fix(skills-guard): allow agent-created dangerous verdicts without confirmation

The security scanner is meant to protect against hostile external skills
pulled from GitHub via hermes skills install — trusted/community policies
block or ask on dangerous verdicts accordingly. But agent-created skills
(from skill_manage) run in the same process as the agent that wrote them.
The agent can already execute the same code paths via terminal() with no
gate, so the ask-on-dangerous policy adds friction without meaningful
security.

Concrete trigger: an agent writing a PR-review skill that describes
cache-busting or persistence semantics in prose gets blocked because
those words appear in the patterns list. The skill isn't actually doing
anything dangerous — it's just documenting what reviewers should watch
for in other PRs.

Change: agent-created dangerous verdict maps to 'allow' instead of 'ask'.
External hub installs (trusted/community) keep their stricter policies
intact. Tests updated: renamed test_dangerous_agent_created_asks →
test_dangerous_agent_created_allowed; renamed force-override test and
updated assertion since force is now a no-op for agent-created (the allow
branch returns first).
This commit is contained in:
Teknium 2026-04-23 05:18:07 -07:00 committed by Teknium
parent 5651a73331
commit e3c0084140
2 changed files with 18 additions and 7 deletions

View file

@ -43,7 +43,11 @@ INSTALL_POLICY = {
"builtin": ("allow", "allow", "allow"),
"trusted": ("allow", "allow", "block"),
"community": ("allow", "block", "block"),
"agent-created": ("allow", "allow", "ask"),
# Agent-created skills run in the same process as the agent that
# wrote them — the agent could already execute the same code via
# terminal(), so a dangerous-pattern gate on skill_manage adds
# friction without meaningful security. Allow all verdicts.
"agent-created": ("allow", "allow", "allow"),
}
VERDICT_INDEX = {"safe": 0, "caution": 1, "dangerous": 2}