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docs: complete Daytona backend documentation coverage
Update all remaining files that enumerate terminal backends to include Daytona. Covers security docs (bypass info, backend comparison table), environment variables reference (DAYTONA_API_KEY, TERMINAL_DAYTONA_IMAGE, container resources header), AGENTS.md (architecture tree, config keys), environments/README.md, hermes_base_env.py field description, and various module docstrings. Follow-up to PR #451 merge.
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@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ All variables go in `~/.hermes/.env`. You can also set them with `hermes config
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| `HONCHO_API_KEY` | Cross-session user modeling ([honcho.dev](https://honcho.dev/)) |
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| `TINKER_API_KEY` | RL training ([tinker-console.thinkingmachines.ai](https://tinker-console.thinkingmachines.ai/)) |
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| `WANDB_API_KEY` | RL training metrics ([wandb.ai](https://wandb.ai/)) |
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| `DAYTONA_API_KEY` | Daytona cloud sandboxes ([daytona.io](https://daytona.io/)) |
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## Terminal Backend
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@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ All variables go in `~/.hermes/.env`. You can also set them with `hermes config
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| `TERMINAL_DOCKER_VOLUMES` | Additional Docker volume mounts (comma-separated `host:container` pairs) |
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| `TERMINAL_SINGULARITY_IMAGE` | Singularity image or `.sif` path |
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| `TERMINAL_MODAL_IMAGE` | Modal container image |
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| `TERMINAL_DAYTONA_IMAGE` | Daytona sandbox image |
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| `TERMINAL_TIMEOUT` | Command timeout in seconds |
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| `TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS` | Max lifetime for terminal sessions in seconds |
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| `TERMINAL_CWD` | Working directory for all terminal sessions |
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@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ All variables go in `~/.hermes/.env`. You can also set them with `hermes config
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| `TERMINAL_SSH_PORT` | SSH port (default: 22) |
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| `TERMINAL_SSH_KEY` | Path to private key |
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## Container Resources (Docker, Singularity, Modal)
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## Container Resources (Docker, Singularity, Modal, Daytona)
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| Variable | Description |
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|----------|-------------|
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Tools are functions that extend the agent's capabilities. They're organized into
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| Category | Tools | Description |
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|----------|-------|-------------|
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| **Web** | `web_search`, `web_extract` | Search the web, extract page content |
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| **Terminal** | `terminal`, `process` | Execute commands (local/docker/singularity/modal/ssh backends), manage background processes |
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| **Terminal** | `terminal`, `process` | Execute commands (local/docker/singularity/modal/daytona/ssh backends), manage background processes |
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| **File** | `read_file`, `write_file`, `patch`, `search_files` | Read, write, edit, and search files |
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| **Browser** | `browser_navigate`, `browser_click`, `browser_type`, etc. | Full browser automation via Browserbase |
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| **Vision** | `vision_analyze` | Image analysis via multimodal models |
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@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Configure CPU, memory, disk, and persistence for all container backends:
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```yaml
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terminal:
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backend: docker # or singularity, modal
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backend: docker # or singularity, modal, daytona
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container_cpu: 1 # CPU cores (default: 1)
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container_memory: 5120 # Memory in MB (default: 5GB)
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container_disk: 51200 # Disk in MB (default: 50GB)
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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ The following patterns trigger approval prompts (defined in `tools/approval.py`)
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| Fork bomb patterns | Fork bombs |
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:::info
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**Container bypass**: When running in `docker`, `singularity`, or `modal` backends, dangerous command checks are **skipped** because the container itself is the security boundary. Destructive commands inside a container can't harm the host.
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**Container bypass**: When running in `docker`, `singularity`, `modal`, or `daytona` backends, dangerous command checks are **skipped** because the container itself is the security boundary. Destructive commands inside a container can't harm the host.
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:::
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### Approval Flow (CLI)
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@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ terminal:
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- **Ephemeral mode** (`container_persistent: false`): Uses tmpfs for workspace — everything is lost on cleanup
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:::tip
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For production gateway deployments, use `docker` or `modal` backend to isolate agent commands from your host system. This eliminates the need for dangerous command approval entirely.
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For production gateway deployments, use `docker`, `modal`, or `daytona` backend to isolate agent commands from your host system. This eliminates the need for dangerous command approval entirely.
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:::
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## Terminal Backend Security Comparison
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@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ For production gateway deployments, use `docker` or `modal` backend to isolate a
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| **docker** | Container | ❌ Skipped (container is boundary) | Production gateway |
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| **singularity** | Container | ❌ Skipped | HPC environments |
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| **modal** | Cloud sandbox | ❌ Skipped | Scalable cloud isolation |
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| **daytona** | Cloud sandbox | ❌ Skipped | Persistent cloud workspaces |
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## MCP Credential Handling
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