ruff check --fix --select F541 . on current main. Pure prefix removals;
adjacent-string concatenations keep the f only on interpolating fragments.
No string content or live placeholder altered.
from a live blocked-sites pass (no PII):
- posture shift: blind opt-out is the DEFAULT, not a fallback -- submit on every site with an
accessible removal channel even without first confirming a listing (own identifiers to the broker's
own official channel = still least-disclosure). guided flows double as the authoritative search.
- blocked-form rule: when a form is automation-hostile (hard captcha / cloudflare / datadome /
slide-to-verify), default to the broker's CITED rights-email rather than recording blocked.
- captcha policy clarified: never defeat behavioral/token/slider challenges; ok to read a static
distorted-text or plain-arithmetic captcha on the subject's own opt-out; stop if the whole
submission is rejected after a correct answer (fingerprinting the automation, not grading it).
- intelius/peopleconnect: delete-wipes-suppression is field-confirmed -- a deletion-complete email
means the suppression is gone and the subject re-lists cluster-wide; re-run suppression and verify
the Control step reads "suppressed". guided-mode session persists; DOB is an <input type=date>.
- new records: addresses.json (intelius front-end, cluster-covered) and socialcatfish.json
(cited rights-email lane + automation-hostile form).
- new references/site-playbooks.md: per-site game-plan matrix (8 blocked-tail sites), the meta-search
no-op skip-list (idcrawl/lullar/yasni/webmii/namesdir/itools/skipease), and the infopay /
peopleconnect backend clusters. OSINT-list triage taxonomy added to methods.md.
- state-machine.md: fixed doc drift + documented submitted->not_found illegal (resolves as
awaiting_processing), blocked->submitted via action_selected, operator_manual_check, --evidence & pitfall.
tests: standalone 99, PR 97 (+1 cluster-coverage regression); ruff + windows-footguns clean.
phase-2 work (sending webmail, clearing session-bound gates like peopleconnect guided-mode) needs
the operator's own logged-in browser, not a cloud browser. new `pdd.py cdp`:
- finds chrome/chromium/brave/edge (macos/linux/windows), launches it detached on a dedicated debug
profile ($HERMES_HOME/chrome-debug) with --remote-debugging-port, waits for the port, prints the
CDP endpoint (webSocketDebuggerUrl)
- `--check`: report whether a debug browser is already live (never double-launches)
- `--print`: emit the exact command for the operator to run themselves
- doctor, SKILL.md, and methods.md all point at it
- windows-safe detach (start_new_session on posix, DETACHED_PROCESS on windows); stdlib only
tests: standalone 98, PR 96 (+6 cdp); ruff + windows-footguns clean.
from a live run (NY subject, 43 brokers):
- fanout default 8->5 (8+ batches time out)
- setup/doctor read $HERMES_HOME/.env so creds hermes already loads are detected
- new `show <subject> <broker>`: reads back case state+evidence for cheap parent re-verify
- intelius: requires.dob + 5-step guided-mode gate; planner pre-warns when dob is missing
- rehold.json: property-record != PII (an address-only match is not_found, not removable)
- tps/fps: match_signal_notes tell the scanner to ignore SEO-templated titles
- methods.md: browser backends (scan vs execute + operator chrome over CDP), property/SEO callouts
- doctor: warn when browser email-mode pairs with a cloud scan backend (needs operator chrome/CDP)
- ledger: found->not_found retract (false-positive), blocked->human_task_queued
- autopilot: indirect-exposure web-form fallback; drop a stray f-string
tests: standalone 92 pass; ruff clean.
PeopleConnect is the exception to deletion-beats-suppression: "DELETE MY
USER DATA" also deletes suppressions on file, and deletion does not stop the
people-search sites from showing you (public records re-list). Suppression
is the effective lever and must be maintained.
- intelius.json: deletion.prefer=false; playbook/quirks/notes rewritten with
the verbatim privacy-center language; delete is the data-purge-only path.
- autopilot: honor deletion.prefer -> prefer_suppression when false.
- methods.md / SKILL.md / README: exception called out.
- tests updated + prefer-flag routing test (86 tests).
unbroker finds where a consenting person's info is exposed across data
brokers and people-search sites and files the removals, running as far as
each site allows and handing only genuinely human-only steps (hard CAPTCHA,
gov-ID, phone, fax) back as an end-of-run digest.
- Deterministic stdlib CLI (scripts/pdd.py) owns config, dossiers+consent,
the broker DB, tier planning, the ledger, email, and the autonomous
action queue; the agent scans/submits with native tools (web_extract,
browser_*, delegate_task, cronjob, terminal).
- Verify-before-disclose, least-disclosure (never volunteers SSN), consent
gate, opaque ids, optional age-at-rest encryption, file-locked ledger.
- Jurisdiction-aware (CCPA/CPRA, GDPR, generic); CA DROP one-shot covers
the state registry (~545) in a single request; BADBOOL + curated
people-search coverage; scheduled re-scan for re-listing.
- No CAPTCHA-solving services or anti-bot bypass; browser email mode needs
no stored password.
- 85 hermetic tests (tests/skills/test_unbroker_skill.py; SMTP/IMAP via
injected fakes, registry via CSV fixtures). Ships placeholder data only.
Broker dataset adapted from BADBOOL (Yael Grauer, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).
Follow-up to the GitHub-skills fix: the same hardcoded ~/.hermes/.env
pattern existed across other bundled and optional skills. Under the
official Docker setup (HERMES_HOME=/opt/data, subprocess HOME=/opt/data/home)
those paths point at a nonexistent file.
- kanban-video-orchestrator setup.sh.tmpl + docs: resolve via
${HERMES_HOME:-$HOME/.hermes}/.env in check_key()
- telephony.py / canvas_api.py / hyperliquid_client.py: error and
save messages now report the real resolved env path instead of a
hardcoded literal (path resolution itself was already correct)
- godmode SKILL.md: load_dotenv snippet resolves via HERMES_HOME
- watch_github.py + ~20 SKILL.md prose mentions: document the env file
as ${HERMES_HOME:-~/.hermes}/.env so Docker users edit the right file
* chore(skills): remove red-team skills (godmode, obliteratus) from bundled catalog
Anthropic's output classifier on claude-fable-5 (and likely other Claude
models served through it) intermittently returns empty content for sessions
whose system prompt advertises these skills. The bundled skills-catalog block
is injected into every session's system prompt, so the descriptions
- red-teaming/godmode 'Jailbreak LLMs: Parseltongue, GODMODE, ULTRAPLINIAN'
- mlops/inference/obliteratus 'OBLITERATUS: abliterate LLM refusals (diff-in-means)'
trip the classifier on EVERY session regardless of which skill is actually
loaded, killing unrelated legitimate work (PR review, codebase audits, etc.).
Measured impact (controlled, interleaved A/B, claude-fable-5 via OpenRouter,
prompts differing only by the ~204 chars of these catalog lines, N=20 each):
catalog lines present -> 19/20 (95%) blocked
catalog lines absent -> 5/20 (25%) blocked
Removing them ~quartered the block rate. Rewording the descriptions was not
enough; the skills must leave the bundled catalog.
- Delete skills/red-teaming/godmode and skills/mlops/inference/obliteratus
- Drop their generated doc pages + catalog/sidebar entries (EN + zh-Hans)
- Drop the godmode hand-written-page exception in generate-skill-docs.py
* chore(skills): relocate godmode + obliteratus to optional-skills
Rather than deleting outright, move both into optional-skills/ so they remain
installable via `hermes skills install` while leaving the always-injected
bundled catalog (which is what tripped Anthropic's classifier).
- optional-skills/security/godmode (was skills/red-teaming/godmode)
- optional-skills/mlops/obliteratus (was skills/mlops/inference/obliteratus)
- regenerate optional-skills catalog + sidebar entries
Adds optional-skills/security/web-pentest/ — an authorized web app
penetration testing skill adapted from Shannon's methodology (concepts
only; AGPL-clean fresh implementation).
Phased: recon (read-only) → vuln analysis (delegate_task per OWASP
class) → proof-based exploitation → report.
Guardrails baked in:
- Authorization gate before first active scan (templates/authorization.md)
- Scope allowlist (scope.txt) consulted by recon-scan.sh and
documented as the rule for every active request
- Aux-client leakage warning (compression + title gen replay history;
payloads/creds must not enter chat verbatim)
- Bypass-exhaustion discipline before false-positive classification
- L3/L4 (proof-required) for reportable findings; L1/L2 listed as
candidates only
Closes#400. Supersedes #21845 (plugin-shaped proposal; skill-shaped is
cheaper and matches the existing optional-skills/security/ pattern).
The platforms-frontmatter sweep inserted 'platforms: [linux, macos, windows]'
immediately after 'description: >' on 5 optional-skills, landing inside the
folded scalar and breaking YAML parsing. docs-site-checks tripped on
one-three-one-rule/SKILL.md and would have failed on the other 4 in turn.
Fixed files:
- optional-skills/communication/one-three-one-rule/SKILL.md
- optional-skills/health/fitness-nutrition/SKILL.md
- optional-skills/health/neuroskill-bci/SKILL.md
- optional-skills/research/drug-discovery/SKILL.md
- optional-skills/security/oss-forensics/SKILL.md
Moved each platforms line below the closing of the description block.
All 161 SKILL.md files across the repo now parse as valid YAML.
Extends the Windows-gating work to the optional-skills/ tree. Every
SKILL.md that previously omitted the platforms: field now carries an
explicit declaration, which Hermes's loader (agent.skill_utils.
skill_matches_platform) honors to skip-load on incompatible OSes.
58 skills declared cross-platform (platforms: [linux, macos, windows]):
autonomous-ai-agents/blackbox, autonomous-ai-agents/honcho
blockchain/base, blockchain/solana
communication/one-three-one-rule
creative/blender-mcp, creative/concept-diagrams, creative/hyperframes,
creative/kanban-video-orchestrator, creative/meme-generation
devops/cli (inference-sh-cli), devops/docker-management
dogfood/adversarial-ux-test
email/agentmail
finance/3-statement-model, finance/comps-analysis, finance/dcf-model,
finance/excel-author, finance/lbo-model, finance/merger-model,
finance/pptx-author
health/fitness-nutrition, health/neuroskill-bci
mcp/fastmcp, mcp/mcporter
migration/openclaw-migration
mlops/accelerate, mlops/chroma, mlops/clip, mlops/guidance,
mlops/hermes-atropos-environments, mlops/huggingface-tokenizers,
mlops/instructor, mlops/lambda-labs, mlops/llava, mlops/modal,
mlops/peft, mlops/pinecone, mlops/pytorch-lightning, mlops/qdrant,
mlops/saelens, mlops/simpo, mlops/stable-diffusion
productivity/canvas, productivity/shop-app, productivity/shopify,
productivity/siyuan, productivity/telephony
research/domain-intel, research/drug-discovery, research/duckduckgo-search,
research/gitnexus-explorer, research/parallel-cli, research/scrapling
security/1password, security/oss-forensics, security/sherlock
web-development/page-agent
5 skills gated from Windows (platforms: [linux, macos]):
mlops/flash-attention - Flash Attention wheels are Linux-first; Windows
install requires building from source with CUDA
mlops/faiss - faiss-gpu has no Windows wheel; gate rather than
leak partial (faiss-cpu) support
mlops/nemo-curator - NVIDIA NeMo ecosystem has no first-class Windows path
mlops/slime - Megatron+SGLang RL stack is Linux-only in practice
mlops/whisper - openai-whisper + ffmpeg setup on Windows is
non-trivial; gate until Windows install stanza lands
Methodology: scanned every SKILL.md for Windows-hostile signals
(apt-get, brew, systemd, osascript, ptrace, X11 binaries, POSIX-only
Python APIs, Docker POSIX $(pwd) bind-mounts, explicit 'linux-only' /
'macos-only' text). 3 skills flagged as having hard signals on review:
docker-management and qdrant only had POSIX $(pwd) docker examples and
the tools themselves (Docker Desktop, Qdrant) run fine on Windows —
declared ALL. whisper had an apt/brew ffmpeg install path and nothing
else but the openai-whisper Windows install story is rough enough to
warrant gating.
Strict-over-lenient policy: when in doubt, gate. Easier to un-gate after
verified Windows support lands than to leak partial support that
manifests as mid-task failures for Windows users.
Add optional skill for username enumeration across 400+ social networks
using the Sherlock Project CLI (https://github.com/sherlock-project/sherlock).
Features:
- Smart username extraction from user messages
- Installation verification before execution
- Categorized output with clickable links
- Ethical use guidelines
- Docker, pipx, and pip installation paths
Co-authored-by: unmodeled-tyler <unmodeled.tyler@proton.me>
Follow-up to PR #883 (arceus77-7):
- Add setup.collect_secrets for OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN so the skill
prompts users to configure their token on first load
- Fix broken code examples: garbled op run export line, truncated
secret reference in cli-examples.md
- Add Authentication Methods section documenting all 3 auth flows
(service account, desktop app, connect server) with service account
recommended for Hermes
- Clarify tmux pattern is only needed for desktop app flow, not
service account token flow
- Credit original author (arceus77-7) in frontmatter
- Add DESCRIPTION.md for security/ category
Co-authored-by: arceus77-7 <arceus77-7@users.noreply.github.com>
