Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium
39975613b1
test: prune wave 2 + speed fixes — 28,106 → 19,757 test functions, suite wall 315s → 294s
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.

Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
  (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
  mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
  silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
  cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
  shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
  MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
  (22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
  (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
  patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
  5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
  with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
  blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
  the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).

Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
2026-07-29 13:39:40 -07:00
kshitijk4poor
915f1bf1bc fix(api): reserve cron fire work during drain 2026-07-13 23:26:10 +05:30
kshitijk4poor
ffc10cc659 fix(gateway): quiesce API and cron work during drains
Reserve API requests before their first await, include every drain-owned work type in runtime status, and pause local cron dispatch while a gateway drain is active.
2026-07-13 23:26:10 +05:30
teknium1
901165b5a4 fix(cron): complete plugins.cron_providers rename in 2 missed test files
uperLu's #50958 renamed plugins/cron → plugins/cron_providers but left
two test files patching the now-gone plugins.cron.chronos.verify path,
which would fail collection. Point them at plugins.cron_providers.*.
Add uperLu to release.py AUTHOR_MAP.
2026-06-23 23:39:22 -07:00
Ben
3fc7b624d8 feat(cron,gateway): NAS-JWT fire verifier + /api/cron/fire webhook (Chronos)
Phase 4E (E.1 + E.2). The inbound side of Chronos: NAS POSTs the agent when a
one-shot fires; the agent verifies a NAS-minted JWT and runs the job.

E.1 — plugins/cron/chronos/verify.py:
- verify_nas_fire_token(token, expected_audience, jwks_or_key, issuer): verifies
  signature against the NAS JWKS (RS/ES family; symmetric rejected), aud == this
  agent, exp/nbf, iss, and purpose == "cron_fire" (so a general agent JWT can't
  be replayed against the fire endpoint). Returns claims or None; never raises.
  Crypto delegated to PyJWT[crypto] (already a declared dep) — no hand-rolled
  JWT, no new dependency. No key configured → refuse (never unsigned-decode a
  security boundary).
- get_fire_verifier(): pluggable indirection so the DQ-4 escape hatch
  (direct per-job cron-key) can swap in with no handler change.

E.2 — gateway/platforms/api_server.py:
- POST /api/cron/fire (registered only when _CRON_AVAILABLE). Authenticated by
  the NAS-JWT via get_fire_verifier() — NOT API_SERVER_KEY (NAS holds no API
  key; this is the only inbound that triggers remote job execution, so it gets
  its own purpose-scoped check). Verifier args come from cron.chronos.* config.
  401 on bad/missing/forged token. 400 on missing job_id. On success: 202 +
  fire_due runs in the background (so a long agent turn never trips NAS's HTTP
  timeout); the store CAS claim inside fire_due de-dupes a scheduler retry.

Tests:
- test_chronos_verify (11): REAL RS256 signing — valid→claims, wrong-aud,
  missing/wrong purpose, expired, wrong-iss, tampered-signature (attacker key),
  no-key-refuse, empty-token, JWKS-URL key resolution, get_fire_verifier.
- test_cron_fire_webhook (5): valid→202+fire, invalid→401+no-fire, missing
  token→401, missing job_id→400, and fire path does NOT require API_SERVER_KEY.
api_server regression suites (214) green.

E.3 (NAS endpoints) is a separate cross-repo PR; the wire contract lands next
(docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md).
2026-06-18 14:46:33 +10:00