Fixes#73973.
A finite one-shot whose dispatch was claimed (claim_dispatch increments
repeat.completed BEFORE execution) but whose run died before mark_job_run
was left permanently wedged: completed==times, last_run_at null, state
'scheduled'. The run-claim TTL blocked re-dispatch, and once it expired
the dispatch-limit guard silently removed the job with no output and no
error.
Two complementary fixes:
- cron/scheduler.py run_one_job: the outer handler now catches
BaseException, not just Exception. The inner run_job handler re-raises
CancelledError/KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit after agent teardown, and
none of those are Exception subclasses, so the outer 'except Exception'
missed them and mark_job_run(False) was never called. Failures are now
recorded first (mark_job_run + finish_execution, each independently
guarded), then non-Exception BaseExceptions are re-raised to preserve
teardown semantics. Plain Exceptions keep the existing behavior
(recorded, return False, no re-raise). Empty str(e) (bare
CancelledError) falls back to the exception class name.
- cron/jobs.py: when either removal site (claim_dispatch or the
get_due_jobs dispatch-limit guard) drops a one-shot whose claimed run
never completed (last_run_at null), _write_wedged_oneshot_diagnostic
now writes an operator-visible .md into cron/output/<job_id>/ instead
of vanishing silently. Best-effort: diagnostics can never break the
removal. No diagnostic when last_run_at is set (normal completion
race).
Issue #65773: run_one_job installs a <home>/.env secret scope around every
job; before c758ded6d (#69057) an installed scope was authoritative even
with multiplexing off, so provider keys injected only via the process
environment (container env vars, systemd Environment=) resolved to empty
inside cron and every provider call went out with the no-key-required
placeholder -> HTTP 401, while interactive turns kept working.
The fix landed in agent/secret_scope.py (scope-miss fallthrough to
os.environ when multiplex is off) with unit tests at that layer only.
These two tests pin the end-to-end contract where the bug actually
surfaced - cron's run_one_job:
- env-injected key resolves during run_job with multiplex OFF (fails on
pre-fix code, verified by mutation against c758ded6d~1)
- .env value still wins when both sources define the key (precedence)
Implementation-agnostic: passes whether the fix is the get_secret
fallthrough (main today) or a multiplex guard at the installation site
(the approach in #65801/#65802/#73037).
Per-job cron inference pins are now user-owned: the agent-facing cronjob
tool schema no longer exposes model/provider/base_url, and the registered
handler ignores them even if a model hallucinates the old parameters.
Users set pins via the dashboard, hermes cron create/edit --model/--provider,
or jobs.json directly — and once set, a pin sticks until the user changes it.
Existing agent-era pins are grandfathered untouched.
New cron.model / cron.model_provider config keys give the cron fleet its
own default model, independent of the chat model. Fire-time resolution:
per-job pin > cron.model > HERMES_MODEL > model.default. An axis covered
by the explicit cron-fleet default is deliberate routing, not drift, so
the #44585 fail-closed guard skips it — switching your chat model with
/model or hermes model no longer breaks unpinned cron fleets.
- tools/cronjob_tools.py: drop model param from agent schema + handler;
remove now-dead _resolve_model_override
- cron/scheduler.py: cron.model/model_provider resolution + per-axis
drift-guard skip
- cron/jobs.py: snapshot resolution mirrors the new precedence
- hermes_cli/subcommands/cron.py + hermes_cli/cron.py: --model/--provider
on hermes cron create/edit
- hermes_cli/config.py: cron.model / cron.model_provider defaults
- docs: cron.md model-resolution tip rewritten
When an operator changes the global model/provider config, warn that
unpinned cron jobs with stored snapshots will fail-closed on their next
run. Adds a cron.model_drift_guard config opt-out (default true) for
fleets that should deliberately track changing global defaults.
Addresses #59031. Original PR #59177 by @doncazper.
Root cause: delegate_task children run through three nested daemon-thread
layers (async-delegation executor -> per-child timeout executor -> the
interrupt worker interruptible_api_call spawns). After multi-day gateway
uptime the deepest layer wedges BEFORE the socket opens — the same
fingerprint as the gateway-cron hang (#62151): zero stale-detector output
(the worker never reaches dispatch), all providers, foreground/restart
works. The cron fix (should_use_direct_api_call) explicitly excluded
delegation 'for lack of evidence' — #60203 is that evidence.
- should_use_direct_api_call: extend the inline gate to delegated
children, detected via the delegation ContextVar set by
_run_single_child (platform='subagent' stamp as fallback). Scope
unchanged otherwise: chat_completions wire only; Codex/Anthropic/
Bedrock/MoA keep their established workers. Interrupts still work —
the inline path registers _active_request_abort, which interrupt()
invokes cross-thread (same mechanism the #72227 stall monitor uses).
- _dump_subagent_timeout_diagnostic: dump ALL thread stacks (bounded,
40), not just the conversation worker — a pre-HTTP wedge is
indistinguishable from a slow provider without seeing where the
nested helper threads sit.
Running any state-writing `hermes cron` CLI command as root (the
default for `docker exec`) rewrote jobs.json via mkstemp +
atomic_replace, leaving it root:root mode 600. The gateway's ticker
(uid 1000 via PUID/PGID) was then locked out of every tick with
PermissionError — silently: the liveness heartbeat stayed fresh,
`hermes cron status` opened with 'Gateway is running — cron jobs will
fire automatically', and in the field ~14h of scheduled jobs were
skipped before a human noticed the absence of messages.
Fixes, per the issue's suggested items 1 and 3:
1. Ownership preservation on save (cron/jobs.py): snapshot the owner
before the atomic replace; when the writer is privileged (euid 0)
and the previous owner differs, chown the rewritten file back.
First-time creation inherits the cron dir's owner. Unprivileged
writers never call chown. POSIX-only (guarded via os.name/getattr),
best-effort — a chown failure logs a warning but never breaks the
save. 0600 hardening is unchanged.
2. Zombie-ticker surfacing: the ticker loop (both single-profile and
multiplex paths) now persists the failure reason to a
ticker_last_error marker next to the heartbeat files on every
failed tick, and clears it on the next clean tick. `hermes cron
status` shows the recorded reason in its 'ticks may be failing'
branch, plus an actionable ownership hint when the error is a
PermissionError (recommend `docker exec -u <uid>:<gid>`).
Fixes#68483
Under multiplex_profiles, the gateway starts a single InProcessCronScheduler
bound to the process-global HERMES_HOME (the default profile's home), so
only that profile's cron/jobs.json is ticked. A job registered from a
secondary-profile session lands in <profile>/cron/jobs.json, reports a valid
next_run_at — and never fires.
Changes:
1. cron/scheduler_provider.py — InProcessCronScheduler.start() now accepts
an optional profile_homes kwarg (list of (name, Path) tuples). When set,
_start_multiplex() iterates tick() over each profile home using
use_cron_store(), so every served profile's cron store is ticked on
every tick cycle. Heartbeats and interrupted-execution recovery are also
scoped per profile via use_cron_store().
2. gateway/run.py — start_gateway() now resolves profiles_to_serve(multiplex=True)
when multiplex_profiles is on and passes them to the cron scheduler as
profile_homes. Only applies to InProcessCronScheduler (the built-in);
external providers are unchanged.
3. cron/jobs.py — record_ticker_heartbeat(), get_ticker_heartbeat_age(), and
get_ticker_success_age() now resolve paths via _current_cron_store()
instead of module-level TICKER_HEARTBEAT_FILE / TICKER_SUCCESS_FILE
constants. This makes heartbeats correctly scoped per profile, so
'hermes cron status' reflects liveness for every profile independently
under multiplex_profiles.
4. tests/cron/test_scheduler_provider.py — two new tests:
- test_multiplex_ticker_ticks_each_profile_once: verifies tick() is called
once per profile per tick cycle.
- test_multiplex_heartbeat_scoped_per_profile: verifies heartbeat files
are written to each profile's cron store.
The in_channel flat-delivery clear was gated on `runtime_adapter is not
None`, but the flat continuation session is seeded ONLY on the live-send
path, which also requires a running event loop. When an adapter is
present but the loop is absent/not-running, the live-send/seed block is
skipped and delivery falls through to the standalone path — clearing
thread_id there flattened an unseeded brief with no continuable session
behind it (and bypassed the D6 capability check).
Factor the live-send condition into `live_adapter_ready` and gate both
the thread_id clear and the live-send block on it, so the clear can no
longer drift from the seed. Add an adapter-present/no-running-loop
regression test (verified it fails against the un-scoped clear).
Addresses review r3609147550.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
cron_continuable_surface=in_channel is meant to deliver a cron brief FLAT
into a channel (thread_id=None) so a plain channel reply continues the job
via the shared-channel session. The scheduler already seeds that flat
session (_seed_cron_channel_session) but never cleared the ORIGINAL
target/origin thread_id before routing the actual delivery, so a job
scheduled from inside a Slack thread still delivered into that origin
thread — the seeded continuable session then never matched where the brief
actually landed.
Clear thread_id once in_channel_surface is finalized, before it is re-read
for route_thread_id / the standalone fallback. Scope the clear to EXACTLY
the target that gets flat-seeded — the origin-continuable target
(mirror_this_target) on a live, in_channel-capable adapter
(runtime_adapter is not None):
- fan-out / broadcast / explicit-thread targets keep their thread_id — they
are not continuable and are never seeded, so flattening them would
reroute an explicit thread and could collapse two targets into duplicate
flat sends;
- the standalone no-live-adapter path keeps the origin thread — it can
never seed the flat session, and without an adapter the D6 capability
fail-safe can't run, so flattening there would both drop the brief out of
any continuable lane and bypass D6.
This keeps the clear in lockstep with the seed condition
(in_channel_surface and mirror_this_target) and the D6 fail-safe.
mirror_this_target / origin_user_id are computed earlier using the original
thread_id to match the origin conversation.
Regression tests in TestCronContinuableSurfaceInChannel:
- a job whose origin carries a thread_id must not forward that thread_id to
the live adapter (DeliveryRouter folds target.thread_id into send
metadata), and the seeded continuable session stays flat (thread_id=None);
- with no live adapter, the standalone send falls back to the origin thread
rather than flattening.
With compression.in_place defaulting True the cron session id never
rotates; get_compression_tip returns the input id. Pin that the
salvaged #67188 fix titles/ends the ORIGINAL cron session in that path
(and for falsy tip returns), i.e. zero behavior change when no
compression rotation happened. Also maps colingreig's contributor
email for attribution CI.
run_job now passes target_model to resolve_runtime_provider; the codex
401-refresh test stubbed it with a requested-only lambda. Widen to
**kwargs like every other cron resolver stub.
Two follow-ups to the per-job model pin surface (#67472 / #49948 review):
- cron/scheduler.py: pass target_model=<effective job model> to
resolve_runtime_provider() on the primary path, so providers with
model-specific api_mode routing derive the mode from the model the job
actually runs (per-job pin > env > config default) instead of the stale
persisted default. The auth-fallback path already did this for its
fb_model.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py: POST /api/cron/jobs (and its sync worker) no
longer hardcodes profile="default" when the request carries no profile
param. A pool backend scoped to a named profile now resolves its own
profile via get_active_profile_name(), so pre-profileScoped desktop
clients can't write a named profile's job into ~/.hermes. Unscoped /
custom HERMES_HOME keeps the legacy default fallback.
Tests: target_model capture test on run_job; two profile-default tests on
the create endpoint.
Windows Notepad and PowerShell 5.1 Set-Content -Encoding UTF8 write a
leading UTF-8 BOM. json.load under encoding=utf-8 raises
JSONDecodeError("Unexpected UTF-8 BOM"), and load_jobs wraps that as
RuntimeError("Cron database corrupted and unrepairable"), taking down
cron CRUD/scheduler for a hand-edited jobs.json.
Read with utf-8-sig on all four independent jobs.json readers
(load_jobs primary + strict=False repair, dump _cron_summary, status
Scheduled Jobs). Write path stays plain utf-8 so the next save_jobs
heals a BOM'd file. Matches the env-class dialect (#65123).
Tests: BOM load (crash repro), bomless regression, empty store,
BOM+bare-list auto-repair, BOM+control-char strict=False arm, dump and
status CLI readers.
Review follow-up: the store-internals tests proved _current_cron_store()
resolves lazily, but not that the PUBLIC job I/O honors it. This exercises
save_jobs()/load_jobs() after a late env repoint and asserts the
import-time jobs.json stays byte-identical to a planted sentinel.
Review follow-up: tests that monkeypatch CRON_DIR/JOBS_FILE/OUTPUT_DIR (the
documented process-wide compatibility surface) were bypassed by the lazy
env fallback — 3 file-permission tests, the cross-process lock test, and
the heartbeat roundtrip regressed. _current_cron_store() now snapshots the
constants at import and honors any deliberate re-point of them ahead of
the env resolution, so the precedence is: use_cron_store() override >
patched constants > fresh HERMES_HOME > import defaults. Adds a test
pinning constants-beat-env; the late-env sentinel behavior is unchanged.
tests/cron: failure set byte-identical to unpatched main on this box
(the 5 regressions gone); 138 pass in the touched files.
Complements ec0227b43 (context-scoped cron store): the ContextVar override
is the right tool for deliberate cross-profile scoping, but with no
override active, _current_cron_store() returned the import-time constants —
so a HERMES_HOME set AFTER cron.jobs import (the filed incident: test
fixtures patching the env too late) still read/wrote the user's real
jobs.json. The fallback now resolves the active profile home fresh via
get_hermes_home() (context-local override, then env) and scopes the store
to it; when the home is unchanged since import, the exact module-level
constants are returned as before (zero change in the common path, and they
remain the documented compatibility surface). use_cron_store() still wins.
Three tests: late env repoint scopes the store; unchanged home returns the
import-time constants identically; an active use_cron_store() override
beats the env.
Switch provider and model together after setup-time auth failure. Serialize global auth-store merges under target-specific locks and preserve auth-to-shared lock ordering for profile OAuth refreshes.
Add agent.reasoning_overrides dict to config.yaml. Users can now set
a reasoning_effort per model, overriding the global agent.reasoning_effort.
Example:
agent:
reasoning_effort: "medium" # global default
reasoning_overrides:
"openrouter/anthropic/claude-opus-4.5": "xhigh"
"openai/gpt-5": "low"
"claude-sonnet-4.6": "high" # bare model name also works
The helper is spelling-tolerant: override keys match regardless of
provider prefix or dots-vs-dashes normalization, so users can write
keys in any sensible form and they'll match.
Resolution priority:
1. Session-scoped /reasoning --session override (gateway only; unchanged)
2. Per-model override from agent.reasoning_overrides (spelling-tolerant)
3. Global agent.reasoning_effort (existing)
4. Provider default (unchanged)
Wired into:
- CLI startup (cli.py)
- Messaging gateway agent construction (gateway/run.py)
- Desktop/TUI _load_reasoning_config (tui_gateway/server.py)
- Cron job scheduler (cron/scheduler.py)
- /model mid-session switch (agent/agent_runtime_helpers.py)
+ _primary_runtime now tracks reasoning_config for correct fallback recovery
- Fallback activation (agent/chat_completion_helpers.py::try_activate_fallback)
+ Re-resolves reasoning_config for the fallback model (best-effort)
Closes#21256 (per-model reasoning_effort defaults).
Note: no hermes config set agent.reasoning_overrides.<model> support;
users edit the YAML directly. _set_nested splits on "." and would
corrupt model keys containing version dots.
Salvage of #63935. The original fix read HERMES_CRON_SESSION_DB_TIMEOUT
from a bare env var, but AGENTS.md requires non-secret behavioral
settings to live in config.yaml with an env var bridge only for
backward compatibility.
Changes:
- Add cron.session_db_timeout_seconds to DEFAULT_CONFIG (default 10s)
- Resolution order: HERMES_CRON_SESSION_DB_TIMEOUT env override →
cron.session_db_timeout_seconds in config.yaml → 10s default
(mirrors the existing script_timeout_seconds pattern)
- 0 = unlimited (opt-in for debugging, skips the bound)
- Strengthen test: assert the warning is logged on invalid env value
(caplog was taken but never asserted)
- Add test: verify config.yaml resolution path works end-to-end
Co-authored-by: LoicHmh <26006141+LoicHmh@users.noreply.github.com>
run_job() constructs SessionDB() synchronously with no timeout of its
own, unlike the agent's run_conversation call further down, which is
already bounded by HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT. A wedged sqlite3.connect (e.g.
a stale flock from a crashed sibling process) hangs this call
indefinitely.
That hang is invisible to every existing cron safeguard because it
happens before _submit_with_guard's future exists: the finally block
that discards the job ID from _running_job_ids never runs. The job
stays wedged "running" — every later tick logs "already running —
skipping" — until the whole gateway process is restarted.
Observed in production: a cron job's worker thread was confirmed via
a live py-spy thread dump to be parked inside SessionDB.__init__'s
sqlite3.connect for 3+ days, silently skipping every scheduled fire
in between across a gateway process that otherwise stayed healthy.
Bound the SessionDB() construction with its own timeout
(HERMES_CRON_SESSION_DB_TIMEOUT, default 10s), following the same
bounded-thread-pool pattern already used elsewhere in this file (the
delivery retry path, and the agent inactivity watchdog just below).
On timeout, log at ERROR and proceed with session_db=None instead of
degrading silently to debug level, since an actual hang here is a new
condition worth surfacing.
Adds tests/cron/test_sessiondb_init_hang.py, including an end-to-end
regression proving the dispatch guard is released and a subsequent
tick can fire the same job again after a simulated hang.
Reserve API requests before their first await, include every drain-owned work type in runtime status, and pause local cron dispatch while a gateway drain is active.
get_due_jobs()'s one-shot stale-entry recovery (#38758) treated an
expired run_claim (#59229) as proof the claiming tick died, but a run
stalled on network I/O — or a laptop asleep mid-run — legitimately
outlives the TTL while very much alive. The recovery then deleted the
job record mid-flight: list showed the job gone, and when the run
finished mark_job_run() found nothing to update, so last_run_at /
last_status / last_delivery_error were never recorded.
Two guards, per the liveness signals available:
- Same process (the common single-gateway case): before removing a
dispatch-limit-reached one-shot, consult the scheduler's running set
via a lazy import; if the job is still running here it is slow, not
stale — keep the entry.
- Cross process: run_job's monitor loop now refreshes run_claim.at
every 60s while the run is alive (including under
HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=0, which previously blocked without polling), so
an expired claim really does mean the owner died and the TTL stays a
dead-owner detector.
Fixes#62002
Structural completion of the malformed-job freeze fixes (#61382 id-less,
#61525 non-dict schedule, #61581 bad next_run_at): wrap the per-job body
of _get_due_jobs_locked in try/except so any FUTURE malformed-field
variant degrades to skipping that one job for the tick instead of
aborting the scan before save_jobs() and freezing the whole profile's
scheduler.
Also: restore test_repeated_concurrent_runs_accumulate_completed_count
to TestMarkJobRunConcurrency (accidentally re-parented by the #61581
diff), add a containment regression test, and AUTHOR_MAP for hydracoco7.
E2E: one jobs.json carrying all five malformed shapes (drifted job_id,
missing id, null schedule, garbage next_run_at, non-string last_run_at)
plus a healthy sibling — single tick contains all five, sibling fires,
repairs persist, second tick stable. 670 cron tests green.
One bad next_run_at value in jobs.json aborts the due-jobs scan with
ValueError from fromisoformat, before any save_jobs, so siblings lose
progress (fast-forwards etc).
Early normalization in _get_due_jobs_locked + defensive parses in
compute_next_run / _recoverable_oneshot_run_at.
Added test_bad_next_run_at_does_not_crash_or_block_sibling_jobs.
