Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
DNS rebinding attack: a victim browser that has the dashboard (or the
WhatsApp bridge) open could be tricked into fetching from an
attacker-controlled hostname that TTL-flips to 127.0.0.1. Same-origin
and CORS checks don't help — the browser now treats the attacker origin
as same-origin with the local service. Validating the Host header at
the app layer rejects any request whose Host isn't one we bound for.
Changes:
hermes_cli/web_server.py:
- New host_header_middleware runs before auth_middleware. Reads
app.state.bound_host (set by start_server) and rejects requests
whose Host header doesn't match the bound interface with HTTP 400.
- Loopback binds accept localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1. Non-loopback
binds require exact match. 0.0.0.0 binds skip the check (explicit
--insecure opt-in; no app-layer defence possible).
- IPv6 bracket notation parsed correctly: [::1] and [::1]:9119 both
accepted.
scripts/whatsapp-bridge/bridge.js:
- Express middleware rejects non-loopback Host headers. Bridge
already binds 127.0.0.1-only, this adds the complementary app-layer
check for DNS rebinding defence.
Tests: 8 new in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_host_header.py
covering loopback/non-loopback/zero-zero binds, IPv6 brackets, case
insensitivity, and end-to-end middleware rejection via TestClient.
Reported in GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7 by @bupt-Yy-young. Hardening — not
CVE per SECURITY.md §3. The dashboard's main trust boundary is the
loopback bind + session token; DNS rebinding defeats the bind assumption
but not the token (since the rebinding browser still sees a first-party
fetch to 127.0.0.1 with the token-gated API). Host-header validation
adds the missing belt-and-braces layer.
