fix(credential-pool): stop lost-update cooldown erasure and wrong-key quarantine

Two related races in credential-pool cooldown state:

1. Lost update across processes: write_credential_pool merged only
   entries missing from the caller's snapshot; for entries present on
   both sides the caller's in-memory copy won wholesale. A process
   holding a snapshot taken before another process marked a key
   exhausted would, on its next persist (e.g. a round-robin rotation),
   write the key back as healthy — erasing the cooldown so every
   process resumes hammering a rate-limited key. Merge status fields by
   last_status_at recency: adopt the on-disk status only when it is
   strictly newer AND still binding (DEAD, or EXHAUSTED with an
   unexpired cooldown), and never onto re-authed (token-changed)
   entries, so legitimate expiry-clears and fresh logins are preserved.

2. Wrong-key quarantine: when mark_exhausted_and_rotate received an
   api_key_hint that matched no entry, it fell through to
   current()/_select_unlocked() — on a freshly loaded pool that selects
   the NEXT healthy key and benches it for the full cooldown TTL,
   punishing an innocent credential. When a hint is provided but
   unmatched, rotate without marking anything instead of guessing.

Includes regression tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Blade 2026-07-16 12:55:33 -04:00 committed by Teknium
parent fdd3943cb1
commit 3d67f00fe1
4 changed files with 276 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -1760,6 +1760,20 @@ class CredentialPool:
(e for e in self._entries if e.runtime_api_key == api_key_hint),
None,
)
if entry is None:
# The failed key is identifiable but matches no entry
# (rotated away, or a wrapper whose runtime key differs).
# Falling through to current()/_select_unlocked() would
# mark an INNOCENT healthy key exhausted for the full
# cooldown TTL. Don't guess — just hand back a fresh
# selection so the caller can retry.
logger.info(
"credential pool: failed key hint matched no %s entry; "
"rotating without marking any credential exhausted",
self.provider,
)
self._current_id = None
return self._select_unlocked()
if entry is None:
entry = self.current() or self._select_unlocked()
if entry is None:

View file

@ -1447,6 +1447,73 @@ def read_credential_pool(provider_id: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return list(global_entries) if isinstance(global_entries, list) else []
_POOL_STATUS_FIELDS = (
"last_status",
"last_status_at",
"last_error_code",
"last_error_reason",
"last_error_message",
"last_error_reset_at",
)
def _merge_disk_cooldown_state(
entry: Dict[str, Any],
disk_entry: Optional[Dict[str, Any]],
provider_id: str,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Keep a newer on-disk cooldown/quarantine over a stale in-memory one.
``write_credential_pool`` callers persist an in-memory snapshot that may
predate another process marking the same credential exhausted or dead
(last-writer-wins lost update). Without this merge, process B's later
rewrite resurrects a rate-limited key as healthy and both processes
resume hammering it. Adopt the on-disk status fields only when they are
strictly more recent (by ``last_status_at``) AND still binding a DEAD
marker, or an EXHAUSTED cooldown that has not yet expired. Expired
cooldowns are not resurrected, so the pool's own expiry-clear (which
resets ``last_status_at`` to None) is never overridden.
"""
if not isinstance(disk_entry, dict):
return entry
try:
from agent.credential_pool import (
PooledCredential,
STATUS_DEAD,
STATUS_EXHAUSTED,
_exhausted_until,
_parse_absolute_timestamp,
)
disk_status = disk_entry.get("last_status")
if disk_status not in (STATUS_DEAD, STATUS_EXHAUSTED):
return entry
# A token change means the caller re-authed/refreshed this entry and
# intentionally cleared its status (e.g. _sync_codex_entry_from_
# auth_store after a fresh device-code login) — never resurrect the
# old cooldown onto fresh credentials.
mem_access = entry.get("access_token") or ""
disk_access = disk_entry.get("access_token") or ""
if mem_access and disk_access and mem_access != disk_access:
return entry
disk_ts = _parse_absolute_timestamp(disk_entry.get("last_status_at")) or 0.0
mem_ts = _parse_absolute_timestamp(entry.get("last_status_at")) or 0.0
if disk_ts <= mem_ts:
return entry
if disk_status == STATUS_EXHAUSTED:
until = _exhausted_until(
PooledCredential.from_dict(provider_id, disk_entry)
)
if until is None or until <= time.time():
return entry
merged_entry = dict(entry)
for status_field in _POOL_STATUS_FIELDS:
merged_entry[status_field] = disk_entry.get(status_field)
return merged_entry
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - best-effort merge
return entry
def write_credential_pool(
provider_id: str,
entries: List[Dict[str, Any]],
@ -1464,6 +1531,10 @@ def write_credential_pool(
the caller loaded its in-memory snapshot; without this merge a later
rotation/exhaustion rewrite drops the concurrent credential.
For entries present on BOTH sides, status fields are merged by
``last_status_at`` recency via ``_merge_disk_cooldown_state`` so a stale
snapshot cannot erase a cooldown/quarantine another process just wrote.
Pass ``removed_ids`` for entries the caller intentionally removed, so the
merge does not resurrect them from the on-disk copy.
"""
@ -1481,12 +1552,24 @@ def write_credential_pool(
]
existing = pool.get(provider_id)
existing_list = existing if isinstance(existing, list) else []
existing_by_id = {
entry.get("id"): entry
for entry in existing_list
if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("id")
}
new_ids = {
entry.get("id")
for entry in sanitized_entries
if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("id")
}
merged: List[Dict[str, Any]] = list(sanitized_entries)
merged: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [
_merge_disk_cooldown_state(
entry, existing_by_id.get(entry.get("id")), provider_id
)
if isinstance(entry, dict)
else entry
for entry in sanitized_entries
]
for disk_entry in existing_list:
if not isinstance(disk_entry, dict):
continue

View file

@ -443,6 +443,67 @@ def test_billing_rotation_marks_all_entries_sharing_failed_key(tmp_path, monkeyp
assert statuses["cred-model-config"] == STATUS_EXHAUSTED
def test_unmatched_api_key_hint_rotates_without_benching_innocent_key(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""An api_key_hint matching no entry must not quarantine a healthy key.
Regression: when the hint was unmatched (key rotated away, or a wrapper
whose runtime key differs), mark_exhausted_and_rotate fell through to
current()/_select_unlocked() on a freshly loaded pool that selects the
NEXT healthy key and benched it for the full cooldown TTL, punishing an
innocent credential. Now it rotates without marking anything.
"""
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / "hermes"))
_write_auth_store(
tmp_path,
{
"version": 1,
"credential_pool": {
"anthropic": [
{
"id": "cred-1",
"label": "primary",
"auth_type": "api_key",
"priority": 0,
"source": "manual",
"access_token": "sk-ant-api-primary",
},
{
"id": "cred-2",
"label": "secondary",
"auth_type": "api_key",
"priority": 1,
"source": "manual",
"access_token": "sk-ant-api-secondary",
},
]
},
},
)
from agent.credential_pool import load_pool, STATUS_DEAD, STATUS_EXHAUSTED
# Freshly loaded pool: current() is None, exactly the shape of the bug.
pool = load_pool("anthropic")
next_entry = pool.mark_exhausted_and_rotate(
status_code=429,
api_key_hint="sk-ant-api-rotated-away",
)
# A fresh selection is still handed back so the caller can retry...
assert next_entry is not None
# ...but no credential was benched, in memory or on disk.
assert all(
entry.last_status not in (STATUS_EXHAUSTED, STATUS_DEAD)
for entry in pool.entries()
)
auth_payload = json.loads((tmp_path / "hermes" / "auth.json").read_text())
for persisted in auth_payload["credential_pool"]["anthropic"]:
assert persisted.get("last_status") not in (STATUS_EXHAUSTED, STATUS_DEAD)
assert persisted.get("last_error_code") is None
def test_token_invalidated_marks_credential_dead(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""OpenAI Codex token_invalidated must mark the credential DEAD, not exhausted.

View file

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ authenticated only at the global root.
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import time
from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
@ -519,3 +520,119 @@ def test_auth_lock_reentrancy_is_scoped_after_profile_context_switch(profile_env
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
assert getattr(holder_a, "depth", 0) == 0
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# write_credential_pool — stale-snapshot cooldown merge
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture()
def classic_env(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Classic single-root layout (HERMES_HOME != ~/.hermes, no profiles)."""
fake_home = tmp_path / "home"
fake_home.mkdir()
monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "home", lambda: fake_home)
hermes_home = tmp_path / "classic"
hermes_home.mkdir()
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
return hermes_home
def _pool_entry(**overrides) -> dict:
entry = {
"id": "cred-x",
"label": "key-x",
"auth_type": "api_key",
"priority": 0,
"source": "manual",
"access_token": "sk-x",
}
entry.update(overrides)
return entry
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"disk_status,error_code",
[("exhausted", 429), ("dead", 401)],
)
def test_write_pool_stale_snapshot_keeps_newer_disk_cooldown(
classic_env, disk_status, error_code,
):
"""A stale healthy snapshot must not erase a newer binding cooldown.
Process A benches a key (EXHAUSTED with an unexpired cooldown, or DEAD);
process B persists a snapshot taken *before* that. The on-disk status is
strictly newer and still binding, so it must survive the rewrite instead
of the key being resurrected as healthy.
"""
from hermes_cli.auth import write_credential_pool
benched_at = time.time() - 60 # newer than the snapshot, cooldown unexpired
_write(classic_env / "auth.json", _make_auth_store(pool={
"openrouter": [_pool_entry(
last_status=disk_status,
last_status_at=benched_at,
last_error_code=error_code,
)],
}))
# Stale in-memory snapshot: same entry, still healthy (no status fields).
write_credential_pool("openrouter", [_pool_entry()])
data = json.loads((classic_env / "auth.json").read_text())
persisted = data["credential_pool"]["openrouter"][0]
assert persisted["last_status"] == disk_status
assert persisted["last_status_at"] == benched_at
assert persisted["last_error_code"] == error_code
def test_write_pool_expired_disk_cooldown_is_not_resurrected(classic_env):
"""An expired on-disk cooldown is NOT re-adopted onto the snapshot.
The pool's own expiry-clear (and any caller that legitimately observed
the cooldown lapse) must win: only still-binding cooldowns are merged.
"""
from hermes_cli.auth import write_credential_pool
_write(classic_env / "auth.json", _make_auth_store(pool={
"openrouter": [_pool_entry(
last_status="exhausted",
last_status_at=time.time() - 90_000, # far past the 1h 429 TTL
last_error_code=429,
)],
}))
write_credential_pool("openrouter", [_pool_entry()])
data = json.loads((classic_env / "auth.json").read_text())
persisted = data["credential_pool"]["openrouter"][0]
assert persisted.get("last_status") != "exhausted"
assert persisted.get("last_error_code") is None
def test_write_pool_never_merges_cooldown_onto_reauthed_entry(classic_env):
"""A token change means re-auth: the old cooldown must never carry over.
A fresh login intentionally clears the entry's status; resurrecting the
stale cooldown onto the new credentials would bench a just-authorized key.
"""
from hermes_cli.auth import write_credential_pool
_write(classic_env / "auth.json", _make_auth_store(pool={
"openrouter": [_pool_entry(
access_token="sk-old",
last_status="exhausted",
last_status_at=time.time() - 60, # newer AND unexpired
last_error_code=429,
)],
}))
# Same entry id, freshly re-authed with a new token and cleared status.
write_credential_pool("openrouter", [_pool_entry(access_token="sk-new")])
data = json.loads((classic_env / "auth.json").read_text())
persisted = data["credential_pool"]["openrouter"][0]
assert persisted["access_token"] == "sk-new"
assert persisted.get("last_status") != "exhausted"
assert persisted.get("last_error_code") is None