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fix(codex): detect leaked tool-call text in assistant content (#15347)
gpt-5.x on the Codex Responses API sometimes degenerates and emits
Harmony-style `to=functions.<name> {json}` serialization as plain
assistant-message text instead of a structured `function_call` item.
The intent never makes it into `response.output` as a function_call,
so `tool_calls` is empty and `_normalize_codex_response()` returns
the leaked text as the final content. Downstream (e.g. delegate_task),
this surfaces as a confident-looking summary with `tool_trace: []`
because no tools actually ran — the Taiwan-embassy-email bug report.
Detect the pattern, scrub the content, and return finish_reason=
'incomplete' so the existing Codex-incomplete continuation path
(run_agent.py:11331, 3 retries) gets a chance to re-elicit a proper
function_call item. Encrypted reasoning items are preserved so the
model keeps its chain-of-thought on the retry.
Regression tests: leaked text triggers incomplete, real tool calls
alongside leak-looking text are preserved, clean responses pass
through unchanged.
Reported on Discord (gpt-5.4 / openai-codex).
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@ -23,6 +23,23 @@ from agent.prompt_builder import DEFAULT_AGENT_IDENTITY
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Matches Codex/Harmony tool-call serialization that occasionally leaks into
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# assistant-message content when the model fails to emit a structured
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# ``function_call`` item. Accepts the common forms:
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#
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# to=functions.exec_command
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# assistant to=functions.exec_command
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# <|channel|>commentary to=functions.exec_command
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#
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# ``to=functions.<name>`` is the stable marker — the optional ``assistant`` or
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# Harmony channel prefix varies by degeneration mode. Case-insensitive to
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# cover lowercase/uppercase ``assistant`` variants.
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_TOOL_CALL_LEAK_PATTERN = re.compile(
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r"(?:^|[\s>|])to=functions\.[A-Za-z_][\w.]*",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Multimodal content helpers
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@ -787,6 +804,37 @@ def _normalize_codex_response(response: Any) -> tuple[Any, str]:
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if isinstance(out_text, str):
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final_text = out_text.strip()
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# ── Tool-call leak recovery ──────────────────────────────────
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# gpt-5.x on the Codex Responses API sometimes degenerates and emits
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# what should be a structured `function_call` item as plain assistant
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# text using the Harmony/Codex serialization (``to=functions.foo
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# {json}`` or ``assistant to=functions.foo {json}``). The model
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# intended to call a tool, but the intent never made it into
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# ``response.output`` as a ``function_call`` item, so ``tool_calls``
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# is empty here. If we pass this through, the parent sees a
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# confident-looking summary with no audit trail (empty ``tool_trace``)
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# and no tools actually ran — the Taiwan-embassy-email incident.
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#
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# Detection: leaked tokens always contain ``to=functions.<name>`` and
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# the assistant message has no real tool calls. Treat it as incomplete
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# so the existing Codex-incomplete continuation path (3 retries,
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# handled in run_agent.py) gets a chance to re-elicit a proper
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# ``function_call`` item. The existing loop already handles message
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# append, dedup, and retry budget.
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leaked_tool_call_text = False
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if final_text and not tool_calls and _TOOL_CALL_LEAK_PATTERN.search(final_text):
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leaked_tool_call_text = True
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logger.warning(
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"Codex response contains leaked tool-call text in assistant content "
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"(no structured function_call items). Treating as incomplete so the "
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"continuation path can re-elicit a proper tool call. Leaked snippet: %r",
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final_text[:300],
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)
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# Clear the text so downstream code doesn't surface the garbage as
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# a summary. The encrypted reasoning items (if any) are preserved
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# so the model keeps its chain-of-thought on the retry.
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final_text = ""
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assistant_message = SimpleNamespace(
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content=final_text,
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tool_calls=tool_calls,
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@ -798,6 +846,8 @@ def _normalize_codex_response(response: Any) -> tuple[Any, str]:
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if tool_calls:
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finish_reason = "tool_calls"
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elif leaked_tool_call_text:
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finish_reason = "incomplete"
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elif has_incomplete_items or (saw_commentary_phase and not saw_final_answer_phase):
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finish_reason = "incomplete"
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elif reasoning_items_raw and not final_text:
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