diff --git a/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py b/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py
index 29a68f07ae0..ebd3c8ddced 100644
--- a/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py
+++ b/tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ class TestYoloMode:
         assert not result["approved"]
 
     def test_dangerous_command_approved_in_yolo_mode(self, monkeypatch):
-        """With HERMES_YOLO_MODE, dangerous (non-hardline) commands are auto-approved."""
-        monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1")
+        """With HERMES_YOLO_MODE, dangerous commands are auto-approved."""
+        monkeypatch.setattr(approval_module, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", "1")
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", "test-session")
 
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ class TestYoloMode:
         assert result["message"] is None
 
     def test_yolo_mode_works_for_all_patterns(self, monkeypatch):
-        """Yolo mode bypasses dangerous patterns (except the hardline floor)."""
-        monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1")
+        """Yolo mode bypasses all dangerous patterns, not just some."""
+        monkeypatch.setattr(approval_module, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", "1")
 
         # Dangerous but recoverable — yolo should bypass.
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ class TestYoloMode:
 
     def test_combined_guard_bypasses_yolo_mode(self, monkeypatch):
         """The new combined guard should preserve yolo bypass semantics."""
-        monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "1")
+        monkeypatch.setattr(approval_module, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", "1")
 
         called = {"value": False}
diff --git a/tools/approval.py b/tools/approval.py
index 399b9d6c2d2..18b085e4786 100644
--- a/tools/approval.py
+++ b/tools/approval.py
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ from utils import env_var_enabled, is_truthy_value
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
+# Freeze YOLO mode at module import time. Reading os.environ on every call
+# would allow any skill running inside the process to set this variable and
+# instantly bypass all approval checks — a prompt-injection escalation path.
+_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN: bool = is_truthy_value(os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", ""))
+
 # Per-thread/per-task gateway session identity.
 # Gateway runs agent turns concurrently in executor threads, so reading a
 # process-global env var for session identity is racy. Keep env fallback for
@@ -344,7 +349,7 @@ DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
     # Any shell invocation via -c or combined flags like -lc, -ic, etc.
     (r'\b(bash|sh|zsh|ksh)\s+-[^\s]*c(\s+|$)', "shell command via -c/-lc flag"),
     (r'\b(python[23]?|perl|ruby|node)\s+-[ec]\s+', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
-    (r'\b(curl|wget)\b.*\|\s*(ba)?sh\b', "pipe remote content to shell"),
+    (r'\b(curl|wget)\b.*\|\s*(?:[/\w]*/)?(?:ba)?sh(?:\s|$|-c)', "pipe remote content to shell"),
     (r'\b(bash|sh|zsh|ksh)\s+<\s*<?\s*\(\s*(curl|wget)\b', "execute remote script via process substitution"),
     (rf'\btee\b.*["\']?{_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET}', "overwrite system file via tee"),
     (rf'>>?\s*["\']?{_SENSITIVE_WRITE_TARGET}', "overwrite system file via redirection"),
@@ -898,9 +903,9 @@ Respond with exactly one word: APPROVE, DENY, or ESCALATE"""
 
         answer = (response.choices[0].message.content or "").strip().upper()
 
-        if "APPROVE" in answer:
+        if answer == "APPROVE":
             return "approve"
-        elif "DENY" in answer:
+        elif answer == "DENY":
             return "deny"
         else:
             return "escalate"
@@ -940,7 +945,7 @@ def check_dangerous_command(command: str, env_type: str,
 
     # --yolo: bypass all approval prompts. Gateway /yolo is session-scoped;
     # CLI --yolo remains process-scoped via the env var for local use.
-    if is_truthy_value(os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE")) or is_current_session_yolo_enabled():
+    if _YOLO_MODE_FROZEN or is_current_session_yolo_enabled():
         return {"approved": True, "message": None}
 
     is_dangerous, pattern_key, description = detect_dangerous_command(command)
@@ -968,6 +973,11 @@ def check_dangerous_command(command: str, env_type: str,
                         "approvals.cron_mode: approve in config.yaml."
                     ),
                 }
+        logger.warning(
+            "AUTO-APPROVED dangerous command in non-interactive non-gateway context "
+            "(pattern: %s): %s — set HERMES_INTERACTIVE or HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION to require approval.",
+            description, command[:200],
+        )
         return {"approved": True, "message": None}
 
     if is_gateway or env_var_enabled("HERMES_EXEC_ASK"):
@@ -1076,7 +1086,7 @@ def check_all_command_guards(command: str, env_type: str,
     # --yolo or approvals.mode=off: bypass all approval prompts.
     # Gateway /yolo is session-scoped; CLI --yolo remains process-scoped.
     approval_mode = _get_approval_mode()
-    if is_truthy_value(os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE")) or is_current_session_yolo_enabled() or approval_mode == "off":
+    if _YOLO_MODE_FROZEN or is_current_session_yolo_enabled() or approval_mode == "off":
         return {"approved": True, "message": None}
 
     is_cli = env_var_enabled("HERMES_INTERACTIVE")