fix(security): strip shell escapes in denylist normalizer; fail-closed on missing approval module

DANGEROUS_PATTERNS and HARDLINE_PATTERNS are matched on the raw command string,
so backslash-escape (r\m) and empty-quote split (r''m) bypass both lists.
_normalize_command_for_detection now strips these before pattern matching.

tui_gateway shell.exec had a bare 'except ImportError: pass' that silently
disabled the entire safety gate if tools.approval wasn't importable. Changed
to fail-closed (return 5001 error). Added detect_hardline_command check.

Fixes #36846, #36847.
This commit is contained in:
ashishpatel26 2026-06-06 13:31:06 +05:30 committed by Teknium
parent 1fb99b1f22
commit 621bf3a873
2 changed files with 11 additions and 2 deletions

View file

@ -537,6 +537,10 @@ def _normalize_command_for_detection(command: str) -> str:
command = command.replace('\x00', '')
# Normalize Unicode (fullwidth Latin, halfwidth Katakana, etc.)
command = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', command)
# Strip shell backslash-escapes: r\m → rm. Prevents \-injection bypass.
command = re.sub(r'\\([^\n])', r'\1', command)
# Strip empty-string literals that split tokens: r''m → rm, r""m → rm.
command = re.sub(r"''|\"\"", '', command)
return command

View file

@ -8490,15 +8490,20 @@ def _(rid, params: dict) -> dict:
if not cmd:
return _err(rid, 4004, "empty command")
try:
from tools.approval import detect_dangerous_command
from tools.approval import detect_dangerous_command, detect_hardline_command
is_hardline, hardline_desc = detect_hardline_command(cmd)
if is_hardline:
return _err(
rid, 4005, f"blocked (hardline): {hardline_desc}. Use the agent for dangerous commands."
)
is_dangerous, _, desc = detect_dangerous_command(cmd)
if is_dangerous:
return _err(
rid, 4005, f"blocked: {desc}. Use the agent for dangerous commands."
)
except ImportError:
pass
return _err(rid, 5001, "shell.exec unavailable: approval safety module not importable")
try:
r = subprocess.run(
cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, cwd=os.getcwd()