diff --git a/hermes_cli/web_server.py b/hermes_cli/web_server.py
index e5333928d87..1d647b7ed50 100644
--- a/hermes_cli/web_server.py
+++ b/hermes_cli/web_server.py
@@ -6606,15 +6606,25 @@ def _ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
     parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(origin)
     if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
         # Packaged Electron loads the desktop renderer over a non-web origin
-        # such as file:// or null. This helper is called only after _ws_auth_ok
-        # has accepted the WS credential; in non-gated mode that credential is
-        # the legacy dashboard session token, including for explicit Tailscale /
-        # LAN binds opened with --insecure. Real DNS-rebinding attacks arrive
-        # from http(s) origins and still have to match the bound host below.
+        # such as file://, null, or a custom app:// scheme. This helper is
+        # called only AFTER _ws_auth_ok has already accepted the WS credential,
+        # which is the real auth boundary in every mode:
+        #   * loopback bind          → legacy dashboard session token
+        #   * non-loopback --insecure → legacy session token (Tailscale / LAN)
+        #   * OAuth-gated public bind → single-use, 30s-TTL, identity-bound
+        #     ?ticket= minted at the cookie-authed POST /api/auth/ws-ticket
+        # A non-web origin can only be produced by a native client (the desktop
+        # shell); a DNS-rebinding attack always arrives from an http(s) origin
+        # and is still match-checked against the bound host below. So once the
+        # credential check upstream has passed, the Origin guard adds nothing
+        # for a non-web origin — trust it in every mode.
         #
-        # OAuth-gated public dashboards authenticate with cookies/tickets and
-        # have no legitimate file:// client, so keep them strict.
-        return not getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False)
+        # (Earlier revisions restricted this to loopback, then to non-gated
+        # binds; both excluded the packaged desktop talking to a remote
+        # OAuth-gated gateway, whose file:// renderer origin then got rejected
+        # at the WS upgrade even with a valid ticket. The ticket is the gate,
+        # not the origin.)
+        return True
 
     if not parsed.netloc:
         return False
diff --git a/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py b/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
index 64dc925b2cb..df16dd000ca 100644
--- a/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
+++ b/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
@@ -379,11 +379,16 @@ class TestWsHostOriginGuardOrigins:
     """The WS Origin guard must let the packaged desktop shell connect.
 
     Electron loads the packaged renderer over ``file://``, so its WebSocket
-    handshake carries ``Origin: file://`` (or the opaque ``null``). The
-    DNS-rebinding guard only needs to block cross-site http(s) origins. On a
-    loopback or explicit non-loopback insecure bind these non-web origins are
-    trusted because the session token is the real gate. OAuth-gated public
-    binds keep rejecting them.
+    handshake carries ``Origin: file://`` (or the opaque ``null``, or a custom
+    ``app://`` scheme). The DNS-rebinding guard only needs to block cross-site
+    http(s) origins — a malicious web page can never forge a non-web origin.
+
+    This guard runs only AFTER ``_ws_auth_ok`` has validated the WS credential
+    (session token on loopback / ``--insecure`` binds, single-use ``?ticket=``
+    on OAuth-gated binds), so a non-web origin is trusted in every mode: the
+    credential is the real gate, and a ``file://`` / ``null`` origin cannot
+    originate a DNS-rebinding browser attack. ``http(s)`` origins are still
+    match-checked against the bound host.
     """
 
     def _ws(self, *, origin, host):
@@ -434,12 +439,36 @@ class TestWsHostOriginGuardOrigins:
         ws = self._ws(origin="http://localhost:9119", host="100.64.0.10:9119")
         assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is False
 
-    def test_gated_file_origin_rejected(self, gated_app):
-        # OAuth-gated public dashboards authenticate with cookies/tickets,
-        # not the legacy desktop session token.
+    def test_gated_file_origin_allowed(self, gated_app):
+        # The packaged desktop app drives a remote OAuth-GATED gateway over a
+        # file:// renderer origin. The WS route validates the single-use
+        # ?ticket= in _ws_auth_ok before this guard runs, and a file:// origin
+        # can't be a DNS-rebinding browser attack, so the Origin guard must let
+        # it through. This is the regression that broke desktop → hosted
+        # gateway connections — every WS upgrade got HTTP 403 even with a valid
+        # ticket.
         ws = self._ws(origin="file://", host="fly-app.fly.dev")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_gated_null_origin_allowed(self, gated_app):
+        ws = self._ws(origin="null", host="fly-app.fly.dev")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_gated_app_scheme_origin_allowed(self, gated_app):
+        ws = self._ws(origin="app://.", host="fly-app.fly.dev")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_gated_cross_site_http_origin_still_host_checked(self, gated_app):
+        # An http(s) origin is still subjected to the same-host check even on a
+        # gated bind: a cross-site http origin whose netloc doesn't match the
+        # bound host is rejected. Real browser DNS-rebinding defence unchanged.
+        ws = self._ws(origin="https://evil.test", host="fly-app.fly.dev")
         assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is False
 
+    def test_gated_same_host_https_origin_allowed(self, gated_app):
+        ws = self._ws(origin="https://fly-app.fly.dev", host="fly-app.fly.dev")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
 
 class TestSidecarUrl:
     def test_loopback_uses_session_token(self, loopback_app):