Merge pull request #46614 from kshitijk4poor/salvage/xai-oauth-profile-writethrough

fix(auth): resolve xAI OAuth credentials across profiles + write rotated tokens back to root
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kshitij 2026-06-15 17:16:19 +05:30 committed by GitHub
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4 changed files with 371 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -1079,8 +1079,13 @@ def _load_auth_store(auth_file: Optional[Path] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {"version": AUTH_STORE_VERSION, "providers": {}}
def _save_auth_store(auth_store: Dict[str, Any]) -> Path:
auth_file = _auth_file_path()
def _save_auth_store(auth_store: Dict[str, Any], target_path: Optional[Path] = None) -> Path:
# target_path=None preserves the existing contract (write the active
# store at _auth_file_path()). An explicit path lets callers persist a
# specific store — e.g. the global-root write-through for rotating xAI
# OAuth grants (#43589) — reusing this function's atomic O_EXCL + 0o600
# write so the root auth.json gets the same TOCTOU-safe treatment.
auth_file = target_path if target_path is not None else _auth_file_path()
auth_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Tighten parent dir to 0o700 so siblings can't traverse to creds.
# No-op on Windows (POSIX mode bits not enforced); ignore failures.
@ -3886,13 +3891,64 @@ def _pool_codex_access_token() -> str:
# xAI Grok OAuth — tokens stored in ~/.hermes/auth.json
# =============================================================================
def _xai_oauth_state_from_store(auth_store: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return usable xAI OAuth state from provider state or credential pool."""
state = _load_provider_state(auth_store, "xai-oauth")
tokens = state.get("tokens") if isinstance(state, dict) else None
if isinstance(tokens, dict):
access_token = str(tokens.get("access_token", "") or "").strip()
refresh_token = str(tokens.get("refresh_token", "") or "").strip()
if access_token and refresh_token:
return state
credential_pool = auth_store.get("credential_pool")
entries = (
credential_pool.get("xai-oauth")
if isinstance(credential_pool, dict)
else None
)
if isinstance(entries, list):
for entry in entries:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
access_token = str(entry.get("access_token", "") or "").strip()
refresh_token = str(entry.get("refresh_token", "") or "").strip()
if not access_token or not refresh_token:
continue
merged = dict(state or {})
merged["tokens"] = {
"access_token": access_token,
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
"token_type": str(entry.get("token_type") or "Bearer"),
}
if entry.get("last_refresh"):
merged["last_refresh"] = entry.get("last_refresh")
merged.setdefault("auth_mode", "oauth_pkce")
return merged
return state if isinstance(state, dict) else None
def _xai_oauth_state_has_usable_tokens(state: Optional[Dict[str, Any]]) -> bool:
tokens = state.get("tokens") if isinstance(state, dict) else None
return (
isinstance(tokens, dict)
and bool(str(tokens.get("access_token", "") or "").strip())
and bool(str(tokens.get("refresh_token", "") or "").strip())
)
def _read_xai_oauth_tokens(*, _lock: bool = True) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if _lock:
with _auth_store_lock():
auth_store = _load_auth_store()
else:
auth_store = _load_auth_store()
state = _load_provider_state(auth_store, "xai-oauth")
state = _xai_oauth_state_from_store(auth_store)
if not _xai_oauth_state_has_usable_tokens(state):
global_state = _xai_oauth_state_from_store(_load_global_auth_store())
if _xai_oauth_state_has_usable_tokens(global_state):
state = global_state
if not state:
raise AuthError(
"No xAI OAuth credentials stored. Select xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+) in `hermes model`.",
@ -3932,6 +3988,62 @@ def _read_xai_oauth_tokens(*, _lock: bool = True) -> Dict[str, Any]:
}
def _profile_has_own_xai_oauth_state(auth_store: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""True when this store has its OWN ``providers.xai-oauth`` block.
Distinguishes a profile that genuinely shadows the root xAI grant from
one that only *reads* root via ``_load_provider_state``'s fallback. Only
the latter needs the refresh write-through below.
"""
providers = auth_store.get("providers")
return isinstance(providers, dict) and isinstance(providers.get("xai-oauth"), dict)
def _write_through_xai_oauth_to_global_root(state: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Persist a rotated xAI OAuth ``state`` into the global-root auth.json.
Best-effort write-through for the multi-profile rotation hazard (#43589):
xAI rotates the refresh_token on every refresh, so when a profile session
refreshes a grant it resolved from the root fallback, the rotated chain
must land back in root. Otherwise root keeps a now-revoked refresh token
and every other profile reading the stale root grant dies with
``invalid_grant`` once its access token expires.
Only updates ``providers.xai-oauth`` in the root store; never touches the
profile store (the caller already saved that). Swallows all errors a
failed write-through degrades to the pre-existing behavior (root stale),
it must never break the profile's own successful save.
"""
global_path = _global_auth_file_path()
if global_path is None:
# Classic mode (profile == root); the profile save already hit root.
return
# Seat belt: under pytest, refuse to write the real user's
# ~/.hermes/auth.json even when HERMES_HOME points at a profile path
# (mirrors the read-side guard in _load_global_auth_store). Uses the
# unmodified HOME env, not Path.home() which fixtures may monkeypatch.
if os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"):
real_home_env = os.environ.get("HOME", "")
if real_home_env:
real_root = Path(real_home_env) / ".hermes" / "auth.json"
try:
if global_path.resolve(strict=False) == real_root.resolve(strict=False):
return
except Exception:
return
try:
if global_path.exists():
global_store = _load_auth_store(global_path)
else:
global_store = {}
if not isinstance(global_store, dict):
return
_store_provider_state(global_store, "xai-oauth", dict(state), set_active=False)
_save_auth_store(global_store, global_path)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - best effort
logger.debug("xAI OAuth: write-through to global root failed: %s", exc)
def _save_xai_oauth_tokens(
tokens: Dict[str, Any],
*,
@ -3943,6 +4055,11 @@ def _save_xai_oauth_tokens(
last_refresh = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
with _auth_store_lock():
auth_store = _load_auth_store()
# A profile that lacks its own xai-oauth block is reading the root
# grant through _load_provider_state's fallback. When such a profile
# refreshes the (rotating) grant, we must write the rotated chain back
# to root too, or root is left holding a revoked refresh token (#43589).
write_through_to_root = not _profile_has_own_xai_oauth_state(auth_store)
state = _load_provider_state(auth_store, "xai-oauth") or {}
state["tokens"] = tokens
state["last_refresh"] = last_refresh
@ -3953,6 +4070,8 @@ def _save_xai_oauth_tokens(
state["redirect_uri"] = redirect_uri
_save_provider_state(auth_store, "xai-oauth", state)
_save_auth_store(auth_store)
if write_through_to_root:
_write_through_xai_oauth_to_global_root(state)
def _xai_access_token_is_expiring(access_token: str, skew_seconds: int = 0) -> bool:

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@ -1541,6 +1541,7 @@ AUTHOR_MAP = {
"desg38@gmail.com": "dschnurbusch", # PR #42373 salvage (archive compressed conversation lineages)
"bsmith@bramarstrategicservices.com": "bcsmith528", # PR #20589 salvage (register_slack_action_handler plugin API)
"sunsky.lau@gmail.com": "liuhao1024", # PR #45494 salvage (claim session slot before auto-resume task; #45456)
"andrewdmwalker@gmail.com": "capt-marbles", # PR #38440 salvage (resolve xAI OAuth credentials across profiles; #43589)
}

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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
"""Regression tests for xAI OAuth auth resolution in profile/cron contexts."""
import pytest
from hermes_cli import auth
from hermes_cli.auth import AuthError
def test_read_xai_oauth_tokens_uses_credential_pool_when_provider_tokens_empty(monkeypatch):
"""Profile auth can have fresh pool tokens while singleton provider state is empty.
This mirrors profiled cron after re-auth/credential-pool sync: the xAI
OAuth credential is usable, but `providers.xai-oauth.tokens` may be empty
or stale. Treating that as missing auth makes cron keep failing after the
user has successfully re-authenticated.
"""
store = {
"providers": {"xai-oauth": {"tokens": {}, "last_auth_error": {}}},
"credential_pool": {
"xai-oauth": [
{
"access_token": "pool-access",
"refresh_token": "pool-refresh",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"last_refresh": "2026-06-03T19:00:00Z",
}
]
},
}
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_auth_store", lambda: store)
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_global_auth_store", lambda: {})
resolved = auth._read_xai_oauth_tokens(_lock=False)
assert resolved["tokens"]["access_token"] == "pool-access"
assert resolved["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "pool-refresh"
assert resolved["tokens"]["token_type"] == "Bearer"
assert resolved["last_refresh"] == "2026-06-03T19:00:00Z"
def test_read_xai_oauth_tokens_uses_global_store_when_profile_state_empty(monkeypatch):
"""A profile/cron process should see root xAI auth after user re-auths there."""
profile_store = {"providers": {"xai-oauth": {"tokens": {}}}}
global_store = {
"providers": {
"xai-oauth": {
"tokens": {
"access_token": "global-access",
"refresh_token": "global-refresh",
"token_type": "Bearer",
},
"last_refresh": "2026-06-03T19:05:00Z",
}
}
}
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_auth_store", lambda: profile_store)
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_global_auth_store", lambda: global_store)
resolved = auth._read_xai_oauth_tokens(_lock=False)
assert resolved["tokens"]["access_token"] == "global-access"
assert resolved["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "global-refresh"
assert resolved["last_refresh"] == "2026-06-03T19:05:00Z"
def test_read_xai_oauth_tokens_still_requires_usable_tokens(monkeypatch):
"""Fallback should not hide genuinely broken xAI auth state."""
store = {
"providers": {"xai-oauth": {"tokens": {}}},
"credential_pool": {"xai-oauth": [{"access_token": "", "refresh_token": ""}]},
}
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_auth_store", lambda: store)
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_global_auth_store", lambda: {})
with pytest.raises(AuthError) as exc:
auth._read_xai_oauth_tokens(_lock=False)
assert exc.value.code == "xai_auth_missing_access_token"
assert exc.value.relogin_required is True

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@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
"""Regression tests for xAI OAuth refresh write-through to the global root.
Companion to ``test_xai_oauth_profile_auth.py``. That file covers the READ
fallback (profile -> credential pool -> global root). These cover the WRITE
side: when a profile that has no own ``providers.xai-oauth`` block refreshes
the (rotating) grant it resolved from the root fallback, the rotated tokens
must be written back to the global root too. Otherwise root keeps a revoked
refresh token and every other profile reading root's stale grant dies with
``invalid_grant`` once its access token expires (issue #43589).
The tests drive the real ``_save_xai_oauth_tokens`` against real on-disk auth
stores (profile + root under ``tmp_path``) rather than mocking the save
boundary, so they exercise the actual atomic write path.
"""
import json
import pytest
from hermes_cli import auth
def _write_store(path, store):
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(json.dumps(store), encoding="utf-8")
def _read_store(path):
return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
@pytest.fixture
def profile_and_root(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Wire a profile auth store + a distinct global-root auth store on disk.
Returns (profile_path, root_path). The pytest seat belt in
``_write_through_xai_oauth_to_global_root`` only refuses the *real* user's
``$HOME/.hermes/auth.json``; a tmp_path root is allowed, so we point HOME
away from the tmp root to keep the guard from tripping on these fixtures.
"""
profile_path = tmp_path / "profiles" / "work" / "auth.json"
root_path = tmp_path / "root" / "auth.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_auth_file_path", lambda: profile_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_global_auth_file_path", lambda: root_path)
# Keep the pytest write seat belt from matching our tmp root.
monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path / "not-the-root"))
return profile_path, root_path
def test_refresh_writes_through_to_root_when_profile_has_no_own_state(profile_and_root):
"""Profile reading root's grant must push rotated tokens back to root."""
profile_path, root_path = profile_and_root
# Profile has NO own xai-oauth block (reads root via fallback).
_write_store(profile_path, {"version": 1, "providers": {}})
_write_store(
root_path,
{
"version": 1,
"providers": {
"xai-oauth": {
"tokens": {
"access_token": "old-access",
"refresh_token": "old-refresh",
}
}
},
},
)
rotated = {
"access_token": "new-access",
"refresh_token": "new-refresh",
"token_type": "Bearer",
}
auth._save_xai_oauth_tokens(rotated)
# Profile got the rotated chain (existing behavior).
profile = _read_store(profile_path)
assert profile["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "new-refresh"
# AND the global root no longer holds the revoked refresh token (#43589).
root = _read_store(root_path)
assert root["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["access_token"] == "new-access"
assert root["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "new-refresh"
def test_refresh_does_not_touch_root_when_profile_has_own_state(profile_and_root):
"""A profile that genuinely shadows root must NOT clobber the root grant."""
profile_path, root_path = profile_and_root
# Profile has its OWN xai-oauth block: it shadows root legitimately.
_write_store(
profile_path,
{
"version": 1,
"providers": {
"xai-oauth": {
"tokens": {
"access_token": "profile-old",
"refresh_token": "profile-old-refresh",
}
}
},
},
)
_write_store(
root_path,
{
"version": 1,
"providers": {
"xai-oauth": {
"tokens": {
"access_token": "root-untouched",
"refresh_token": "root-untouched-refresh",
}
}
},
},
)
auth._save_xai_oauth_tokens(
{"access_token": "profile-new", "refresh_token": "profile-new-refresh"}
)
profile = _read_store(profile_path)
assert profile["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "profile-new-refresh"
# Root is a separate grant chain — must be left exactly as-is.
root = _read_store(root_path)
assert root["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["access_token"] == "root-untouched"
assert root["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "root-untouched-refresh"
def test_write_through_is_noop_in_classic_mode(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Classic mode (profile == root) already saves to root; no double write."""
profile_path = tmp_path / "auth.json"
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_auth_file_path", lambda: profile_path)
# Classic mode: _global_auth_file_path returns None.
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_global_auth_file_path", lambda: None)
_write_store(profile_path, {"version": 1, "providers": {}})
# Should not raise and should persist to the single store.
auth._save_xai_oauth_tokens(
{"access_token": "a", "refresh_token": "r"}
)
store = _read_store(profile_path)
assert store["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "r"
def test_write_through_failure_does_not_break_profile_save(profile_and_root, monkeypatch):
"""A failed root write-through must not break the profile's own save."""
profile_path, root_path = profile_and_root
_write_store(profile_path, {"version": 1, "providers": {}})
_write_store(root_path, {"version": 1, "providers": {}})
# Make the root write blow up; the profile save must still succeed.
real_save = auth._save_auth_store
def _exploding_save(store, target_path=None):
if target_path is not None and target_path == root_path:
raise OSError("simulated root write failure")
return real_save(store, target_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_save_auth_store", _exploding_save)
auth._save_xai_oauth_tokens({"access_token": "a", "refresh_token": "r"})
profile = _read_store(profile_path)
assert profile["providers"]["xai-oauth"]["tokens"]["refresh_token"] == "r"