the evaluate endpoint
- withhold Camofox eval results when the page is now private/internal

Follow-up to browser private-network hardening in #56173, #56526, #56664.

Salvage of #56764 by @rayjun (rayoo), cherry-picked to preserve authorship.
2026-07-02 13:10:30 +05:30
teknium1
7ef04ae7a7 fix(browser): close eval return-value SSRF bypass (sibling of #44731)
The snapshot/vision guards re-check the page URL before returning content,
but browser_console(expression=...) -> _browser_eval returns arbitrary JS
results directly, leaving two same-class bypasses open:

  1. Direct fetch: fetch('http://127.0.0.1/secret').then(r=>r.text()) reads
     a private endpoint and returns the body — the page URL stays public so
     the post-eval recheck never sees it.
  2. Navigate-then-read: location.href='http://127.0.0.1/' then a later eval
     reads document.body.innerText.

Guard _browser_eval on the same condition as navigate/snapshot/vision
(not local backend, not local sidecar, not allow_private_urls):
  - pre-scan the expression for private/always-blocked URL literals
  - re-check window.location.href after the eval at both success-return
    sites (supervisor fast-path + subprocess fallback)

Probe failures fail-open (matching the snapshot/vision guards).
2026-06-28 02:42:01 -07:00