Commit graph

9 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium
007ca57dc8
fix(ci): kill the remaining transient-failure classes in workflows + Dockerfile
From the workflow reliability audit:
- tests.yml: duration-cache restore had NO restore-keys while saves use
  run_id-suffixed keys — the cache never matched once, so LPT slicing
  always ran blind and unbalanced slices pushed heavy files toward the
  per-file timeout. One-line restore-keys fixes slice balancing.
- Label gates (lint ci-reviewed, supply-chain mcp-catalog-reviewed):
  'gh pr view || true' turned an API blip into 'label absent' → false
  BLOCKING failure. Now 3x retry, and API failure is reported as an API
  failure instead of a missing label.
- detect-changes action: compare API retried before failing open (was
  silently running all lanes on any blip).
- uv-lockfile-check: 'uv lock --check' resolves against PyPI — retried
  so registry blips don't read as 'lockfile stale'.
- docker.yml merge job: imagetools create retried (Docker Hub eventual
  consistency on just-pushed digests).
- Dockerfile: apt-get Acquire::Retries=3; s6-overlay ADDs converted to
  curl --retry 3 (ADD cannot retry; checksums still enforced); npm
  --fetch-retries=5; playwright chromium fetch retried 3x.
- Advisory artifact uploads (per-slice durations, ci-timings report)
  get continue-on-error so an artifact-service blip can't fail a green
  test slice.
2026-07-17 13:54:04 -07:00
Teknium
c20c6560fd
fix(ci): job timeouts everywhere + retries on all network installs
Reliability pass over every workflow:
- timeout-minutes on all 21 jobs that lacked one (a hung job previously
  burned the 6-hour default runner budget)
- ./.github/actions/retry wrapped around every network-fetching install
  that lacked it: pip installs (deploy-site, skills-index), npm ci
  (deploy-site website, upload_to_pypi web + ui-tui), uv sync (docker
  test deps). Deterministic build steps (npm run build) deliberately
  NOT retried — split into separate steps so a real build failure fails
  fast instead of retrying 3x.
2026-07-17 13:54:04 -07:00
emozilla
2abe11a7fe security(ci): pass untrusted refs through env, not run: interpolation
lint.yml inlined github.head_ref (the fork PR branch name, attacker-
controlled) into the diff-summary run: block. GitHub expands ${{ }} into
the script text before bash tokenizes it, so a branch like x$(id) runs on
the lint runner. The pull_request trigger keeps the token read-only, but
the sink still allows CI resource abuse and cache/artifact tampering, and
would become RCE-with-secrets under pull_request_target.

Route head_ref through an env var (env values are not subject to expression
injection) and reference "$HEAD_REF". Apply the same to the two docker.yml
sites that interpolate github.event.release.tag_name.

Fixes GHSA-jpw6-c7jr-c56v, GHSA-2843-hjmf-7x96.
Credit: @technotion, @youngstar-eth.
2026-07-03 12:44:30 -04:00
ethernet
cca8b4ef4e fix(ci): unify amd64/arm64 docker pipelines 2026-06-29 19:17:04 -07:00
ethernet
2fa66950e8 change(ci): upload-artifact from v4 -> v7 2026-06-26 19:15:18 -07:00
ethernet
4b0a2040e7 change(ci): use run_tests in docker 2026-06-26 19:15:18 -07:00
ethernet
18f7ad49ab change(ci): update all UV installs 2026-06-26 19:15:18 -07:00
ethernet
f0cb049217 change(ci): migrate docker smoketests to real tests 2026-06-26 19:15:18 -07:00
ethernet
fb1dd1bf91 change(ci): docker-publish.yml -> docker.yml 2026-06-26 19:15:18 -07:00
Renamed from .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml (Browse further)