The original test file had mock secrets corrupted by secret-redaction
tooling before commit — the test values (sk-ant...l012) didn't actually
trigger the PREFIX_RE regex, so 4 of 10 tests were asserting against
values that never appeared in the input.
- Replace truncated mock values with proper fake keys built via string
concatenation (avoids tool redaction during file writes)
- Add _ensure_redaction_enabled autouse fixture to patch the module-level
_REDACT_ENABLED constant, matching the pattern from test_redact.py
Three exfiltration vectors closed:
1. Browser URL exfil — agent could embed secrets in URL params and
navigate to attacker-controlled server. Now scans URLs for known
API key patterns before navigating (browser_navigate, web_extract).
2. Browser snapshot leak — page displaying env vars or API keys would
send secrets to auxiliary LLM via _extract_relevant_content before
run_agent.py's redaction layer sees the result. Now redacts snapshot
text before the auxiliary call.
3. Camofox annotation leak — accessibility tree text sent to vision
LLM could contain secrets visible on screen. Now redacts annotation
context before the vision call.
10 new tests covering URL blocking, snapshot redaction, and annotation
redaction for both browser and camofox backends.
