mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
synced 2026-06-09 08:21:50 +00:00
120 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
c1a531d063
|
fix(dashboard): guard update endpoint in Docker with structured guidance (salvage #34831) (#36263)
* fix: guard dashboard update in Docker * fix(dashboard): align action response type --------- Co-authored-by: Donovan Yohan <donovan-yohan@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Donovan Yohan <34756395+donovan-yohan@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
7fbe9b79ab
|
fix(desktop): add missing PATCH /api/sessions/{id} so rename works (#36249)
The desktop rename dialog sent PATCH /api/sessions/{id}, but the backend
only defined GET and DELETE for that path — FastAPI returned 405 Method
Not Allowed, surfaced to the user as "Rename failed". Add the PATCH route
backed by SessionDB.set_session_title (handles sanitization, uniqueness,
and clearing the title when empty).
Also fix a misleading notification: any 405 was summarized as an unrelated
"does not support that audio endpoint" message. Make it a generic 405 hint.
|
||
|
|
51c68d4ab1
|
Add Hermes desktop app (#20059)
* feat: better composer etc * docs: add desktop and dashboard run instructions * fix(desktop): address security scan findings * fix(dashboard): resolve @nous-research/ui path under npm workspaces The sync-assets prebuild step shelled out to 'cp -r node_modules/@nous-research/ui/dist/fonts ...' with a path relative to apps/dashboard/. That works only when the dep is installed locally in the dashboard workspace, but 'npm install' at the repo root (the documented setup — see apps/desktop/README.md) hoists shared deps to the root node_modules under npm workspaces. The relative cp then fails with 'No such file or directory', sync-assets exits 1, the Vite build aborts, and 'hermes dashboard' surfaces a generic 'Web UI build failed' message. Replace the shell one-liner with scripts/sync-assets.cjs, which walks up from the dashboard directory looking for node_modules/ @nous-research/ui — working in both the hoisted (workspaces) and co-located (standalone) layouts. Also guards against a missing dist/fonts or dist/assets with a clearer error pointing at a rebuild of the UI package rather than silently copying nothing. * feat(desktop): support connecting to a remote Hermes backend Add HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_URL and HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_TOKEN env vars that, when set, short-circuit the local-child spawn in startHermes() and connect the Electron renderer to an already- running 'hermes dashboard' server reachable over the network. Motivating use case: WSL2 users who want to run the Hermes core (agent loop, tools, filesystem access) inside their WSL distribution while rendering the Electron GUI on native Windows. Before this change, the desktop app always spawned a local Python child on the same host as the renderer, which doesn't cross the WSL/Windows boundary. The remote path reuses waitForHermes() as a liveness probe (/api/status is in the backend's public endpoint allowlist), so the connection is only returned once the backend is actually ready. WebSocket URL derivation picks ws:// or wss:// based on the input scheme. URL validation rejects non-http(s) schemes and requires both env vars together to avoid a half-configured connection that would silently fall through to the spawn path. No behaviour change when the env vars are unset — the default local-spawn flow is untouched. Typical usage: # in WSL2 hermes dashboard --tui --no-open --host 0.0.0.0 --port 9119 --insecure # on Windows set HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_URL=http://localhost:9119 set HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_TOKEN=<session token> set HERMES_DESKTOP_IGNORE_EXISTING=1 (launch Hermes desktop) * ci(desktop): automate desktop releases Add GitHub Actions release channels for signed desktop installers and document the stable/nightly download paths. * feat: file tabs * refactor(desktop): tighten right-rail tab close API Promote closeRightRailTab/closeActiveRightRailTab as the single public entry point. Drops the activeTabRef + handleCloseDocument indirection in ChatPreviewRail, the unused $rightRailHasContent atom, and the legacy dismissFilePreviewTarget alias. -70 LOC. * feat(desktop): polish composer pill toward reference look Solid foreground-on-background send/voice-conversation circle (black-on-white in light, white-on-black in dark) anchors the right edge as the primary CTA instead of the orange theme primary. Bumps the primary control to 2.125rem so it visually outranks the ghost mic/plus controls. Opens up the surface padding (0.625rem x / 0.5rem y) so the input row breathes around its controls, and nudges the corner radius from 20 to 24px for a slightly pill-ier silhouette. LiquidGlass distortion is preserved. * feat(desktop): add startup and onboarding flow Add phase-based desktop boot progress, fresh-install sandbox testing, and first-run provider credential onboarding so packaged installs can start cleanly without manual settings detours. * fix(desktop): gate prompts on provider setup Show the desktop provider onboarding flow before prompt submission when no inference provider is configured, preventing fresh installs from falling through to backend credential errors. * fix(desktop): surface provider onboarding from session warnings Propagate credential warnings through session runtime info and open desktop onboarding whenever a session reports no usable provider, so unconfigured installs cannot fall through to prompt errors. * fix(desktop): route gateway provider errors to onboarding The "No inference provider configured" auth error reaches the renderer through gateway error events, not the prompt.submit promise; the previous patch only caught the latter, so the error toast still surfaced and onboarding never opened. Also strip credential-shaped env vars from the test:desktop:fresh sandbox so the packaged backend can't see provider keys leaking from the launching shell. * fix(desktop): use strict runtime check to drive onboarding setup.status returned True whenever any provider auth state was discoverable, including indirect fallbacks like a gh-CLI Copilot token. That made desktop think the user was set up while the agent's actual resolve_runtime_provider call still raised AuthError, leaving the user with a useless toast and no onboarding. Add a setup.runtime_check gateway method that runs the same resolver the agent uses on session creation, and switch the desktop onboarding overlay and prompt precheck to use it. * feat(desktop): OAuth-first onboarding using existing dashboard provider API Replace the engineer-flavored API key form with a Sign-in-first onboarding overlay that uses the dashboard's existing /api/providers/oauth catalog and PKCE/device-code endpoints (Anthropic, Nous, OpenAI Codex, etc.). API key entry is now a fallback tab with friendly provider names instead of env var prefixes, and the loud raw resolver error is gone in favor of a one-line welcome message. * fix(desktop): polish onboarding provider list Reorder OAuth providers so Nous Portal is first, give the segmented Sign in / API key control equal column widths, and replace the engineer-flavored backend names like "Anthropic (Claude API)" / "MiniMax (OAuth)" with friendlier in-app titles. External-CLI providers now show a softer subtitle and an external-link icon instead of a chevron. * refactor(desktop): split onboarding overlay into store + view Move the OAuth state machine, runtime check, copy-to-clipboard, and api-key save into store/onboarding.ts (matching the boot.ts pattern), leaving the overlay as a presentation layer that subscribes via useStore. Tabs are now table-driven, child panels read flow from the store instead of prop-drilling, and the polling/PKCE/error/success branches share a small Status atom. * fix(desktop): external CLI providers + center mode tabs External-CLI providers (Claude Code, Qwen Code) now open an in-overlay panel with the CLI command, copy button, and an "I've signed in" recheck instead of firing an invisible toast. Center the Sign in / API key tab control so it sits under the heading instead of hugging the left edge. * fix(desktop): drop onboarding tabs for an inline link, group device-code waiting state Replace the Sign in / API key tab pair with an "I have an API key" footer link under the OAuth provider list, with a "Back to sign in" affordance inside the API key form. Group the device-code "Waiting for you to authorize..." status next to the Cancel button so the alignment matches the action. * refactor(desktop): tighten onboarding store + overlay Drop the dead isOnboardingBusy/BUSY set, factor the catch-fallback dance into safeReq, and share a single reloadAndConnect helper between PKCE submit, device-code success, external recheck, and api-key save. In the overlay, extract Step / CodeBlock / FlowFooter / CancelBtn / DocsLink atoms so the four sign-in panels share the same chrome instead of repeating it inline. Net effect: fewer literal divs, one place to touch the spacing, and the code-block + footer rows are reusable across future flows. * fix(desktop): mount onboarding from frame 1 to kill the FOUT Default onboarding.configured to null (unknown until the runtime check resolves) and have the onboarding overlay render whenever it's not yet confirmed true. The boot overlay now yields to it, so the very first paint is the Welcome card with a "While we get you set up..." progress strip instead of a flash of the chat shell between boot dismiss and onboarding mount. The picker swaps in cleanly once the gateway opens and the runtime check confirms the user is not configured. Already-configured users see the same prep card briefly while their existing runtime warms up, then the overlay dismisses without touching the chat shell. * fix(desktop): top-align empty sessions placeholder The "Start a chat to build your history." empty state used a min-h-35 grid place-items-center container, which floated the text in a tall dead zone. Render it as a flat paragraph that sits right under the section header like the empty pinned state does. * refactor(desktop): drop dead boot overlay Onboarding overlay subsumes the boot card now that it mounts from frame 1 and renders boot progress inline. The standalone DesktopBootOverlay is unreachable in every flow (yields whenever onboarding has not confirmed configured, dismisses once it has). * fix(desktop): hide pinned/recents sections until first session A fresh sidebar showed the Pinned and Recent chats headers with floating empty-state copy underneath. Drop both sections (and the now-orphan SidebarEmptySessionState) when there are no sessions yet — they reappear after the first chat. Skeletons during initial load are unchanged. * feat(gui): route embedded TUI through dashboard gateway (#21979) Inject HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL into dashboard PTY sessions so embedded ui-tui instances attach to the in-process websocket gateway, with coverage for the new env wiring. * Add desktop remote gateway settings Make the desktop gateway connection configurable from settings so local remains the default while remote backends can be saved, tested, and applied without environment variables. * feat(gui): first-class Messaging page + gateway menu redesign - Add Messaging page to the desktop app with per-platform setup, status, and inline guidance. Catalog derives from gateway.config Platform enum + plugin registry, so every messaging adapter the CLI supports (Telegram, Discord, Slack, Mattermost, Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal, BlueBubbles, Home Assistant, Email, SMS, DingTalk, Feishu, WeCom, Weixin, QQ, Yuanbao, API server, Webhooks, plugins) shows up without per-platform code. - New REST endpoints: GET /api/messaging/platforms, PUT and POST /test on the same path. Secrets go through the existing .env pipeline; enable/disable writes config.yaml. - Replace gateway statusbar dropdown with a richer panel: status row, icon-only restart + system-panel actions, recent activity (with timestamps trimmed in display, full text on hover), platform list. - Auto-poll the messaging page every 6s (paused when hidden) so status updates without a manual check. - Drop Settings / Command Center from the sidebar nav (still reachable via shortcuts and the titlebar cog). - Flatten top corners on Messaging/Skills/Artifacts/Chat panes. - Share new StatusDot component across messaging + gateway menu. - Fix gateway/config.py so an explicit platforms.<name>.enabled=false in config.yaml is honored when env tokens are present. - pb-9 on the chat content area for breathing room above the composer. * Potential fix for pull request finding 'CodeQL / Clear-text logging of sensitive information' Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * pin electron version * hide application menu on non-mac systems * interpret compactPreview for non-string vlaues as JSON or an empty string * fix(desktop): keep composer contenteditable mounted across stacked toggle The composer rendered {input} inside two different parent fragments depending on `stacked`. When auto-expand flipped `stacked` (e.g. the moment typed text wrapped past two lines), React reconciled the two branches as different positions and unmounted/remounted the contenteditable. The fresh mount started empty, so any in-flight characters — most reliably reproduced by holding a key — were lost. Replace the conditional with a single CSS Grid whose template-areas swap on `stacked`. The three children (menu, input, controls) keep stable identities across the toggle; only their grid placement changes, which the browser handles without React tearing down the editor. * refactor(desktop): align install layout with install.ps1 / install.sh Make the desktop app's runtime layout match what scripts/install.ps1 and scripts/install.sh produce, so a desktop-only user and a CLI-only user end up with the same files in the same places and can share one install. Layout - ACTIVE_HERMES_ROOT = HERMES_HOME/hermes-agent (was: process.resourcesPath/hermes-agent, read-only) - VENV_ROOT = HERMES_HOME/hermes-agent/venv (was: userData/hermes-runtime) - desktop.log = HERMES_HOME/logs/desktop.log (was: userData/desktop.log) - HERMES_HOME default: %LOCALAPPDATA%\hermes on Windows, ~/.hermes elsewhere The packaged .app/.exe still ships a read-only payload at process.resourcesPath/hermes-agent (FACTORY_HERMES_ROOT). On first launch or after an installer-driven upgrade we sync factory -> active, then provision the venv and run pip install -e . against the active root. Key behaviors - Pin HERMES_HOME in the spawned Python's env so get_hermes_home() resolves to the same path resolveHermesHome() picked. Without this, Python falls back to ~/.hermes on every platform - fine on mac/linux, a split-state bug on Windows where our default is %LOCALAPPDATA%\hermes. - Detect developer installs by .git presence at ACTIVE; never overwrite a user's checkout via factory sync. - Marker at ACTIVE/.hermes-desktop-runtime.json (schema v4) tracks pyproject hash + factory version + runtime schema version. depsFresh fast-paths when nothing changed. - Dev (npm run dev) prefers SOURCE_REPO_ROOT over ACTIVE so devs run their local edits, not whatever's under HERMES_HOME. - Better error messages distinguish "no payload" from "no Python". - Preserve a legacy ~/.hermes on Windows when no %LOCALAPPDATA%\hermes exists, so users with prior pip/manual installs aren't orphaned. pyproject.toml - Promote fastapi, uvicorn[standard], ptyprocess (non-Windows), and pywinpty (Windows) to main dependencies. The dashboard backend (hermes dashboard) needs them at runtime; the previous lazy-import fallback was a footgun for fresh installs. - Empty the [pty] optional-extra; kept as a no-op back-compat alias for any existing pip install hermes-agent[pty] invocations. Drops the hardcoded BUNDLED_RUNTIME_REQUIREMENTS list in main.cjs - the desktop now installs whatever pyproject.toml says, single source of truth. Files - apps/desktop/electron/main.cjs: runtime layout, HERMES_HOME pin, factory->active sync, marker v4 - apps/desktop/scripts/test-desktop.mjs: track new venv location - apps/desktop/README.md: new Setup, Runtime Bootstrap, and Debugging sections - pyproject.toml: fastapi/uvicorn/pty backends in main dependencies; [pty] extra emptied Tested locally on Windows: npm run dev boots cleanly, sessions land at the new location, type-check + lint + test:desktop:platforms all pass. Verified end-to-end on a fresh Win11 VM via dist:win installer. Known gaps (filed as follow-ups, not in this PR): - Skills not seeded on packaged installs (sync_skills only runs in cmd_chat, not cmd_dashboard). Need to move to shared pre-dispatch. - Git Bash not bundled or detected; agent's terminal tool errors out with a useful message but desktop bootstrapper should pre-flight it. - install.ps1 / install.sh should be decomposed into composable phase libraries so the desktop bootstrapper can reuse them as a single source of truth across all install surfaces. * feat(desktop): theme polish, prose chat typography, composer chrome - DS tokens/midground, Backdrop, scoped scrollbars, typography plugin + prose - Composer liquid/radius utilities, thread font parity, tool/thinking cues - File tree label scale, preview flex, thread retry loading + streaming tests * feat(desktop): NSIS prereq detection page + auto-install via winget The packaged Windows installer now detects Python 3.11+ and Git for Windows at install time and offers to install missing prereqs via winget. Mirrors the prereq logic scripts/install.ps1 already runs for CLI installs, so desktop installer users get the same out-of-the-box experience as install.ps1 users. Why - Hermes' terminal tool calls bash.exe directly (tools/environments/ local.py); on Windows that's Git Bash from Git for Windows. Without it, the agent fails on the first terminal() call. - Hermes' Python runtime needs 3.11+. Without it, the desktop bootstrapper errors out at venv creation. - Both gaps surfaced on a fresh Windows 11 VM smoke test: VM had Python pre-installed but no Git, so the agent's first terminal call failed with "Git Bash isn't installed." - install.ps1 has had Install-Git + Install-Uv functions for ages. The desktop installer was the asymmetric outlier. How — NSIS prereq page - New file: apps/desktop/installer/prereq-check.nsh (plugged into electron-builder via build.nsis.include) - Real Wizard page using nsDialogs, inserted via customPageAfterChangeDir hook (between the Directory page and InstFiles). - Group boxes for Python and Git, each showing detection status. - Pre-checked install checkboxes when winget is available. - Auto-skips silently if both prereqs are already installed. - Falls back to manual download URLs when winget itself is missing. - Detection: - Python: probes `py -3.11`/`-3.12`/`-3.13`/`-3.14` via the Python launcher. Microsoft Store "Python stub" (no py.exe) is correctly classified as not-installed. - Git: `where git`. - winget: `where winget` (Win10 1809+ / Win11 with App Installer). - Install execution (in customInstall macro): - Python: nsExec::ExecToLog with `--scope user --silent`. Per-user install, no UAC prompt, output streams to install log. - Git: ExecShellWait via Windows ShellExecute. Critical because Git always installs per-machine and triggers UAC; ShellExecute preserves the foreground focus chain across non-elevated → elevated process spawns, so UAC actually comes to the foreground. nsExec::ExecToLog breaks the chain because winget runs hidden. - Both pass `--disable-interactivity --accept-package-agreements --accept-source-agreements` to suppress winget's own dialogs. - Verification: probes Git's standard install locations via FileExists rather than `where git`. NSIS's process inherits PATH at startup, so a freshly-installed Git won't be visible to `where` until restart. - Silent installs (/S) skip the prompts; managed deploys handle prereqs out-of-band via Group Policy / Intune. How — Electron-side safety net - New findGitBash() in main.cjs, parallel to findSystemPython(). Probes the same locations as tools/environments/local.py:_find_bash() so a positive result here means the agent's terminal tool will work. - ensureRuntime now throws a clear, actionable error on Windows when Git Bash isn't found, matching the existing "Python 3.11+ is required" error path. - Catches users the NSIS page doesn't: .msi installer users (NSIS prereq page doesn't run for MSI), `npm run dev` users, manual installers, anyone who unchecked the install boxes on the NSIS prereq page. - All gated on `IS_WINDOWS`; macOS / Linux unaffected. NSIS build issue (resolved) - electron-builder defaults to `-WX` (warnings as errors). NSIS optimizer emits "warning 6010: function not referenced" for our page functions because Page custom directives don't count as references in its static-analysis pass. The functions ARE called at runtime when NSIS invokes the page; the optimizer just can't see it statically. - Set `build.nsis.warningsAsErrors=false` in package.json so this spurious warning doesn't fail the build. (Documented option from electron-builder's nsisOptions.) Out of scope (filed for future work) - MSI prereq detection: Windows Installer custom actions are a different mechanism. Enterprise deploys typically handle prereqs via GP/Intune. - Bundle PortableGit + python-build-standalone in extraResources for zero-network installs. ~80MB increase. - Mac / Linux GUI prereq flows (different installer formats; Xcode CLT covers most macOS prereqs already; Linux is per-distro hard). Files - apps/desktop/installer/prereq-check.nsh (new, ~290 lines NSIS) - apps/desktop/package.json (build.nsis.include + warningsAsErrors) - apps/desktop/electron/main.cjs (findGitBash + preflight) - apps/desktop/README.md (Runtime prerequisites section) Cross-platform impact - macOS / Linux builds (dist:mac, dist:mac:dmg, dist:mac:zip): nsis config is ignored entirely; .nsh is dormant. - npm run dev: .nsh dormant; main.cjs preflight gated on IS_WINDOWS. - scripts/install.ps1, scripts/install.sh: no reference to any new files; CLI install paths untouched. - Hermes CLI / dashboard / gateway: no reference; runtime untouched. - All checks: node --check on main.cjs and test-desktop.mjs pass; npm run test:desktop:platforms 4/4 passing; node --test green. Tested - npm run dist:win produces signed .exe and .msi without errors. - Fresh Win11 VM (Python pre-installed, no Git): prereq page renders, Python check shows detected, Git checkbox pre-checked. Click Next → Git installs via winget with UAC prompt in foreground. - After install completes, Hermes launches and the agent's terminal tool can run bash commands. Verified Git Bash is detected at `C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe` by ensureRuntime's preflight. * feat: theme changes, composer tweaks, in app update ux, finesse * fix(cli): seed bundled skills on dashboard + gateway entrypoints `sync_skills(quiet=True)` was only being called from inside `cmd_chat`, which meant `hermes dashboard` (the desktop GUI's backend) and `hermes gateway` (Telegram/Discord/Slack/etc daemons) never seeded the bundled skill library into ~/.hermes/skills/. This surfaced as "No skills found" in the desktop GUI's skills panel on fresh installs, despite the agent having access to the full bundled library when invoked via `hermes chat`. scripts/install.ps1 worked around it by running skills_sync.py as part of Copy-ConfigTemplates, but that's not part of the desktop installer's bootstrap chain. Fix - Extract the skills-sync block from cmd_chat into a module-level `_sync_bundled_skills_quietly()` helper. - Call the helper from cmd_chat (preserving existing behavior), cmd_dashboard (after the --status/--stop early-return paths and fastapi import check, so we don't run skills_sync on management commands or when deps aren't installed), and cmd_gateway. Why these three entrypoints - cmd_chat: the user's primary CLI entrypoint - cmd_dashboard: the desktop GUI's backend; this is what `hermes dashboard --tui` invokes when the desktop bootstrapper spawns Hermes - cmd_gateway: long-running daemons where the user expects the agent to have full skill access Other entrypoints (cmd_config, cmd_doctor, cmd_login, cmd_status, etc.) are management commands that don't need skill discovery and were never running skills_sync in the first place — leaving them alone. Idempotence - tools/skills_sync.py is manifest-based: skipped skills cost milliseconds. Calling it from multiple entrypoints adds no real cost, and users running `hermes chat` then `hermes dashboard` get two fast no-ops on the second call. Failure handling - Helper wraps skills_sync in try/except. Skills are an enhancement, not a hard dependency — Hermes runs fine with an empty skills/ dir. Files - hermes_cli/main.py: + new helper `_sync_bundled_skills_quietly()` at module level + cmd_chat: replace inline block with helper call + cmd_dashboard: add helper call after fastapi import succeeds + cmd_gateway: add helper call before delegating to gateway_command * feat(desktop): hoisted todo widget, JSON tool summaries, history grouping & timer fixes - Hoist todo to first-class widget (shadcn checkboxes, brand colors, no tool-accordion). Header derives label from active task; non-active rows fade. - Replace raw JSON dumps with structured key/value summaries via formatToolResultSummary; nested error extraction for clearer failures. - Fix loaded-session grouping: stitch interleaved assistant/tool iterations into one bubble instead of orphaned synthetic messages. - Stable tool/thinking timers via keyed registry so unmount/scroll doesn't reset elapsed counts; gate "running" on real live thread state. - Reorganize chat-only assistant-ui components under components/chat/. * fix(desktop): address CodeQL alerts on PR #20059 - settings/helpers.ts: harden setNested against prototype pollution. POLLUTING_PATH_PARTS check is now applied at every assignment site (loop + leaf) and uses Object.defineProperty so CodeQL can see the guard inline rather than via a helper function call. - lib/markdown-preprocess.ts: rebuild the dangling-fence close regex from a fence-char + length instead of marker.replace(...). The marker is captured by `(`{3,}|~{3,})` so it can only be backticks or tildes, but CodeQL was tracing tainted input text into the RegExp source and flagging hostname dots from input as part of the pattern (false positive js/incomplete-hostname-regexp on the test fixture URLs). Reconstructing from a literal char breaks the dataflow. - scripts/notarize-artifact.cjs: drop args from the run() rejection message. Args carry --key-id / --issuer / key file path; the existing outer catch already squashes errors to a generic line, but CodeQL was flagging the args.join(' ') as clear-text logging of APPLE_API_KEY_ID. Composer DOM-text-as-HTML alerts (composer/index.tsx:379, :547) are already addressed in |
||
|
|
234ac00937
|
fix(dashboard): allow insecure WS peers on explicit non-loopback binds (#35386)
The merged 0.0.0.0/:: insecure-bind fix (#35141) did not cover binding directly to a specific non-loopback address (e.g. a Tailscale/LAN IP via --host 100.64.0.10 --insecure). In that mode the dashboard HTML loaded but every WebSocket upgrade was rejected by the loopback-only peer guard, so /chat connected then silently received no data. Generalize _ws_client_is_allowed to lift the loopback-only peer gate for any explicit non-loopback bound host, not just the 0.0.0.0/:: wildcard. DNS-rebinding stays blocked: _ws_host_origin_is_allowed already requires the Host header to exactly match the bound interface for explicit binds, mirroring _is_accepted_host on the HTTP layer. Co-authored-by: pxdsgnco <14163800+pxdsgnco@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
e8076c1ebe |
fix(dashboard): allow chat websockets on insecure public bind
Allow non-loopback websocket peers when the dashboard is explicitly exposed with --host 0.0.0.0/:: and --insecure. This fixes the failure mode where /chat rendered over LAN but /api/ws and /api/events were rejected with HTTP 403, leaving the embedded TUI chat disconnected. Add regression coverage for the insecure public bind case in the dashboard websocket auth tests. |
||
|
|
3a2c03061c
|
fix(stt,tts): restore mistralai — 2.4.8 is clean, ban lifted (#34841)
* docs(code-execution): document HERMES_* env narrowing + passthrough workaround
The execute_code sandbox-child env scrub (
|
||
|
|
a22c250001 |
refactor(auth): remove vestigial Nous min_key_ttl/inference_auth_mode params
After the legacy session-key path was removed, two parameters became dead surface on the Nous runtime-resolution chain: - min_key_ttl_seconds: del'd inside refresh_nous_oauth_pure and pass-through / telemetry-only in refresh_nous_oauth_from_state, _try_import_shared_nous_state, _nous_device_code_login, and resolve_nous_runtime_credentials. It controlled the now-deleted agent-key mint TTL and drives no behavior. - inference_auth_mode: with the legacy mode gone, AUTO and FRESH are behaviorally identical; the value only fed _normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode validation and oauth trace output, never a branch. Removing inference_auth_mode orphaned its whole supporting cluster (NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODE_AUTO/FRESH, NOUS_INFERENCE_AUTH_MODES, _normalize_nous_inference_auth_mode), and dropping min_key_ttl_seconds orphaned DEFAULT_AGENT_KEY_MIN_TTL_SECONDS — all deleted here. Updated every caller (run_agent, auxiliary_client, credential_pool, proxy adapter, runtime_provider, web_server, main, auth_commands, setup) and pruned the matching test kwargs. Deleted two tests that exercised the removed surface (test_legacy_auth_mode_is_rejected, test_try_refresh_..._accepts_explicit_auth_mode). No behavior change: net -134 LOC of dead code. |
||
|
|
41ff6e5937 | refactor(auth): Disable Nous legacy session key fallback | ||
|
|
66827f8947 |
chore: prune unused imports and duplicate import redefinitions
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only. - ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines) - __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so public re-export surfaces stay intact) - Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa: F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor, agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap, agent.codex_responses_adapter) - Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those can change behavior when the RHS has side effects - ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change Verification: - python -m compileall: clean - pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors) - core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli, toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway) - static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited module still resolves |
||
|
|
a618789dba |
fix(dashboard-auth): share /api/* public allowlist between legacy and OAuth gates
Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in
hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py
(OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a
non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not.
Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the
portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account
service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts
getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie
as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to
'agent dead' on the portal side.
Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py
and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults
the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's
auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list
hit both gates automatically.
Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public):
* /api/status — version, gateway state, active session count,
auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target.
* /api/config/defaults — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page
* /api/config/schema — config schema for the SPA's Config page
* /api/model/info — model catalogue metadata (context windows)
* /api/dashboard/themes — theme manifests for the skin engine
* /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard
No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external
monitoring agent would hit on /healthz.
Tests:
* New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS
fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring)
* New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised
over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is
never the response)
* New: docker integration check #3 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status
remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the
portal can distinguish modes
* Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes
/api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it
can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally
disabled')
* Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie /
dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason
* Updated: docker integration check #2 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes
/api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting
* Removed: dead _login() helper in
test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since
/api/status is reachable cold)
Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md
(the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).
|
||
|
|
b26d81d536 |
feat(dashboard-auth): honour X-Forwarded-Prefix + __Host-/__Secure- cookies
Mission-control style deploys reverse-proxy the dashboard at a path
prefix (e.g. mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/* -> :9119) and inject
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes on every request. The SPA mount already
honoured this for asset URLs and the bootstrap __HERMES_BASE_PATH__,
but the OAuth gate didn't:
1. The gate's Location: header to /login and the 401 envelope's
login_url were built bare ("/login?next=..."). Under a /hermes
prefix the browser follows that to mission-control.tilos.com/login
which the proxy doesn't route to the dashboard.
2. _redirect_uri (the OAuth callback URL handed to the IDP) used
request.url_for() which doesn't honour X-Forwarded-Prefix
(Starlette/uvicorn only proxy_headers Host + Proto + For). The
IDP redirects back to /auth/callback instead of /hermes/auth/
callback → 404 in the user's browser.
3. Cookies were set with Path=/ which leaks them to other apps on
the same origin and won't be sent back on requests under the
prefix in the first place.
Fix threads the normalised prefix through every boundary:
* New hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py — single source of truth
for X-Forwarded-Prefix parsing. web_server._normalise_prefix
becomes a re-export so the SPA mount, the gate, and the cookies
helper all agree.
* middleware._unauth_response builds login_url = f"{prefix}/login".
* routes._redirect_uri splices the prefix into the path component
of the IDP-bound URL (with full validation of the header).
* cookies.{set,clear}_{session,pkce}_cookie now take prefix="".
Path attribute switches to /hermes when set; cookie name switches
name variant (see below). Every caller passes the request's
normalised prefix.
Cookie hardening (Teknium's lesser-note #1 in the PR review): adopt
the __Host- / __Secure- cookie name prefixes per draft-west-cookie-
prefixes. The variant is selected from (use_https, prefix):
* Loopback HTTP → bare "hermes_session_at" (both prefixes require
Secure, incompatible with HTTP).
* HTTPS, direct deploy (Path=/) → "__Host-hermes_session_at".
Strongest spec: bound to exact origin, no Domain attribute, Secure
required.
* HTTPS, behind a proxy prefix (Path=/hermes) →
"__Secure-hermes_session_at". __Host- forbids Path != "/"; the
explicit Path=/hermes covers same-origin app isolation.
Setter and reader BOTH consult the prefix because the cookie *name*
changes — a reader that looked up the bare name when the setter wrote
__Secure- would never find the value. The reader falls back across
all three variants so a request whose shape changed mid-session (e.g.
post-deploy from no-prefix to /hermes) still picks up the existing
cookie until it expires.
Test coverage:
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py — new file. 11 tests
pinning:
• Location: /hermes/login on the gate's HTML redirect
• 401 envelope login_url carries the prefix
• Malformed X-Forwarded-Prefix is ignored (header-injection
defence; the script-tag value is normalised to empty string)
• _redirect_uri splices /hermes into the path (the property
that prevents the IDP-returns-to-404 failure)
• PKCE cookie uses Path=/hermes + __Secure- when proxied
• Session cookies use __Host- when direct, __Secure- when
proxied, bare on loopback HTTP
• End-to-end round trip with hand-managed PKCE cookie carriage
(TestClient can't simulate a Path=/hermes cookie automatically)
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_cookies.py — rewritten to pin
each (use_https, prefix) shape produces its expected cookie name,
plus reader-side coverage that __Host- and __Secure- variants are
both recognised.
- Existing tests across middleware / 401-reauth / etc. updated to
match the new cookie names (substring contains instead of
startswith).
Mutation-tested: reverting _unauth_response to build the bare
"/login" URL trips exactly the two tests that pin the prefix
carriage, confirming the suite discriminates the regression.
|
||
|
|
c3104195b8 |
fix(dashboard-auth): bypass loopback WS peer check in gated mode
When the OAuth gate is active, start_server runs uvicorn with proxy_headers=True so the dashboard can honour X-Forwarded-Proto from Fly's TLS terminator (cookies, redirect URI reconstruction). A side effect: ws.client.host is rewritten to the X-Forwarded-For value, which on Fly is the real internet client IP — never loopback. The loopback peer guard in _ws_client_is_allowed then rejected every WS upgrade in gated mode (4403 close) even after a successful OAuth round trip and ticket consumption, silently breaking /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub, and /api/events. Fix: in gated mode, bypass the peer-IP check. The OAuth gate + single-use ticket is the auth. The Host/Origin guard in _ws_host_origin_is_allowed still runs and is what protects against DNS-rebinding here, not the peer IP. Loopback mode behaviour is unchanged: the legacy ?token= path is the only auth there and we don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens. Regression coverage: TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated pins all four behaviours — non-loopback peer allowed in gated mode, non-loopback peer rejected in loopback mode, loopback peer allowed in loopback mode, and the Host/Origin guard still firing on a rebinding attempt with gated mode + matching peer. |
||
|
|
b3dc539304 |
feat(dashboard-auth): Nous plugin always-on; default portal URL; specific error messages
The Nous OAuth provider plugin (plugins/dashboard_auth/nous) is bundled
and auto-loaded — same as before — but previously refused to register
unless BOTH HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL
were set, then the gate's fail-closed branch told the operator 'install
the default Nous provider'. That message is misleading: the provider IS
installed; it's just unconfigured. And the contract only really needs
the per-instance client_id — the portal URL is the same for everyone
in production.
Three changes:
1. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/__init__.py:
- HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL is now optional and defaults to
'https://portal.nousresearch.com'. Override only for staging
(portal.rewbs.uk) or a custom deployment. Empty string also
falls back to the default so an empty Fly secret can't point
the dashboard at nowhere.
- Plugin exposes a module-level LAST_SKIP_REASON: str that the gate
reads when no providers register. Cleared on each register() call.
Skip reasons are human-readable and actionable
('HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. The Nous Portal
provisions this env var…').
2. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/plugin.yaml:
- requires_env drops HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL; only the client_id
is mandatory. Description updated to reflect this.
3. hermes_cli/web_server.py:
- When the gate fail-closes for 'no providers', it now reads each
bundled plugin's LAST_SKIP_REASON and embeds them in the SystemExit
message. Operator sees the specific config fix needed:
Bundled providers reported these issues:
• nous: HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. …
instead of the prior generic 'Install the default Nous provider'.
Tests:
- TestPluginRegister rewritten to assert the new defaults +
LAST_SKIP_REASON contents (6 tests, +1 new for empty-string env).
- New gate test test_start_server_surfaces_nous_skip_reason_when_unconfigured.
- test_get_method_is_not_allowed widened to handle the SPA-shell 200
path explicitly — assertion now verifies no JSON ticket leaks
rather than asserting a specific status code (covers all four of
401/404/405/200).
Docs updated: web-dashboard.md's 'Default provider' section now shows
the env-var table with required/optional columns and embeds the
fail-closed error message verbatim so operators can match what they
see at the prompt.
|
||
|
|
2fc4615fc4 |
feat(dashboard-auth): Phase 7 — SPA AuthWidget + /api/status auth fields
Phase 7 surfaces the OAuth gate state to users.
web/src/components/AuthWidget.tsx (new):
Sidebar widget that fetches /api/auth/me on mount and renders a
compact 'Logged in as <user_id…> via <provider>' row with a logout
icon. Contract V1 (Nous Portal) emits no email/display_name claims,
so user_id is the display value (truncated to 14 chars + ellipsis);
display_name and email fallthroughs are forward-compat for OQ-C1.
Renders nothing on 401 from /api/auth/me — that's the signal the
gate isn't engaged (loopback mode), in which case the widget would
be confusing.
Logout POSTs /auth/logout (which clears cookies + redirects to
/login) then full-page-navigates to /login itself; the SPA's fetch
wrapper doesn't follow that redirect, so the navigation is explicit.
web/src/App.tsx: mounts <AuthWidget /> above <SidebarFooter />.
Component is self-hiding in loopback mode so there's no need for a
conditional mount.
web/src/lib/api.ts:
- getAuthMe() + logout() helpers
- AuthMeResponse type
- StatusResponse gets optional auth_required + auth_providers fields
so the existing StatusPage can render a gated/loopback badge.
hermes_cli/web_server.py: /api/status payload now includes
- auth_required: bool — whether app.state.auth_required is True
- auth_providers: list[str] — registered DashboardAuthProvider names
Lazy-imports list_providers so early-startup status calls don't
crash if the dashboard_auth module is still being set up.
tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py: 3 new tests
covering the new status fields in both gated and loopback modes plus
a regression that no existing field got dropped from the payload.
The hermes status CLI is unchanged in this commit — that command
tracks model providers + OAuth credentials, not running-dashboard
state. The /api/status endpoint is the canonical place to query
dashboard auth-gate state, consumed by the React StatusPage already.
|
||
|
|
b2360ba44e |
feat(dashboard-auth): _ws_auth_ok helper + ticket auth on all 4 WS endpoints
Phase 5 task 5.2. Four WebSocket endpoints — /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub,
/api/events — previously authed with the same constant-time check against
`_SESSION_TOKEN`. Replaced with a single helper that branches on
`app.state.auth_required`:
Loopback / --insecure: legacy ?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN> path (unchanged).
Gated: ?ticket=<single-use> consumed against the
dashboard-auth ticket store.
Critical security property: gated mode UNCONDITIONALLY rejects the
?token= path. A leaked _SESSION_TOKEN value from a log line is not
replayable for WS access in gated deployments.
`_build_sidecar_url` now branches too: loopback uses the legacy token;
gated mode mints a server-internal ticket via mint_ticket() with
pseudo-user 'pty-sidecar' / provider 'server-internal' so audit logs can
distinguish PTY-internal sidecar tickets from browser tickets. PTY
children open /api/pub exactly once at startup so single-use suffices.
Ticket rejections audit-log as WS_TICKET_REJECTED with truncated reason
+ client IP + WS path. Operators debugging 'WS keeps closing' issues see
which endpoint and why.
17 new tests:
- POST /api/auth/ws-ticket: 200 with cookie, 401/302 without, distinct
per call, GET-not-allowed.
- _ws_auth_ok loopback: token accept/reject, missing-token reject,
ticket-param-ignored.
- _ws_auth_ok gated: ticket accept, single-use rejection, unknown reject,
legacy-token-rejected-in-gated assertion, audit-log emission.
- _build_sidecar_url: loopback uses token=, gated uses ticket=, no-bound
returns None.
|
||
|
|
53736b3922 |
feat(dashboard-auth): fail-closed on no providers; proxy_headers when gated; suppress _SESSION_TOKEN injection
Phase 3, Task 3.5. Three changes to web_server.py:
1. start_server replaces the legacy SystemExit-refusing-to-bind guard
with: if app.state.auth_required and no providers registered, exit
with a clear message; otherwise log the gate-on banner. --insecure
keeps its existing behaviour.
2. uvicorn proxy_headers flag is computed from app.state.auth_required.
Loopback / --insecure keep it False (so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
the real peer for the loopback gate); gated mode flips it True so
X-Forwarded-Proto from Fly's TLS terminator is honoured for cookie
Secure-flag decisions in detect_https().
3. _serve_index no longer injects window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ when
the gate is on — the SPA reads identity from /api/auth/me using
cookie auth instead. window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__ flag lets the
SPA pick between ticket-auth (gated) and token-auth (loopback) for
/api/pty + /api/ws (Phase 5 will wire this in the React layer).
4 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
|
||
|
|
5b17eab67a |
feat(dashboard-auth): auth gate middleware + /auth/* routes + /login HTML
Phase 3, Tasks 3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4. These three pieces are mutually dependent so they land together. middleware.py - gated_auth_middleware engages when app.state.auth_required is True. Allowlists /login, /auth/*, /api/auth/providers, and static asset paths; everything else demands a valid session_at cookie. Verifies by trying every registered provider's verify_session in turn (multi- provider stack); attaches verified Session to request.state.session. Returns 401 JSON for /api/* and 302 -> /login for HTML. ProviderError during verify -> 503. routes.py - APIRouter with: GET /login server-rendered HTML GET /auth/login?provider=N 302 to IDP + PKCE cookie GET /auth/callback?code,state completes login, sets session cookies POST /auth/logout clears cookies + best-effort revoke GET /api/auth/providers public bootstrap endpoint (503 if zero) GET /api/auth/me verified session as JSON (auth-required) login_page.py - Inline-CSS HTML template, no React, no JavaScript. web_server.py - Mounted gated_auth_middleware between host_header and auth_middleware (FastAPI runs middlewares in registration order: host check -> cookie auth -> token auth). auth_middleware short-circuits when auth_required so cookie auth is authoritative in gated mode. Router is included before mount_spa so the catch-all doesn't swallow /login or /auth/*. 17 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green. |
||
|
|
949ad95e4b |
feat(dashboard): stash auth_required flag on app.state
Phase 0, Task 0.3. start_server now computes should_require_auth(host, allow_public) and records it on app.state.auth_required BEFORE the existing legacy SystemExit guard fires. This gives middleware, the SPA token-injection path, and WS endpoints a consistent read source for 'is the gate active'. The flag is set but no one reads it yet — Phase 3 registers the gate middleware. Note: 4 pre-existing test failures in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py (PtyWebSocket) + test_update_hangup_protection.py reproduce on pristine HEAD and are unrelated to this change (starlette TestClient WS regression). |
||
|
|
8773bbf186 |
feat(dashboard): add should_require_auth predicate for OAuth gate
Phase 0, Task 0.2. Single source of truth for 'is the auth gate active?'. Reuses the existing _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES frozenset so this stays in sync with the DNS-rebinding host-header check. RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local are treated as public — exact threat model the gate exists for. |
||
|
|
febc4cfec0
|
remove Vercel AI Gateway and Vercel Sandbox (#33067)
* remove Vercel AI Gateway provider and Vercel Sandbox terminal backend Both Vercel-hosted integrations are removed end-to-end. Users on the AI Gateway should switch to OpenRouter or one of the other aggregators (Nous Portal, Kilo Code). Users on the Vercel Sandbox backend should switch to Docker, Modal, Daytona, or SSH. What's removed: - `plugins/model-providers/ai-gateway/` provider plugin - `hermes_cli/vercel_auth.py` Vercel-Sandbox auth helper - `tools/environments/vercel_sandbox.py` terminal backend - `ai-gateway` provider wiring across auth, doctor, setup, models, config, status, providers, main, web_server, model_normalize, dump - `vercel_sandbox` backend wiring across terminal_tool, file_tools, code_execution_tool, file_operations, approval, skills_tool, environments/local, credential_files, lazy_deps, prompt_builder, cli, gateway/run - `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL` constant, `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS` auxiliary-client header set, run_agent base-URL header/reasoning special-cases - `[vercel]` pyproject extra and `vercel`/`vercel-workers` from uv.lock - env vars: `AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY`, `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL`, `VERCEL_TOKEN`, `VERCEL_PROJECT_ID`, `VERCEL_TEAM_ID`, `VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN`, `TERMINAL_VERCEL_RUNTIME` - Tests: deletes test_ai_gateway_models.py and test_vercel_sandbox_environment.py; scrubs references across 23 surviving test files (no entire tests deleted unless they were dedicated to AI Gateway / Sandbox) - Docs: provider tables, env-var reference, setup guides, security notes, tool config, terminal-backend tables — English plus zh-Hans i18n parity - `hermes-agent` skill: provider table entry and remote-backend list What stays (intentional): - `popular-web-designs/templates/vercel.md` — CSS design reference, unrelated to Vercel-the-AI-product - `x-vercel-id` in `stream_diag.py` headers — generic Vercel CDN response header, useful diag signal on any Vercel-hosted endpoint - `vercel-labs/agent-browser` URL in browser config — lightpanda browser project, different OSS effort - `userStories.json` historical contributor entry mentioning Vercel Sandbox — archive, not active docs Validation: - 1153 tests in the 22 targeted files pass (`scripts/run_tests.sh`) - Full repo `py_compile` clean - Live import of every touched module + invariant check (no `ai-gateway` in `PROVIDER_REGISTRY`, no `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS`, no `vercel_sandbox` in `_REMOTE_TERMINAL_BACKENDS`) * test: convert profile-count check from change-detector to invariant The hardcoded "== 34" assertion broke when ai-gateway was removed. Per AGENTS.md change-detector-test guidance, assert the relationship (registry count >= number of plugin dirs) instead of a literal count. Counts shift when providers are added/removed; that's expected. |
||
|
|
30928f945f
|
fix(dashboard): suffix-allowlist plugin assets + denylist subprocess-influencing env vars (#32277)
Two posture fixes surfaced by the web-pentest skill self-test against the dashboard (issue #32267). 1. /dashboard-plugins/<name>/<path> previously returned 200 for any file inside the plugin's dashboard directory — including plugin_api.py and __pycache__/*.pyc. The path is unauthenticated by architecture (SPA loads JS via <script src> and CSS via <link href>, neither of which can attach a custom auth header), so the fix is not "require token" — it's "restrict to browser-fetchable suffixes." Allowlist now: .js .mjs .css .json .html .svg .png .jpg .jpeg .gif .webp .ico .woff .woff2 .ttf .otf .map. Everything else → 404. This stops a private user-installed plugin's Python source from being readable by anyone reachable on the dashboard's loopback port (other local users on a shared box, sidecar containers sharing the host netns). 2. save_env_value() now refuses to persist env-var names that influence how the next subprocess executes: LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, PYTHONHOME, PYTHONSTARTUP, NODE_OPTIONS, NODE_PATH, PATH, SHELL, EDITOR, VISUAL, PAGER, BROWSER, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EXEC_PATH; plus HERMES_HOME / HERMES_PROFILE / HERMES_CONFIG / HERMES_ENV. PUT /api/env is authed but the session token lives in the SPA HTML where any future plugin XSS or local process can read it. Without this gate, a token-holder could plant LD_PRELOAD in .env and the next hermes process start would load attacker code via the dotenv to os.environ chain. This is enforced on write only — pre-existing .env values are left alone (the gate is in save_env_value, not in load_env). PUT /api/env now returns 400 with the explanatory message instead of an opaque 500. IMPORTANT: HERMES_* overall is NOT blocked — only the four runtime location names. Integration credentials following the HERMES_* convention (HERMES_GEMINI_*, HERMES_LANGFUSE_*, HERMES_SPOTIFY_*, HERMES_QWEN_BASE_URL, ...) keep working. Regression tests cover both fixes (30 new test cases). No existing tests changed; 257 passing in tests/hermes_cli/. Closes #32267. |
||
|
|
2c3ca475c0 |
fix(cron): reject id mutation + validate output paths under OUTPUT_DIR
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
|
|
243ebc7a61 |
Protect dashboard OAuth credentials with the same file-safety guarantees as other auth paths
The web dashboard's Anthropic OAuth helper wrote the credential file straight to its final destination and relied on the process umask for permissions. That left the dashboard-specific path weaker than the existing auth writers, which already use owner-only permissions and safer write semantics. This change keeps the scope narrow: make the dashboard helper write via a temp file + replace, chmod the final file to owner-only, and add a focused regression test for both permission handling and atomic-write behavior. Constraint: Must preserve the existing dashboard OAuth flow and credential-pool side effects Rejected: Broader auth-storage refactor | unnecessary scope for a single verified inconsistency Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Reversibility: clean Directive: Keep dashboard credential writes aligned with existing auth storage semantics; do not reintroduce direct write_text() here without matching chmod/atomic behavior Tested: pytest -o addopts='' tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_oauth_write.py tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py -q (78 passed) Not-tested: Cross-platform permission semantics on Windows-managed filesystems |
||
|
|
2e66eefbc3 | fix(dashboard): validate WebSocket Host and Origin | ||
|
|
ee002e7fc5
|
fix(dashboard): require auth for plugin rescan (#27340) | ||
|
|
9732559864
|
fix(security): restrict dashboard websockets to loopback clients (#30741) | ||
|
|
8bf99227f0 |
fix(plugins): block plugin-api path traversal + project RCE (#29156)
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j — half two of the bypass chain.
``_mount_plugin_api_routes`` imports each dashboard plugin's
manifest ``api`` field as a Python module via
``importlib.util.spec_from_file_location`` — arbitrary code
execution by design. Two primitives in the surrounding code
turned that "by design" RCE into a usable attack:
1. Absolute paths in the manifest swallow the plugin directory.
``Path('safe/dashboard') / '/tmp/evil.py'`` resolves to
``/tmp/evil.py``, so a single manifest line
``{"api": "/tmp/payload.py"}`` was enough to redirect the
importer at any Python file on disk.
2. ``..`` traversal in the manifest climbs out of the dashboard
directory. ``Path('plugins/safe/dashboard') /
'../../../tmp/evil.py'`` lands in ``/tmp/evil.py`` after
``resolve()`` — the static-asset handler
(``serve_plugin_asset``) already defends against this via
``is_relative_to``; the api-mount path didn't.
Fix at three layers so a regression in any one can't re-open the
advisory:
* New ``_safe_plugin_api_relpath`` validator runs at *discovery*
time and stores only sanitised relative paths on the plugin
entry's ``_api_file`` field. Absolute paths, ``..`` traversal,
empty / non-string values, and paths that ``resolve()`` outside
the plugin's ``dashboard/`` directory are rejected with a
warning naming the plugin. ``has_api`` follows the sanitised
value so the dashboard frontend doesn't render a fake "Backend
API" badge for plugins whose api was scrubbed.
* ``_mount_plugin_api_routes`` re-validates the resolved path
against the live filesystem just before the import — defence in
depth in case ``_dir`` is tampered with post-cache or a future
caller bypasses the discovery-time validator.
* Project plugins (``source == "project"``) are refused outright
for backend import. ``./.hermes/plugins/`` ships with the CWD,
so any threat model that includes "user opens a malicious repo"
treats it as attacker-controlled; project plugins can still
extend the UI via static JS/CSS but their Python ``api`` is no
longer auto-imported. Combined with the truthy env-gate fix
from the previous commit, the original advisory chain now
fails at two distinct choke points.
|
||
|
|
09f85f2cf7 |
fix(plugins): apply truthy env semantics to project-plugin gate (#29156)
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j — half one of the bypass chain.
``_discover_dashboard_plugins`` opted into the untrusted ``./.hermes/
plugins/`` source via ``if os.environ.get("HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_
PLUGINS"):`` — which is True for any non-empty string. ``=0``,
``=false``, ``=no``, ``=off`` all return non-empty strings and so
*enabled* the project source even though every operator (and the
agent loader, ``hermes_cli/plugins.py`` line 815) reads those values
as "disabled". An attacker who can land a manifest under the CWD's
``.hermes/plugins/`` directory — a malicious cloned repo, a worktree
checked out from a forked PR, a CI runner workspace — was therefore
guaranteed to get their manifest discovered the moment the user ran
``hermes dashboard`` from that directory, regardless of whether the
user thought they had project plugins disabled.
Switch to the shared ``utils.env_var_enabled`` helper used by the
agent loader so the gate accepts the documented truthy set (``1`` /
``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``, case-insensitive) and treats everything
else — including ``0`` / ``false`` / ``no`` — as off.
Half two (path-traversal + project-source ``api`` import) lands in
the next commit. Together they break the RCE chain at two distinct
choke points so a future regression in either one alone can't
re-open the advisory.
|
||
|
|
487c398dcf |
refactor(web): dashboard typography & contrast pass
Removes the global `uppercase` + `font-mondwest` from the App.tsx root
that forced every page to opt-out, replaces stacked-alpha text colors
with semantic tokens for WCAG-AA contrast across all 7 themes, and
applies the new `text-display` utility from @nous-research/ui@0.16.0
on intentional brand chrome (page titles, sidebar headings, segmented
filters) only. Bumps every sub-12px arbitrary text size to text-xs.
Also widens the dashboard plugin routes (/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/
{name:path}/...) so category-namespaced plugins like observability/
langfuse and image_gen/openai can be enable/disabled from the dashboard
— previously the FE encodeURIComponent-ed the slash and the backend
{name} route rejected it. _validate_plugin_name still blocks .. and
backslash, and strips leading/trailing slash.
Touches sessions/env/keys page chrome and adds two new i18n keys
(`overview`, `showMore`/`showLess`) across all 18 locales.
Squashes 19 commits from PR #28832.
Co-authored-by: Hermes <noreply@nousresearch.com>
|
||
|
|
f89afdbd17 |
fix(test): deflake two intermittent CI failures
- test_browser_secret_exfil: mock _run_browser_command instead of launching real Chrome (secret check is pre-launch, browser is irrelevant to the assertion) - test_web_server: add time.sleep(0.05) after pub.send_text() to yield the event loop before receive_text(). TestClient's sync mode can race the broadcast handler otherwise, hanging the test. |
||
|
|
d246f9a278 |
fix(aux-picker): drop stale session_search slot
PR #27590 removed auxiliary.session_search from DEFAULT_CONFIG (single-shape tool now returns DB content directly without an aux LLM), but the slot remained in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS (web_server.py) and AUX_TASKS (ModelsPage.tsx). Removing the dead entries while we're touching these tables. |
||
|
|
c1e93aa331 |
fix: add missing aux model slots to model picker
triage_specifier, kanban_decomposer, profile_describer exist in DEFAULT_CONFIG auxiliary section but weren't in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS, _AUX_TASKS, or the dashboard AUX_TASKS array — so users couldn't configure them through hermes model or the web dashboard. 9â\x86\x9212 aux slots across all three UI surfaces. |
||
|
|
afffb8d9a5 | fix(dashboard): use browser scrollback for chat wheel | ||
|
|
1a5172742e |
feat(kanban): show dashboard cron jobs across profiles
Salvages #27568 by @SerenityTn. Dashboard cron page now lists cron jobs from all profiles, with profile-aware filter UI and storage routing. Includes test coverage for cross-profile listing, mutation, deletion, and validation. Also fixes orphan conflict markers in config.py left by an earlier salvage merge (kanban.dispatch_stale_timeout_seconds was double-nested in HEAD/PR markers from #28452 salvage of #23790). |
||
|
|
4519d2b476 |
fix(web): add Cache-Control: no-store to plugin static file serving
Prevents browser caching of stale dashboard plugin JS files that may contain bugs already fixed upstream (e.g. COLUMN_LABEL undefined). |
||
|
|
9df9816dab |
feat(azure-foundry): add Microsoft Entra ID auth
Use azure-identity DefaultAzureCredential for keyless Foundry auth. Preserve refreshable callable credentials through OpenAI and Anthropic client paths. Add setup, doctor, auth status, docs, and tests for Entra auth. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
20bffa5b37 | refactor(auth): mostly cleanups and style changes | ||
|
|
0bac7dd05b | refactor(auth): collapse Nous inference fallback controls | ||
|
|
714b3b2bd8 |
fix(web_server): pass proxy_headers=False to uvicorn.run so the dashboard's loopback gate sees the real connection peer
`_ws_client_is_allowed()` enforces a loopback-only client check on every
dashboard WebSocket upgrade (`/api/ws`, `/api/events`, `/api/pty`,
`/api/pub`):
def _ws_client_is_allowed(ws):
if _is_public_bind():
return True
client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else ""
if not client_host:
return True
return client_host in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS
The intent is: when bound to 127.0.0.1, only accept WS upgrades from
loopback peers. Public bind (--insecure) trades that for token-only.
However, `uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port, log_level="warning")`
omits `proxy_headers`. In modern uvicorn (>= 0.20) `proxy_headers`
defaults to True and `forwarded_allow_ips` defaults to "127.0.0.1".
With those defaults, any reverse proxy connecting from loopback (nginx,
in-cluster proxy, Cloudflare Tunnel sidecar in HTTP mode, K8s
ingress-nginx) causes uvicorn to rewrite `ws.client.host` from the
request's `X-Forwarded-For` header. So the gate sees the original
client's IP (a public address) instead of the loopback peer, returns
False, and closes every browser WS with code=4403 (surfaces as HTTP
403 to the proxy).
Passing `proxy_headers=False` keeps the loopback gate's view of
`ws.client.host` at the immediate transport peer (the proxy on
127.0.0.1), which is exactly what the gate is designed to check.
The bug is invisible in dev (no proxy → no XFF → ws.client.host stays
loopback). It surfaces in proxied production: dashboard chat tab opens,
events feed banner shows "disconnected — tool calls may not appear",
all WS endpoints return 403. Reproduces with:
curl -i -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
-H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: ..." \
-H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4" \
"http://127.0.0.1:9119/api/ws?token=\$TOKEN"
# Before: HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
# After: HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Without the XFF header, both behave the same (101) — confirming the
single-variable trigger.
Discovered while diagnosing why the Hermes dashboard at
mandy.loadmagic.ai (behind nginx + Cloudflare Tunnel + CF Access)
refused all browser WS upgrades despite Access app config matching a
known-working sibling deployment (Simone, which doesn't have nginx in
the path).
|
||
|
|
efc32ab639 |
refactor(inventory): extract shared ConfigContext + build_models_payload
Three call-sites in the codebase each duplicated the same config-slice
+ list_authenticated_providers + post-processing pattern:
- hermes_cli/web_server.py /api/model/options
- tui_gateway/server.py model.options JSON-RPC
- tui_gateway/server.py model.save_key JSON-RPC
This consolidates them onto hermes_cli/inventory.py:
load_picker_context() -> ConfigContext
Replaces the 17-LOC config-slice (model.{default,name,provider,
base_url}, providers:, custom_providers:) every consumer did
inline.
ConfigContext.with_overrides(*, current_provider=, current_model=,
current_base_url=) -> ConfigContext
Truthy-only overlay for TUI agent-session state on top of disk
config. Empty getattr(agent, ...) attrs MUST NOT clobber disk.
build_models_payload(ctx, *, include_unconfigured, picker_hints,
canonical_order, max_models) -> dict
Single payload builder. Delegates curation to
list_authenticated_providers (does not call provider_model_ids
per row \u2014 that pulls non-agentic models). picker_hints +
canonical_order produce the TUI ModelPickerDialog shape;
defaults match the dashboard's existing /api/model/options
contract.
Two latent bugs fixed by consolidation:
1. The dashboard read cfg.get('custom_providers') directly, missing
the v12+ keyed providers: form. Now both surfaces go through
get_compatible_custom_providers().
2. The TUI's canonical-merge keyed on is_user_defined to decide order.
Section 3 of list_authenticated_providers sets is_user_defined=True
on rows from the providers: config dict even when the slug is
canonical \u2014 that silently demoted them to the picker tail.
_reorder_canonical now keys on slug membership instead.
Stats: +666 / -145 (net +521). Module 240 LOC; 18 behavior tests.
This PR replaces the rejected #23369 (which bundled the consolidation
with new scriptable CLI surfaces \u2014 hermes models list/status, hermes
providers list \u2014 and a JSON contract that have no external user
demand). Just the refactor; the CLI surface is deferred to a separate
PR gated on actual demand.
Refs #23359.
|
||
|
|
2a3140a814 | fix(dashboard): rescan plugins when cached directory is removed | ||
|
|
e3858772d0 |
fix(dashboard): skip browser-open on headless Linux to prevent process exit
Fixes #24127 On headless Linux VPS (no DISPLAY or WAYLAND_DISPLAY), some Python webbrowser backends register TUI programs such as links, lynx, or www-browser. GenericBrowser.open() spawns these without redirecting stdin/stdout, allowing them to take over the terminal. This can cause the process to receive SIGHUP and exit immediately even though uvicorn bound the port successfully, producing a misleading success message followed by an empty --status. Fix: detect headless Linux at startup and skip the auto-open when no display server is available. On such systems the URL is still printed so the user can open it manually or via an SSH tunnel. The webbrowser call is also wrapped in a try/except so any unexpected failure on other platforms is silently absorbed rather than surfacing as an unhandled exception in the daemon thread. |
||
|
|
c1eb2dcda7
|
feat(security): supply-chain advisory checker + lazy-install framework + tiered install fallback (#24220)
* feat(security): supply-chain advisory checker + lazy-install framework + tiered install fallback
Three coordinated mitigations for the Mini Shai-Hulud worm hitting
mistralai 2.4.6 on PyPI (2026-05-12) and for the next single-package
compromise that follows.
# What this PR makes true
1. Users with the poisoned mistralai 2.4.6 in their venv get a loud
detection banner with copy-pasteable remediation steps the moment
they run hermes (and on every gateway startup).
2. One quarantined / yanked PyPI package can no longer silently demote
a fresh install to 'core only' — the installer keeps every other
extra and tells the user which tier landed.
3. Future opt-in backends (Mistral, ElevenLabs, Honcho, etc.) can
lazy-install on first use under a strict allowlist, instead of
eagerly pulling everything at install time.
# Detection: hermes_cli/security_advisories.py
- ADVISORIES catalog (one entry currently: shai-hulud-2026-05 for
mistralai==2.4.6). Adding the next one is a single dataclass.
- detect_compromised() uses importlib.metadata.version() — no pip
dependency, works in uv venvs that lack pip.
- Banner cache (~/.hermes/cache/advisory_banner_seen) rate-limits
the startup banner to once per 24h per advisory.
- Acks persisted to security.acked_advisories in config.yaml; never
re-banner after ack.
- Wired into:
* hermes doctor — runs first, prints full remediation block
* hermes doctor --ack <id> — dismisses an advisory
* cli.py interactive run() and single-query branches — short
stderr banner pointing at hermes doctor
* gateway/run.py startup — operator-visible warning in gateway.log
# Lazy-install framework: tools/lazy_deps.py
- LAZY_DEPS allowlist maps namespaced feature keys (tts.elevenlabs,
memory.honcho, provider.bedrock, etc.) to pip specs.
- ensure(feature) installs missing deps in the active venv via the
uv → pip → ensurepip ladder (matches tools_config._pip_install).
- Strict spec safety regex rejects URLs, file paths, shell metas,
pip flag injection, control chars — only PyPI-by-name accepted.
- Gated on security.allow_lazy_installs (default true) plus the
HERMES_DISABLE_LAZY_INSTALLS env var for restricted/audited envs.
- Migrated three backends as proof of pattern:
* tools/tts_tool.py — _import_elevenlabs() calls ensure first
* plugins/memory/honcho/client.py — get_honcho_client lazy-installs
* tts.mistral / stt.mistral entries pre-registered for when PyPI
restores mistralai
# Installer fallback tiers
scripts/install.sh, scripts/install.ps1, setup-hermes.sh:
- Centralised _BROKEN_EXTRAS list (currently: mistral). Edit one
array when a transitive breaks; users keep every other extra.
- New 'all minus known-broken' tier between [all] and the existing
PyPI-only-extras tier. Only kicks in when [all] fails resolve.
- All three tiers explicit: every fallback announces which tier
landed and prints a re-run hint when not on Tier 1.
- install.ps1 and install.sh both regenerate their tier specs from
the same _BROKEN_EXTRAS array so updates stay in sync.
Side effect: install.ps1 Tier 2 spec previously hardcoded 'mistral'
in its extra list — bug fixed by the refactor (mistral is filtered
out).
# Config
hermes_cli/config.py — DEFAULT_CONFIG.security gains:
- acked_advisories: [] (advisory IDs the user has dismissed)
- allow_lazy_installs: True (security gate for ensure())
No config version bump needed — both keys nest under existing
security: block, and load_config's deep-merge picks up DEFAULT_CONFIG
defaults for users with older configs.
# Tests
tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py — 23 tests covering:
- detect_compromised matches/non-matches, wildcard frozenset
- ack persistence, idempotence, blank rejection, config-failure path
- banner cache rate limiting + 24h re-banner + ack-stops-banner
- short_banner_lines / full_remediation_text / render_doctor_section /
gateway_log_message
- shipped catalog well-formedness invariant
tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py — 40 tests covering:
- spec safety: 11 safe parametrized + 18 unsafe parametrized
- allowlist: unknown-feature rejection, namespace.name shape,
every shipped spec passes the safety regex
- security gating: config flag, env var, default, fail-open
- ensure() happy/sad paths: already-satisfied, install success,
pip stderr surfaced on failure, install-succeeds-but-still-missing
- is_available, feature_install_command
Combined: 63 new tests, all passing under scripts/run_tests.sh.
# Validation
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py
tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py → 63/63 passing
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_doctor.py
tests/hermes_cli/test_doctor_command_install.py
tests/tools/test_tts_mistral.py tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py
tests/tools/test_transcription_dotenv_fallback.py → 165/165 passing
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/ tests/tools/ →
9191 passed, 8 pre-existing failures (verified on origin/main
before this change)
- bash -n on install.sh and setup-hermes.sh → OK
- py_compile on all modified .py files → OK
- End-to-end smoke test of detect_compromised + render_doctor_section
+ gateway_log_message with mocked installed version → produces
copy-pasteable remediation output
# Community
Full advisory + remediation steps:
website/docs/community/security-advisories/shai-hulud-mistralai-2026-05.md
Short-form post drafts (Discord, GitHub pinned issue, README banner):
scripts/community-announcement-shai-hulud.md
Refs: PR #24205 (mistral disabled), Socket Security advisory
<https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-worm-pypi>
* build(deps): pin every direct dep to ==X.Y.Z (no ranges)
Companion to the supply-chain advisory work: replace every >=/</~= range
in pyproject.toml's [project.dependencies] and [project.optional-dependencies]
with an exact ==X.Y.Z pin sourced from uv.lock.
Why: ranges allow PyPI to ship a fresh version of any direct dep at any
time without a code review on our side. With ranges, the malicious
mistralai 2.4.6 release would have been pulled by every fresh
'pip install -e .[all]' for the hours between upload and PyPI's
quarantine — exactly the install window we got hit on. Exact pins close
that window: the only way a new package version reaches a user is via
an intentional update on our end.
What the user-facing change is: nothing, behavior-wise. Every package
resolves to the same version it was already resolving to via uv.lock —
the pins just remove the resolver's freedom to pick a different one.
Cost: any user installing Hermes alongside another package that requires
a newer pin gets a resolver conflict. Acceptable for our isolated-venv
install path; documented in the new comment block.
Build-system requires line (setuptools>=61.0) is intentionally left
as a range — pinning the build backend would block fresh pip from
bootstrapping the build on architectures where that exact wheel isn't
available.
mistral extra (mistralai==2.3.0) is pinned but stays out of [all]
(per PR #24205). 'uv lock' regeneration will fail until PyPI restores
mistralai; lockfile regeneration is gated behind that, NOT on every PR.
LAZY_DEPS in tools/lazy_deps.py also moved to exact pins so the lazy-
install pathway can never resolve a different version than the one
declared in pyproject.toml.
Validation:
- Cross-checked all 77 pinned direct deps in pyproject.toml against
uv.lock — every pin matches the resolved version exactly.
- Cross-checked all LAZY_DEPS specs against uv.lock — same.
- 'uv pip install -e .[all] --dry-run' resolves 205 packages cleanly.
- tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py + tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py
→ 63/63 passing (every shipped spec passes the safety regex).
- Doctor + TTS + transcription targeted suite → 146/146 passing.
* build(deps): hash-verify transitives via uv.lock; remove unresolvable [mistral] extra
You asked: 'what about the dependencies the dependencies rely on?' —
correctly noting that exact-pinning direct deps in pyproject.toml does
NOT cover the transitive graph. `pip install` and `uv pip install` both
re-resolve transitives fresh from PyPI at install time, so a compromised
transitive (e.g. `httpcore` if it got worm-poisoned tomorrow) would
still hit our users even with every direct dep exact-pinned.
# What this commit fixes
1. **Both real installer scripts now prefer `uv sync --locked` as Tier 0.**
uv.lock records SHA256 hashes for every transitive — a compromised
package with a different hash gets REJECTED. Falls through to the
existing `uv pip install` cascade if the lockfile is missing or
stale, with a loud warning that the fallback path does NOT
hash-verify transitives. Previously only `setup-hermes.sh` (the dev
path) used the lockfile; `scripts/install.sh` and `scripts/install.ps1`
(the paths fresh users actually run) skipped it.
2. **Removed the `[mistral]` extra entirely.** The `mistralai` PyPI
project is fully quarantined right now — every version returns 404,
so any pin we wrote was unresolvable, which broke `uv lock --check`
in CI. Restoration is documented in pyproject.toml as a 5-step
checklist (verify, re-add extra, re-enable in 4 modules, regenerate
lock, optionally re-add to [all]).
3. **Regenerated uv.lock.** 262 packages, mistralai/eval-type-backport/
jsonpath-python pruned. `uv lock --check` now passes.
# Defense-in-depth view
| Layer | Where | Protects against |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Exact pins in pyproject | direct deps | new mistralai 2.4.6-style direct compromise |
| uv.lock + `--locked` install | transitive graph | transitive worm injection |
| Tier-0 hash-verified path | install.sh / .ps1 | actually USE the lockfile in fresh installs |
| `uv lock --check` CI gate | every PR | drift between pyproject and lockfile |
| `hermes_cli/security_advisories.py` | runtime | cleanup for users who already got hit |
The exact pinning + hash verification together close the supply-chain
gap. Without the lockfile path, exact pins alone are theater.
# Validation
- `uv lock --check` → passes (262 packages resolved, no drift).
- `bash -n` on install.sh + setup-hermes.sh → OK.
- 209/209 tests passing across new + adjacent test files
(test_lazy_deps.py, test_security_advisories.py, test_doctor.py,
test_tts_mistral.py, test_transcription_tools.py).
- TOML parse OK.
* chore: remove community announcement drafts (PR body covers it)
* build(deps): lazy-install every opt-in backend (anthropic, search, terminal, platforms, dashboard)
Extends the lazy-install framework to cover everything that's not used by
every hermes session. Base install drops from ~60 packages to 45.
Moved out of core dependencies = []:
- anthropic (only when provider=anthropic native, not via aggregators)
- exa-py, firecrawl-py, parallel-web (search backends; only when picked)
- fal-client (image gen; only when picked)
- edge-tts (default TTS but still optional)
New extras in pyproject.toml: [anthropic] [exa] [firecrawl] [parallel-web]
[fal] [edge-tts]. All added to [all].
New LAZY_DEPS entries: provider.anthropic, search.{exa,firecrawl,parallel},
tts.edge, image.fal, memory.hindsight, platform.{telegram,discord,matrix},
terminal.{modal,daytona,vercel}, tool.dashboard.
Each import site now calls ensure() before importing the SDK. Where the
module had a top-level try/except (telegram, discord, fastapi), the
graceful-fallback pattern was extended to lazy-install on first
check_*_requirements() call and re-bind module globals.
Updated test_windows_native_support.py tzdata check from snapshot
(>=2023.3 literal) to invariant (any version + win32 marker).
Validation:
- Base install: 45 packages (was ~60); 6 newly-extracted packages absent
- uv lock --check: passes (262 packages, no drift)
- 209/209 lazy_deps + advisory + doctor + tts/transcription tests passing
- py_compile clean on all 12 modified modules
|
||
|
|
99ad2d1372
|
fix(deps): unbreak [all] install — drop mistralai while PyPI quarantined (#24205)
The `mistralai` PyPI package was quarantined on 2026-05-12 after a malicious 2.4.6 release. Every fresh resolve (AUR makepkg, Docker build, CI run, install.sh first-run) currently fails on `mistralai>=2.3.0,<3` because PyPI returns zero candidates. Existing users running `hermes update` mostly didn't notice — `hermes update` falls back from `.[all]` to per-extra retries and silently skips mistral with a warning that scrolls past. But fresh installs hard-fail or lose every other extra. Changes: - pyproject.toml: drop `hermes-agent[mistral]` from `[all]` and `[termux-all]`. The `mistral` extra itself is preserved so users can opt back in once PyPI un-quarantines. - hermes_cli/tools_config.py: hide Mistral Voxtral TTS from the `hermes tools` provider picker until restored. - hermes_cli/web_server.py: drop "mistral" from dashboard STT options. - tools/transcription_tools.py: explicit `provider: mistral` returns "none" with a clear status message; auto-detect skips mistral. - tools/tts_tool.py: dispatcher returns a clear "temporarily disabled" error before any SDK import attempt (avoids cached-stale-package surprises). - tests/tools/: update three test files to assert the new disabled behavior. Each test docstring records why and points at the rollback trigger (PyPI un-quarantines mistralai). Restore plan: revert this commit once the package is available on PyPI again. The behavior change is intentional and documented in code comments + test docstrings to make the rollback trivial. Validation: - scripts/run_tests.sh tests/tools/ -k 'mistral or stt or tts' → 425/425 passing. Refs: https://pypi.org/simple/mistralai/ (currently "pypi:project-status: quarantined"). |
||
|
|
58e2109f10 |
fix(minimax): harden OAuth dashboard and runtime
Handle MiniMax OAuth expiry values consistently across CLI and dashboard flows, fix CLI status/add behavior, and force pooled OAuth runtime requests through Anthropic Messages. - web_server._minimax_poller: parse expired_in via the shared resolver so unix-ms absolute timestamps stop landing as TTL seconds and crashing with 'year 583911 is out of range' when a user connects MiniMax OAuth from the dashboard. - auth._minimax_oauth_login / _refresh_minimax_oauth_state: same fix on the CLI login + refresh paths. - auth.get_auth_status: dispatch minimax-oauth to its dedicated status function instead of falling through. - auth_commands.auth_add_command: 'hermes auth add minimax-oauth' now starts the device-code login flow and persists a pool entry with the access + refresh tokens, instead of requiring credentials to already exist. - runtime_provider._resolve_runtime_from_pool_entry: pin pooled minimax-oauth credentials to anthropic_messages so a stale model.api_mode: chat_completions can't send requests to /anthropic/chat/completions and trigger MiniMax nginx 404s. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
|
05bad7b1e7 |
fix(dashboard): MiniMax 'Login' button launched Claude OAuth (#22832)
Fixes #22832. ## Root cause `hermes_cli/web_server.py:start_oauth_login` dispatched OAuth flows by the catalog's `flow` field rather than provider id: if catalog_entry["flow"] == "pkce": return _start_anthropic_pkce() The catalog had two `flow: "pkce"` entries — `anthropic` and `minimax-oauth` — so clicking "Login" on MiniMax in the dashboard's Keys tab unconditionally launched the Anthropic/Claude PKCE flow. ## Fix Three changes in `hermes_cli/web_server.py`: 1. Catalog entry for `minimax-oauth` changed from `flow: "pkce"` to `flow: "device_code"`. From a UX perspective MiniMax is a verification-URI + user-code flow (open URL, enter code, backend polls) — same shape as Nous's device-code flow. The PKCE bit (verifier + challenge from `_minimax_pkce_pair`) is a security extension that doesn't change the operator experience; the existing dashboard modal already renders `device_code` correctly for this UX. 2. New MiniMax branch in `_start_device_code_flow`, mirroring the existing Nous branch but calling MiniMax-specific helpers (`_minimax_request_user_code`, `_minimax_pkce_pair`). Stashes verifier + state in the session for the poller to consume. Handles the overloaded `expired_in` field (could be unix-ms timestamp OR seconds-from-now duration) the same way `_minimax_poll_token` does. 3. New `_minimax_poller` background thread mirroring `_nous_poller`. Calls `_minimax_poll_token` → on success builds the same `auth_state` dict the CLI flow (`_minimax_oauth_login`) builds, and persists via `_minimax_save_auth_state` so the dashboard path leaves the system in the same state as `hermes auth add minimax-oauth`. Plus a dispatcher tightening to prevent regression: the `pkce` branch now requires `provider_id == "anthropic"`, so any future PKCE provider added without a proper start function gets a clean `400 Unsupported flow` rather than silently launching Anthropic OAuth. ## Test New `tests/hermes_cli/test_web_oauth_dispatch.py`: - Regression test asserting MiniMax start does NOT return claude.ai - Sanity test that Anthropic PKCE still works after the dispatcher tightening - Forward-looking test: a hypothetical pkce-flagged provider without an explicit branch is rejected cleanly rather than misrouted ## Limitations - The dashboard MiniMax path defaults to `region="global"`. CN-region operators can still use the CLI flow which supports `--region cn`. Adding a region toggle to the dashboard UI is a follow-up. |
||
|
|
2ec8d2b42f
|
chore: ruff auto-fix PLR6201 — tuple → set in membership tests (#23937)
Replace with for all literal-tuple membership tests. Set lookup is O(1) vs O(n) for tuple — consistent micro-optimization across the codebase. 608 instances fixed via `ruff --fix --unsafe-fixes`, 0 remaining. 133 files, +626/-626 (net zero). |
||
|
|
657874460f
|
chore: ruff auto-fixes — collapsible-else-if, if-stmt-min-max, dict.fromkeys (#23926)
PLR5501 (collapsible-else-if): 28 instances — else: if: → elif: PLR1730 (if-stmt-min-max): 15 instances — if x<y: x=y → x=max(x,y) C420 (dict.fromkeys): 2 instances — dictcomp → dict.fromkeys PLR1704 (redefined-argument): 1 instance — reason → err_msg (shadow fix) C414 (unnecessary-list): 1 instance — sorted(list(x)) → sorted(x) 28 files, -44 net lines. All mechanical, zero logic changes. 17,211 tests pass, zero regressions. |
||
|
|
ec9329ec41 |
fix(security): require dashboard auth for plugin API routes
Remove the blanket /api/plugins/* exemption from auth_middleware so plugin API routes (e.g. Kanban dashboard) require the same session token as all other /api/ endpoints. Fixes #19533 |
||
|
|
4a1840e683 |
fix(async): replace get_event_loop() with get_running_loop() in async contexts
Follow-up to PR #21293 (cli.py), which fixed the same anti-pattern. `asyncio.get_event_loop()` is documented as effectively "always returns the running loop when called from a coroutine" and emits DeprecationWarning/RuntimeWarning in some interpreter configurations. The Python docs explicitly recommend get_running_loop() inside coroutines. Replaces the remaining 9 call sites that are unconditionally inside async def bodies: - tools/browser_cdp_tool.py — _cdp_call() (4 sites): deadline + remaining computations inside the async websockets.connect context manager. - hermes_cli/web_server.py — get_status, _start_device_code_flow, submit_oauth_code (3 sites): all FastAPI async endpoints offloading blocking httpx / PKCE work to run_in_executor. - environments/agent_loop.py — HermesAgentLoop (1 site): tool dispatch inside the async rollout loop. - environments/benchmarks/terminalbench_2/terminalbench2_env.py — rollout_and_score_eval (1 site): test verification thread offload. All 9 sites are unconditionally inside async def bodies, so a running loop is guaranteed and no try/except RuntimeError fallback is needed (unlike the cli.py case in #21293, which ran from a background thread). Behavior is identical on supported Python versions; aligns the codebase with the post-#21293 idiom and avoids future warnings as the deprecation hardens. Salvaged from PR #21930 by @Zhekinmaksim onto current main (the original branch was 109 commits behind and carried unintended stale-branch reverts of unrelated landed changes — _tail_lines encoding=utf-8 and the Windows PTY bridge guard). Only the 9 swaps from the PR's intended scope are applied here. |