fix(desktop): open remote-gateway artifacts via authenticated download (#46895)

On a remote gateway connection, agent-written files live on the gateway
host, not the desktop's disk, so the Artifacts view's file:// hrefs failed
("Invalid external URL") and image thumbnails broke.

Make mediaExternalUrl() remote-aware in one place: in remote mode it
rewrites gateway-local paths to GET /api/files/download (a new endpoint
that streams the file as a Content-Disposition: attachment). The artifacts
view now resolves through it, and so do the existing chat-media and
generated-image callers, for free.

The download endpoint stays auth-gated; auth_middleware additionally
accepts the session token as a ?token= query param for this one path so a
shell/browser-opened download (which can't set the session header) still
authenticates — the same query-token tradeoff as the /api/pty WebSocket.
It is NOT added to PUBLIC_API_PATHS.

Salvages #46663 (which carried ~19k lines of CRLF noise and made the
endpoint public). Reimplemented on a clean LF base with the security hole
closed and tests added.

Co-authored-by: qingshan89 <qs2816661685@gmail.com>

apps/desktop/src/app/artifacts/index.tsx

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import { type Translations, useI18n } from '@/i18n'
 import { sessionTitle } from '@/lib/chat-runtime'
 import { ExternalLink, ExternalLinkIcon, hostPathLabel, urlSlugTitleLabel, useLinkTitle } from '@/lib/external-link'
 import { FileImage, FileText, FolderOpen, Link2 } from '@/lib/icons'
+import { mediaExternalUrl } from '@/lib/media'
 import { cn } from '@/lib/utils'
 import { notifyError } from '@/store/notifications'
 import type { SessionInfo, SessionMessage } from '@/types/hermes'
@@ -124,17 +125,12 @@ function artifactKind(value: string): ArtifactKind {
 }
 
 function artifactHref(value: string): string {
-  if (
-    value.startsWith('http://') ||
-    value.startsWith('https://') ||
-    value.startsWith('file://') ||
-    value.startsWith('data:')
-  ) {
+  if (value.startsWith('http://') || value.startsWith('https://') || value.startsWith('data:')) {
     return value
   }
 
-  if (value.startsWith('/')) {
-    return `file://${encodeURI(value)}`
+  if (value.startsWith('file://') || value.startsWith('/')) {
+    return mediaExternalUrl(value)
   }
 
   return value

apps/desktop/src/lib/media.remote.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
 import { $connection } from '@/store/session'
 
-import { filePathFromMediaPath, gatewayMediaDataUrl, isRemoteGateway } from './media'
+import { filePathFromMediaPath, gatewayMediaDataUrl, isRemoteGateway, mediaExternalUrl } from './media'
 
 describe('isRemoteGateway', () => {
   afterEach(() => {
@@ -35,6 +35,38 @@ describe('filePathFromMediaPath', () => {
   })
 })
 
+describe('mediaExternalUrl', () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    $connection.set(null)
+  })
+
+  it('passes through http(s) URLs untouched', () => {
+    $connection.set({ mode: 'remote', baseUrl: 'https://gw', token: 't' } as never)
+    expect(mediaExternalUrl('https://example.com/a.png')).toBe('https://example.com/a.png')
+  })
+
+  it('keeps file:// form in local mode', () => {
+    $connection.set({ mode: 'local' } as never)
+    expect(mediaExternalUrl('/tmp/a.png')).toBe('file:///tmp/a.png')
+    expect(mediaExternalUrl('file:///tmp/a.png')).toBe('file:///tmp/a.png')
+  })
+
+  it('rewrites gateway-local paths to an authenticated download URL', () => {
+    $connection.set({ mode: 'remote', baseUrl: 'https://gw', token: 's e/cret' } as never)
+    expect(mediaExternalUrl('file:///tmp/a b.png')).toBe(
+      'https://gw/api/files/download?path=%2Ftmp%2Fa%20b.png&token=s%20e%2Fcret'
+    )
+    expect(mediaExternalUrl('/tmp/a b.png')).toBe(
+      'https://gw/api/files/download?path=%2Ftmp%2Fa%20b.png&token=s%20e%2Fcret'
+    )
+  })
+
+  it('falls back to file:// when remote connection lacks a token', () => {
+    $connection.set({ mode: 'remote', baseUrl: 'https://gw' } as never)
+    expect(mediaExternalUrl('/tmp/a.png')).toBe('file:///tmp/a.png')
+  })
+})
+
 describe('gatewayMediaDataUrl', () => {
   const api = vi.fn(async () => ({ data_url: '' }))
 

apps/desktop/src/lib/media.ts

@@ -56,8 +56,25 @@ export function mediaMarkdownHref(path: string): string {
   return `#media:${encodeURIComponent(path)}`
 }
 
+// Resolve a media path to a URL the shell can open. Remote mode rewrites
+// gateway-local paths to an authenticated /api/files/download URL (the file
+// lives on the gateway, not this disk); local mode keeps the file:// form.
 export function mediaExternalUrl(path: string): string {
-  return /^(?:https?|file):/i.test(path) ? path : `file://${path}`
+  if (/^https?:/i.test(path)) {
+    return path
+  }
+
+  if (isRemoteGateway()) {
+    const conn = $connection.get()
+
+    if (conn?.baseUrl && conn.token) {
+      const file = encodeURIComponent(filePathFromMediaPath(path))
+
+      return `${conn.baseUrl}/api/files/download?path=${file}&token=${encodeURIComponent(conn.token)}`
+    }
+  }
+
+  return /^file:/i.test(path) ? path : `file://${path}`
 }
 
 // Custom Electron scheme (registered in electron/main.cjs) that streams a local

hermes_cli/web_server.py

@@ -247,6 +247,19 @@ def _has_valid_session_token(request: Request) -> bool:
     return hmac.compare_digest(auth.encode(), expected.encode())
 
 
+# Routes that may also authenticate via a ``?token=`` query param, for download
+# links opened by the OS shell or a new browser tab where the session header
+# can't be set. Kept narrow — same query-token tradeoff as the /api/pty WS.
+_QUERY_TOKEN_API_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"/api/files/download"})
+
+
+def _has_valid_query_token(request: Request, path: str) -> bool:
+    if path not in _QUERY_TOKEN_API_PATHS:
+        return False
+    token = request.query_params.get("token", "")
+    return bool(token) and hmac.compare_digest(token.encode(), _SESSION_TOKEN.encode())
+
+
 def _require_token(request: Request) -> None:
     """Authorize a sensitive endpoint, raising 401 if the caller isn't allowed.
 
@@ -403,7 +416,7 @@ async def auth_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
         return await call_next(request)
     path = request.url.path
     if path.startswith("/api/") and path not in _PUBLIC_API_PATHS:
-        if not _has_valid_session_token(request):
+        if not _has_valid_session_token(request) and not _has_valid_query_token(request, path):
             return JSONResponse(
                 status_code=401,
                 content={"detail": "Unauthorized"},
@@ -1409,6 +1422,40 @@ async def read_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
     }
 
 
+@app.get("/api/files/download")
+async def download_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
+    """Stream a managed file as an attachment download.
+
+    Remote clients (desktop app, browser dashboard) open agent-written files
+    that live on *this* gateway's disk, not theirs. Auth-gated like every other
+    managed-files route — ``auth_middleware`` additionally accepts the session
+    token as a ``?token=`` query param here so a shell/browser-opened download
+    (which can't set the session header) still authenticates. See ``/api/pty``
+    for the same query-token precedent.
+    """
+    policy, target, _display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
+    if not target.exists():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
+    if not target.is_file():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a file")
+
+    try:
+        size = target.stat().st_size
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat file: {exc}")
+    if size > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
+
+    mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(target.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
+
+    return FileResponse(
+        path=str(target),
+        media_type=mime_type,
+        filename=target.name,
+        content_disposition_type="attachment",
+    )
+
+
 @app.post("/api/files/upload")
 async def upload_managed_file(payload: ManagedFileUpload, request: Request):
     policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request, for_write=True)

tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_files.py

@@ -254,6 +254,66 @@ def test_local_mode_upload_read_mkdir_delete_roundtrip(local_files_client):
     assert not folder.exists()
 
 
+def _seed_file(client, root, name="out/hello.txt"):
+    file_path = root / name
+    created = client.post(
+        "/api/files/upload",
+        json={"path": str(file_path), "data_url": "data:text/plain;base64,aGVsbG8="},
+    )
+    assert created.status_code == 200
+    return file_path
+
+
+def test_download_returns_file_as_attachment(forced_files_client):
+    client, root = forced_files_client
+    file_path = _seed_file(client, root)
+
+    resp = client.get("/api/files/download", params={"path": str(file_path)})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.content == b"hello"
+    disposition = resp.headers["content-disposition"]
+    assert "attachment" in disposition
+    assert "hello.txt" in disposition
+
+
+def test_download_authenticates_via_query_token(forced_files_client):
+    client, root = forced_files_client
+    file_path = _seed_file(client, root)
+
+    # Drop the session header so only the ?token= query param authenticates —
+    # mirrors a browser/shell-opened download that can't set the session header.
+    del client.headers[web_server._SESSION_HEADER_NAME]
+
+    ok = client.get(
+        "/api/files/download",
+        params={"path": str(file_path), "token": web_server._SESSION_TOKEN},
+    )
+    assert ok.status_code == 200
+    assert ok.content == b"hello"
+
+    assert client.get(
+        "/api/files/download", params={"path": str(file_path), "token": "nope"}
+    ).status_code == 401
+    assert client.get(
+        "/api/files/download", params={"path": str(file_path)}
+    ).status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_query_token_does_not_authenticate_other_endpoints(forced_files_client):
+    client, root = forced_files_client
+    file_path = _seed_file(client, root)
+
+    del client.headers[web_server._SESSION_HEADER_NAME]
+
+    # The query-token escape hatch is scoped to /api/files/download only; it must
+    # not unlock the rest of the API surface.
+    leaked = client.get(
+        "/api/files/read",
+        params={"path": str(file_path), "token": web_server._SESSION_TOKEN},
+    )
+    assert leaked.status_code == 401
+
+
 def test_hosted_policy_locks_to_opt_data(monkeypatch):
     monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_DASHBOARD_FILES_ROOT", raising=False)
     monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", "/opt/data")