Phase 7 surfaces the OAuth gate state to users.
web/src/components/AuthWidget.tsx (new):
Sidebar widget that fetches /api/auth/me on mount and renders a
compact 'Logged in as <user_id…> via <provider>' row with a logout
icon. Contract V1 (Nous Portal) emits no email/display_name claims,
so user_id is the display value (truncated to 14 chars + ellipsis);
display_name and email fallthroughs are forward-compat for OQ-C1.
Renders nothing on 401 from /api/auth/me — that's the signal the
gate isn't engaged (loopback mode), in which case the widget would
be confusing.
Logout POSTs /auth/logout (which clears cookies + redirects to
/login) then full-page-navigates to /login itself; the SPA's fetch
wrapper doesn't follow that redirect, so the navigation is explicit.
web/src/App.tsx: mounts <AuthWidget /> above <SidebarFooter />.
Component is self-hiding in loopback mode so there's no need for a
conditional mount.
web/src/lib/api.ts:
- getAuthMe() + logout() helpers
- AuthMeResponse type
- StatusResponse gets optional auth_required + auth_providers fields
so the existing StatusPage can render a gated/loopback badge.
hermes_cli/web_server.py: /api/status payload now includes
- auth_required: bool — whether app.state.auth_required is True
- auth_providers: list[str] — registered DashboardAuthProvider names
Lazy-imports list_providers so early-startup status calls don't
crash if the dashboard_auth module is still being set up.
tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py: 3 new tests
covering the new status fields in both gated and loopback modes plus
a regression that no existing field got dropped from the payload.
The hermes status CLI is unchanged in this commit — that command
tracks model providers + OAuth credentials, not running-dashboard
state. The /api/status endpoint is the canonical place to query
dashboard auth-gate state, consumed by the React StatusPage already.
Phase 5 task 5.2. Four WebSocket endpoints — /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub,
/api/events — previously authed with the same constant-time check against
`_SESSION_TOKEN`. Replaced with a single helper that branches on
`app.state.auth_required`:
Loopback / --insecure: legacy ?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN> path (unchanged).
Gated: ?ticket=<single-use> consumed against the
dashboard-auth ticket store.
Critical security property: gated mode UNCONDITIONALLY rejects the
?token= path. A leaked _SESSION_TOKEN value from a log line is not
replayable for WS access in gated deployments.
`_build_sidecar_url` now branches too: loopback uses the legacy token;
gated mode mints a server-internal ticket via mint_ticket() with
pseudo-user 'pty-sidecar' / provider 'server-internal' so audit logs can
distinguish PTY-internal sidecar tickets from browser tickets. PTY
children open /api/pub exactly once at startup so single-use suffices.
Ticket rejections audit-log as WS_TICKET_REJECTED with truncated reason
+ client IP + WS path. Operators debugging 'WS keeps closing' issues see
which endpoint and why.
17 new tests:
- POST /api/auth/ws-ticket: 200 with cookie, 401/302 without, distinct
per call, GET-not-allowed.
- _ws_auth_ok loopback: token accept/reject, missing-token reject,
ticket-param-ignored.
- _ws_auth_ok gated: ticket accept, single-use rejection, unknown reject,
legacy-token-rejected-in-gated assertion, audit-log emission.
- _build_sidecar_url: loopback uses token=, gated uses ticket=, no-bound
returns None.
Phase 3, Task 3.5. Three changes to web_server.py:
1. start_server replaces the legacy SystemExit-refusing-to-bind guard
with: if app.state.auth_required and no providers registered, exit
with a clear message; otherwise log the gate-on banner. --insecure
keeps its existing behaviour.
2. uvicorn proxy_headers flag is computed from app.state.auth_required.
Loopback / --insecure keep it False (so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
the real peer for the loopback gate); gated mode flips it True so
X-Forwarded-Proto from Fly's TLS terminator is honoured for cookie
Secure-flag decisions in detect_https().
3. _serve_index no longer injects window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ when
the gate is on — the SPA reads identity from /api/auth/me using
cookie auth instead. window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__ flag lets the
SPA pick between ticket-auth (gated) and token-auth (loopback) for
/api/pty + /api/ws (Phase 5 will wire this in the React layer).
4 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
Phase 3, Tasks 3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4. These three pieces are mutually
dependent so they land together.
middleware.py - gated_auth_middleware engages when app.state.auth_required
is True. Allowlists /login, /auth/*, /api/auth/providers, and static
asset paths; everything else demands a valid session_at cookie. Verifies
by trying every registered provider's verify_session in turn (multi-
provider stack); attaches verified Session to request.state.session.
Returns 401 JSON for /api/* and 302 -> /login for HTML. ProviderError
during verify -> 503.
routes.py - APIRouter with:
GET /login server-rendered HTML
GET /auth/login?provider=N 302 to IDP + PKCE cookie
GET /auth/callback?code,state completes login, sets session cookies
POST /auth/logout clears cookies + best-effort revoke
GET /api/auth/providers public bootstrap endpoint (503 if zero)
GET /api/auth/me verified session as JSON (auth-required)
login_page.py - Inline-CSS HTML template, no React, no JavaScript.
web_server.py - Mounted gated_auth_middleware between host_header and
auth_middleware (FastAPI runs middlewares in registration order: host
check -> cookie auth -> token auth). auth_middleware short-circuits
when auth_required so cookie auth is authoritative in gated mode.
Router is included before mount_spa so the catch-all doesn't swallow
/login or /auth/*.
17 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
Phase 0, Task 0.3. start_server now computes should_require_auth(host,
allow_public) and records it on app.state.auth_required BEFORE the
existing legacy SystemExit guard fires. This gives middleware, the SPA
token-injection path, and WS endpoints a consistent read source for
'is the gate active'. The flag is set but no one reads it yet — Phase 3
registers the gate middleware.
Note: 4 pre-existing test failures in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py
(PtyWebSocket) + test_update_hangup_protection.py reproduce on pristine
HEAD and are unrelated to this change (starlette TestClient WS regression).
Phase 0, Task 0.2. Single source of truth for 'is the auth gate active?'.
Reuses the existing _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES frozenset so this stays in sync
with the DNS-rebinding host-header check. RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local are
treated as public — exact threat model the gate exists for.
* remove Vercel AI Gateway provider and Vercel Sandbox terminal backend
Both Vercel-hosted integrations are removed end-to-end. Users on the AI
Gateway should switch to OpenRouter or one of the other aggregators
(Nous Portal, Kilo Code). Users on the Vercel Sandbox backend should
switch to Docker, Modal, Daytona, or SSH.
What's removed:
- `plugins/model-providers/ai-gateway/` provider plugin
- `hermes_cli/vercel_auth.py` Vercel-Sandbox auth helper
- `tools/environments/vercel_sandbox.py` terminal backend
- `ai-gateway` provider wiring across auth, doctor, setup, models,
config, status, providers, main, web_server, model_normalize, dump
- `vercel_sandbox` backend wiring across terminal_tool, file_tools,
code_execution_tool, file_operations, approval, skills_tool,
environments/local, credential_files, lazy_deps, prompt_builder,
cli, gateway/run
- `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL` constant, `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS` auxiliary-client
header set, run_agent base-URL header/reasoning special-cases
- `[vercel]` pyproject extra and `vercel`/`vercel-workers` from uv.lock
- env vars: `AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY`, `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL`, `VERCEL_TOKEN`,
`VERCEL_PROJECT_ID`, `VERCEL_TEAM_ID`, `VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN`,
`TERMINAL_VERCEL_RUNTIME`
- Tests: deletes test_ai_gateway_models.py and
test_vercel_sandbox_environment.py; scrubs references across 23
surviving test files (no entire tests deleted unless they were
dedicated to AI Gateway / Sandbox)
- Docs: provider tables, env-var reference, setup guides, security
notes, tool config, terminal-backend tables — English plus zh-Hans
i18n parity
- `hermes-agent` skill: provider table entry and remote-backend list
What stays (intentional):
- `popular-web-designs/templates/vercel.md` — CSS design reference,
unrelated to Vercel-the-AI-product
- `x-vercel-id` in `stream_diag.py` headers — generic Vercel CDN
response header, useful diag signal on any Vercel-hosted endpoint
- `vercel-labs/agent-browser` URL in browser config — lightpanda
browser project, different OSS effort
- `userStories.json` historical contributor entry mentioning Vercel
Sandbox — archive, not active docs
Validation:
- 1153 tests in the 22 targeted files pass (`scripts/run_tests.sh`)
- Full repo `py_compile` clean
- Live import of every touched module + invariant check (no
`ai-gateway` in `PROVIDER_REGISTRY`, no `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS`, no
`vercel_sandbox` in `_REMOTE_TERMINAL_BACKENDS`)
* test: convert profile-count check from change-detector to invariant
The hardcoded "== 34" assertion broke when ai-gateway was removed.
Per AGENTS.md change-detector-test guidance, assert the relationship
(registry count >= number of plugin dirs) instead of a literal count.
Counts shift when providers are added/removed; that's expected.
Two posture fixes surfaced by the web-pentest skill self-test against
the dashboard (issue #32267).
1. /dashboard-plugins/<name>/<path> previously returned 200 for any
file inside the plugin's dashboard directory — including
plugin_api.py and __pycache__/*.pyc. The path is unauthenticated by
architecture (SPA loads JS via <script src> and CSS via <link href>,
neither of which can attach a custom auth header), so the fix is
not "require token" — it's "restrict to browser-fetchable suffixes."
Allowlist now: .js .mjs .css .json .html .svg .png .jpg .jpeg .gif
.webp .ico .woff .woff2 .ttf .otf .map. Everything else → 404.
This stops a private user-installed plugin's Python source from
being readable by anyone reachable on the dashboard's loopback port
(other local users on a shared box, sidecar containers sharing the
host netns).
2. save_env_value() now refuses to persist env-var names that
influence how the next subprocess executes: LD_PRELOAD,
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, PYTHONHOME,
PYTHONSTARTUP, NODE_OPTIONS, NODE_PATH, PATH, SHELL, EDITOR,
VISUAL, PAGER, BROWSER, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EXEC_PATH; plus
HERMES_HOME / HERMES_PROFILE / HERMES_CONFIG / HERMES_ENV.
PUT /api/env is authed but the session token lives in the SPA HTML
where any future plugin XSS or local process can read it. Without
this gate, a token-holder could plant LD_PRELOAD in .env and the
next hermes process start would load attacker code via the dotenv
to os.environ chain. This is enforced on write only — pre-existing
.env values are left alone (the gate is in save_env_value, not in
load_env). PUT /api/env now returns 400 with the explanatory
message instead of an opaque 500.
IMPORTANT: HERMES_* overall is NOT blocked — only the four runtime
location names. Integration credentials following the HERMES_*
convention (HERMES_GEMINI_*, HERMES_LANGFUSE_*, HERMES_SPOTIFY_*,
HERMES_QWEN_BASE_URL, ...) keep working.
Regression tests cover both fixes (30 new test cases). No existing
tests changed; 257 passing in tests/hermes_cli/.
Closes#32267.
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The web dashboard's Anthropic OAuth helper wrote the credential file
straight to its final destination and relied on the process umask for
permissions. That left the dashboard-specific path weaker than the
existing auth writers, which already use owner-only permissions and
safer write semantics.
This change keeps the scope narrow: make the dashboard helper write via
a temp file + replace, chmod the final file to owner-only, and add a
focused regression test for both permission handling and atomic-write
behavior.
Constraint: Must preserve the existing dashboard OAuth flow and credential-pool side effects
Rejected: Broader auth-storage refactor | unnecessary scope for a single verified inconsistency
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep dashboard credential writes aligned with existing auth storage semantics; do not reintroduce direct write_text() here without matching chmod/atomic behavior
Tested: pytest -o addopts='' tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_oauth_write.py tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py -q (78 passed)
Not-tested: Cross-platform permission semantics on Windows-managed filesystems
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j — half two of the bypass chain.
``_mount_plugin_api_routes`` imports each dashboard plugin's
manifest ``api`` field as a Python module via
``importlib.util.spec_from_file_location`` — arbitrary code
execution by design. Two primitives in the surrounding code
turned that "by design" RCE into a usable attack:
1. Absolute paths in the manifest swallow the plugin directory.
``Path('safe/dashboard') / '/tmp/evil.py'`` resolves to
``/tmp/evil.py``, so a single manifest line
``{"api": "/tmp/payload.py"}`` was enough to redirect the
importer at any Python file on disk.
2. ``..`` traversal in the manifest climbs out of the dashboard
directory. ``Path('plugins/safe/dashboard') /
'../../../tmp/evil.py'`` lands in ``/tmp/evil.py`` after
``resolve()`` — the static-asset handler
(``serve_plugin_asset``) already defends against this via
``is_relative_to``; the api-mount path didn't.
Fix at three layers so a regression in any one can't re-open the
advisory:
* New ``_safe_plugin_api_relpath`` validator runs at *discovery*
time and stores only sanitised relative paths on the plugin
entry's ``_api_file`` field. Absolute paths, ``..`` traversal,
empty / non-string values, and paths that ``resolve()`` outside
the plugin's ``dashboard/`` directory are rejected with a
warning naming the plugin. ``has_api`` follows the sanitised
value so the dashboard frontend doesn't render a fake "Backend
API" badge for plugins whose api was scrubbed.
* ``_mount_plugin_api_routes`` re-validates the resolved path
against the live filesystem just before the import — defence in
depth in case ``_dir`` is tampered with post-cache or a future
caller bypasses the discovery-time validator.
* Project plugins (``source == "project"``) are refused outright
for backend import. ``./.hermes/plugins/`` ships with the CWD,
so any threat model that includes "user opens a malicious repo"
treats it as attacker-controlled; project plugins can still
extend the UI via static JS/CSS but their Python ``api`` is no
longer auto-imported. Combined with the truthy env-gate fix
from the previous commit, the original advisory chain now
fails at two distinct choke points.
GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j — half one of the bypass chain.
``_discover_dashboard_plugins`` opted into the untrusted ``./.hermes/
plugins/`` source via ``if os.environ.get("HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_
PLUGINS"):`` — which is True for any non-empty string. ``=0``,
``=false``, ``=no``, ``=off`` all return non-empty strings and so
*enabled* the project source even though every operator (and the
agent loader, ``hermes_cli/plugins.py`` line 815) reads those values
as "disabled". An attacker who can land a manifest under the CWD's
``.hermes/plugins/`` directory — a malicious cloned repo, a worktree
checked out from a forked PR, a CI runner workspace — was therefore
guaranteed to get their manifest discovered the moment the user ran
``hermes dashboard`` from that directory, regardless of whether the
user thought they had project plugins disabled.
Switch to the shared ``utils.env_var_enabled`` helper used by the
agent loader so the gate accepts the documented truthy set (``1`` /
``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``, case-insensitive) and treats everything
else — including ``0`` / ``false`` / ``no`` — as off.
Half two (path-traversal + project-source ``api`` import) lands in
the next commit. Together they break the RCE chain at two distinct
choke points so a future regression in either one alone can't
re-open the advisory.
Removes the global `uppercase` + `font-mondwest` from the App.tsx root
that forced every page to opt-out, replaces stacked-alpha text colors
with semantic tokens for WCAG-AA contrast across all 7 themes, and
applies the new `text-display` utility from @nous-research/ui@0.16.0
on intentional brand chrome (page titles, sidebar headings, segmented
filters) only. Bumps every sub-12px arbitrary text size to text-xs.
Also widens the dashboard plugin routes (/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/
{name:path}/...) so category-namespaced plugins like observability/
langfuse and image_gen/openai can be enable/disabled from the dashboard
— previously the FE encodeURIComponent-ed the slash and the backend
{name} route rejected it. _validate_plugin_name still blocks .. and
backslash, and strips leading/trailing slash.
Touches sessions/env/keys page chrome and adds two new i18n keys
(`overview`, `showMore`/`showLess`) across all 18 locales.
Squashes 19 commits from PR #28832.
Co-authored-by: Hermes <noreply@nousresearch.com>
- test_browser_secret_exfil: mock _run_browser_command instead of
launching real Chrome (secret check is pre-launch, browser is
irrelevant to the assertion)
- test_web_server: add time.sleep(0.05) after pub.send_text() to
yield the event loop before receive_text(). TestClient's sync mode
can race the broadcast handler otherwise, hanging the test.
PR #27590 removed auxiliary.session_search from DEFAULT_CONFIG (single-shape
tool now returns DB content directly without an aux LLM), but the slot
remained in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS (web_server.py) and AUX_TASKS (ModelsPage.tsx).
Removing the dead entries while we're touching these tables.
triage_specifier, kanban_decomposer, profile_describer exist in
DEFAULT_CONFIG auxiliary section but weren't in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS,
_AUX_TASKS, or the dashboard AUX_TASKS array — so users couldn't
configure them through hermes model or the web dashboard.
9â\x86\x9212 aux slots across all three UI surfaces.
Salvages #27568 by @SerenityTn. Dashboard cron page now lists cron
jobs from all profiles, with profile-aware filter UI and storage
routing. Includes test coverage for cross-profile listing, mutation,
deletion, and validation.
Also fixes orphan conflict markers in config.py left by an earlier
salvage merge (kanban.dispatch_stale_timeout_seconds was double-nested
in HEAD/PR markers from #28452 salvage of #23790).
`_ws_client_is_allowed()` enforces a loopback-only client check on every
dashboard WebSocket upgrade (`/api/ws`, `/api/events`, `/api/pty`,
`/api/pub`):
def _ws_client_is_allowed(ws):
if _is_public_bind():
return True
client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else ""
if not client_host:
return True
return client_host in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS
The intent is: when bound to 127.0.0.1, only accept WS upgrades from
loopback peers. Public bind (--insecure) trades that for token-only.
However, `uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port, log_level="warning")`
omits `proxy_headers`. In modern uvicorn (>= 0.20) `proxy_headers`
defaults to True and `forwarded_allow_ips` defaults to "127.0.0.1".
With those defaults, any reverse proxy connecting from loopback (nginx,
in-cluster proxy, Cloudflare Tunnel sidecar in HTTP mode, K8s
ingress-nginx) causes uvicorn to rewrite `ws.client.host` from the
request's `X-Forwarded-For` header. So the gate sees the original
client's IP (a public address) instead of the loopback peer, returns
False, and closes every browser WS with code=4403 (surfaces as HTTP
403 to the proxy).
Passing `proxy_headers=False` keeps the loopback gate's view of
`ws.client.host` at the immediate transport peer (the proxy on
127.0.0.1), which is exactly what the gate is designed to check.
The bug is invisible in dev (no proxy → no XFF → ws.client.host stays
loopback). It surfaces in proxied production: dashboard chat tab opens,
events feed banner shows "disconnected — tool calls may not appear",
all WS endpoints return 403. Reproduces with:
curl -i -H "Connection: Upgrade" -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
-H "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13" -H "Sec-WebSocket-Key: ..." \
-H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4" \
"http://127.0.0.1:9119/api/ws?token=\$TOKEN"
# Before: HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
# After: HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Without the XFF header, both behave the same (101) — confirming the
single-variable trigger.
Discovered while diagnosing why the Hermes dashboard at
mandy.loadmagic.ai (behind nginx + Cloudflare Tunnel + CF Access)
refused all browser WS upgrades despite Access app config matching a
known-working sibling deployment (Simone, which doesn't have nginx in
the path).
Three call-sites in the codebase each duplicated the same config-slice
+ list_authenticated_providers + post-processing pattern:
- hermes_cli/web_server.py /api/model/options
- tui_gateway/server.py model.options JSON-RPC
- tui_gateway/server.py model.save_key JSON-RPC
This consolidates them onto hermes_cli/inventory.py:
load_picker_context() -> ConfigContext
Replaces the 17-LOC config-slice (model.{default,name,provider,
base_url}, providers:, custom_providers:) every consumer did
inline.
ConfigContext.with_overrides(*, current_provider=, current_model=,
current_base_url=) -> ConfigContext
Truthy-only overlay for TUI agent-session state on top of disk
config. Empty getattr(agent, ...) attrs MUST NOT clobber disk.
build_models_payload(ctx, *, include_unconfigured, picker_hints,
canonical_order, max_models) -> dict
Single payload builder. Delegates curation to
list_authenticated_providers (does not call provider_model_ids
per row \u2014 that pulls non-agentic models). picker_hints +
canonical_order produce the TUI ModelPickerDialog shape;
defaults match the dashboard's existing /api/model/options
contract.
Two latent bugs fixed by consolidation:
1. The dashboard read cfg.get('custom_providers') directly, missing
the v12+ keyed providers: form. Now both surfaces go through
get_compatible_custom_providers().
2. The TUI's canonical-merge keyed on is_user_defined to decide order.
Section 3 of list_authenticated_providers sets is_user_defined=True
on rows from the providers: config dict even when the slug is
canonical \u2014 that silently demoted them to the picker tail.
_reorder_canonical now keys on slug membership instead.
Stats: +666 / -145 (net +521). Module 240 LOC; 18 behavior tests.
This PR replaces the rejected #23369 (which bundled the consolidation
with new scriptable CLI surfaces \u2014 hermes models list/status, hermes
providers list \u2014 and a JSON contract that have no external user
demand). Just the refactor; the CLI surface is deferred to a separate
PR gated on actual demand.
Refs #23359.
Fixes#24127
On headless Linux VPS (no DISPLAY or WAYLAND_DISPLAY), some Python
webbrowser backends register TUI programs such as links, lynx, or
www-browser. GenericBrowser.open() spawns these without redirecting
stdin/stdout, allowing them to take over the terminal. This can cause
the process to receive SIGHUP and exit immediately even though uvicorn
bound the port successfully, producing a misleading success message
followed by an empty --status.
Fix: detect headless Linux at startup and skip the auto-open when no
display server is available. On such systems the URL is still printed
so the user can open it manually or via an SSH tunnel. The webbrowser
call is also wrapped in a try/except so any unexpected failure on other
platforms is silently absorbed rather than surfacing as an unhandled
exception in the daemon thread.
* feat(security): supply-chain advisory checker + lazy-install framework + tiered install fallback
Three coordinated mitigations for the Mini Shai-Hulud worm hitting
mistralai 2.4.6 on PyPI (2026-05-12) and for the next single-package
compromise that follows.
# What this PR makes true
1. Users with the poisoned mistralai 2.4.6 in their venv get a loud
detection banner with copy-pasteable remediation steps the moment
they run hermes (and on every gateway startup).
2. One quarantined / yanked PyPI package can no longer silently demote
a fresh install to 'core only' — the installer keeps every other
extra and tells the user which tier landed.
3. Future opt-in backends (Mistral, ElevenLabs, Honcho, etc.) can
lazy-install on first use under a strict allowlist, instead of
eagerly pulling everything at install time.
# Detection: hermes_cli/security_advisories.py
- ADVISORIES catalog (one entry currently: shai-hulud-2026-05 for
mistralai==2.4.6). Adding the next one is a single dataclass.
- detect_compromised() uses importlib.metadata.version() — no pip
dependency, works in uv venvs that lack pip.
- Banner cache (~/.hermes/cache/advisory_banner_seen) rate-limits
the startup banner to once per 24h per advisory.
- Acks persisted to security.acked_advisories in config.yaml; never
re-banner after ack.
- Wired into:
* hermes doctor — runs first, prints full remediation block
* hermes doctor --ack <id> — dismisses an advisory
* cli.py interactive run() and single-query branches — short
stderr banner pointing at hermes doctor
* gateway/run.py startup — operator-visible warning in gateway.log
# Lazy-install framework: tools/lazy_deps.py
- LAZY_DEPS allowlist maps namespaced feature keys (tts.elevenlabs,
memory.honcho, provider.bedrock, etc.) to pip specs.
- ensure(feature) installs missing deps in the active venv via the
uv → pip → ensurepip ladder (matches tools_config._pip_install).
- Strict spec safety regex rejects URLs, file paths, shell metas,
pip flag injection, control chars — only PyPI-by-name accepted.
- Gated on security.allow_lazy_installs (default true) plus the
HERMES_DISABLE_LAZY_INSTALLS env var for restricted/audited envs.
- Migrated three backends as proof of pattern:
* tools/tts_tool.py — _import_elevenlabs() calls ensure first
* plugins/memory/honcho/client.py — get_honcho_client lazy-installs
* tts.mistral / stt.mistral entries pre-registered for when PyPI
restores mistralai
# Installer fallback tiers
scripts/install.sh, scripts/install.ps1, setup-hermes.sh:
- Centralised _BROKEN_EXTRAS list (currently: mistral). Edit one
array when a transitive breaks; users keep every other extra.
- New 'all minus known-broken' tier between [all] and the existing
PyPI-only-extras tier. Only kicks in when [all] fails resolve.
- All three tiers explicit: every fallback announces which tier
landed and prints a re-run hint when not on Tier 1.
- install.ps1 and install.sh both regenerate their tier specs from
the same _BROKEN_EXTRAS array so updates stay in sync.
Side effect: install.ps1 Tier 2 spec previously hardcoded 'mistral'
in its extra list — bug fixed by the refactor (mistral is filtered
out).
# Config
hermes_cli/config.py — DEFAULT_CONFIG.security gains:
- acked_advisories: [] (advisory IDs the user has dismissed)
- allow_lazy_installs: True (security gate for ensure())
No config version bump needed — both keys nest under existing
security: block, and load_config's deep-merge picks up DEFAULT_CONFIG
defaults for users with older configs.
# Tests
tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py — 23 tests covering:
- detect_compromised matches/non-matches, wildcard frozenset
- ack persistence, idempotence, blank rejection, config-failure path
- banner cache rate limiting + 24h re-banner + ack-stops-banner
- short_banner_lines / full_remediation_text / render_doctor_section /
gateway_log_message
- shipped catalog well-formedness invariant
tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py — 40 tests covering:
- spec safety: 11 safe parametrized + 18 unsafe parametrized
- allowlist: unknown-feature rejection, namespace.name shape,
every shipped spec passes the safety regex
- security gating: config flag, env var, default, fail-open
- ensure() happy/sad paths: already-satisfied, install success,
pip stderr surfaced on failure, install-succeeds-but-still-missing
- is_available, feature_install_command
Combined: 63 new tests, all passing under scripts/run_tests.sh.
# Validation
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py
tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py → 63/63 passing
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_doctor.py
tests/hermes_cli/test_doctor_command_install.py
tests/tools/test_tts_mistral.py tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py
tests/tools/test_transcription_dotenv_fallback.py → 165/165 passing
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/ tests/tools/ →
9191 passed, 8 pre-existing failures (verified on origin/main
before this change)
- bash -n on install.sh and setup-hermes.sh → OK
- py_compile on all modified .py files → OK
- End-to-end smoke test of detect_compromised + render_doctor_section
+ gateway_log_message with mocked installed version → produces
copy-pasteable remediation output
# Community
Full advisory + remediation steps:
website/docs/community/security-advisories/shai-hulud-mistralai-2026-05.md
Short-form post drafts (Discord, GitHub pinned issue, README banner):
scripts/community-announcement-shai-hulud.md
Refs: PR #24205 (mistral disabled), Socket Security advisory
<https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-worm-pypi>
* build(deps): pin every direct dep to ==X.Y.Z (no ranges)
Companion to the supply-chain advisory work: replace every >=/</~= range
in pyproject.toml's [project.dependencies] and [project.optional-dependencies]
with an exact ==X.Y.Z pin sourced from uv.lock.
Why: ranges allow PyPI to ship a fresh version of any direct dep at any
time without a code review on our side. With ranges, the malicious
mistralai 2.4.6 release would have been pulled by every fresh
'pip install -e .[all]' for the hours between upload and PyPI's
quarantine — exactly the install window we got hit on. Exact pins close
that window: the only way a new package version reaches a user is via
an intentional update on our end.
What the user-facing change is: nothing, behavior-wise. Every package
resolves to the same version it was already resolving to via uv.lock —
the pins just remove the resolver's freedom to pick a different one.
Cost: any user installing Hermes alongside another package that requires
a newer pin gets a resolver conflict. Acceptable for our isolated-venv
install path; documented in the new comment block.
Build-system requires line (setuptools>=61.0) is intentionally left
as a range — pinning the build backend would block fresh pip from
bootstrapping the build on architectures where that exact wheel isn't
available.
mistral extra (mistralai==2.3.0) is pinned but stays out of [all]
(per PR #24205). 'uv lock' regeneration will fail until PyPI restores
mistralai; lockfile regeneration is gated behind that, NOT on every PR.
LAZY_DEPS in tools/lazy_deps.py also moved to exact pins so the lazy-
install pathway can never resolve a different version than the one
declared in pyproject.toml.
Validation:
- Cross-checked all 77 pinned direct deps in pyproject.toml against
uv.lock — every pin matches the resolved version exactly.
- Cross-checked all LAZY_DEPS specs against uv.lock — same.
- 'uv pip install -e .[all] --dry-run' resolves 205 packages cleanly.
- tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py + tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py
→ 63/63 passing (every shipped spec passes the safety regex).
- Doctor + TTS + transcription targeted suite → 146/146 passing.
* build(deps): hash-verify transitives via uv.lock; remove unresolvable [mistral] extra
You asked: 'what about the dependencies the dependencies rely on?' —
correctly noting that exact-pinning direct deps in pyproject.toml does
NOT cover the transitive graph. `pip install` and `uv pip install` both
re-resolve transitives fresh from PyPI at install time, so a compromised
transitive (e.g. `httpcore` if it got worm-poisoned tomorrow) would
still hit our users even with every direct dep exact-pinned.
# What this commit fixes
1. **Both real installer scripts now prefer `uv sync --locked` as Tier 0.**
uv.lock records SHA256 hashes for every transitive — a compromised
package with a different hash gets REJECTED. Falls through to the
existing `uv pip install` cascade if the lockfile is missing or
stale, with a loud warning that the fallback path does NOT
hash-verify transitives. Previously only `setup-hermes.sh` (the dev
path) used the lockfile; `scripts/install.sh` and `scripts/install.ps1`
(the paths fresh users actually run) skipped it.
2. **Removed the `[mistral]` extra entirely.** The `mistralai` PyPI
project is fully quarantined right now — every version returns 404,
so any pin we wrote was unresolvable, which broke `uv lock --check`
in CI. Restoration is documented in pyproject.toml as a 5-step
checklist (verify, re-add extra, re-enable in 4 modules, regenerate
lock, optionally re-add to [all]).
3. **Regenerated uv.lock.** 262 packages, mistralai/eval-type-backport/
jsonpath-python pruned. `uv lock --check` now passes.
# Defense-in-depth view
| Layer | Where | Protects against |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Exact pins in pyproject | direct deps | new mistralai 2.4.6-style direct compromise |
| uv.lock + `--locked` install | transitive graph | transitive worm injection |
| Tier-0 hash-verified path | install.sh / .ps1 | actually USE the lockfile in fresh installs |
| `uv lock --check` CI gate | every PR | drift between pyproject and lockfile |
| `hermes_cli/security_advisories.py` | runtime | cleanup for users who already got hit |
The exact pinning + hash verification together close the supply-chain
gap. Without the lockfile path, exact pins alone are theater.
# Validation
- `uv lock --check` → passes (262 packages resolved, no drift).
- `bash -n` on install.sh + setup-hermes.sh → OK.
- 209/209 tests passing across new + adjacent test files
(test_lazy_deps.py, test_security_advisories.py, test_doctor.py,
test_tts_mistral.py, test_transcription_tools.py).
- TOML parse OK.
* chore: remove community announcement drafts (PR body covers it)
* build(deps): lazy-install every opt-in backend (anthropic, search, terminal, platforms, dashboard)
Extends the lazy-install framework to cover everything that's not used by
every hermes session. Base install drops from ~60 packages to 45.
Moved out of core dependencies = []:
- anthropic (only when provider=anthropic native, not via aggregators)
- exa-py, firecrawl-py, parallel-web (search backends; only when picked)
- fal-client (image gen; only when picked)
- edge-tts (default TTS but still optional)
New extras in pyproject.toml: [anthropic] [exa] [firecrawl] [parallel-web]
[fal] [edge-tts]. All added to [all].
New LAZY_DEPS entries: provider.anthropic, search.{exa,firecrawl,parallel},
tts.edge, image.fal, memory.hindsight, platform.{telegram,discord,matrix},
terminal.{modal,daytona,vercel}, tool.dashboard.
Each import site now calls ensure() before importing the SDK. Where the
module had a top-level try/except (telegram, discord, fastapi), the
graceful-fallback pattern was extended to lazy-install on first
check_*_requirements() call and re-bind module globals.
Updated test_windows_native_support.py tzdata check from snapshot
(>=2023.3 literal) to invariant (any version + win32 marker).
Validation:
- Base install: 45 packages (was ~60); 6 newly-extracted packages absent
- uv lock --check: passes (262 packages, no drift)
- 209/209 lazy_deps + advisory + doctor + tts/transcription tests passing
- py_compile clean on all 12 modified modules
The `mistralai` PyPI package was quarantined on 2026-05-12 after a
malicious 2.4.6 release. Every fresh resolve (AUR makepkg, Docker build,
CI run, install.sh first-run) currently fails on
`mistralai>=2.3.0,<3` because PyPI returns zero candidates.
Existing users running `hermes update` mostly didn't notice — `hermes
update` falls back from `.[all]` to per-extra retries and silently
skips mistral with a warning that scrolls past. But fresh installs
hard-fail or lose every other extra.
Changes:
- pyproject.toml: drop `hermes-agent[mistral]` from `[all]` and
`[termux-all]`. The `mistral` extra itself is preserved so users
can opt back in once PyPI un-quarantines.
- hermes_cli/tools_config.py: hide Mistral Voxtral TTS from the
`hermes tools` provider picker until restored.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py: drop "mistral" from dashboard STT options.
- tools/transcription_tools.py: explicit `provider: mistral` returns
"none" with a clear status message; auto-detect skips mistral.
- tools/tts_tool.py: dispatcher returns a clear "temporarily disabled"
error before any SDK import attempt (avoids cached-stale-package
surprises).
- tests/tools/: update three test files to assert the new disabled
behavior. Each test docstring records why and points at the rollback
trigger (PyPI un-quarantines mistralai).
Restore plan: revert this commit once the package is available on PyPI
again. The behavior change is intentional and documented in code
comments + test docstrings to make the rollback trivial.
Validation:
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/tools/ -k 'mistral or stt or tts' →
425/425 passing.
Refs: https://pypi.org/simple/mistralai/ (currently
"pypi:project-status: quarantined").
Handle MiniMax OAuth expiry values consistently across CLI and dashboard
flows, fix CLI status/add behavior, and force pooled OAuth runtime
requests through Anthropic Messages.
- web_server._minimax_poller: parse expired_in via the shared resolver
so unix-ms absolute timestamps stop landing as TTL seconds and crashing
with 'year 583911 is out of range' when a user connects MiniMax OAuth
from the dashboard.
- auth._minimax_oauth_login / _refresh_minimax_oauth_state: same fix on
the CLI login + refresh paths.
- auth.get_auth_status: dispatch minimax-oauth to its dedicated status
function instead of falling through.
- auth_commands.auth_add_command: 'hermes auth add minimax-oauth' now
starts the device-code login flow and persists a pool entry with the
access + refresh tokens, instead of requiring credentials to already
exist.
- runtime_provider._resolve_runtime_from_pool_entry: pin pooled
minimax-oauth credentials to anthropic_messages so a stale
model.api_mode: chat_completions can't send requests to
/anthropic/chat/completions and trigger MiniMax nginx 404s.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Fixes#22832.
## Root cause
`hermes_cli/web_server.py:start_oauth_login` dispatched OAuth flows by
the catalog's `flow` field rather than provider id:
if catalog_entry["flow"] == "pkce":
return _start_anthropic_pkce()
The catalog had two `flow: "pkce"` entries — `anthropic` and
`minimax-oauth` — so clicking "Login" on MiniMax in the dashboard's
Keys tab unconditionally launched the Anthropic/Claude PKCE flow.
## Fix
Three changes in `hermes_cli/web_server.py`:
1. Catalog entry for `minimax-oauth` changed from `flow: "pkce"` to
`flow: "device_code"`. From a UX perspective MiniMax is a
verification-URI + user-code flow (open URL, enter code, backend
polls) — same shape as Nous's device-code flow. The PKCE bit
(verifier + challenge from `_minimax_pkce_pair`) is a security
extension that doesn't change the operator experience; the existing
dashboard modal already renders `device_code` correctly for this UX.
2. New MiniMax branch in `_start_device_code_flow`, mirroring the
existing Nous branch but calling MiniMax-specific helpers
(`_minimax_request_user_code`, `_minimax_pkce_pair`). Stashes
verifier + state in the session for the poller to consume. Handles
the overloaded `expired_in` field (could be unix-ms timestamp OR
seconds-from-now duration) the same way `_minimax_poll_token` does.
3. New `_minimax_poller` background thread mirroring `_nous_poller`.
Calls `_minimax_poll_token` → on success builds the same
`auth_state` dict the CLI flow (`_minimax_oauth_login`) builds, and
persists via `_minimax_save_auth_state` so the dashboard path leaves
the system in the same state as `hermes auth add minimax-oauth`.
Plus a dispatcher tightening to prevent regression: the `pkce` branch
now requires `provider_id == "anthropic"`, so any future PKCE provider
added without a proper start function gets a clean
`400 Unsupported flow` rather than silently launching Anthropic OAuth.
## Test
New `tests/hermes_cli/test_web_oauth_dispatch.py`:
- Regression test asserting MiniMax start does NOT return claude.ai
- Sanity test that Anthropic PKCE still works after the dispatcher
tightening
- Forward-looking test: a hypothetical pkce-flagged provider without
an explicit branch is rejected cleanly rather than misrouted
## Limitations
- The dashboard MiniMax path defaults to `region="global"`. CN-region
operators can still use the CLI flow which supports `--region cn`.
Adding a region toggle to the dashboard UI is a follow-up.
Replace with for all literal-tuple
membership tests. Set lookup is O(1) vs O(n) for tuple — consistent
micro-optimization across the codebase.
608 instances fixed via `ruff --fix --unsafe-fixes`, 0 remaining.
133 files, +626/-626 (net zero).
Remove the blanket /api/plugins/* exemption from auth_middleware so
plugin API routes (e.g. Kanban dashboard) require the same session
token as all other /api/ endpoints.
Fixes#19533
Follow-up to PR #21293 (cli.py), which fixed the same anti-pattern.
`asyncio.get_event_loop()` is documented as effectively "always returns
the running loop when called from a coroutine" and emits
DeprecationWarning/RuntimeWarning in some interpreter configurations.
The Python docs explicitly recommend get_running_loop() inside coroutines.
Replaces the remaining 9 call sites that are unconditionally inside
async def bodies:
- tools/browser_cdp_tool.py — _cdp_call() (4 sites): deadline + remaining
computations inside the async websockets.connect context manager.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py — get_status, _start_device_code_flow,
submit_oauth_code (3 sites): all FastAPI async endpoints offloading
blocking httpx / PKCE work to run_in_executor.
- environments/agent_loop.py — HermesAgentLoop (1 site): tool dispatch
inside the async rollout loop.
- environments/benchmarks/terminalbench_2/terminalbench2_env.py —
rollout_and_score_eval (1 site): test verification thread offload.
All 9 sites are unconditionally inside async def bodies, so a running
loop is guaranteed and no try/except RuntimeError fallback is needed
(unlike the cli.py case in #21293, which ran from a background thread).
Behavior is identical on supported Python versions; aligns the codebase
with the post-#21293 idiom and avoids future warnings as the deprecation
hardens.
Salvaged from PR #21930 by @Zhekinmaksim onto current main (the
original branch was 109 commits behind and carried unintended
stale-branch reverts of unrelated landed changes — _tail_lines
encoding=utf-8 and the Windows PTY bridge guard). Only the 9 swaps
from the PR's intended scope are applied here.
Closes the last Python-on-Windows UTF-8 exposure by making every
text-mode open() call explicit about its encoding.
Before: on Windows, bare open(path, 'r') defaults to the system
locale encoding (cp1252 on US-locale installs). That means reading
any config/yaml/markdown/json file with non-ASCII content either
crashes with UnicodeDecodeError or silently mis-decodes bytes.
After: all 89 affected call sites in production code now pass
encoding='utf-8' explicitly. Works identically on every platform
and every locale, no surprise behavior.
Mechanical sweep via:
ruff check --preview --extend-select PLW1514 --unsafe-fixes --fix --exclude 'tests,venv,.venv,node_modules,website,optional-skills, skills,tinker-atropos,plugins' .
All 89 fixes have the same shape: open(x) or open(x, mode) became
open(x, encoding='utf-8') or open(x, mode, encoding='utf-8'). Nothing
else changed. Every modified file still parses and the Windows/sandbox
test suite is still green (85 passed, 14 skipped, 0 failed across
tests/tools/test_code_execution_windows_env.py +
tests/tools/test_code_execution_modes.py + tests/tools/test_env_passthrough.py +
tests/test_hermes_bootstrap.py).
Scope notes:
- tests/ excluded: test fixtures can use locale encoding intentionally
(exercising edge cases). If we want to tighten tests later that's
a separate PR.
- plugins/ excluded: plugin-specific conventions may differ; plugin
authors own their code.
- optional-skills/ and skills/ excluded: skill scripts are user-authored
and we don't want to mass-edit them.
- website/ and tinker-atropos/ excluded: vendored / generated content.
46 files touched, 89 +/- lines (symmetric replacement). No behavior
change on POSIX or on Windows when the file is ASCII; bug fix on
Windows when the file contains non-ASCII.
Native Windows (with Git for Windows installed) can now run the Hermes CLI
and gateway end-to-end without crashing. install.ps1 already existed and
the Git Bash terminal backend was already wired up — this PR fills the
remaining gaps discovered by auditing every Windows-unsafe primitive
(`signal.SIGKILL`, `os.kill(pid, 0)` probes, bare `fcntl`/`termios`
imports) and by comparing hermes against how Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex,
and Cline handle native Windows.
## What changed
### UTF-8 stdio (new module)
- `hermes_cli/stdio.py` — single `configure_windows_stdio()` entry point.
Flips the console code page to CP_UTF8 (65001), reconfigures
`sys.stdout`/`stderr`/`stdin` to UTF-8, sets `PYTHONIOENCODING` + `PYTHONUTF8`
for subprocesses. No-op on non-Windows. Opt out via `HERMES_DISABLE_WINDOWS_UTF8=1`.
- Called early in `cli.py::main`, `hermes_cli/main.py::main`, and
`gateway/run.py::main` so Unicode banners (box-drawing, geometric
symbols, non-Latin chat text) don't `UnicodeEncodeError` on cp1252
consoles.
### Crash sites fixed
- `hermes_cli/main.py:7970` (hermes update → stuck gateway sweep): raw
`os.kill(pid, _signal.SIGKILL)` → `gateway.status.terminate_pid(pid, force=True)`
which routes through `taskkill /T /F` on Windows.
- `hermes_cli/profiles.py::_stop_gateway_process`: same fix — also
converted SIGTERM path to `terminate_pid()` and widened OSError catch
on the intermediate `os.kill(pid, 0)` probe.
- `hermes_cli/kanban_db.py:2914, 3041`: raw `signal.SIGKILL` →
`getattr(signal, "SIGKILL", signal.SIGTERM)` fallback (matches the
pattern already used in `gateway/status.py`).
### OSError widening on `os.kill(pid, 0)` probes
Windows raises `OSError` (WinError 87) for a gone PID instead of
`ProcessLookupError`. Widened the catch at:
- `gateway/run.py:15101` (`--replace` wait-for-exit loop — without this,
the loop busy-spins the full 10s every Windows gateway start)
- `hermes_cli/gateway.py:228, 460, 940`
- `hermes_cli/profiles.py:777`
- `tools/process_registry.py::_is_host_pid_alive`
- `tools/browser_tool.py:1170, 1206`
### Dashboard PTY graceful degradation
`hermes_cli/pty_bridge.py` depends on `fcntl`/`termios`/`ptyprocess`,
none of which exist on native Windows. Previously a Windows dashboard
would crash on `import hermes_cli.web_server` because of a top-level
import. Now:
- `hermes_cli/web_server.py` wraps the pty_bridge import in
`try/except ImportError` and sets `_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE=False`.
- The `/api/pty` WebSocket handler returns a friendly "use WSL2 for
this tab" message instead of exploding.
- Every other dashboard feature (sessions, jobs, metrics, config
editor) runs natively on Windows.
### Dependency
- `pyproject.toml`: add `tzdata>=2023.3; sys_platform == 'win32'` so
Python's `zoneinfo` works on Windows (which has no IANA tzdata
shipped with the OS). Credits @sprmn24 (PR #13182).
### Docs
- README.md: removed "Native Windows is not supported"; added
PowerShell one-liner and Git-for-Windows prerequisite note.
- `website/docs/getting-started/installation.md`: new Windows section
with capability matrix (everything native except the dashboard
`/chat` PTY tab, which is WSL2-only).
- `website/docs/user-guide/windows-wsl-quickstart.md`: reframed as
"WSL2 as an alternative to native" rather than "the only way".
- `website/docs/developer-guide/contributing.md`: updated
cross-platform guidance with the `signal.SIGKILL` / `OSError`
rules we enforce now.
- `website/docs/user-guide/features/web-dashboard.md`: acknowledged
native Windows works for everything except the embedded PTY pane.
## Why this shape
Pulled from a survey of how other agent codebases handle native
Windows (Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Cline):
- All four treat Git Bash as the canonical shell on Windows, same as
hermes already does in `tools/environments/local.py::_find_bash()`.
- None of them force `SetConsoleOutputCP` — but they don't have to,
Node/Rust write UTF-16 to the Win32 console API. Python does not get
that for free, so we flip CP_UTF8 via ctypes.
- None of them ship PowerShell-as-primary-shell (Claude Code exposes
PS as a secondary tool; scope creep for this PR).
- All of them use `taskkill /T /F` for force-kill on Windows, which
is exactly what `gateway.status.terminate_pid(force=True)` does.
## Non-goals (deliberate scope limits)
- No PowerShell-as-a-second-shell tool — worth designing separately.
- No terminal routing rewrite (#12317, #15461, #19800 cluster) — that's
the hardest design call and needs a separate doc.
- No wholesale `open()` → `open(..., encoding="utf-8")` sweep (Tianworld
cluster) — will do as follow-up if users hit actual breakage; most
modern code already specifies it.
## Validation
- 28 new tests in `tests/tools/test_windows_native_support.py` — all
platform-mocked, pass on Linux CI. Cover:
- `configure_windows_stdio` idempotency, opt-out, env-preservation
- `terminate_pid` taskkill routing, failure → OSError, FileNotFoundError fallback
- `getattr(signal, "SIGKILL", …)` fallback shape
- `_is_host_pid_alive` OSError widening (Windows-gone-PID behavior)
- Source-level checks that all entry points call `configure_windows_stdio`
- pty_bridge import-guard present in `web_server.py`
- README no longer says "not supported"
- 12 pre-existing tests in `tests/tools/test_windows_compat.py` still pass.
- `tests/hermes_cli/` ran fully (3909 passed, 9 failures — all confirmed
pre-existing on main by stash-test).
- `tests/gateway/` ran fully (5021 passed, 1 pre-existing failure).
- `tests/tools/test_process_registry.py` + `test_browser_*` pass.
- Manual smoke: `import hermes_cli.stdio; import gateway.run;
import hermes_cli.web_server` — all clean, `_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE=True`
on Linux (as expected).
## Files
- New: `hermes_cli/stdio.py`, `tests/tools/test_windows_native_support.py`
- Modified: `cli.py`, `gateway/run.py`, `hermes_cli/main.py`,
`hermes_cli/profiles.py`, `hermes_cli/gateway.py`,
`hermes_cli/kanban_db.py`, `hermes_cli/pty_bridge.py`,
`hermes_cli/web_server.py`, `tools/browser_tool.py`,
`tools/process_registry.py`, `pyproject.toml`, `README.md`, and 4
docs pages.
Credits to everyone whose prior PR work informed these fixes — see
the co-author trailers. All of the PRs listed in
`~/.hermes/plans/windows-support-prs.md` fixing `os.kill` / `signal.SIGKILL`
/ UTF-8 stdio / tzdata / README patterns found the same issues; this PR
consolidates them.
Co-authored-by: Philip D'Souza <9472774+PhilipAD@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Arecanon <42595053+ArecaNon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: XiaoXiao0221 <263113677+XiaoXiao0221@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lars Hagen <1360677+lars-hagen@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Luan Dias <65574834+luandiasrj@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruzzgar <ruzzgarcn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: sprmn24 <oncuevtv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: adybag14-cyber <252811164+adybag14-cyber@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Prasanna28Devadiga <54196612+Prasanna28Devadiga@users.noreply.github.com>
The Hermes dashboard previously assumed it was served at the root of its
host (e.g. https://kanban.tilos.com/). When mounted behind a path-prefix
reverse proxy (e.g. https://mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/), the SPA
404'd because:
- index.html shipped absolute /assets/index-*.js URLs
- React Router had no basename
- The plugin loader hit /dashboard-plugins/<name>/... at the root host
- CSS in the bundle had absolute url(/fonts/...) references
This patch makes the dashboard prefix-aware at runtime, no rebuild
required. The proxy injects 'X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes' on every
request and the Python server:
- Rewrites href/src in served index.html to '${prefix}/assets/...'
- Injects 'window.__HERMES_BASE_PATH__="${prefix}"' for the SPA to read
- Rewrites url() refs in CSS at serve time
The SPA reads window.__HERMES_BASE_PATH__ once at boot and:
- Prefixes all /api/... fetches via api.ts
- Prefixes all /dashboard-plugins/... script/css URLs in usePlugins
- Sets <BrowserRouter basename={...}> so client-side routing works
When no X-Forwarded-Prefix header is present, behavior is unchanged
(empty prefix => serves at root, kanban.tilos.com keeps working).
Refs: MC-AUTO-13
Widen PR #20314's fix to the other timeout-polling sites in the codebase
that share the same wall-clock-jump bug class. All of these measure elapsed
timeout duration, not civil time, so they belong on time.monotonic().
- hermes_cli/auth.py: auth-store file-lock timeout, Spotify OAuth callback
wait, Nous portal device-auth token poll.
- hermes_cli/copilot_auth.py: Copilot OAuth device-flow token poll.
- hermes_cli/gateway.py: gateway systemd restart wait.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py: dashboard Codex device-auth user_code wait,
dashboard Nous device-auth token poll. (sess["expires_at"] stays on
time.time() — it's a persisted absolute timestamp, not a local
deadline-polling variable.)
- agent/copilot_acp_client.py: Copilot ACP JSON-RPC request timeout.
Adds `hermes profile create <name> --no-skills` to create a profile with
zero bundled skills. Writes a `.no-bundled-skills` marker file in the
profile root so `hermes update`'s all-profile skill sync loop also skips
the profile — without the marker, every update would re-seed skills and
the user would have to delete them again.
Use case (from @hiut1u): orchestrator profiles and narrow-task profiles
don't need 100+ bundled skills polluting their system prompt.
- create_profile() gains a `no_skills` param, mutually exclusive with
`--clone` / `--clone-all` (cloning explicitly copies skills).
- seed_profile_skills() no-ops on opted-out profiles and returns
`{skipped_opt_out: True}` so callers can report cleanly.
- Web API (POST /api/profiles) accepts `no_skills: bool`.
- Delete `.no-bundled-skills` to opt back in — next `hermes update`
re-seeds normally.
6 new tests in TestNoSkillsOptOut cover marker write, mutual exclusion
with clone, seed_profile_skills opt-out, fresh profile unaffected, and
delete-marker-re-enables-seeding.
Same Hermes Teal palette as the default theme, but with baseSize 18px,
lineHeight 1.65, and spacious density so the whole dashboard scales up.
Gives users a one-click bigger-text preset and a copyable reference for
authoring custom YAML themes with their own typography settings.
Adds an optional dashboard side-process to the container entrypoint,
toggled by `HERMES_DASHBOARD=1` (also accepts `true` / `yes`). When set,
the entrypoint backgrounds `hermes dashboard` before `exec`-ing the main
command so the user's chosen foreground process (gateway, chat, `sleep
infinity`, …) remains PID-of-interest for the container runtime.
docker run -d \
-v ~/.hermes:/opt/data \
-p 8642:8642 -p 9119:9119 \
-e HERMES_DASHBOARD=1 \
nousresearch/hermes-agent gateway run
Defaults chosen for the container case:
- Host: 0.0.0.0 (reachable through published port; can override to
127.0.0.1 via HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST for sidecar/reverse-proxy setups)
- Port: 9119 (matches `hermes dashboard`)
- Auto-adds `--insecure` when binding to non-localhost, matching the
dashboard's own safety gate for exposing API keys
- HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI is read by `hermes dashboard` directly — no
entrypoint plumbing needed
Dashboard output is prefixed with `[dashboard]` via `stdbuf`+`sed -u` so
it's easy to separate from gateway logs in `docker logs`. No supervision:
if the dashboard crashes it stays down until the container restarts
(documented in the `:::note` panel).
Other changes bundled in:
- Deprecate GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL / GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT env vars in
hermes_cli/web_server.py with a DEPRECATED block comment and a
`.. deprecated::` note on _probe_gateway_health. The feature still
works for this release; it'll be removed alongside the move to a
first-class dashboard config key.
- Rewrite the "Running the dashboard" doc section around the new
single-container pattern. Drops the previously-documented
dashboard-as-its-own-container setup — that pattern relied on the
deprecated env vars for cross-container gateway-liveness detection,
and without them the dashboard would permanently report the gateway
as "not running".
- Collapse the two-service Compose example (gateway + dashboard
container) into a single service with HERMES_DASHBOARD=1. Removes
the now-unnecessary bridge network and `depends_on`.
- Drop the ":::warning" caveat about "Running a dashboard container
alongside the gateway is safe" — that case no longer exists.
When the dashboard is bound to 0.0.0.0 with --insecure (e.g. behind
Tailscale Serve), WebSocket endpoints (/api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub,
/api/events) rejected connections from non-loopback client IPs with
code 4403 — causing 'events feed disconnected' in the UI.
Extract the repeated loopback check into _ws_client_is_allowed() which
respects the public bind flag. Session token auth still guards all
endpoints regardless of bind mode.
Add a standing-goal slash command that keeps Hermes working toward a
user-stated objective across turns until it is achieved, paused, or
the turn budget runs out. Our take on the Ralph loop — cf. Codex CLI
0.128.0's /goal.
After each turn, a lightweight auxiliary-model judge call asks 'is
this goal satisfied by the assistant's last response?'. If not, and
we're under the turn budget (default 20), Hermes feeds a continuation
prompt back into the same session as a normal user message. Any real
user message preempts the continuation loop automatically.
Judge failures fail OPEN (continue) so a flaky judge never wedges
progress — the turn budget is the real backstop.
### Commands
- `/goal <text>` — set a standing goal (kicks off the first turn)
- `/goal` or `/goal status` — show current state
- `/goal pause` — pause the continuation loop
- `/goal resume` — resume (resets turn counter)
- `/goal clear` — drop the goal
Works on both CLI and gateway platforms via the central CommandDef
registry.
### Design invariants preserved
- **Prompt cache**: continuation prompts are regular user-role
messages appended to history. No system-prompt mutation, no toolset
swap.
- **Role alternation**: continuation is a user turn, never injected
mid-tool-loop.
- **Session persistence**: goal state lives in SessionDB.state_meta
keyed by `goal:<session_id>`, so `/resume` picks it up.
- **Mid-run safety**: on the gateway, `/goal status|pause|clear` are
allowed mid-run (control-plane only); setting a new goal requires
`/stop` first so we don't race a second continuation prompt against
the current turn.
### Files
- `hermes_cli/goals.py` (new, 380 lines) — GoalManager + judge + state
- `hermes_cli/commands.py` — CommandDef entry
- `hermes_cli/config.py` — `goals.max_turns` default
- `hermes_cli/web_server.py` — dashboard category merge
- `cli.py` — /goal handler + post-turn continuation hook in
process_loop
- `gateway/run.py` — /goal handler + post-turn continuation hook
wrapping _handle_message_with_agent
- `tests/hermes_cli/test_goals.py` (new, 26 tests) — judge parsing,
fail-open semantics, lifecycle, persistence, budget exhaustion
- `website/docs/reference/slash-commands.md` — docs entry
