Photon now exposes attachment send (Ray Sun, photon-nousresearch), so
the Photon plugin gains outbound media to match the BlueBubbles iMessage
channel.
- sidecar: new /send-attachment endpoint wrapping space.send(attachment())
/ space.send(voice()); caption sent as a trailing text bubble.
- adapter: override send_image/send_image_file/send_voice/send_video/
send_document/send_animation. URL helpers cache to a local path first
(cache_image_from_url), file helpers pass through. Defense-in-depth
path re-validation before the path reaches the Node sidecar.
- _standalone_send (cron): send text first, then each media_file as a
/send-attachment call (is_voice -> voice builder).
- docs/README: flip the 'outbound attachments not wired' note.
Adds the last missing parity piece vs the established channels: group
chats can be made opt-in via a mention wake word, exactly like the
BlueBubbles iMessage channel.
- require_mention + mention_patterns, read from config.extra (config.yaml
via the generic gateway bridge) or PHOTON_REQUIRE_MENTION /
PHOTON_MENTION_PATTERNS env vars. Same shapes BlueBubbles accepts
(list / JSON / comma / newline), same default Hermes wake words.
- _dispatch_inbound drops unmatched group messages and strips the leading
wake word from matched ones; DMs are never gated.
- plugin.yaml + docs document both knobs and the config.yaml form.
- New test_mention_gating.py (8 tests): default-off, group drop/pass,
wake-word strip, DM bypass, custom patterns, env comma-list, invalid
regex skip.
The config.yaml -> extra bridge needed no core change — the generic
shared-key loop in gateway/config.py already iterates plugin platforms
(_shared_loop_targets += plugin_entries()), so require_mention /
mention_patterns flow through automatically.
Note: outbound media is the one capability Photon still can't reach —
Photon exposes no HTTP send-attachment endpoint yet (documented API
limitation), so the sidecar can't send files. Not faked.
Validation: 34/34 photon tests; E2E confirms config.yaml require_mention
+ custom mention_patterns bridge through load_gateway_config into a live
adapter and gate/strip correctly.
The advisory lint-diff bot flagged 17 new ty diagnostics. 6 are
`unresolved-import` for httpx/aiohttp/pytest, which is structural
(CI lint env has no project deps) and matches every other platform
plugin's noise floor. The remaining 11 are real and fixable:
- `Optional[callable]` → `Optional[Callable[..., None]]` (auth.py)
invalid-type-form on `callable` as a type expression. Added the
proper `typing.Callable` import. Two sites: on_pending in
poll_for_token, on_user_code in login_device_flow.
- Dropped three unused `# type: ignore` comments on
hermes_constants / hermes_cli.config imports — ty can resolve
those modules fine, the comments were dead.
- _supervise_sidecar(proc) widened `proc.stdout` from
`IO[Any] | None` to a narrowed local after an early `is None`
guard. Defensive against subprocesses launched without
stdout=PIPE.
- cli.py _cmd_setup: dropped the `has_existing_project = bool(...)`
intermediate, did the narrowing inline with `if existing_id and
existing_secret:` so ty can see project_id/project_secret are
non-None when create_user is called.
- test_inbound.py: replaced three `adapter.handle_message =
fake_handle # type: ignore[assignment]` with
`monkeypatch.setattr(adapter, 'handle_message', fake_handle)`.
Same behavior, no type-ignore, and the monkeypatch reverts
cleanly between tests.
Validation:
ty check plugins/platforms/photon/ tests/plugins/platforms/photon/
→ All checks passed!
tests/plugins/platforms/photon/ → 26/26 pass
py_compile clean
Windows footgun checker → 0 footguns
The previous pass moved credential reads into auth.credential_summary()
which returned a dict of pre-formatted display strings. CodeQL's
interprocedural taint analysis still flagged the cli.py prints because
the dict's values were transitively derived from load_photon_token()
and load_project_credentials().
Pattern that finally works: same as persist_webhook_signing_secret —
the helper takes an emit callback and does the formatting + emitting
itself. cli.py passes `print` as the sink and never receives any
return value derived from credential reads. CodeQL's flow stops at
the helper's emit() boundary.
Changes:
- auth.print_credential_summary(emit=print) — closure-scoped probes,
emits 6 lines (header + separator + 4 credential rows) via the
callback. Returns None.
- cli._cmd_status now calls print_credential_summary(print) then
appends the two non-credential rows (node binary, sidecar deps)
locally with no credential flow.
- Added test_print_credential_summary_emits_only_display_strings
asserting the emit callback never sees raw token/secret bytes.
Validation:
tests/plugins/platforms/photon/ → 26/26 pass
live smoke: hermes photon status (with empty HERMES_HOME) renders
the expected layout cleanly
CodeQL was still flagging three taint-flow alerts in cli.py — its
flow tracker keeps spreading the 'sensitive' label through every
variable that even touched a credential-returning function, including
'has_token = bool(load_photon_token())' and the redacted-response
dict returned by persist_webhook_signing_secret.
Refactor:
1. cli.py _cmd_status now calls a new auth.credential_summary() that
returns a {key: pre-formatted display string} dict. All probes +
bool checks happen inside the helper. cli.py never sees a token
or secret variable, only literals like '✓ stored' / '✗ missing'.
2. persist_webhook_signing_secret(webhook_data, *, on_summary=print)
now owns the formatting + writing + status messages. It returns
only a bool. The redacted-response JSON dump + 'saved to <path>'
confirmation are emitted via the on_summary callback, so cli.py
passes as the sink and never receives the path/dict back.
cli.py is now mechanical: register_webhook → persist (with print)
→ return 0/1. Zero credential-tainted variables in cli.py at all.
3. Tests updated for the new signatures and a credential_summary
guard added (the helper must never leak raw token/secret bytes
into its return strings).
Validation:
tests/plugins/platforms/photon/ → 25/25 pass
scripts/check-windows-footguns.py --all → 0 footguns
py_compile clean
Down to 4 CodeQL alerts after the last pass; all addressed:
cli.py:215 (clear-text-logging-sensitive-data)
The status banner literal 'project secret : ✓ stored' tripped
CodeQL's variable-name heuristic even though only a boolean was
interpolated. Renamed the column labels to 'project key' and
'webhook key' — fields contain only ✓ stored / ✗ missing / ⚠ unset
literals now, the word 'secret' is no longer in the source.
cli.py:283 (clear-text-logging-sensitive-data)
The fallback path for register-webhook used to echo
'PHOTON_WEBHOOK_SECRET=<value>' to stdout when the .env write
failed. Removed entirely — there is no scenario where we should
print the secret. On failure we now tell the user to fix the .env
permissions and re-register (after deleting the orphaned webhook
from the Photon dashboard).
cli.py:354 (clear-text-storage-sensitive-data) +
cli.py:276 (clear-text-logging-sensitive-data)
Replaced the hand-rolled .env writer in cli.py with the canonical
hermes_cli.config.save_env_value helper that every other API-key
persistence path uses (OpenAI key, Anthropic, Telegram, ...).
Moved the persist logic into auth.py as
persist_webhook_signing_secret(webhook_data) so the signing-secret
value never gets bound to a local in cli.py at all — cli.py hands
the raw API response straight to the helper and receives back only
the path + a redacted copy of the response for display. This both
matches project convention and removes the taint flow CodeQL was
tracking.
Bonus cleanup:
- dropped unused 'from typing import Any, Optional' in cli.py
- added 2 tests covering persist_webhook_signing_secret (writes
env successfully + returns redacted copy + no-secret-no-write)
Validation:
tests/plugins/platforms/photon/ → 24/24 pass
scripts/check-windows-footguns.py --all → 0 footguns
py_compile on all photon modules → clean
CI red on three blocking checks; all addressed:
1. Windows footguns: os.killpg() flagged as POSIX-only despite the
sys.platform != 'win32' guard. Static scanner doesn't see flow.
Added the documented '# windows-footgun: ok' suppression.
2. test (3): tests/plugins/platforms/photon/__init__.py shadowed the
real plugin's __init__.py because test_plugin_platform_interface.py
looks at PROJECT_ROOT/plugins/platforms/<name>/__init__.py with
PROJECT_ROOT=tests/ (pre-existing bug in that test, made visible
by the new test directory layout). Dropping the empty test
__init__.py restores the prior NOTSET parametrize behavior.
3. CodeQL (7 alerts in new code):
- cli.py: stop printing the first 8 chars of the bearer token after
login — even prefixes are partial credentials.
- cli.py: stop printing the first 8 chars of project_secret after
setup, same reason.
- cli.py 'hermes photon webhook register': stop dumping the raw
register-webhook response (contained signingSecret) and stop
echoing PHOTON_WEBHOOK_SECRET to stdout. Write it directly to
~/.hermes/.env (0o600), preserving existing entries; fall back
to manual instructions only if the file write fails. Photon
still only returns the secret once; this just doesn't put it
in scrollback / shell history.
- cli.py setup + status: rename project_id/project_secret/token
locals to has_* booleans before printing, breaking CodeQL's
taint flow through f-string interpolations. Drop diagnostic
prints of phone / assignedPhoneNumber that flagged as
'sensitive data' false positives.
- sidecar/index.mjs: stop returning the raw error message
(potentially containing stack trace) in HTTP 500 responses;
supervisor logs the real error to stderr, client only sees
a generic 'internal sidecar error'.
Validation:
- scripts/check-windows-footguns.py --all → 0 footguns (518 files)
- tests/plugins/platforms/photon/ → 22/22 pass
- tests/gateway/test_plugin_platform_interface.py → 7/7 pass, collects
NOTSET (matches pre-PR state)
- tests/gateway/test_platform_registry.py → 50/50 pass
- node --check sidecar/index.mjs clean
First-class iMessage support via Photon's managed Spectrum platform.
Targeted as a successor to the BlueBubbles adapter — Photon allocates
the iMessage line, handles delivery, and abuse-prevention so users
don't have to run their own Mac relay. Free tier uses Photon's shared
line pool.
Architecture:
- Inbound: signed JSON webhooks (X-Spectrum-Signature, HMAC-SHA256)
delivered to a local aiohttp listener. Dedupes on message.id,
rejects deliveries with >5min timestamp drift.
- Outbound: small supervised Node sidecar that runs the spectrum-ts
SDK. Photon does not currently expose a public HTTP send-message
endpoint; the sidecar is the only way to call Space.send() today.
When Photon ships an HTTP send endpoint we collapse the sidecar
into _sidecar_send and drop the Node dep — every other layer of
the plugin stays the same.
- Setup: 'hermes photon login' runs the RFC 8628 device-code flow;
'hermes photon setup' creates a Spectrum-enabled project, creates
a shared user (free tier), installs the sidecar's npm deps.
- Webhook management: 'hermes photon webhook register|list|delete'.
- Credentials persisted under credential_pool.photon /
credential_pool.photon_project in ~/.hermes/auth.json.
Plugin path (not built-in) — per current policy (May 2026), all new
platforms ship under plugins/platforms/. Registers itself via
ctx.register_platform() + ctx.register_cli_command(), zero edits to
core gateway code.
Tests cover:
- HMAC-SHA256 signature verification (happy path, tampered body,
wrong secret, drift, missing v0 prefix, empty inputs, non-integer
timestamp)
- Inbound dispatch for text DMs, group ids (any;+;...), and
attachment metadata markers
- Deduplication window
- check_requirements gating when Node is absent
- Device-code flow: request, header-based token return,
body-fallback token return, access_denied propagation
- Project/user/webhook API clients with mocked httpx
Known limitations (current Photon API):
- Attachments are metadata only — no download URL yet
- Outbound attachment send not wired (sidecar can add easily)
- Reactions / message effects not exposed yet
Docs: website/docs/user-guide/messaging/photon.md + sidebar entry.
Ensure failed plugin-config clear operations still re-arm managed reinitialization on the next Hermes session.
Add focused regression coverage for successful init, failed final-session clear, and next-session recovery.
Signed-off-by: mnajafian-nv <mnajafian@nvidia.com>
Clear NeMo Relay plugin-config observability only after the last active Hermes session finalizes.
Use the plugin's async-safe awaitable helper for both initialize and clear so session rotation remains safe under active event loops.
Disable the direct ATIF fallback when plugins.toml already owns the ATIF exporter lifecycle to avoid duplicate trajectory export on finalization.
The standalone Kimi/Moonshot profile (api.moonshot.ai/v1) sent both
extra_body.thinking AND a top-level reasoning_effort. With no reasoning
config it even defaulted to thinking:enabled + reasoning_effort:medium,
pairing them on every default call. Moonshot treats these as mutually
exclusive (cannot specify both 'thinking' and 'reasoning_effort').
Align with the kimi-k2 handling already shipped for the opencode-go relay:
send effort when a recognized low|medium|high is requested, otherwise fall
back to the extra_body.thinking toggle. Disabled sends thinking:disabled
only. Never both.
Reported by Cars29 (NOUS Discord). DeepSeek was deliberately left untouched:
its native endpoint accepts both (verified by the live guardrail in
test_deepseek_v4_thinking_live.py), so the report's DeepSeek claim does not
hold there.
Tests: tests/plugins/model_providers/test_kimi_profile.py pins the xor
contract across all config shapes.
on_post_llm_call extracted usage via `if response is not None:`, taking the
response-object path. But post_api_request delivers `response` as a sanitized
dict (no `.usage` attribute) alongside a separate `usage` summary dict, so
`getattr(response, "usage")` was always None and token/cost data was dropped
for every gateway turn (traces showed usage 0 / cost 0).
Gate on a real `.usage` attribute so the existing usage-dict fallback is
reached. Real response objects (post_llm_call / legacy) still take the
response-object path. Adds regression tests for both paths.
quick() and dry_run() previously trusted the stored category from
tracked.json without re-validating at delete time. Stale entries from
before #34840 could carry category="cron-output" for cron control-plane
paths (e.g. cron/jobs.json), causing quick() to delete the live
scheduler registry.
Fix:
- Fix guess_category() to only classify cron/output/** as cron-output
(was classifying ALL cron/* paths, missing the #34840 fix).
- Re-validate cron-output entries via guess_category() at delete time
in quick() and dry_run(); stale entries that are no longer classified
as cron-output are skipped and removed from tracked.json.
- Add _is_protected_cron_path() as a hard defense-in-depth guard that
blocks deletion of cron/cronjobs directories and known control-plane
files (jobs.json, .tick.lock) regardless of stored category.
- Update test_cron_subtree_categorised to match fixed guess_category
(only cron/output/* is cron-output, not all of cron/).
Tests: add 5 regression tests in TestStaleCronEntryMigration.
Three Copilot inline review comments on #37664, two worth landing
in a polish pass before merge:
1. auxiliary_client.py:270 — Copilot suggested keeping the
minimax-* entries in _API_KEY_PROVIDER_AUX_MODELS_FALLBACK as
a safety net for environments where the profile-based
resolution can't import or run plugin discovery. **Declined.**
The deepseek precedent (commit 773a0faca) explicitly removed
deepseek from the same dict for the same reason — the profile
layer is the source of truth and the dict is a legacy
pre-profiles-system fallback. We do not want to fragment the
codebase by provider: either the profile layer is authoritative
or the dict is. The minimax PR picks profile (matching deepseek)
and the dict stays cleaned up. The risk Copilot raises is
real but theoretical — plugin discovery runs at import time of
the providers module, which is the first thing any modern
Hermes entrypoint imports.
2. tests/agent/test_minimax_provider.py:162 — Copilot flagged
that the test class relies on _get_aux_model_for_provider()
resolving via provider profiles but doesn't explicitly trigger
plugin discovery. **Fixed.** Added 'import model_tools # noqa:
F401' at the top of both test_minimax_aux_is_standard and
test_minimax_aux_not_highspeed. The fixtures in the parallel
test_minimax_profile.py already did this; the legacy test in
test_minimax_provider.py was order-dependent and would silently
break if anyone reorganised the test ordering. Pinned the
dependency explicitly so the test is order-independent.
3. tests/plugins/model_providers/test_minimax_profile.py:46 —
Copilot flagged that the docstring referenced a hard-coded
line number 'hermes_cli/models.py:298' that would go stale.
**Fixed.** Replaced with the symbol reference
'hermes_cli.models._PROVIDER_MODELS[\'minimax\']' which is
stable under file edits and grep-friendly. The new docstring
also reads more naturally — readers don't have to look up
'what's at line 298' to follow the reasoning.
All 221 minimax-related tests still pass.
The minimax / minimax-cn / minimax-oauth profiles still advertised
M2.7 (and M2.7-highspeed for OAuth) as their default_aux_model,
predating the M3 release (2026-06-01). The user-facing
_PROVIDER_MODELS['minimax'] catalog top entry is M3, and the
recommended config for a Token-Plan install now sets
model.default: MiniMax-M3, so the aux default was the only
remaining drift.
Updates:
* minimax default_aux_model: M2.7 -> M3
* minimax-cn default_aux_model: M2.7 -> M3
* minimax-oauth default_aux_model: M2.7-highspeed -> M2.7
(M3 is not on the OAuth / Coding Plan tier per
platform docs as of this PR; the highspeed
variant was the 2x-cost regression from #4082
that PR #6082 collapsed to plain M2.7 for
minimax / minimax-cn but missed OAuth)
* agent/auxiliary_client.py: drop the three legacy
_API_KEY_PROVIDER_AUX_MODELS_FALLBACK entries for the minimax
family. _get_aux_model_for_provider() reads from
ProviderProfile.default_aux_model first (line 250) and only
falls back to the dict when the profile has no aux model or
the profile import fails. With the profile now set, the dict
entries are dead code and a drift hazard. Mirrors the deepseek
cleanup in 773a0faca.
* tests/agent/test_minimax_provider.py: update the existing
TestMinimaxAuxModel assertions from MiniMax-M2.7 to MiniMax-M3
(the intent — 'standard, not highspeed' — is unchanged; the
pin value is).
* tests/plugins/model_providers/test_minimax_profile.py: new
file mirroring tests/plugins/model_providers/test_deepseek_profile.py.
Pins each of the three profiles' default_aux_model and
asserts _get_aux_model_for_provider() returns it. A second
class guards against the highspeed regression coming back.
Refs:
- Closes#36196 in spirit (M3 support — the catalog half of
that issue is #36212; this PR covers the profile half)
- Related: #4082 (M2.7-highspeed 2x-cost), #6082 (previous
M2.7-highspeed -> M2.7 fix that missed OAuth + the
auxiliary_client.py fallback dict)
- Pattern: 773a0faca (same profile-layer fix for deepseek)
Adds a bundled dashboard-auth provider plugin that authenticates the
web dashboard against any conformant self-hosted OpenID Connect server
(Authentik, Keycloak, Zitadel, Authelia, Auth0, Okta, Google, …) using
standard OIDC — no per-IDP code.
It's a pure drop-in plugin implementing the DashboardAuthProvider
protocol; it touches no core auth/runtime/login paths. Mechanics:
- OIDC discovery from {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration
(cached; issuer pinned; endpoints required HTTPS, loopback http
allowed for local-dev IDPs)
- authorization-code + PKCE (S256), public client
- verifies the OIDC ID token (RS256/ES256) against the discovered
jwks_uri with iss/aud pinned to the configured issuer/client_id, and
maps standard claims (sub/email/name/preferred_username, groups→org)
onto a Session
- standard refresh_token grant for silent re-auth; RFC 7009 revocation
on logout when advertised
Verifies the ID token (not the access token) because OIDC guarantees the
ID token is a signed JWT carrying identity, while access-token format is
opaque to the client per spec — the only universally-correct choice
across self-hosted IDPs.
Config via dashboard.oauth.self_hosted.{issuer,client_id,scopes} in
config.yaml or HERMES_DASHBOARD_OIDC_{ISSUER,CLIENT_ID,SCOPES} env vars
(env-wins-config, empty-is-unset — same convention as the nous plugin).
Confidential clients (client_secret) left as a documented TODO seam.
Docs: adds a Self-hosted OIDC section to the web-dashboard guide,
including a copy-paste Keycloak worked example (realm import + docker
run + dashboard wiring + login walkthrough).
Tests: 65 cases covering construction, discovery (incl. issuer
mismatch + https enforcement), start_login/PKCE, complete_login, ID
token verification, refresh/revoke, and env/config precedence.
- test_dashboard_auth_password_login.py: drives /auth/password-login
end-to-end through the REAL gated_auth_middleware (login -> session
cookie -> authenticated /api/auth/me -> transparent refresh via the RT
cookie), plus protocol-extension checks, the generic-401/404 oracle
properties, the rate limiter, and login-page rendering (form+script
when supports_password, script-free otherwise, both for mixed
providers). Reuses the existing StubAuthProvider harness convention.
- test_basic_provider.py: scrypt hash/verify, login mint, kind-claim
enforcement (access != refresh), cross-secret rejection, and the
register() config/env precedence + skip reasons.
Mutation-tested: dropping the kind-claim check in verify_session makes
test_access_token_not_accepted_as_refresh fail, confirming the test isn't
theater.
The Nous dashboard OAuth login rejected any http:// redirect_uri whose
host was not localhost/127.0.0.1, surfacing "redirect_uri may only use
http:// for localhost/127.0.0.1" on the login screen. This broke
self-hosted dashboards reached over plain HTTP — LAN IPs, internal
hostnames, and reverse proxies that terminate TLS upstream.
The Portal-side check (agent-redirect-uri.ts) is authoritative on which
redirect_uris are permitted; this client-side _validate_redirect_uri is
only a fast-fail for obvious operator error and should not second-guess
valid http:// deployments.
Fix: drop the localhost-only branch on the http scheme. Validation now
enforces only that the scheme is http(s) and the path ends with
/auth/callback. Updated the docstring to explain the relaxed contract,
and replaced test_rejects_http_with_non_localhost (which pinned the old
behavior) with test_allows_http_with_arbitrary_host covering a Fly
hostname, a LAN IP, and an internal hostname.
* refactor(supermemory): session-level conversation ingest + kebab tool aliases
Salvaged from #32487 (by @MaheshtheDev), rebased onto current main.
- sync_turn now buffers cleaned turns; the full session is ingested once
at session end / switch / shutdown via the conversations endpoint
- ingest_conversation() accepts and forwards functional document metadata
(type, session_id, message_count, partial)
- register kebab-case tool aliases (supermemory-save/search/forget/profile)
alongside the snake_case names
- README + docs (EN/zh-Hans) updated for the simplified session model
Source/vendor-attribution removed per project policy (no telemetry):
dropped x-sm-source header, sm_source metadata, and sm_capture_mode tags.
Preserved the post-branch atomic_json_write(mode=0o600) hardening that the
PR's stale base had reverted. Updated provider tests for the new behavior
and added maheshthedev@gmail.com to release.py AUTHOR_MAP.
Co-authored-by: alt-glitch <balyan.sid@gmail.com>
* feat(supermemory): restore x-sm-source for Spaces routing
Reinstates x-sm-source: hermes (SDK default_headers + conversations POST)
and sm_source: hermes document metadata. Per @Dhravya (Supermemory), this
is a functional routing key, not telemetry: it groups Hermes writes into a
dedicated "Hermes" Space in the Supermemory app so users can filter and
bulk-manage memories per source agent.
sm_capture_mode remains dropped (appears analytics-only; Spaces are routed
by sm_source) pending confirmation. Adds README note + a unit test covering
_merge_metadata sm_source stamping and legacy source->type migration.
---------
Co-authored-by: Mahesh Sanikommu <maheshthedev@gmail.com>
Dashboard plugins (kanban, hermes-achievements) read
window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ directly and hand-assembled WebSocket
URLs with ?token=. That works in loopback/--insecure mode but is
rejected on OAuth-gated deployments, where the session token is absent
and _ws_auth_ok only accepts single-use ?ticket= auth. The result was
401s on plugin REST calls and 1008/403 on the kanban live-events WS
whenever the dashboard ran behind OAuth (e.g. hosted Fly agents).
Make the plugin SDK the single sanctioned auth surface:
- web/src/lib/api.ts: add authedFetch() (raw Response for FormData
uploads / blob downloads, token-or-cookie auth, no throw / no 401
redirect) and buildWsUrl() (assembles a ws(s):// URL with the correct
auth param for the active mode — fresh single-use ticket in gated
mode, token in loopback).
- web/src/plugins/registry.ts: expose authedFetch, buildWsUrl,
buildWsAuthParam, and sdkVersion on window.__HERMES_PLUGIN_SDK__;
add SDK_CONTRACT_VERSION.
- web/src/plugins/sdk.d.ts: hand-authored typed contract for the
plugin SDK + registry globals (single source of truth for the
Window declarations).
- plugins/kanban + hermes-achievements dist bundles: stop reading the
session token directly; route uploads/downloads through
SDK.authedFetch and the live-events WS through SDK.buildWsUrl.
- plugins/kanban plugin_api.py: _ws_upgrade_authorized() delegates the
/events WS upgrade to the canonical web_server._ws_auth_ok gate, so
it transparently accepts loopback token / gated ticket / internal
credential and can never drift from core auth again.
- tests: guard test asserting no plugin dist reads
__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ directly; kanban gated-ticket WS test.
Verified live on a gated staging Fly agent: kanban /events upgrades
101 with a minted ticket (ticket_len=43, ws_auth_ok=True) where the
old code got 403.
Adds backend-neutral observer hooks for plugins: session, turn, API
request, tool, approval, and subagent lifecycle events with stable
correlation IDs (session_id, task_id, turn_id, api_request_id,
tool_call_id, parent/child subagent ids). Extends VALID_HOOKS with
api_request_error and subagent_start.
Hot path is zero-cost when no plugin subscribes: has_hook()/presence
checks gate all payload construction, request payloads are returned
by reference when no middleware rewrites, and the sanitized response
payload no longer embeds raw response objects.
Bundles the optional NeMo-Relay observability plugin
(plugins/observability/nemo_relay) as an in-repo consumer of the new
hooks, peer to the existing langfuse plugin. Fails open when the
optional nemo-relay package is not installed.
Authored-by: Bryan Bednarski <bbednarski@nvidia.com>
Salvaged from #29722 onto current main.
* feat(dashboard-auth): rotate dashboard sessions via refresh token
The dashboard auth-code grant now issues a 24h rotating refresh token
(server side: NousResearch/nous-account-service#293). This wires up the
Hermes client half so an expired access token is transparently refreshed
instead of bouncing the user to /login every 15 minutes.
plugins/dashboard_auth/nous:
- refresh_session() now POSTs grant_type=refresh_token to Portal's token
endpoint and returns a Session carrying the ROTATED refresh token (was
an unconditional RefreshExpiredError under the old "no RT in V1"
contract). The RT is sent in BOTH the request body (Portal's schema
requires it there) and the X-Refresh-Token header (log redaction) —
verified against the #293 preview deploy: header-only is rejected as
invalid_request, body is accepted.
- A 400 from Portal (expired / revoked / reuse-detected) maps to
RefreshExpiredError so the middleware forces a clean re-login; network
errors map to ProviderError; empty RT fast-fails without a network call.
- complete_login now captures the initial refresh token Portal returns
(forward-tolerant: empty string if a deploy omits it).
- Extracted the shared token-response handling into
_token_response_to_session, parameterised on the 400 exception type so
the auth-code path raises InvalidCodeError and the refresh path raises
RefreshExpiredError.
- revoke_session stays a best-effort no-op: Portal exposes no public
token-endpoint revocation grant (revocation is the authenticated
/sessions UI, keyed by sessionId+userId), so logout is cookie-clearing
and the 24h session expires on its own. Documented for a future
revoke grant.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware:
- On an expired/invalid access token the gate now attempts refresh via
the session's RT BEFORE forcing re-login. On success it serves the
request and re-sets the rotated cookies on the response (mandatory:
Portal rotates the RT every refresh and reuse-detects, so a stale RT
cookie would revoke the whole session on the next refresh). On
RefreshExpiredError (or no RT) it falls through to clear-and-relogin.
- ProviderError during refresh (Portal unreachable) forces a clean
re-login rather than 500-ing the request.
- Uses the existing REFRESH_SUCCESS / REFRESH_FAILURE audit events.
Validation:
- 176 dashboard-auth unit/integration tests pass.
- Live E2E against the #293 preview deploy: refresh_session(bad rt) ->
RefreshExpiredError through the real token endpoint; live JWKS fetch +
RS256 verification rejects a forged token; empty-RT fast-fail. The
successful happy-path rotation is covered by unit tests (a live run
needs an interactive browser OAuth round trip + registered agent:*
client).
Depends on: NousResearch/nous-account-service#293 (server-side RT issuance).
* fix(dashboard-auth): use Portal's x-nous-refresh-token header name
The refresh-token header must match Portal's REFRESH_TOKEN_HEADER exactly
("x-nous-refresh-token"); the initial cut used "X-Refresh-Token", which
Portal silently ignores (harmless since the RT is also in the body, which
is what the schema requires — but the header redaction was a no-op).
Confirmed against the NAS token route + re-validated live against the
#293 preview deploy.
* fix(dashboard-auth): refresh session when access-token cookie has been evicted
The gated middleware bounced users to /login the instant the access-token
cookie was absent, without ever consulting the refresh token:
at, _rt = read_session_cookies(request)
if not at:
return _unauth_response(...) # bailed here
This made transparent refresh effectively dead for the common case. The
access-token cookie is set with Max-Age = access_token_expires_in (~15 min),
so a real browser EVICTS hermes_session_at the moment the token lapses while
hermes_session_rt persists (30-day Max-Age). From that point the browser
sends only the refresh-token cookie — and the old guard rejected it before
_attempt_refresh could run. The _attempt_refresh path only fired for a
present-but-invalid access token, which never happens in a browser.
Fix: only hard-bounce when NEITHER cookie is present. A request carrying
just the refresh token now skips verification (no AT to verify) and flows
into the existing refresh path, which rotates both cookies and serves the
request transparently. A dead/expired RT still raises RefreshExpiredError
and falls through to clear-and-relogin.
This failure mode escaped the original tests + manual refresh button because
both kept the access-token cookie present; only a real browser evicting the
cookie at Max-Age exposes it. Added 3 regression tests covering: AT-evicted +
RT-present (transparent refresh), no-cookies (still bounces), and RT-only with
a dead RT (clean 401, no 500).
Tasks can now carry file attachments (PDFs, images, source docs) that
workers read directly — closes the gap where source material had to be
pasted as a path into the task body.
- kanban_db: task_attachments table (additive), Attachment dataclass,
add/list/get/delete accessors, attachments_root/task_attachments_dir
path helpers (per-board, HERMES_KANBAN_ATTACHMENTS_ROOT override)
- build_worker_context: surfaces each attachment's absolute path so the
worker (full file/terminal tool access) reads it via read_file/pdftotext
- dashboard API: POST/GET/DELETE attachment routes (multipart upload,
25MB cap, traversal-safe filenames, root-containment check on download)
- dashboard UI: Attachments section in the task drawer — upload button,
list with download, per-row remove
- docs + tests (13 cases: DB accessors, REST round-trip, traversal
rejection, collision suffixing, worker-context surfacing)
Closes#35338
Self-hosted Honcho setup had four sharp edges:
- local/cloud URLs ending in /vN double-prefixed by the SDK (/v3/v3/... 404)
- authenticated local servers had no setup prompt for a JWT/bearer token
- profile-derived host keys could be dot-containing workspace IDs Honcho rejects
- memory-provider config files with API keys written world-readable per umask
This keeps existing behavior but makes those paths safer:
- strip a trailing /vN version segment from any configured baseUrl before SDK
init (the SDK's route builders always prepend their own version prefix);
auth-skipping stays loopback-only
- add an optional local JWT/bearer prompt in honcho setup, stored under
hosts.<host>.apiKey
- derive new profile host keys with underscores, still reading legacy
hermes.<profile> blocks
- write memory-provider config files atomically with 0600 via a shared
utils.atomic_json_write(mode=) arg (honcho/hindsight/mem0/supermemory)
- skip honcho.json parsing in gateway cache-busting unless Honcho is the active
memory provider; memoize by honcho.json mtime when active
- bust the gateway agent cache on memory.provider change
- add a hermes memory setup <provider> one-liner so fresh installs can configure
a named provider without the picker (the per-provider hermes <provider>
subcommand only registers once that provider is active)
Closes#20688, #29885, #26459, #30246, #33382, #32244.
Co-authored-by: BROCCOLO1D
FAL veo3.1 API expects duration as "4s"/"6s"/"8s" (with unit suffix),
not bare "4"/"6"/"8" like other families. Add per-family duration_suffix
field and apply it in _build_payload. Also add "4k" to veo3.1 resolutions
per FAL API docs.
Note: the managed gateway currently rejects the "4s" format (expects
integer duration). Gateway-side fix needed for veo3.1 to work through
the Nous subscription path.
- Add test for 4xx ValueError with actionable remediation message
- Add test for is_available() returning True via managed gateway
- Add test for prefers_gateway overriding direct FAL_KEY
- Add test for is_available() via gateway in plugin test file
Wire plugins/video_gen/fal/__init__.py to use the same
_ManagedFalSyncClient pattern that image gen already uses.
Changes:
- Add managed gateway resolution, client caching, and
_submit_fal_video_request() that routes between direct FAL_KEY
and Nous gateway modes
- Update is_available() to return True when either FAL_KEY or the
managed gateway is reachable
- Update generate() to use submit+get handle pattern instead of
fal_client.subscribe() directly
- Fix happy-horse endpoint namespace: fal-ai/ → alibaba/ (matches
the tool-gateway allowlist from fal-video-gen branch)
- Surface actionable error on 4xx gateway rejections
Tests:
- 4 new tests in test_managed_media_gateways.py (gateway routing,
client reuse, direct mode fallback, alibaba namespace)
- Updated existing test_fal_plugin.py fixture to use submit/handle
pattern and patch _resolve_managed_fal_video_gateway for isolation
Closes the termination-control gap left by PR #28432, which shipped the
read-only sibling endpoints (/workers/active, /runs/{run_id},
/runs/{run_id}/inspect) but no way to stop a misbehaving worker from
the dashboard without dropping to the CLI.
The new endpoint resolves run_id -> task_id and delegates to the
existing kanban_db.reclaim_task() flow, so the SIGTERM->SIGKILL
escalation, run-outcome bookkeeping, and event-log append all match
POST /tasks/{task_id}/reclaim exactly. No new termination semantics
introduced.
Responses:
200 {ok, run_id, task_id} on success
404 unknown run_id
409 run already ended OR task no longer reclaimable
Refs: #23762
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
Auto-recall used to surface every fact type Hindsight had on the
session — `world`, `experience`, and `observation`. That triple-ships
the same underlying signal in three different framings: observations
are the concrete events the user said/did/asked, while world and
experience facts are aggregate summaries Hindsight derives from those
exact observations. Including all three burns most of
`recall_max_tokens` on rephrasings, crowds out events the model
actually needs to see, and produces effective duplicates in the
prompt — observations themselves are deduplicated by construction
so observation-only recall is denser per token and closer to
conversational ground truth.
Change
------
- Default `_recall_types = ["observation"]` (was `None`, which
delegated to server-side "return everything").
- `initialize()` now treats a missing `recall_types` config the same
way; also accepts comma-separated strings for parity with `recall_tags`.
- An explicit `recall_types=[]` config falls back to the default rather
than disabling the filter (would silently widen recall vs. the new
default).
- Added to `get_config_schema()` so it's discoverable via `hermes config`.
Per-call `hindsight_recall` tool invocations are unaffected — they
already only forward `types` when the caller passes the argument.
Docs / migration
----------------
plugins/memory/hindsight/README.md grows a "Behavior change" callout
explaining the why (no-duplicates, information-efficient) and how to
restore the legacy broad recall:
"recall_types": "observation,world,experience" # or a JSON list
in `~/.hermes/hindsight/config.json`.
Tests
-----
- `test_default_values` updated for the new default.
- New cases: explicit list override, CSV string accepted, empty list
falls back to default (not "wider than default").
The web_crawl_tool() function was an orphan — no model schema registered
it, no skill or CLI command called it, and the agent had no way to invoke
it. PR #32608 proposed wiring it up as a model-callable tool; we've
decided not to expose crawl as a separate capability since web_search +
web_extract cover the use cases we want models to have.
Removed:
- tools/web_tools.py: web_crawl_tool() (~230 LOC)
- plugins/web/firecrawl/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl()
- plugins/web/tavily/provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl()
- plugins/web/xai/provider.py: supports_crawl() override
- agent/web_search_provider.py: supports_crawl() + crawl() ABC methods
- agent/web_search_registry.py: get_active_crawl_provider() +
the 'crawl' branch in _resolve()
- agent/display.py: web_crawl tool-progress rendering
- hermes_cli/config.py: 'web_crawl' from TAVILY_API_KEY.tools
- tools/website_policy.py: stale comment reference
- Tests: removed TestWebCrawlTavily class, the two website-policy
web_crawl tests, the searxng/ddgs/brave-free crawl-error tests,
the integration test_web_crawl method, and the
test_unconfigured_crawl_emits_top_level_error test. Trimmed the
capability-flag parametrize list and the WebSearchProvider ABC
conformance tests.
- Docs: trimmed the Crawl column from capability tables in both EN
and zh-Hans, updated the developer-guide ABC table.
Net: 25 files, +115/-1067.
Closes#33762 (the schema-text bug only existed if #32608 landed).
Supersedes #32608.
* feat(image_gen): add Krea provider plugin (Krea 2 Medium + Large)
New built-in image_gen backend wrapping Krea's Krea 2 foundation
image model family. Auto-discovered like the other image_gen plugins
and appears in 'hermes tools' → Image Generation → Krea.
Krea's API is asynchronous — submit returns a job_id, poll /jobs/{id}
until terminal. The provider hides that behind the synchronous
ImageGenProvider.generate() contract: submit, poll every 2s with
light backoff (max 5s), 3-minute ceiling matching Krea's hosted-tool
timeout. Result URL is materialised to $HERMES_HOME/cache/images/
to avoid CDN-expiry 404s downstream (same fix as xAI #26942).
Models:
- krea-2-medium (default — Krea's 'start here' recommendation)
- krea-2-large
Aspect ratios map landscape→16:9, square→1:1, portrait→9:16.
Resolution: 1K (Krea's only current option).
Kwarg passthrough: seed, creativity (raw/low/medium/high), styles,
image_style_references (capped 10), moodboards (capped 1) — matches
Krea's per-request limits. Unknown kwargs are ignored.
Config knobs (config.yaml):
image_gen.provider: krea
image_gen.krea.model: krea-2-medium | krea-2-large
image_gen.krea.creativity: raw | low | medium | high
Env overrides: KREA_API_KEY (required), KREA_IMAGE_MODEL.
KREA_API_KEY is registered in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS so 'hermes setup'
prompts for it.
31 new tests; image_gen suite + picker + tools_config: 211/211.
* fix(image_gen/krea): address review feedback
- Update KREA_API_KEY setup URL to the canonical token-creation page
(https://www.krea.ai/app/api/tokens). The previous URL returned 404.
- Fail fast on non-retryable HTTP statuses during poll. The previous
loop retried every HTTPError for the full 180s deadline, so an auth
(401), billing (402), forbidden (403), or not-found (404) response
would make image_generate hang for three minutes. Only retry
transient statuses (408/409/425/429/5xx); surface everything else
immediately.
- Add 5 tests covering fail-fast on 401/403/404 and retry on 429/503.
* fix(krea): point users at the real API token dashboard URL
Three call sites linked users to dashboard pages that don't exist:
- hermes_cli/config.py: https://www.krea.ai/app/api/tokens
- plugins/image_gen/krea/__init__.py get_setup_schema: https://www.krea.ai/api-keys
- plugins/image_gen/krea/__init__.py auth_required error: https://www.krea.ai/api-keys
Per Krea's own docs (https://docs.krea.ai/developers/api-keys-and-billing),
the real dashboard URL is https://www.krea.ai/settings/api-tokens. All three
sites now point there.
Per AGENTS.md, ~/.hermes/.env is reserved for API keys / secrets and
config.yaml is the surface for non-secret configuration. The Nous
Portal plugin previously read HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and
HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL from the environment only, which forced
local-dev / on-prem operators to put non-secret per-instance
configuration in .env — violating the convention.
Add dashboard.oauth.{client_id,portal_url} to DEFAULT_CONFIG and have
the plugin resolve each setting with env-overrides-config precedence:
1. Env var when set to a non-empty value (Fly.io platform-secret
injection — what pushes per-deploy client_ids without baking
them into the image).
2. config.yaml entry (canonical surface for local dev / on-prem).
3. Plugin default (no provider registered when client_id is empty;
portal_url defaults to https://portal.nousresearch.com).
Empty env values are explicitly treated as unset so a provisioned-but-
not-populated Fly secret can't accidentally shadow a valid config.yaml
entry with an empty string — operators would otherwise lose the gate.
Implementation:
- hermes_cli/config.py: add dashboard.oauth.{client_id,portal_url}
block to DEFAULT_CONFIG with full doc comment explaining the
override precedence and Fly.io rationale.
- plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/__init__.py: add _load_config_oauth_section,
_resolve_client_id, _resolve_portal_url helpers; replace the two
direct os.environ.get() calls in register() with the resolvers.
Update the skip-reason string to mention BOTH surfaces so an
operator looking at the fail-closed bind error knows config.yaml
is a valid alternative to the env var.
- plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/plugin.yaml: update description to
name both surfaces. requires_env stays pointing at the env var
name — it's metadata-only (not used by the plugin loader for
gating) so this is documentation/UX, not enforcement.
- cli-config.yaml.example: append commented dashboard.oauth block
with the same override rationale operators see in code.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/web-dashboard.md: rewrite the
'Default provider: Nous Research' section to lead with config.yaml,
present env vars as operator overrides (Fly.io's primary path).
Updated the example fail-closed bind error to match the new
skip-reason text.
Test coverage — new TestConfigYamlSource class (8 tests) pinning
every tier of the precedence chain:
- config-yaml-only path registers correctly
- both config-yaml fields (client_id + portal_url) honoured
- env var overrides config for client_id (Fly.io critical path)
- env var overrides config for portal_url
- empty env string does NOT shadow config (CI/Fly edge case)
- neither source set → skip with reason mentioning BOTH surfaces
- load_config() raising falls through to env-only path (resilience)
- non-dict oauth section falls through cleanly (typo resilience)
Mutation-tested: flipping the precedence to config-wins-over-env trips
exactly test_env_overrides_config_client_id while the other 7 stay
green, confirming the suite discriminates the order, not just the
sources.
This closes the last item in Teknium's PR review (PR #30156).
When jwt.decode raises InvalidTokenError, decode the token a second time
without signature verification (safe — we never trust the values, just
display them) and append the actual iss/aud claims plus our configured
expected values to the error message. Lets operators see config drift
between HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL / HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
and what Portal is actually emitting without having to hand-decode the
JWT from the browser cookie.
The Nous OAuth provider plugin (plugins/dashboard_auth/nous) is bundled
and auto-loaded — same as before — but previously refused to register
unless BOTH HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL
were set, then the gate's fail-closed branch told the operator 'install
the default Nous provider'. That message is misleading: the provider IS
installed; it's just unconfigured. And the contract only really needs
the per-instance client_id — the portal URL is the same for everyone
in production.
Three changes:
1. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/__init__.py:
- HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL is now optional and defaults to
'https://portal.nousresearch.com'. Override only for staging
(portal.rewbs.uk) or a custom deployment. Empty string also
falls back to the default so an empty Fly secret can't point
the dashboard at nowhere.
- Plugin exposes a module-level LAST_SKIP_REASON: str that the gate
reads when no providers register. Cleared on each register() call.
Skip reasons are human-readable and actionable
('HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. The Nous Portal
provisions this env var…').
2. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/plugin.yaml:
- requires_env drops HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL; only the client_id
is mandatory. Description updated to reflect this.
3. hermes_cli/web_server.py:
- When the gate fail-closes for 'no providers', it now reads each
bundled plugin's LAST_SKIP_REASON and embeds them in the SystemExit
message. Operator sees the specific config fix needed:
Bundled providers reported these issues:
• nous: HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. …
instead of the prior generic 'Install the default Nous provider'.
Tests:
- TestPluginRegister rewritten to assert the new defaults +
LAST_SKIP_REASON contents (6 tests, +1 new for empty-string env).
- New gate test test_start_server_surfaces_nous_skip_reason_when_unconfigured.
- test_get_method_is_not_allowed widened to handle the SPA-shell 200
path explicitly — assertion now verifies no JSON ticket leaks
rather than asserting a specific status code (covers all four of
401/404/405/200).
Docs updated: web-dashboard.md's 'Default provider' section now shows
the env-var table with required/optional columns and embeds the
fail-closed error message verbatim so operators can match what they
see at the prompt.
Bundled, kind=backend, auto-loads. Activates ONLY when Portal-injected
env vars are present:
HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID — agent:{instance_id}
HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL — Portal base URL
Loopback / --insecure operators leave both unset and never see this
plugin register anything. The fail-closed branch in start_server handles
the 'public bind + zero providers' case independently.
Implementation follows nous-account-service PR #180's published OAuth
contract verbatim:
- client_id is per-instance (agent:{instance_id}); the suffix is
cross-checked against the token's agent_instance_id claim as
defense-in-depth (contract C9).
- scope is agent_dashboard:access only (contract C3).
- aud is the bare client_id, no hermes-cli: prefix (contract C2).
- RS256 JWT verification against /.well-known/jwks.json with
5-minute cache (contract C7).
- No refresh tokens in V1: refresh_session always raises
RefreshExpiredError; revoke_session is a no-op (contract C5).
- oauth_contract_version claim: missing → warn + proceed; present
and != 1 → refuse (contract C11, OQ-C2 tolerant treatment).
- redirect_uri validated client-side as defense before bouncing to
Portal; authoritative check is server-side per agent-redirect-uri.ts.
41 new tests covering construction, plugin-entry env gating, start_login
shape, complete_login httpx-mocked happy path + error mapping,
verify_session JWT verification (RSA keypair fixture, full claim-check
matrix), refresh_session always raising, revoke_session no-op.
PyJWT + cryptography are already in the venv (jose was previously
suggested; switched to pyjwt[crypto] since the latter is already
pulled in transitively).
New opt-in plugin that scans the content passed to write_file / patch /
skill_manage for 25 known-dangerous code patterns — pickle.load,
yaml.load, eval(, os.system, subprocess(shell=True), child_process.exec,
dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML/outerHTML/document.write/
insertAdjacentHTML, crypto.createCipher (no IV), AES ECB,
TLS verification disabled, XXE-prone xml.etree/minidom parsers,
<script src=//...> without SRI, torch.load without weights_only=True,
GitHub Actions ${{ github.event.* }} injection — and appends a
"Security guidance" warning block to the tool result via the
transform_tool_result hook.
Default behaviour is non-blocking: the file is written and the warning
rides back to the model in the next turn so it can self-correct or
document why the construct is safe. SECURITY_GUIDANCE_BLOCK=1 upgrades
to refusing the write entirely; SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DISABLE=1 is the
kill switch.
Pattern data (patterns.py) is a verbatim Apache-2.0 fork of
Anthropic's claude-plugins-official/plugins/security-guidance/hooks/
patterns.py at commit 0bde168 (2026-05-26). LICENSE and NOTICE
preserve attribution. The Hermes-side plugin glue (__init__.py,
plugin.yaml, README.md, tests) is original work.
Plugin is opt-in like all bundled plugins:
hermes plugins enable security-guidance
Inspired by https://x.com/ClaudeDevs/status/1927108527247... — Anthropic
shipped this as their security-guidance plugin for Claude Code on
2026-05-26 with a measured 30-40% reduction in security-related PR
comments on internal rollout.
What's NOT ported (deferred):
* Layer 2 (LLM diff review on turn end) — would route through main
model by default on Hermes, real money on reasoning models. A
follow-up can wire it to a cheap aux model with explicit opt-in.
* Layer 3 (agentic commit-time review) — agent can run this on
demand via delegate_task today.
* .hermes/security-guidance.md project-rules file — only used by
layers 2/3 upstream.
