Reserve API requests before their first await, include every drain-owned work type in runtime status, and pause local cron dispatch while a gateway drain is active.
The agent-facing cronjob tool scans the user prompt with _scan_cron_prompt()
before creating/updating a job (tools/cronjob_tools.py); the REST cron
endpoints (POST /api/jobs, PATCH /api/jobs/{id}) validated length but not
content. This adds the same scan to both handlers so an exfiltration/injection
prompt is rejected the same way regardless of which surface created the job.
NOT a security boundary, defense-in-depth / parity only: the REST cron
endpoints are authenticated (every handler runs _check_auth, and connect()
refuses to start without API_SERVER_KEY), and _scan_cron_prompt is a documented
in-process heuristic, not a containment boundary (SECURITY.md 3.2).
Raised externally via GHSA-fr3q-rjg3-x6mf (DNS-rebinding pre-auth RCE). The
report's load-bearing 'no auth by default' premise was already closed three
weeks after it was filed by the API_SERVER_KEY-required guard (commit
1a9ef8314); this lands the create/update prompt-validation parity the report
also pointed at. Scanner imported defensively so a missing scanner cannot
disable the cron REST API.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
Sweep ~74 redundant local imports across 21 files where the same module
was already imported at the top level. Also includes type fixes and lint
cleanups on the same branch.
Plain functions imported as class attributes in APIServerAdapter get
auto-bound as methods via Python's descriptor protocol. Every
self._cron_*() call injected self as the first positional argument,
causing TypeError on all 8 cron API endpoints at runtime.
Wrap each import with staticmethod() so self._cron_*() calls dispatch
correctly without modifying any call sites.
Co-authored-by: teknium <teknium@nousresearch.com>
Five improvements to the /api/jobs endpoints:
1. Startup availability check — cron module imported once at class load,
endpoints return 501 if unavailable (not 500 per-request import error)
2. Input limits — name ≤ 200 chars, prompt ≤ 5000 chars, repeat must be
positive int
3. Update field whitelist — only name/schedule/prompt/deliver/skills/
repeat/enabled pass through to cron.jobs.update_job, preventing
arbitrary key injection
4. Deduplicated validation — _check_job_id and _check_jobs_available
helpers replace repeated boilerplate
5. 32 new tests covering all endpoints, validation, auth, and
cron-unavailable cases
