The Codex app-server runtime bypasses the main conversation loop and drives
its own subprocess turn, so it needs first-class hooks rather than the
OpenAI-loop interrupt path.
- `AIAgent.interrupt()` now forwards a hard stop to
`CodexAppServerSession.request_interrupt()`, and `redirect()` uses Codex's
native `turn/steer` protocol instead of cancelling the subprocess.
- `run_turn()` no longer clears an interrupt that arrived during
`ensure_started()`: a stop landing mid-startup is honored before `turn/start`,
and the interrupt event is cleared on every exit path.
- `run_codex_app_server_turn()` mirrors the loop finalizer's interrupt handoff
(surface `interrupted` / `interrupt_message`, then `clear_interrupt()`) on
both the normal and exception early-return paths, so a hard stop can't leave
`_interrupt_requested` stale for the next turn.
Fold #62349's broader provider-boundary handling into the header fix: bound top-level and xAI override keys again at preflight after middleware, preserve unrelated headers, and cover boundaries and collisions.
Co-authored-by: Nick Taylor <nicktaylor@TheWorldofNick-Lappy.local>
The approval-drain loop in CodexAppServerSession.run_turn drains up to 8
pending notifications to keep per-turn state current before answering a
server-initiated approval request — but never forwarded them to the
on_event display hook. Tool bubbles for items drained alongside an
approval (e.g. the item/started for the very command awaiting approval)
silently disappeared.
Mirror the main notification path's on_event invocation in the drain
loop. Regression test demonstrates RED→GREEN.
Grafted from PR #26541 by @simpolism — the earliest submission of the
codex app-server display-bridge family (May 15). Confirmed independently
by #64698 and #65412.
DeepSeek's own API (api.deepseek.com) reports context-cache hits as
top-level usage.prompt_cache_hit_tokens / prompt_cache_miss_tokens
(prompt_tokens = hit + miss), not the OpenAI nested
prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens shape. Neither normalize_usage()
nor the chat_completions transport's extract_cache_stats() read those
fields, so direct DeepSeek sessions always showed 0 cache-hit tokens:
invisible in accounting, mis-billed at the full input rate, and 0%
cache display.
Both layers now fall back to prompt_cache_hit_tokens when the nested
shape is absent; the nested value wins when both are present (proxies).
Fixes#61871.
Map Codex Responses status=incomplete with incomplete_details.reason=content_filter to finish_reason=content_filter so the existing refusal/fallback path runs instead of burning incomplete continuation attempts.
Fixes#64025
The hermes-tools MCP server was fetching each tool's JSON schema
into params_schema but never passing it to FastMCP's add_tool(),
so all published tools had an empty **kwargs signature. MCP clients
couldn't see parameters and arguments were dropped at dispatch.
This fix:
- Adds _signature_from_schema() to convert JSON schemas to Python
function signatures with type annotations
- Attaches the generated signature/annotations to each handler closure
so FastMCP introspects the real parameter structure
- Filters out None values before dispatch to avoid forwarding unset
optional parameters
Impact: web_search, browser automation, vision, and other Hermes tools
are now properly callable from the codex_app_server runtime.
Copilot (api.githubcopilot.com/responses) binds replayed assistant
codex_message_items ids to a specific backend "connection". Credential-
pool rotation, a gateway restart, or routine load-balancer churn between
turns all invalidate that binding, and Copilot rejects the stale id with
HTTP 401 "input item ID does not belong to this connection" — even for
short ids well under the #27038 64-char length cap, since this is a
connection-scope problem, not a length problem. Once a session captures
one of these ids it is persisted and replayed forever, permanently
bricking the session.
Thread an is_github_responses flag from build_kwargs/convert_messages
into _chat_messages_to_responses_input and drop the id unconditionally
on that path, mirroring how reasoning items already strip id on replay.
phase/status/content are still replayed so cache-relevant signal isn't
lost — only the connection-scoped id is unsafe to reuse.
Written to apply independently of the #27038 length-cap fix so the two
PRs don't block each other; they touch adjacent conditions in the same
block and merge cleanly in either order.
Fixes#32716
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review finding: PR #40632's branch had silently dropped gemma-3-27b
from the keep-extra_content test loop (part of its Gemma narrowing,
which this salvage reverts). Restore main's original coverage so a
future narrowing back to Gemini-only fails loudly.
Trim the salvaged commit to its two still-valid conversions:
- ChatCompletionsTransport.convert_messages (copy-on-write sanitize)
- QwenProfile.prepare_messages (copy-on-write normalize + cache_control)
Dropped from the original PR:
- agent/prompt_caching.py selective-copy: superseded by #57229 which
already rewrites apply_anthropic_cache_control on current main.
- Gemma extra_content narrowing (_model_consumes_thought_signature
'gemini or gemma' -> 'gemini' only) + its two tests: unrelated
behavior change reverting deliberate e8c3ac2f5; belongs in its own
PR with its own justification if pursued.
Conflict resolution: preserved main's newer timestamp-stripping
(#47868) inside the copy-on-write path.
Subprocesses spawned by the terminal tool, execute_code, Docker backend, and
the codex app-server could inherit Hermes-internal secrets that the name-based
`_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST` can't enumerate, because they're injected into
`os.environ` at runtime under dynamic names:
- `AUXILIARY_<TASK>_API_KEY` / `AUXILIARY_<TASK>_BASE_URL` — per-task side-LLM
credentials bridged from `config.yaml[auxiliary]` by gateway/run.py and cli.py
(vision, web_extract, approval, compression, plugin-registered tasks). Often
separate, higher-spend keys plus base URLs pointing at private endpoints.
- `GATEWAY_RELAY_*_SECRET` / `_KEY` / `_TOKEN` — relay-auth material provisioned
by gateway/relay.
Additionally, agent/transports/codex_app_server.py built its spawn env from a
raw `os.environ.copy()`, bypassing the centralized `hermes_subprocess_env()`
helper entirely — handing every codex subprocess the full Tier-1 secret set
(GH_TOKEN, gateway bot tokens, Modal/Daytona infra tokens, dashboard session
token) unfiltered. This is the #29157 sibling spawn-site gap; copilot_acp_client
already routes through the helper.
Fix — single chokepoint:
- Add `_is_hermes_internal_secret(key)` in tools/environments/local.py as the
single source of truth for the dynamic secret patterns. Matches
AUXILIARY_*_API_KEY / _BASE_URL and GATEWAY_RELAY_*_SECRET/_KEY/_TOKEN; leaves
non-secret AUXILIARY_*_PROVIDER/_MODEL and GATEWAY_RELAY routing hints visible.
- Wire the predicate into every spawn path unconditionally (ignores skill
env_passthrough opt-in AND inherit_credentials — a model-driving CLI never
needs these): `_sanitize_subprocess_env` (both loops), `_make_run_env`
(foreground), `hermes_subprocess_env` (Tier-1), and the Docker forward filter.
- Add the static GATEWAY_RELAY_* names to `_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST` so the
exact-match path catches them independently of the predicate.
- Add the GATEWAY_RELAY_ID/_SECRET/_DELIVERY_KEY triplet to `_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS`
(Tier-1) so it is stripped unconditionally on EVERY spawn surface — including
the codex/copilot `inherit_credentials=True` path that skips the Tier-2
blocklist. `_SECRET`/`_DELIVERY_KEY` are already predicate-matched; `_ID` has
no secret suffix, so enumerating it here is what closes its leak on the
inherit path (self-review W1).
- Defense in depth: env_passthrough.py `_is_hermes_provider_credential()` now
consults the same predicate, so a skill can't register these names as
passthrough and tunnel them into an execute_code / terminal child.
- Route codex_app_server through `hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=True)`
— strips Tier-1 + dynamic-internal secrets while provider creds (which codex
needs to authenticate) still flow.
Consolidates PRs #53715 (necoweb3 — the _is_hermes_internal_secret backbone +
Docker filter), #53503 (srojk34 — env_passthrough guard), and #55709 (srojk34 —
codex routing). Retires #52348 (claudlos): its copilot half is already on main,
and its codex half used the full-strip `_sanitize_subprocess_env` which would
break codex provider auth — the correct tier is `inherit_credentials=True`.
Tests: TestHermesInternalDynamicSecrets (terminal + predicate + passthrough
override), TestInternalDynamicSecrets (hermes_subprocess_env both tiers),
TestSpawnEnvSecretStripping (codex spawn env), plus env_passthrough
defense-in-depth cases.
Co-authored-by: necoweb3 <sswdarius@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: srojk34 <286497132+srojk34@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: claudlos <claudlos@agentmail.to>
Recurring cron jobs were prompt-cache-cold on every fire. session_id is
built as cron_<job_id>_<timestamp>, and the Codex/Responses transport used
session_id directly as prompt_cache_key — so the timestamp changed the cache
key on every run and the static prefix (agent identity + tool schemas) was
re-paid each tick.
Derive prompt_cache_key from a SHA-256 of the static prefix (instructions +
sorted tool schemas) instead. Repeated fires of the same job share one
content-addressed key (pck_<hash>) and reuse the warm prefix within the
provider's cache TTL. The key changes exactly when the prefix changes —
edit the job's prompt or toolset and it re-keys; leave it alone and it stays
stable.
session_id is left untouched for transcript isolation, log correlation, and
the Codex/xAI session-scope routing headers (session_id, x-client-request-id,
x-grok-conv-id) — those are the per-fire identity, not the cache key. Only the
prompt_cache_key body field (standard OpenAI/Codex path and the xAI extra_body
field) is content-addressed.
Closes#51395.
Co-authored-by: spiky02plateau <spiky02plateau@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: JoaoMarcos44 <JoaoMarcos44@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(providers): remove google-gemini-cli + google-antigravity OAuth providers
Google now actively bans accounts for third-party tools that piggyback on
Gemini CLI / Antigravity / Code Assist OAuth, and because abuse prevention
sits at a backend layer the ban can extend to the entire Google account
(Gmail/Drive), with a second violation being permanent.
Ref: https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/discussions/20632
Removes both OAuth inference providers entirely (modules, provider profiles,
auth/runtime/config/models wiring, the /gquota Code Assist quota command,
the antigravity-cli optional skill, desktop + docs surface in en + zh-Hans).
The API-key 'gemini' provider (GOOGLE_API_KEY/GEMINI_API_KEY against
generativelanguage.googleapis.com) is unaffected and stays fully supported.
* fix(skills): keep the antigravity-cli skill — only the OAuth provider is removed
The antigravity-cli optional skill orchestrates the external `agy` binary as
a coding-agent tool via the terminal tool — it does NOT wrap Hermes inference
through the banned google-antigravity OAuth provider, so it carries none of
the account-ban risk that motivated removing that provider. Restore the skill,
its docs page, the sidebar entry, and the optional-skills catalog row. The
google-antigravity / google-gemini-cli inference providers stay fully removed.
Add a regression test for #47868 asserting convert_messages strips the
internal per-message timestamp field, plus the identity-return path for
timestamp-free message lists. Map x7peeps for the release attribution gate.
Salvage corrections on top of @XVVH's #44341:
- Make native web_search injection a 1:1 swap for an already-present client
web_search function, NOT an additive grant. The original unconditionally
appended {"type":"web_search"} on every is_xai_responses turn with any
tools, force-enabling Grok server-side search even when the user never
enabled the web toolset (bypassing Hermes web-provider config + tool-trace
plumbing). Now gated on a client web_search actually being present.
- Reconcile grok-composer context to 200000 (merged in #47908) rather than
262144; 200k is xAI's published usable context window for Composer 2.5,
262144 is the /v1/responses input+output budget.
- Update tests to match scoped behavior + add a no-web-toolset guard test.
- AUTHOR_MAP entry for #44341 salvage.
Incomplete-guard (server-side *_call items at in_progress no longer flip
has_incomplete_items) and preflight built-in-tool allowlist kept as-is.
- model_metadata: grok-composer-2.5-fast → 262144 (OAuth slug not in /v1/models)
- codex transport: inject native {"type":"web_search"} for is_xai_responses;
drop client web_search to avoid duplicate-name 400s
- codex adapter: do not treat in-progress server-side *_call items as incomplete
- tests: adapter, transport build_kwargs, model_metadata, oauth recovery
A chat-completions response that carries real text or tool calls *alongside*
a `message.refusal` note is a normal, usable turn — the model did work. The
prior logic flipped finish_reason to `content_filter` whenever a refusal
string was present, so the conversation loop reframed a content-bearing turn
as a *failed* safety refusal (failed=True) and buried the model's actual
output inside the "model declined" template, or dropped tool calls entirely.
Only promote to a terminal `content_filter` when the refusal is the sole
payload (no visible text AND no tool calls). The refusal explanation is still
recorded in provider_data in every case for observability. Refusal-only
responses (the bug this feature targets) are unaffected and still surface
terminally; the empty+refusal, bare content_filter passthrough, and no-refusal
common cases are byte-identical to before.
Updates the partial-content test to the corrected contract and adds a
tool_calls-alongside-refusal regression guard.
OpenRouter (and every other OpenAI-compatible provider) uses the default
chat_completions transport, so it is already covered by the refusal fix:
an upstream Claude / moderation refusal arrives as
finish_reason="content_filter" (often empty content, no message.refusal).
Add a regression test asserting the transport passes that finish reason
straight through to the loop's content_filter handler.
(cherry picked from commit 60168a513b)
A Claude refusal (HTTP 200, stop_reason="refusal", empty content) was
laundered into a generic retry loop and surfaced as a misleading
"rate limited / invalid response" or "no content after retries" error,
burning paid attempts reproducing a deterministic refusal.
This hit two distinct paths:
- Direct Anthropic (anthropic_messages): validate_response rejected the
empty-content refusal *before* normalize_response mapped refusal ->
content_filter, so it fell into the invalid-response retry loop.
- Nous Portal / OpenAI-compatible (chat_completions): the portal surfaces
a Claude refusal via message.refusal with empty content, which sailed
past validation and died in the empty-response retry loop.
Fix (one unified content_filter dispatch for all backends):
- AnthropicTransport.validate_response: accept empty content when
stop_reason == "refusal" so it flows to normalize_response.
- ChatCompletionsTransport.normalize_response: promote message.refusal to
content + a content_filter finish reason.
- conversation_loop: handle finish_reason == "content_filter" - fire the
api_request_error hook (content_policy_blocked), try a configured
fallback once, else return a clear terminal refusal message. Never retry
a deterministic refusal.
Supersedes #43084, which fixed only the direct-Anthropic path and could
not reach the chat_completions/portal path.
Tests: transport-level (validate_response refusal, message.refusal
promotion) + end-to-end loop (refusal surfaced, exactly one API call).
(cherry picked from commit 01f546f92c)
* fix: respect disabled auto-compaction on context overflow
Port from anomalyco/opencode#30749.
When compression.enabled is false, NO automatic compaction trigger may
fire. The proactive token-threshold paths (preflight + post-response
should_compress gate) already honoured the setting, but the three
provider-overflow recovery paths in the agent loop — long-context-tier
429, 413 payload-too-large, and context-overflow — called
_compress_context() unconditionally, silently compressing and rotating
the session against the user's explicit choice.
Add a single guard at the top of the overflow-recovery dispatch: when
compression is disabled and the error is one of those three overflow
classes, surface a terminal error (compaction_disabled: True) telling the
user to /compress manually, /new, switch to a larger-context model, or
reduce attachments. Manual /compress (force=True) is unaffected — it never
enters this loop.
Tests: new TestOverflowWithCompactionDisabled (413 + 400 overflow don't
compress when disabled; control case still compresses when enabled).
Existing overflow-recovery tests updated to enable compaction explicitly
(they verify the recovery fires); fixture defaults flipped to True to
match production (compression.enabled defaults to True).
* fix(gemini): default native maxOutputTokens + strip OpenAI extra_body on Gemini endpoints
Two distinct failures hit users on the gemini provider with only Google
AI Studio keys set.
1. Truncation loop: build_gemini_request() only set maxOutputTokens when
max_tokens was non-None. Hermes passes None to mean "unlimited", but
Gemini's native generateContent does NOT treat an absent maxOutputTokens
as full budget — it applies a low internal default and stops early with
finishReason=MAX_TOKENS, truncating tool calls. The agent then retries
3x and refuses the incomplete call. Now default to the published 65,535
ceiling (shared by all current Gemini text models) when max_tokens=None.
2. HTTP 400 on Gemini endpoint: the chat_completions transport assembles
profile extra_body (Nous portal 'tags', reasoning, provider prefs) and
sends it via the OpenAI client to whatever base_url is resolved. When a
profile that emits extra_body (e.g. Nous) is active but the endpoint is a
native Gemini base_url — typical when only Google creds exist and a
fallback/aux call lands on Gemini — Google rejects the unknown 'tags'
field with a non-retryable 400. Strip all non-thinking_config extra_body
keys when the resolved endpoint is native Gemini.
Verified E2E against real transport code: tags stripped on native Gemini,
preserved on Nous and the /openai compat endpoint; maxOutputTokens=65535
on None, explicit values respected.
Fireworks/Mistral reject HTTP 400 'Extra inputs are not permitted, field:
messages[N].tool_calls[M].extra_content' on any session whose history
contains prior Gemini tool calls. Gemini 3 thinking models attach
extra_content (thought_signature) to tool_calls; it survived to the wire
because the sanitize paths only stripped call_id/response_item_id.
Strip extra_content from the outgoing wire copy in both sanitize paths
(ChatCompletionsTransport.convert_messages + _sanitize_tool_calls_for_strict_api),
but gate it on the target model: keep extra_content for Gemini-family
targets (the thought_signature MUST be replayed or Gemini 400s), strip it
for everyone else — including non-Gemini models that inherit a stale Gemini
signature earlier in a mixed-provider session. Native Gemini is unaffected
(GeminiNativeClient bypasses these paths).
Original stored history is never mutated (only the per-call copy).
Fixes#17986.
Remove unused imports (F401) and duplicate/shadowed import
redefinitions (F811) across the codebase using ruff's safe
autofixes. No behavioral changes -- imports only.
- ~1400 safe autofixes applied across 644 files (net -1072 lines)
- __init__.py re-exports preserved (excluded from F401 removal so
public re-export surfaces stay intact)
- Re-exports that are imported or monkeypatched by tests but look
unused in their defining module are kept with explicit # noqa:
F401 (gateway/run.py load_dotenv; run_agent re-exports from
agent.message_sanitization, agent.context_compressor,
agent.retry_utils, agent.prompt_builder, agent.process_bootstrap,
agent.codex_responses_adapter)
- Unsafe F841 (unused-variable) fixes deliberately skipped -- those
can change behavior when the RHS has side effects
- ruff lints remain disabled in pyproject.toml (only PLW1514 is
selected); this is a one-time cleanup, not a config change
Verification:
- python -m compileall: clean
- pytest --collect-only: all 27161 tests collect (zero import errors)
- core entry points import clean (run_agent, model_tools, cli,
toolsets, hermes_state, batch_runner, gateway)
- static scan: every name any test imports directly from an edited
module still resolves
* fix(redact): pass web URLs through unchanged
Magic-link checkout URLs, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow,
and pre-signed share URLs were getting `?token=***` / `?code=***` /
`?signature=***` blanket-redacted by parameter NAME, which breaks any
skill that has to round-trip a URL through history (the model's tool
call arguments get sanitized before persistence — the live call fires
with the real URL, but the next turn sees `***`).
Joe Rinaldi Johnson hit this with a checkout-acceleration skill that
uses magic links in URLs.
Drops three call sites from `redact_sensitive_text`:
- `_redact_url_query_params` (was redacting `access_token`, `token`,
`api_key`, `code`, `signature`, `key`, `auth`, etc.)
- `_redact_url_userinfo` (was redacting `https://user:pass@host`)
- `_redact_http_request_target_query_params` (was redacting access-log
request targets like `"POST /hook?password=... HTTP/1.1"`)
The helpers themselves are kept in the module — still importable by
anything that wants to opt in explicitly.
Still redacted (unchanged):
- Vendor-prefix credential shapes (sk-, ghp_, AKIA, gAAAA, etc.)
anywhere they appear, including inside URLs — see the
`test_known_prefix_inside_url_still_redacted` case.
- JWTs (`eyJ...`)
- DB connection-string passwords (`postgres://admin:pw@host`) —
these are connection strings, not web URLs the agent navigates to.
- Authorization headers, ENV assignments, JSON `apiKey`/`token` fields,
Telegram bot tokens, private key blocks, Discord mentions, E.164
phone numbers, and form-urlencoded bodies (request bodies, not URLs).
Tests: replaces `TestUrlQueryParamRedaction` + `TestUrlUserinfoRedaction`
with `TestWebUrlsNotRedacted`, asserting representative URLs (OAuth
callback, magic link, S3 pre-signed, websocket, userinfo, access log)
pass through unchanged. Adds positive cases proving the prefix and DB
connstr nets still fire. 74 redact tests + 10 browser-exfil + 16 PII
redaction tests all pass.
* test(codex_app_server): drop URL-query assertion from stderr-tail redaction test
The test bundled (a) sk-live-* credential-prefix redaction with (b)
URL query-param redaction. (a) is still in effect via _PREFIX_RE;
(b) was the contract we just removed in the parent commit so the
'querysecret12345' assertion stopped holding. Keep the credential-shape
assertion, drop the URL-query one.
Send-message tool's local _URL_SECRET_QUERY_RE in tools/send_message_tool.py
is independent of agent/redact.py and unchanged — its tests
(test_top_level_send_failure_redacts_query_token,
test_http_error_redacts_access_token_in_exception_text) still pass.
Three additions on top of @Nami4D's salvage:
1. Gate the preflight slash-enum strip on the model name pattern
(grok-* / x-ai/grok-*). The original PR stripped slash-containing
enum values from every codex_responses request, but native Codex
(OpenAI) and GitHub Models DO accept slash enums — stripping them
there would silently degrade tool-schema constraints. xAI is the
only Responses-API surface that rejects the shape.
2. Resolve the merge conflict in agent/transports/codex.py by
preserving both the timeout-forwarding block that landed on main
between the PR's branch point and now AND the new service_tier
strip. Behavioural intent of both is preserved.
3. Six new tests in tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py
covering:
- TestCodexTransportXaiServiceTierStrip (3 tests): xAI strips
service_tier from request_overrides; non-xAI codex_responses
and GitHub Models both KEEP service_tier (regression guards
so the strip stays xAI-only).
- TestPreflightSlashEnumStrip (3 tests): Grok and aggregator-
prefixed Grok model names both trigger the safety-net strip;
non-Grok models preserve slash enums as a regression guard
against the strip becoming too broad.
51/51 in tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py.
Co-authored-by: Nami4D <hello@nami4d.tech>
Codex / Responses-API requests had three latent timeout bugs that combined
into the long silent hangs reported on #21444:
1. The non-stream stale-call detector estimated context tokens from
``api_kwargs["messages"]`` only. Codex / Responses-API payloads carry
their conversational load in ``input`` (with ``instructions`` and
``tools``), so every Codex turn logged ``context=~0 tokens`` and the
detector never applied its >50k / >100k tier bumps.
2. ``providers.<id>.request_timeout_seconds`` was silently dropped on the
main Codex path. The chat_completions path and the auxiliary Codex
adapter both forwarded it; the main path skipped it through three
places (``build_api_kwargs``, ``ResponsesApiTransport.build_kwargs``,
``_preflight_codex_api_kwargs``).
3. The streaming stale detector had the same payload-shape bug for
``codex_responses`` requests, which route through the non-streaming
detector (it's the path that emits the user-facing
"No response from provider for 300s (non-streaming, ...)" warning that
reporters keep pasting).
This commit:
- Adds ``estimate_request_context_tokens`` in ``chat_completion_helpers``,
used by both the non-stream and stream detectors. Handles ``messages``
(Chat Completions), ``input + instructions + tools`` (Responses API),
bare lists, and an unknown-dict fallback.
- Forwards ``timeout`` through ``ResponsesApiTransport.build_kwargs``
and ``_preflight_codex_api_kwargs`` (with guards against
zero/negative/inf/bool values), and wires
``_resolved_api_call_timeout()`` into the Codex branch of
``build_api_kwargs``.
- Lowers the implicit non-stream stale defaults so fallback providers
kick in faster when upstream stalls:
* base 300s -> 90s
* >50k 450s -> 150s
* >100k 600s -> 240s
These only apply when the user has *not* set
``providers.<id>.stale_timeout_seconds`` or
``HERMES_API_CALL_STALE_TIMEOUT``. Explicit config still wins.
- Adds regression tests for the estimator shapes, the new defaults, the
context-tier scaling, transport timeout pass-through, and preflight
timeout pass-through / rejection of invalid values.
Closes#21444
Supersedes #21652#24126#31855
Co-authored-by: Hoang V. Pham <26063003+hehehe0803@users.noreply.github.com>
The empty-response recovery path in run_agent.py appends synthetic
messages tagged with _empty_recovery_synthetic (and the agent loop uses
_thinking_prefill / _empty_terminal_sentinel similarly). These are
internal bookkeeping markers — they must never reach the wire.
chat_completions' convert_messages only stripped Codex Responses leak
fields (codex_reasoning_items, call_id, etc.), not these _-prefixed
markers. Permissive providers (real OpenAI, Anthropic) silently ignore
unknown message keys so the bug stayed hidden, but strict
OpenAI-compatible gateways reject them outright. Observed against
codex.nekos.me:
502: [ObjectParam] [input[617]._empty_recovery_synthetic]
[unknown_parameter] Unknown parameter:
'_empty_recovery_synthetic'
Because the synthetic messages persist in the session, every
subsequent request in that session carries the poisoned key and
fails identically — a deterministic 502 the retry loop mistakes for
a transient server error.
Fix: convert_messages now drops any top-level message key starting
with '_'. OpenAI's message schema has no '_'-prefixed fields, so this
is safe and future-proofs against new internal markers.
Origin: local-author
Upstream-PR: none
Patch-State: local-only
xAI partner integration requires Hermes to thread `encrypted_content`
reasoning items back to the Responses API on every turn so Grok can
maintain cross-turn reasoning coherence. PR #26644 (May 15) gated this
off for `is_xai_responses` on the theory that the OAuth/SuperGrok
surface rejected replayed encrypted blobs and produced the multi-turn
"Expected to have received \`response.created\` before \`error\`"
failure. That diagnosis was wrong — the prelude-SSE fallback added in
the same PR is what actually fixed that failure mode. Suppressing the
replay was an unnecessary side-effect that broke the whole point of
xAI's partnership integration.
Changes:
- agent/codex_responses_adapter.py — drop the `is_xai_responses` gate
in `_chat_messages_to_responses_input`. Keep the kwarg in the
signature for transport compatibility; update the docstring to
document the May 2026 reversal.
- agent/transports/codex.py — restore
`kwargs["include"] = ["reasoning.encrypted_content"]` on the xAI
Responses path so xAI echoes encrypted reasoning back to us.
- tests/run_agent/test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery.py — flip the three
xAI assertions (now: xAI MUST receive replayed reasoning AND we MUST
include encrypted_content in the request).
- tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py — flip the
`include` assertions on `test_xai_reasoning_effort_passed` and
`test_xai_grok_4_omits_reasoning_effort`; update the allowlist
block comment.
The prelude-SSE fallback and the entitlement-403 surfacing fixes from
#26644 are untouched — they were independent fixes that happened to
ride along with the reasoning-replay gate.
Validation:
- Targeted: tests/run_agent/test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery.py +
tests/agent/transports/test_codex_transport.py → 65/65 pass
- Broader: tests/agent/transports/ + tests/run_agent/ →
1674 passed, 3 skipped, 0 failures
- E2E (real imports, isolated HERMES_HOME, ResponsesApiTransport
build_kwargs): turn-1 request carries
`include: ["reasoning.encrypted_content"]`; turn-2 input replays
the encrypted_content blob from turn-1's
`codex_reasoning_items`; native Codex unchanged.
The 'tool_name' key on role=tool messages is an internal Hermes field
(stored in the messages.tool_name SQLite column for FTS indexing) that
is not part of the OpenAI Chat Completions schema. Strict OpenAI-compatible
providers — notably Moonshot AI (Kimi) — reject it with HTTP 400:
Error from provider: Extra inputs are not permitted,
field: 'messages[N].tool_name', value: 'execute_code'
Add 'tool_name' to the sanitize block in ChatCompletionsTransport.convert_messages
alongside the existing Codex Responses API fields (codex_reasoning_items,
codex_message_items) so it is popped before the request is sent.
Reproducer:
hermes chat --model kimi-k2.6
> list the top 5 Hacker News stories
-> assistant emits tool_call(execute_code)
-> tool result message gets tool_name='execute_code'
-> next turn's payload includes messages[N].tool_name -> 400
Permissive backends (MiniMax, OpenRouter on most routes) ignore the extra
field and were masking the bug.
Three fixes for the May 2026 xAI OAuth (SuperGrok / X Premium) rollout
failures:
- _run_codex_stream: when openai SDK raises RuntimeError("Expected to
have received `response.created` before `<type>`"), retry once then
fall back to responses.create(stream=True) — same path used for
missing-response.completed postlude. Fallback surfaces the real
provider error with body+status_code intact. Also fixes#8133
(response.in_progress prelude on custom relays) and #14634
(codex.rate_limits prelude on codex-lb).
- _summarize_api_error: when error body matches xAI's entitlement
shape, append a one-line hint pointing to https://grok.com and
/model. Once-only, applies to both auxiliary warnings and
main-loop error surfacing.
- _chat_messages_to_responses_input: new is_xai_responses kwarg
drops replayed codex_reasoning_items (encrypted_content) before
they reach xAI. Also drops reasoning.encrypted_content from the
xAI include array. Native Codex behavior unchanged. Grok still
reasons natively each turn; coherence rides on visible message
text alone.
Closes#8133, #14634.
The xAI prompt_cache_key block carried two long comment paragraphs
that either restated setdefault semantics, narrated the SDK
type-validation mechanism, or recapped the historical motivation for
the extra_body indirection — all already covered by the test
docstring at test_xai_responses_sends_cache_key_via_extra_body
(which links to the xAI docs). Also restored the truncated link in
the body-injection comment.
No behavior change.
Adds a new authentication provider that lets SuperGrok subscribers sign
in to Hermes with their xAI account via the standard OAuth 2.0 PKCE
loopback flow, instead of pasting a raw API key from console.x.ai.
Highlights
----------
* OAuth 2.0 PKCE loopback login against accounts.x.ai with discovery,
state/nonce, and a strict CORS-origin allowlist on the callback.
* Authorize URL carries `plan=generic` (required for non-allowlisted
loopback clients) and `referrer=hermes-agent` for best-effort
attribution in xAI's OAuth server logs.
* Token storage in `auth.json` with file-locked atomic writes; JWT
`exp`-based expiry detection with skew; refresh-token rotation
synced both ways between the singleton store and the credential
pool so multi-process / multi-profile setups don't tear each other's
refresh tokens.
* Reactive 401 retry: on a 401 from the xAI Responses API, the agent
refreshes the token, swaps it back into `self.api_key`, and retries
the call once. Guarded against silent account swaps when the active
key was sourced from a different (manual) pool entry.
* Auxiliary tasks (curator, vision, embeddings, etc.) route through a
dedicated xAI Responses-mode auxiliary client instead of falling back
to OpenRouter billing.
* Direct HTTP tools (`tools/xai_http.py`, transcription, TTS, image-gen
plugin) resolve credentials through a unified runtime → singleton →
env-var fallback chain so xai-oauth users get them for free.
* `hermes auth add xai-oauth` and `hermes auth remove xai-oauth N` are
wired through the standard auth-commands surface; remove cleans up
the singleton loopback_pkce entry so it doesn't silently reinstate.
* `hermes model` provider picker shows
"xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok Subscription)" and the model-flow falls
back to pool credentials when the singleton is missing.
Hardening
---------
* Discovery and refresh responses validate the returned
`token_endpoint` host against the same `*.x.ai` allowlist as the
authorization endpoint, blocking MITM persistence of a hostile
endpoint.
* Discovery / refresh / token-exchange `response.json()` calls are
wrapped to raise typed `AuthError` on malformed bodies (captive
portals, proxy error pages) instead of leaking JSONDecodeError
tracebacks.
* `prompt_cache_key` is routed through `extra_body` on the codex
transport (sending it as a top-level kwarg trips xAI's SDK with a
TypeError).
* Credential-pool sync-back preserves `active_provider` so refreshing
an OAuth entry doesn't silently flip the active provider out from
under the running agent.
Testing
-------
* New `tests/hermes_cli/test_auth_xai_oauth_provider.py` (~63 tests)
covers JWT expiry, OAuth URL params (plan + referrer), CORS origins,
redirect URI validation, singleton↔pool sync, concurrency races,
refresh error paths, runtime resolution, and malformed-JSON guards.
* Extended `test_credential_pool.py`, `test_codex_transport.py`, and
`test_run_agent_codex_responses.py` cover the pool sync-back,
`extra_body` routing, and 401 reactive refresh paths.
* 165 tests passing on this branch via `scripts/run_tests.sh`.
