The CLI `hermes model` picker shows per-model $/Mtok pricing and gates paid
models on free Nous accounts. The GUI picker showed bare model names. Bring it
to parity across both the model-picker dialog and onboarding confirm card.
Backend:
- inventory.build_models_payload gains a pricing=True flag → _apply_pricing
enriches each provider row with formatted per-model pricing
({input,output,cache,free}) via the same _format_price_per_mtok the CLI uses,
and for Nous adds free_tier + unavailable_models (paid models a free user
can't select) via check_nous_free_tier + partition_nous_models_by_tier.
Best-effort: any pricing/tier failure is swallowed and fails open (no gating).
- /api/model/options and TUI model.options now pass pricing=True so the
global picker and in-session picker both carry pricing.
Frontend:
- ModelOptionProvider gains pricing/free_tier/unavailable_models; new
ModelPricing type.
- model-picker dialog renders In/Out $/Mtok (or a Free pill) per model, a
Free tier/Pro badge on the Nous heading, and disables + grays unavailable
paid models for free users with a 'Pro models need a paid subscription' note.
- onboarding confirm card shows the chosen model's price + tier badge.
Tests: test_inventory_pricing covers price formatting, free-tier gating,
paid no-gating, providers without pricing, and swallowed failures.
GUI onboarding picked models[0] from /api/model/options, which ignores the
Nous free/paid tier — a free user could land on a paid default (e.g.
anthropic/claude-opus-4). Now the recommended default mirrors what `hermes
model` does.
- web_server.py: new GET /api/model/recommended-default?provider=<slug>. For
Nous it runs the same curation as the CLI (get_curated_nous_model_ids +
pricing + check_nous_free_tier + union_with_portal_{free,paid}_recommendations
+ partition_nous_models_by_tier) so free users get a free model and paid users
get the curated default. Other providers fall back to the first curated model.
Never 500s — returns empty model on error so onboarding degrades gracefully.
- hermes.ts: getRecommendedDefaultModel client + RecommendedDefaultModel type.
- onboarding.ts: fetchProviderDefaultModel prefers the recommended endpoint,
falls back to models[0] when unavailable.
- tests: free-tier picks free model, paid-tier picks curated default, failure
returns empty without 500.
When the GUI sets the main provider to Nous via POST /api/model/set, call
the same apply_nous_managed_defaults the CLI uses after model selection, so
GUI/onboarding users land on the Nous Tool Gateway the same way CLI users do
— no separate prompt, no duplicated logic.
Purely additive: apply_nous_managed_defaults skips any tool where the user
has a direct key (FIRECRAWL_API_KEY, FAL_KEY, etc.) or explicit config, so it
never overwrites a user's own setup. Only unconfigured tools get routed.
- web_server.py: in set_model_assignment (scope=main, provider=nous), resolve
enabled toolsets and apply managed defaults; guarded so a Portal hiccup never
blocks saving the model. Returns routed tools as gateway_tools.
- onboarding.ts: surface a 'Tool Gateway enabled' toast listing routed tools.
- types/hermes.ts: add gateway_tools to ModelAssignmentResponse.
- tests: cover nous-applies, non-nous-skips, and failure-doesnt-block-save.
The SPA catch-all (serve_spa) served index.html for any unmatched GET,
including unregistered /api/* endpoints. A missing API route therefore
came back as <!doctype html> with status 200, and JSON clients (the
desktop app's fetchJson) crashed with an opaque
'SyntaxError: Unexpected token <' instead of a clear error.
- web_server.py: unmatched /api or /api/... now returns 404 JSON
('No such API endpoint'); non-api paths still serve the SPA for
client-side routing.
- main.cjs fetchJson: detect an HTML body / text/html content-type on a
2xx response and reject with a clear message naming the URL, rather
than a raw JSON.parse SyntaxError. Empty bodies resolve to null;
malformed JSON reports the URL plus a snippet.
The merged 0.0.0.0/:: insecure-bind fix (#35141) did not cover binding
directly to a specific non-loopback address (e.g. a Tailscale/LAN IP via
--host 100.64.0.10 --insecure). In that mode the dashboard HTML loaded but
every WebSocket upgrade was rejected by the loopback-only peer guard, so
/chat connected then silently received no data.
Generalize _ws_client_is_allowed to lift the loopback-only peer gate for
any explicit non-loopback bound host, not just the 0.0.0.0/:: wildcard.
DNS-rebinding stays blocked: _ws_host_origin_is_allowed already requires
the Host header to exactly match the bound interface for explicit binds,
mirroring _is_accepted_host on the HTTP layer.
Co-authored-by: pxdsgnco <14163800+pxdsgnco@users.noreply.github.com>
Allow non-loopback websocket peers when the dashboard is explicitly exposed with --host 0.0.0.0/:: and --insecure.
This fixes the failure mode where /chat rendered over LAN but /api/ws and /api/events were rejected with HTTP 403, leaving the embedded TUI chat disconnected.
Add regression coverage for the insecure public bind case in the dashboard websocket auth tests.
The packaged Electron desktop loads its renderer over file://, so its
/api/ws handshake carries Origin: file:// (or null). The DNS-rebinding
WebSocket Origin guard only accepted http(s) origins matching the bound
host, so it rejected the desktop's own renderer with 4403 -> "Could not
connect to Hermes gateway" on macOS.
A browser DNS-rebinding attacker can only ever present an http(s) origin
(the site hosting the malicious page); it cannot forge file://, null, or
a custom app scheme AND hold the loopback session token. So on loopback
binds we now trust non-web origins -- the token in _ws_auth_ok remains
the real authenticator. Public/gated binds still reject them, and
cross-site http(s) origins are still rejected everywhere.
The desktop shell mints a session token and signs its /api + /api/ws
calls with it via HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN, but the main-merge
restored a web_server.py that ignored the env var and minted its own
random _SESSION_TOKEN -- so every desktop request 401'd and the UI
reported "gateway offline". Read the injected token (fall back to a
fresh random one) so loopback HTTP + WS auth line up.
Adds a regression test so a future merge can't silently drop the read.
* docs(code-execution): document HERMES_* env narrowing + passthrough workaround
The execute_code sandbox-child env scrub (108397726, #27303) deliberately
dropped the broad HERMES_ prefix passthrough, keeping only an operational
4-var allowlist (HERMES_HOME/PROFILE/CONFIG/ENV). A script that relied on a
non-secret HERMES_* var (HERMES_BASE_URL, HERMES_KANBAN_DB, HERMES_*_WEBHOOK,
or a plugin-defined one) now sees it unset in the child.
Document the behavior change and the two recovery routes (terminal.env_passthrough
in config.yaml, or required_environment_variables in skill frontmatter), plus
the debug log line that surfaces the drop for diagnosis.
* fix(stt,tts): restore mistralai — 2.4.8 is clean, ban lifted
PyPI quarantined mistralai on 2026-05-12 after the malicious 2.4.6
release (Mini Shai-Hulud worm). 2.4.6 has since been removed from the
registry and clean releases resumed (2.4.7 2026-05-25, 2.4.8 2026-05-28).
This rolls back the blanket runtime ban so Voxtral STT + TTS work again,
following the restoration checklist the repo left in pyproject.toml.
Verified against the real SDK: 2.4.8 keeps the import path the code uses
(from mistralai.client import Mistral) and the audio.transcriptions.complete
/ audio.speech.complete surfaces.
Changes:
- pyproject.toml: re-add mistral extra pinned to mistralai==2.4.8; left
OUT of [all] per the 2026-05-12 lazy-install policy (one quarantined
release must not break fresh installs). uv.lock regenerated.
- tools/lazy_deps.py: add stt.mistral / tts.mistral entries so the SDK
lazy-installs on first use (matches edge / elevenlabs).
- tools/transcription_tools.py: restore explicit-provider gate
(_HAS_MISTRAL + key) and auto-detect entry (local>groq>openai>mistral>xai);
_transcribe_mistral lazy-installs before import.
- tools/tts_tool.py: dispatcher routes back to _generate_mistral_tts;
_import_mistral_client lazy-installs the SDK.
- hermes_cli/tools_config.py, hermes_cli/web_server.py: un-hide Mistral
from the TTS provider picker and dashboard STT options.
- hermes_cli/security_advisories.py: KEEP the shai-hulud-2026-05 advisory
(module policy forbids removal) — it is scoped to 2.4.6 only, so it
still warns anyone with the poisoned build cached and never fires on
2.4.8. Summary note updated to reflect the un-quarantine.
- tests: revert the disabled-behavior assertions added by the ban commit
back to routing/positive expectations; add mistral to the
lazy-installable-extras-excluded-from-[all] contract.
Reported by @SkYNewZ (#34503).
Validation: 189 targeted STT/TTS/lazy_deps/metadata tests pass; E2E with
the real mistralai 2.4.8 SDK routes both STT and TTS to mistral.
After the legacy session-key path was removed, two parameters became dead
surface on the Nous runtime-resolution chain:
- min_key_ttl_seconds: del'd inside refresh_nous_oauth_pure and pass-through /
telemetry-only in refresh_nous_oauth_from_state, _try_import_shared_nous_state,
_nous_device_code_login, and resolve_nous_runtime_credentials. It controlled the
now-deleted agent-key mint TTL and drives no behavior.
- inference_auth_mode: with the legacy mode gone, AUTO and FRESH are behaviorally
identical; the value only fed _normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode validation and
oauth trace output, never a branch.
Removing inference_auth_mode orphaned its whole supporting cluster
(NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO/FRESH, NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODES,
_normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode), and dropping min_key_ttl_seconds orphaned
DEFAULT_AGENT_KEY_MIN_TTL_SECONDS — all deleted here.
Updated every caller (run_agent, auxiliary_client, credential_pool, proxy adapter,
runtime_provider, web_server, main, auth_commands, setup) and pruned the matching
test kwargs. Deleted two tests that exercised the removed surface
(test_legacy_auth_mode_is_rejected, test_try_refresh_..._accepts_explicit_auth_mode).
No behavior change: net -134 LOC of dead code.
The desktop command-center 'update' action hits POST /api/hermes/update,
which spawned bare `hermes update` with no --branch. cmd_update then
falls back to its default (main) and checks the working tree OUT of the
tracked branch — a bb/gui install silently jumped to main and lost the
desktop CLI.
Resolve the checkout's current branch and pass --branch <current> from
this endpoint only. The engine default (main) is DELIBERATELY unchanged:
bare `hermes update` from a terminal, the gateway /update bot command,
and the CLI/TUI relaunch path all keep their long-standing 'update against
main' contract for the existing user base. Only the GUI button is scoped
to update-the-branch-you're-on. Detached HEAD / git failure falls back to
the bare default.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in
hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py
(OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a
non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not.
Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the
portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account
service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts
getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie
as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to
'agent dead' on the portal side.
Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py
and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults
the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's
auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list
hit both gates automatically.
Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public):
* /api/status — version, gateway state, active session count,
auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target.
* /api/config/defaults — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page
* /api/config/schema — config schema for the SPA's Config page
* /api/model/info — model catalogue metadata (context windows)
* /api/dashboard/themes — theme manifests for the skin engine
* /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard
No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external
monitoring agent would hit on /healthz.
Tests:
* New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS
fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring)
* New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised
over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is
never the response)
* New: docker integration check #3 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status
remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the
portal can distinguish modes
* Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes
/api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it
can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally
disabled')
* Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie /
dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason
* Updated: docker integration check #2 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes
/api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting
* Removed: dead _login() helper in
test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since
/api/status is reachable cold)
Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md
(the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).
Mission-control style deploys reverse-proxy the dashboard at a path
prefix (e.g. mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/* -> :9119) and inject
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes on every request. The SPA mount already
honoured this for asset URLs and the bootstrap __HERMES_BASE_PATH__,
but the OAuth gate didn't:
1. The gate's Location: header to /login and the 401 envelope's
login_url were built bare ("/login?next=..."). Under a /hermes
prefix the browser follows that to mission-control.tilos.com/login
which the proxy doesn't route to the dashboard.
2. _redirect_uri (the OAuth callback URL handed to the IDP) used
request.url_for() which doesn't honour X-Forwarded-Prefix
(Starlette/uvicorn only proxy_headers Host + Proto + For). The
IDP redirects back to /auth/callback instead of /hermes/auth/
callback → 404 in the user's browser.
3. Cookies were set with Path=/ which leaks them to other apps on
the same origin and won't be sent back on requests under the
prefix in the first place.
Fix threads the normalised prefix through every boundary:
* New hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py — single source of truth
for X-Forwarded-Prefix parsing. web_server._normalise_prefix
becomes a re-export so the SPA mount, the gate, and the cookies
helper all agree.
* middleware._unauth_response builds login_url = f"{prefix}/login".
* routes._redirect_uri splices the prefix into the path component
of the IDP-bound URL (with full validation of the header).
* cookies.{set,clear}_{session,pkce}_cookie now take prefix="".
Path attribute switches to /hermes when set; cookie name switches
name variant (see below). Every caller passes the request's
normalised prefix.
Cookie hardening (Teknium's lesser-note #1 in the PR review): adopt
the __Host- / __Secure- cookie name prefixes per draft-west-cookie-
prefixes. The variant is selected from (use_https, prefix):
* Loopback HTTP → bare "hermes_session_at" (both prefixes require
Secure, incompatible with HTTP).
* HTTPS, direct deploy (Path=/) → "__Host-hermes_session_at".
Strongest spec: bound to exact origin, no Domain attribute, Secure
required.
* HTTPS, behind a proxy prefix (Path=/hermes) →
"__Secure-hermes_session_at". __Host- forbids Path != "/"; the
explicit Path=/hermes covers same-origin app isolation.
Setter and reader BOTH consult the prefix because the cookie *name*
changes — a reader that looked up the bare name when the setter wrote
__Secure- would never find the value. The reader falls back across
all three variants so a request whose shape changed mid-session (e.g.
post-deploy from no-prefix to /hermes) still picks up the existing
cookie until it expires.
Test coverage:
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py — new file. 11 tests
pinning:
• Location: /hermes/login on the gate's HTML redirect
• 401 envelope login_url carries the prefix
• Malformed X-Forwarded-Prefix is ignored (header-injection
defence; the script-tag value is normalised to empty string)
• _redirect_uri splices /hermes into the path (the property
that prevents the IDP-returns-to-404 failure)
• PKCE cookie uses Path=/hermes + __Secure- when proxied
• Session cookies use __Host- when direct, __Secure- when
proxied, bare on loopback HTTP
• End-to-end round trip with hand-managed PKCE cookie carriage
(TestClient can't simulate a Path=/hermes cookie automatically)
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_cookies.py — rewritten to pin
each (use_https, prefix) shape produces its expected cookie name,
plus reader-side coverage that __Host- and __Secure- variants are
both recognised.
- Existing tests across middleware / 401-reauth / etc. updated to
match the new cookie names (substring contains instead of
startswith).
Mutation-tested: reverting _unauth_response to build the bare
"/login" URL trips exactly the two tests that pin the prefix
carriage, confirming the suite discriminates the regression.
When the OAuth gate is active, start_server runs uvicorn with
proxy_headers=True so the dashboard can honour X-Forwarded-Proto from
Fly's TLS terminator (cookies, redirect URI reconstruction). A side
effect: ws.client.host is rewritten to the X-Forwarded-For value, which
on Fly is the real internet client IP — never loopback. The loopback
peer guard in _ws_client_is_allowed then rejected every WS upgrade in
gated mode (4403 close) even after a successful OAuth round trip and
ticket consumption, silently breaking /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub, and
/api/events.
Fix: in gated mode, bypass the peer-IP check. The OAuth gate +
single-use ticket is the auth. The Host/Origin guard in
_ws_host_origin_is_allowed still runs and is what protects against
DNS-rebinding here, not the peer IP.
Loopback mode behaviour is unchanged: the legacy ?token= path is the
only auth there and we don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens.
Regression coverage: TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated pins all four
behaviours — non-loopback peer allowed in gated mode, non-loopback peer
rejected in loopback mode, loopback peer allowed in loopback mode, and
the Host/Origin guard still firing on a rebinding attempt with gated
mode + matching peer.
The Nous OAuth provider plugin (plugins/dashboard_auth/nous) is bundled
and auto-loaded — same as before — but previously refused to register
unless BOTH HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL
were set, then the gate's fail-closed branch told the operator 'install
the default Nous provider'. That message is misleading: the provider IS
installed; it's just unconfigured. And the contract only really needs
the per-instance client_id — the portal URL is the same for everyone
in production.
Three changes:
1. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/__init__.py:
- HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL is now optional and defaults to
'https://portal.nousresearch.com'. Override only for staging
(portal.rewbs.uk) or a custom deployment. Empty string also
falls back to the default so an empty Fly secret can't point
the dashboard at nowhere.
- Plugin exposes a module-level LAST_SKIP_REASON: str that the gate
reads when no providers register. Cleared on each register() call.
Skip reasons are human-readable and actionable
('HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. The Nous Portal
provisions this env var…').
2. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/plugin.yaml:
- requires_env drops HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL; only the client_id
is mandatory. Description updated to reflect this.
3. hermes_cli/web_server.py:
- When the gate fail-closes for 'no providers', it now reads each
bundled plugin's LAST_SKIP_REASON and embeds them in the SystemExit
message. Operator sees the specific config fix needed:
Bundled providers reported these issues:
• nous: HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. …
instead of the prior generic 'Install the default Nous provider'.
Tests:
- TestPluginRegister rewritten to assert the new defaults +
LAST_SKIP_REASON contents (6 tests, +1 new for empty-string env).
- New gate test test_start_server_surfaces_nous_skip_reason_when_unconfigured.
- test_get_method_is_not_allowed widened to handle the SPA-shell 200
path explicitly — assertion now verifies no JSON ticket leaks
rather than asserting a specific status code (covers all four of
401/404/405/200).
Docs updated: web-dashboard.md's 'Default provider' section now shows
the env-var table with required/optional columns and embeds the
fail-closed error message verbatim so operators can match what they
see at the prompt.
Phase 7 surfaces the OAuth gate state to users.
web/src/components/AuthWidget.tsx (new):
Sidebar widget that fetches /api/auth/me on mount and renders a
compact 'Logged in as <user_id…> via <provider>' row with a logout
icon. Contract V1 (Nous Portal) emits no email/display_name claims,
so user_id is the display value (truncated to 14 chars + ellipsis);
display_name and email fallthroughs are forward-compat for OQ-C1.
Renders nothing on 401 from /api/auth/me — that's the signal the
gate isn't engaged (loopback mode), in which case the widget would
be confusing.
Logout POSTs /auth/logout (which clears cookies + redirects to
/login) then full-page-navigates to /login itself; the SPA's fetch
wrapper doesn't follow that redirect, so the navigation is explicit.
web/src/App.tsx: mounts <AuthWidget /> above <SidebarFooter />.
Component is self-hiding in loopback mode so there's no need for a
conditional mount.
web/src/lib/api.ts:
- getAuthMe() + logout() helpers
- AuthMeResponse type
- StatusResponse gets optional auth_required + auth_providers fields
so the existing StatusPage can render a gated/loopback badge.
hermes_cli/web_server.py: /api/status payload now includes
- auth_required: bool — whether app.state.auth_required is True
- auth_providers: list[str] — registered DashboardAuthProvider names
Lazy-imports list_providers so early-startup status calls don't
crash if the dashboard_auth module is still being set up.
tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py: 3 new tests
covering the new status fields in both gated and loopback modes plus
a regression that no existing field got dropped from the payload.
The hermes status CLI is unchanged in this commit — that command
tracks model providers + OAuth credentials, not running-dashboard
state. The /api/status endpoint is the canonical place to query
dashboard auth-gate state, consumed by the React StatusPage already.
Phase 5 task 5.2. Four WebSocket endpoints — /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub,
/api/events — previously authed with the same constant-time check against
`_SESSION_TOKEN`. Replaced with a single helper that branches on
`app.state.auth_required`:
Loopback / --insecure: legacy ?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN> path (unchanged).
Gated: ?ticket=<single-use> consumed against the
dashboard-auth ticket store.
Critical security property: gated mode UNCONDITIONALLY rejects the
?token= path. A leaked _SESSION_TOKEN value from a log line is not
replayable for WS access in gated deployments.
`_build_sidecar_url` now branches too: loopback uses the legacy token;
gated mode mints a server-internal ticket via mint_ticket() with
pseudo-user 'pty-sidecar' / provider 'server-internal' so audit logs can
distinguish PTY-internal sidecar tickets from browser tickets. PTY
children open /api/pub exactly once at startup so single-use suffices.
Ticket rejections audit-log as WS_TICKET_REJECTED with truncated reason
+ client IP + WS path. Operators debugging 'WS keeps closing' issues see
which endpoint and why.
17 new tests:
- POST /api/auth/ws-ticket: 200 with cookie, 401/302 without, distinct
per call, GET-not-allowed.
- _ws_auth_ok loopback: token accept/reject, missing-token reject,
ticket-param-ignored.
- _ws_auth_ok gated: ticket accept, single-use rejection, unknown reject,
legacy-token-rejected-in-gated assertion, audit-log emission.
- _build_sidecar_url: loopback uses token=, gated uses ticket=, no-bound
returns None.
Phase 3, Task 3.5. Three changes to web_server.py:
1. start_server replaces the legacy SystemExit-refusing-to-bind guard
with: if app.state.auth_required and no providers registered, exit
with a clear message; otherwise log the gate-on banner. --insecure
keeps its existing behaviour.
2. uvicorn proxy_headers flag is computed from app.state.auth_required.
Loopback / --insecure keep it False (so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
the real peer for the loopback gate); gated mode flips it True so
X-Forwarded-Proto from Fly's TLS terminator is honoured for cookie
Secure-flag decisions in detect_https().
3. _serve_index no longer injects window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ when
the gate is on — the SPA reads identity from /api/auth/me using
cookie auth instead. window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__ flag lets the
SPA pick between ticket-auth (gated) and token-auth (loopback) for
/api/pty + /api/ws (Phase 5 will wire this in the React layer).
4 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
Phase 3, Tasks 3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4. These three pieces are mutually
dependent so they land together.
middleware.py - gated_auth_middleware engages when app.state.auth_required
is True. Allowlists /login, /auth/*, /api/auth/providers, and static
asset paths; everything else demands a valid session_at cookie. Verifies
by trying every registered provider's verify_session in turn (multi-
provider stack); attaches verified Session to request.state.session.
Returns 401 JSON for /api/* and 302 -> /login for HTML. ProviderError
during verify -> 503.
routes.py - APIRouter with:
GET /login server-rendered HTML
GET /auth/login?provider=N 302 to IDP + PKCE cookie
GET /auth/callback?code,state completes login, sets session cookies
POST /auth/logout clears cookies + best-effort revoke
GET /api/auth/providers public bootstrap endpoint (503 if zero)
GET /api/auth/me verified session as JSON (auth-required)
login_page.py - Inline-CSS HTML template, no React, no JavaScript.
web_server.py - Mounted gated_auth_middleware between host_header and
auth_middleware (FastAPI runs middlewares in registration order: host
check -> cookie auth -> token auth). auth_middleware short-circuits
when auth_required so cookie auth is authoritative in gated mode.
Router is included before mount_spa so the catch-all doesn't swallow
/login or /auth/*.
17 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
Phase 0, Task 0.3. start_server now computes should_require_auth(host,
allow_public) and records it on app.state.auth_required BEFORE the
existing legacy SystemExit guard fires. This gives middleware, the SPA
token-injection path, and WS endpoints a consistent read source for
'is the gate active'. The flag is set but no one reads it yet — Phase 3
registers the gate middleware.
Note: 4 pre-existing test failures in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py
(PtyWebSocket) + test_update_hangup_protection.py reproduce on pristine
HEAD and are unrelated to this change (starlette TestClient WS regression).
Phase 0, Task 0.2. Single source of truth for 'is the auth gate active?'.
Reuses the existing _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES frozenset so this stays in sync
with the DNS-rebinding host-header check. RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local are
treated as public — exact threat model the gate exists for.
* remove Vercel AI Gateway provider and Vercel Sandbox terminal backend
Both Vercel-hosted integrations are removed end-to-end. Users on the AI
Gateway should switch to OpenRouter or one of the other aggregators
(Nous Portal, Kilo Code). Users on the Vercel Sandbox backend should
switch to Docker, Modal, Daytona, or SSH.
What's removed:
- `plugins/model-providers/ai-gateway/` provider plugin
- `hermes_cli/vercel_auth.py` Vercel-Sandbox auth helper
- `tools/environments/vercel_sandbox.py` terminal backend
- `ai-gateway` provider wiring across auth, doctor, setup, models,
config, status, providers, main, web_server, model_normalize, dump
- `vercel_sandbox` backend wiring across terminal_tool, file_tools,
code_execution_tool, file_operations, approval, skills_tool,
environments/local, credential_files, lazy_deps, prompt_builder,
cli, gateway/run
- `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL` constant, `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS` auxiliary-client
header set, run_agent base-URL header/reasoning special-cases
- `[vercel]` pyproject extra and `vercel`/`vercel-workers` from uv.lock
- env vars: `AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY`, `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL`, `VERCEL_TOKEN`,
`VERCEL_PROJECT_ID`, `VERCEL_TEAM_ID`, `VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN`,
`TERMINAL_VERCEL_RUNTIME`
- Tests: deletes test_ai_gateway_models.py and
test_vercel_sandbox_environment.py; scrubs references across 23
surviving test files (no entire tests deleted unless they were
dedicated to AI Gateway / Sandbox)
- Docs: provider tables, env-var reference, setup guides, security
notes, tool config, terminal-backend tables — English plus zh-Hans
i18n parity
- `hermes-agent` skill: provider table entry and remote-backend list
What stays (intentional):
- `popular-web-designs/templates/vercel.md` — CSS design reference,
unrelated to Vercel-the-AI-product
- `x-vercel-id` in `stream_diag.py` headers — generic Vercel CDN
response header, useful diag signal on any Vercel-hosted endpoint
- `vercel-labs/agent-browser` URL in browser config — lightpanda
browser project, different OSS effort
- `userStories.json` historical contributor entry mentioning Vercel
Sandbox — archive, not active docs
Validation:
- 1153 tests in the 22 targeted files pass (`scripts/run_tests.sh`)
- Full repo `py_compile` clean
- Live import of every touched module + invariant check (no
`ai-gateway` in `PROVIDER_REGISTRY`, no `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS`, no
`vercel_sandbox` in `_REMOTE_TERMINAL_BACKENDS`)
* test: convert profile-count check from change-detector to invariant
The hardcoded "== 34" assertion broke when ai-gateway was removed.
Per AGENTS.md change-detector-test guidance, assert the relationship
(registry count >= number of plugin dirs) instead of a literal count.
Counts shift when providers are added/removed; that's expected.
Two posture fixes surfaced by the web-pentest skill self-test against
the dashboard (issue #32267).
1. /dashboard-plugins/<name>/<path> previously returned 200 for any
file inside the plugin's dashboard directory — including
plugin_api.py and __pycache__/*.pyc. The path is unauthenticated by
architecture (SPA loads JS via <script src> and CSS via <link href>,
neither of which can attach a custom auth header), so the fix is
not "require token" — it's "restrict to browser-fetchable suffixes."
Allowlist now: .js .mjs .css .json .html .svg .png .jpg .jpeg .gif
.webp .ico .woff .woff2 .ttf .otf .map. Everything else → 404.
This stops a private user-installed plugin's Python source from
being readable by anyone reachable on the dashboard's loopback port
(other local users on a shared box, sidecar containers sharing the
host netns).
2. save_env_value() now refuses to persist env-var names that
influence how the next subprocess executes: LD_PRELOAD,
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, PYTHONHOME,
PYTHONSTARTUP, NODE_OPTIONS, NODE_PATH, PATH, SHELL, EDITOR,
VISUAL, PAGER, BROWSER, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EXEC_PATH; plus
HERMES_HOME / HERMES_PROFILE / HERMES_CONFIG / HERMES_ENV.
PUT /api/env is authed but the session token lives in the SPA HTML
where any future plugin XSS or local process can read it. Without
this gate, a token-holder could plant LD_PRELOAD in .env and the
next hermes process start would load attacker code via the dotenv
to os.environ chain. This is enforced on write only — pre-existing
.env values are left alone (the gate is in save_env_value, not in
load_env). PUT /api/env now returns 400 with the explanatory
message instead of an opaque 500.
IMPORTANT: HERMES_* overall is NOT blocked — only the four runtime
location names. Integration credentials following the HERMES_*
convention (HERMES_GEMINI_*, HERMES_LANGFUSE_*, HERMES_SPOTIFY_*,
HERMES_QWEN_BASE_URL, ...) keep working.
Regression tests cover both fixes (30 new test cases). No existing
tests changed; 257 passing in tests/hermes_cli/.
Closes#32267.
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
Upstream commit 2e66eefbc ("fix(dashboard): validate WebSocket Host
and Origin") added a WebSocket Host/Origin guard to block DNS
rebinding against the dashboard. The guard rejects any Origin whose
scheme is not http/https or whose netloc is empty — which includes
Electron's renderer Origin: file:// when the desktop app loads its
bundle from disk in production mode.
That makes the bb/gui Electron desktop unable to open the gateway
WebSocket against the embedded backend on Windows / macOS prod
builds. The renderer reports "Desktop boot failed" and the backend
logs:
WARNING hermes_cli.web_server: gateway-ws reject
peer=127.0.0.1:NNNN reason=non_loopback_or_bad_origin
bound_host=127.0.0.1 close_code=4403
DNS-rebinding requires a DNS-resolvable hostname; file:// has no
host component and therefore cannot be the attack vector this guard
exists to block. When bound to a loopback interface (127.0.0.1 /
::1 / localhost), accept file:// origins so desktop wrappers can
attach. Non-loopback binds (operator opted into network exposure)
keep rejecting file:// — the loose policy doesn't apply.
Also adds per-reason diagnostic logging in
_ws_host_origin_is_allowed, so future ws-guard rejections name the
specific clause that fired (bad_host / bad_origin_scheme /
origin_host_mismatch) instead of the opaque
"non_loopback_or_bad_origin" surfaced at the call site.
Verified against tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_host_header.py
(all 11 upstream tests still pass) and hand-tested by opening the
bb/gui Electron desktop dev build against the patched backend.
Bring 313 commits of upstream main into the bb/gui dashboard
refactor branch. Eight conflicts resolved by hand, the rest
auto-merged. One missing class (_StreamErrorEvent) restored from
main after the auto-merger dropped it.
Conflict resolutions:
apps/dashboard/README.md take HEAD: main's text described
the pre-rename web/ layout that
bb/gui refactored away.
apps/dashboard/package.json combine: keep HEAD's @hermes/shared
workspace dep, take main's
@nous-research/ui 0.16.0 bump.
apps/dashboard/package-lock.json regenerate via
npm install --package-lock-only.
Root lock also regenerated; only
dashboard and apps/desktop entries
moved (apps/desktop version 0.0.1 →
0.0.2 to match bb/gui's
package.json bump).
apps/dashboard/src/pages/ take main (4 hunks): text-xs
EnvPage.tsx replaces text-[0.65rem] per the
typography rule HEAD's own README
documents.
hermes_cli/gateway.py take main (2 hunks): Discord
setup metadata moved to plugin
(architectural migration); s6
service-manager dispatch helpers
additive.
hermes_cli/main.py combine (2 hunks): take main's
Termux-aware
_sync_bundled_skills_for_startup;
combine gui + portal subcommands
in the known-subcommand list.
hermes_cli/web_server.py mixed (10 hunks):
- take main on _PUBLIC_API_PATHS
(bb/gui's own test asserts the
rescan endpoint must require auth)
- combine WS helpers: keep HEAD's
_ws_client_label + main's
Host/Origin guard + composing
_ws_request_is_allowed
- take HEAD's debug-level broadcast
drop log (matches the comment
"subscriber went away mid-send")
- take main's _safe_plugin_api_relpath
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j fix and the
paired discovery-time validation
- take main's {name:path} route
converter for plugin visibility
tui_gateway/server.py take main: PR #31379's verbose-
args gating supersedes HEAD's
unconditional args dump on
tool.start.
Post-merge restoration:
run_agent.py restored class _StreamErrorEvent
(40 lines, from origin/main:288).
Auto-merge silently dropped it,
breaking imports in
agent/codex_runtime.py and three
test files
(test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery.py,
test_streaming.py). Restored
verbatim from main.
Sanity checks:
* git diff --check / --cached --check: clean (no stray markers)
* ast.parse + import on all touched .py files: clean
* targeted pytest on resolved files: 756 passed, 1 pre-existing
Windows-curses failure unrelated to the merge
* full pytest_parallel run: 105 files / 391 failures vs baseline
98 files / 346. Differential vs origin/bb/gui shows all 11
"new" failure files come from main's added tests/code and
reproduce identically against origin/main on the same Windows
host (pure Windows path-separator / perms / git-bash issues
in upstream tests, not merge regressions). 4 baseline
failures fixed: 3 in test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery (the
_StreamErrorEvent restoration), 1 each in test_pairing,
test_runner_startup_failures, test_stream_consumer.
* sentinel-token sweep on main's eight largest commits:
every audited symbol present in the merged tree at expected
counts (TTSProvider 61, NtfyAdapter 29, S6ServiceManager 70,
install_bws 12, security_audit 16, register_image_gen_provider
23, list_profile_gateways 22, DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS
48, …).
* byte-diff sweep: 30/30 sampled main-only-modified files
byte-identical to origin/main; the four bb/gui-only files
that drifted (i18n/types.ts, i18n/ru.ts, ThemeSwitcher.tsx,
ToolCall.tsx) correctly absorbed main's web/ → apps/dashboard/
edits through git's rename detection (main's added lines all
present, removed lines all absent).
The web dashboard's Anthropic OAuth helper wrote the credential file
straight to its final destination and relied on the process umask for
permissions. That left the dashboard-specific path weaker than the
existing auth writers, which already use owner-only permissions and
safer write semantics.
This change keeps the scope narrow: make the dashboard helper write via
a temp file + replace, chmod the final file to owner-only, and add a
focused regression test for both permission handling and atomic-write
behavior.
Constraint: Must preserve the existing dashboard OAuth flow and credential-pool side effects
Rejected: Broader auth-storage refactor | unnecessary scope for a single verified inconsistency
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep dashboard credential writes aligned with existing auth storage semantics; do not reintroduce direct write_text() here without matching chmod/atomic behavior
Tested: pytest -o addopts='' tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_oauth_write.py tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py -q (78 passed)
Not-tested: Cross-platform permission semantics on Windows-managed filesystems
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j — half two of the bypass chain.
``_mount_plugin_api_routes`` imports each dashboard plugin's
manifest ``api`` field as a Python module via
``importlib.util.spec_from_file_location`` — arbitrary code
execution by design. Two primitives in the surrounding code
turned that "by design" RCE into a usable attack:
1. Absolute paths in the manifest swallow the plugin directory.
``Path('safe/dashboard') / '/tmp/evil.py'`` resolves to
``/tmp/evil.py``, so a single manifest line
``{"api": "/tmp/payload.py"}`` was enough to redirect the
importer at any Python file on disk.
2. ``..`` traversal in the manifest climbs out of the dashboard
directory. ``Path('plugins/safe/dashboard') /
'../../../tmp/evil.py'`` lands in ``/tmp/evil.py`` after
``resolve()`` — the static-asset handler
(``serve_plugin_asset``) already defends against this via
``is_relative_to``; the api-mount path didn't.
Fix at three layers so a regression in any one can't re-open the
advisory:
* New ``_safe_plugin_api_relpath`` validator runs at *discovery*
time and stores only sanitised relative paths on the plugin
entry's ``_api_file`` field. Absolute paths, ``..`` traversal,
empty / non-string values, and paths that ``resolve()`` outside
the plugin's ``dashboard/`` directory are rejected with a
warning naming the plugin. ``has_api`` follows the sanitised
value so the dashboard frontend doesn't render a fake "Backend
API" badge for plugins whose api was scrubbed.
* ``_mount_plugin_api_routes`` re-validates the resolved path
against the live filesystem just before the import — defence in
depth in case ``_dir`` is tampered with post-cache or a future
caller bypasses the discovery-time validator.
* Project plugins (``source == "project"``) are refused outright
for backend import. ``./.hermes/plugins/`` ships with the CWD,
so any threat model that includes "user opens a malicious repo"
treats it as attacker-controlled; project plugins can still
extend the UI via static JS/CSS but their Python ``api`` is no
longer auto-imported. Combined with the truthy env-gate fix
from the previous commit, the original advisory chain now
fails at two distinct choke points.
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j — half one of the bypass chain.
``_discover_dashboard_plugins`` opted into the untrusted ``./.hermes/
plugins/`` source via ``if os.environ.get("HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_
PLUGINS"):`` — which is True for any non-empty string. ``=0``,
``=false``, ``=no``, ``=off`` all return non-empty strings and so
*enabled* the project source even though every operator (and the
agent loader, ``hermes_cli/plugins.py`` line 815) reads those values
as "disabled". An attacker who can land a manifest under the CWD's
``.hermes/plugins/`` directory — a malicious cloned repo, a worktree
checked out from a forked PR, a CI runner workspace — was therefore
guaranteed to get their manifest discovered the moment the user ran
``hermes dashboard`` from that directory, regardless of whether the
user thought they had project plugins disabled.
Switch to the shared ``utils.env_var_enabled`` helper used by the
agent loader so the gate accepts the documented truthy set (``1`` /
``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``, case-insensitive) and treats everything
else — including ``0`` / ``false`` / ``no`` — as off.
Half two (path-traversal + project-source ``api`` import) lands in
the next commit. Together they break the RCE chain at two distinct
choke points so a future regression in either one alone can't
re-open the advisory.
Removes the global `uppercase` + `font-mondwest` from the App.tsx root
that forced every page to opt-out, replaces stacked-alpha text colors
with semantic tokens for WCAG-AA contrast across all 7 themes, and
applies the new `text-display` utility from @nous-research/ui@0.16.0
on intentional brand chrome (page titles, sidebar headings, segmented
filters) only. Bumps every sub-12px arbitrary text size to text-xs.
Also widens the dashboard plugin routes (/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/
{name:path}/...) so category-namespaced plugins like observability/
langfuse and image_gen/openai can be enable/disabled from the dashboard
— previously the FE encodeURIComponent-ed the slash and the backend
{name} route rejected it. _validate_plugin_name still blocks .. and
backslash, and strips leading/trailing slash.
Touches sessions/env/keys page chrome and adds two new i18n keys
(`overview`, `showMore`/`showLess`) across all 18 locales.
Squashes 19 commits from PR #28832.
Co-authored-by: Hermes <noreply@nousresearch.com>
- test_browser_secret_exfil: mock _run_browser_command instead of
launching real Chrome (secret check is pre-launch, browser is
irrelevant to the assertion)
- test_web_server: add time.sleep(0.05) after pub.send_text() to
yield the event loop before receive_text(). TestClient's sync mode
can race the broadcast handler otherwise, hanging the test.
PR #27590 removed auxiliary.session_search from DEFAULT_CONFIG (single-shape
tool now returns DB content directly without an aux LLM), but the slot
remained in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS (web_server.py) and AUX_TASKS (ModelsPage.tsx).
Removing the dead entries while we're touching these tables.
triage_specifier, kanban_decomposer, profile_describer exist in
DEFAULT_CONFIG auxiliary section but weren't in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS,
_AUX_TASKS, or the dashboard AUX_TASKS array — so users couldn't
configure them through hermes model or the web dashboard.
9â\x86\x9212 aux slots across all three UI surfaces.
* desktop+gateway: harden Slack socket recovery and Windows restart dedupe
Fix Slack Socket Mode reliability by adding a watchdog/reconnect path so silent socket task drops no longer leave the adapter stuck. Harden Windows gateway lifecycle by avoiding desktop-binary path collisions, making gateway PID scans case/extension tolerant, and reusing in-flight restart actions to prevent duplicate gateway spawns.
* test(slack): add Socket Mode watchdog/reconnect behavioural coverage
Drive the new Slack Socket Mode self-healing logic through a fake AsyncSocketModeHandler so we can simulate the P0 silent-hang failure mode (task exit, transport disconnected, intentional shutdown, concurrent reconnect attempts) without touching real Slack.
* fix(slack,desktop): address Copilot review on watchdog races and path normalization
- connect(): explicitly cancel + await the prior socket watchdog before flipping _running, so an old monitor cannot exit between teardown and respawn (Copilot #1)
- _socket_watchdog_loop: wrap the body in try/except + add a done-callback that respawns on unexpected crash, so a transient bug cannot permanently disable self-healing (Copilot #2)
- normalizeExecutablePathForCompare: use the resolved path for realpathSync so non-string inputs cannot leak through (Copilot #3)
- Add tests for crash-recovery and atomic watchdog replacement across reconnects
* fix(slack): tighten connect() error path and clarify watchdog test intent
Address Copilot review round 2.
- connect(): wrap _start_socket_mode_handler/_ensure_socket_watchdog in a focused try/except so any failure rolls back partially-started handler/task state and leaves _running=False, ensuring the platform lock is always released by the outer finally
- Defer _running=True until after the handler is actually started so the watchdog observes a live socket task immediately and never spins against a half-built adapter
- Rename test_watchdog_self_restarts_after_unexpected_crash to test_watchdog_cancellation_does_not_respawn (matches what it actually asserts) and add test_watchdog_unexpected_exit_respawns_via_done_callback that drives a real RuntimeError through _on_socket_watchdog_done and verifies a fresh task replaces the crashed one
* fix(web_server): serialize action spawn check+store under a threading lock
Address Copilot review round 3.
FastAPI runs sync handlers on its threadpool, so two near-simultaneous /api/gateway/restart (or /api/hermes/update) requests could both observe "no live process" in _spawn_hermes_action's poll-based dedupe and double-spawn. Add a module-level _ACTION_SPAWN_LOCK around the entire check + Popen + _ACTION_PROCS store sequence so the dedupe is atomic across threads.
* fix: address Copilot review round 4
- slack.disconnect(): mirror connect()'s defensive cleanup — catch the broad Exception path on watchdog await so handler shutdown and lock release still run if the watchdog raised before cancellation took effect
- web_server._spawn_hermes_action: wrap subprocess.Popen in try/except so a missing executable / permission error closes the log file handle, writes a failure marker, and re-raises instead of leaking a file descriptor
- gateway._scan_gateway_pids: drop the over-broad "hermes.exe --profile" / "hermes.exe -p" patterns that would match any Hermes CLI subcommand using a profile flag (e.g. `hermes.exe --profile foo dashboard`); rely on the "hermes.exe gateway" + "hermes-gateway.exe" tokens instead
- tests: tighten _fake_create_task to assert coroutine input and return a real asyncio.Task that stays pending until pytest teardown, and update the three callsites whose mocked AsyncSocketModeHandler.start_async returned a non-coroutine value
* fix(slack): reset multi-workspace state on reconnect
Address Copilot review round 5.
connect() is reentrant (gateway restart, in-process reconnect), but it was leaving _bot_user_id / _team_clients / _team_bot_user_ids populated from the previous session. A reconnect that rotated the primary token or dropped a workspace would silently keep the stale bot user id and stale workspace client maps, leading to dispatch against gone workspaces.
Clear these three pieces of state right after _stop_socket_mode_handler() and before the auth_test loop, then let the loop repopulate from the current tokens. Add test_reconnect_refreshes_multi_workspace_state to lock it in.
Salvages #27568 by @SerenityTn. Dashboard cron page now lists cron
jobs from all profiles, with profile-aware filter UI and storage
routing. Includes test coverage for cross-profile listing, mutation,
deletion, and validation.
Also fixes orphan conflict markers in config.py left by an earlier
salvage merge (kanban.dispatch_stale_timeout_seconds was double-nested
in HEAD/PR markers from #28452 salvage of #23790).
