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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ethernet
c80b244b52 refactor(terminal,file-tools): delete legacy env-side cwd tracking (step 4)
The per-session record store is now the ONLY cwd mechanism. Deleted:

- env.cwd_owner stamping + prev_owner threading (terminal_tool): the
  shared env no longer carries ownership metadata at all
- _resolve_command_cwd's env/prev_owner params: resolution is
  workdir > session record > config/override default
- file_tools._live_cwd_if_owned + _get_live_tracking_cwd: path
  resolution never consults the shared env's live cwd
- file_tools._last_known_cwd + _remember_last_known_cwd +
  _last_known_cwd_for: the #26211 preserved-anchor registry is
  subsumed by the session record, which never lived on the env and
  therefore cannot be lost to env cleanup. The _get_file_ops
  stale-cache rescue now writes the record instead.
- env recreation (both _get_file_ops and terminal_tool) seeds the
  fresh env from override > session record > config

Why no transition fallback: the legacy state was process-local and
in-memory exactly like the record store — after a restart both start
empty, and within a running process every legacy write site has been
dual-writing the record since step 1. There is no populated-legacy/
empty-record state to fall back for.

Tests updated to drive the record store instead of the deleted
mechanism; the cross-session isolation suite now asserts the same
behavior contracts (no leak, cd isolation, #26211 persistence)
against the new architecture, plus a new "session C inherits nothing"
case that the old ownership guard could not express.
2026-07-16 00:18:38 -07:00
Ben Barclay
8fe800ee1a
fix(file-tools): sanitize host/relative cwd override before it reaches container sandbox (#54447) (#54616)
(cherry picked from commit 82132f7911)

Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <66773372+Tranquil-Flow@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-29 15:32:20 +10:00
Ben Barclay
c15945655f
fix(terminal): sanitize host/relative cwd OVERRIDE before it reaches docker run -w (#50636)
terminal_tool() resolves a per-task cwd override that WINS over config["cwd"]:

    cwd = overrides.get("cwd") or config["cwd"]

config["cwd"] is sanitized for container backends in _get_env_config() (host
prefixes /Users//home//C:\\/C:/ and relative paths are replaced with the
backend default /root). But the override was applied RAW — it was never run
through that guard. The gateway/TUI registers the host launch dir as a cwd
override for workspace tracking (tui_gateway/server.py _register_session_cwd
-> _terminal_task_cwd -> _session_cwd -> os.getcwd()), so on a container
backend a host path leaked straight to `docker run -w <host-path>`:

  - Windows desktop: -w C:\Users\<user>  -> container fails to start (exit 125)
  - POSIX:           -w /home/<user>      -> same

The ACP adapter translates its override cwd (acp_adapter/session.py
_translate_acp_cwd), but the gateway path did neither translation nor
sanitization, so the override bypassed the one guard that would have caught it.

Fix: extract the host/relative-path predicate into a shared
_is_unusable_container_cwd() helper (so the existing _get_env_config()
sanitizer and the new guard can't drift), and re-apply it to the *resolved*
cwd at the override-resolution site. Valid in-container override paths
(RL/benchmark sandboxes that set cwd to /workspace, /root, ...) are absolute
non-host paths and pass through untouched.

Tests: unit-pin the predicate (Windows backslash/forwardslash, POSIX home,
macOS /Users, relative, valid container paths) AND an E2E call-site pin that
drives terminal_tool() with a host-path override registered and asserts the
cwd reaching _create_environment is sanitized. Mutation-verified: reverting
the call-site guard makes the two host-path E2E tests fail (showing the raw
host path leaking) while the valid-/workspace-override test stays green.
2026-06-25 02:33:40 +00:00