diff --git a/hermes_cli/web_server.py b/hermes_cli/web_server.py
index 10f20dc35ad..1d83e7d7711 100644
--- a/hermes_cli/web_server.py
+++ b/hermes_cli/web_server.py
@@ -4210,7 +4210,16 @@ def _ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
         return True
 
     parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(origin)
-    if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
+    if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
+        # Packaged Electron loads the desktop renderer over file://, so its
+        # WebSocket handshake carries a non-web Origin such as file:// or null.
+        # DNS-rebinding attacks originate from an http(s) site; they cannot
+        # forge a file:// origin and still hold the loopback session token.
+        # Public/gated binds have no legitimate non-web client, so keep
+        # rejecting these origins there.
+        return bound_host.lower() in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES
+
+    if not parsed.netloc:
         return False
 
     return _is_accepted_host(parsed.netloc, bound_host)
diff --git a/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py b/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
index 0ebed6d9519..d16c7719d1a 100644
--- a/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
+++ b/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
@@ -290,6 +290,50 @@ class TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated:
         assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is False
 
 
+class TestWsHostOriginGuardOrigins:
+    """The WS Origin guard must let the packaged desktop shell connect.
+
+    Electron loads the packaged renderer over ``file://``, so its WebSocket
+    handshake carries ``Origin: file://`` (or the opaque ``null``). The
+    DNS-rebinding guard only needs to block cross-site http(s) origins. On a
+    loopback bind these non-web origins are trusted because the session token
+    is the real gate. Public/gated binds keep rejecting them.
+    """
+
+    def _ws(self, *, origin, host):
+        ws = _fake_ws(query={}, path="/api/ws")
+        ws.headers = {"host": host, "origin": origin}
+        return ws
+
+    def test_loopback_file_origin_allowed(self, loopback_app):
+        ws = self._ws(origin="file://", host="127.0.0.1:8080")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_loopback_null_origin_allowed(self, loopback_app):
+        ws = self._ws(origin="null", host="127.0.0.1:8080")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_loopback_app_scheme_origin_allowed(self, loopback_app):
+        ws = self._ws(origin="app://hermes", host="127.0.0.1:8080")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_loopback_matching_http_origin_allowed(self, loopback_app):
+        # The dev renderer (vite) loads over http://127.0.0.1:<port>.
+        ws = self._ws(origin="http://127.0.0.1:5174", host="127.0.0.1:8080")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is True
+
+    def test_loopback_cross_site_http_origin_rejected(self, loopback_app):
+        # DNS-rebinding / cross-site: a real web attacker can only present an
+        # http(s) origin, and that must still be rejected.
+        ws = self._ws(origin="http://evil.test", host="127.0.0.1:8080")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is False
+
+    def test_gated_file_origin_rejected(self, gated_app):
+        # A public/gated bind has no legitimate file:// client.
+        ws = self._ws(origin="file://", host="fly-app.fly.dev")
+        assert web_server._ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) is False
+
+
 class TestSidecarUrl:
     def test_loopback_uses_session_token(self, loopback_app):
         url = web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch-1")