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fix(feishu): validate verification token before reflecting url_verification challenge

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When FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN is configured, an unauthenticated remote
could previously prove endpoint control by sending a url_verification
payload with any attacker-controlled challenge string — the handler
reflected the challenge BEFORE running the token check.

Move the verification_token check ahead of the url_verification echo so
the challenge response is gated on a valid token. Add a regression test
covering the wrong-token case. Also fix the stale
test_connect_webhook_mode_starts_local_server fixture to set
FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN (post #30746 webhook mode requires a secret).

Salvaged from PR #29663 by @m0n3r0 — kept the url_verification reorder
and its regression test; dropped the host-conditional weakening of the
#30746 secret guard (we want webhook secrets required regardless of
bind host, not only on 0.0.0.0/::).

Docs updated to call out the gating.

Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
m0n3r0 2026-05-24 04:50:51 -07:00 • committed by Teknium
parent 5e6749fbf3
commit f378f00bfb
3 changed files with 37 additions and 6 deletions
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12
gateway/platforms/feishu.py
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@ -3289,11 +3289,6 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
self._record_webhook_anomaly(remote_ip, "400")
return web.json_response({"code": 400, "msg": "invalid json"}, status=400)
# URL verification challenge — respond before other checks so that Feishu's
# subscription setup works even before encrypt_key is wired.
if payload.get("type") == "url_verification":
return web.json_response({"challenge": payload.get("challenge", "")})
# Verification token check — second layer of defence beyond signature (matches openclaw).
if self._verification_token:
header = payload.get("header") or {}
@ -3303,6 +3298,13 @@ class FeishuAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
self._record_webhook_anomaly(remote_ip, "401-token")
return web.Response(status=401, text="Invalid verification token")
# URL verification challenge — Feishu includes the verification token in
# challenge requests. Validate the token (above) before reflecting the
# challenge so an unauthenticated remote request cannot prove endpoint
# control by getting attacker-supplied challenge data echoed back.
if payload.get("type") == "url_verification":
return web.json_response({"challenge": payload.get("challenge", "")})
# Timing-safe signature verification (only enforced when encrypt_key is set).
if self._encrypt_key and not self._is_webhook_signature_valid(request.headers, body_bytes):
logger.warning("[Feishu] Webhook rejected: invalid signature from %s", remote_ip)